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About 
This textbook anthology was created using an Online Educational 
Resource Grant from the University of Northern Colorado for the 
explicit purpose of teaching ENG 345: Literary Theory and Criticism 
in Fall 2019. The goal in creating this OER textbook was to help 
students reduce print textbook costs. Use of this textbook resulted 
in savings of $2500 total or ~$100 per student. Total savings was 
calculated by multiplying the price of the previously-assigned 
traditional print textbook for this class by the number of students in 
the class. 
This textbook anthology benefits students by providing them with 
completely free, electronically accessible, efficiently organized, and 
reasonably edited versions of texts that I regularly teach at the 
University of Northern Colorado. The previously-assigned print 
anthology is over 2800 pages long, weighs 6 pounds, and is printed 
on extremely thin paper that makes the pages difficult to turn and 
read. Because of time constraints, my classes would normally read 
only about 15-30% of the print anthology in a fifteen-week course, 
meaning that introductory students were being asked to purchase 
and carry around an expensive, heavy textbook that contained 
much more material than they needed. This OER anthology contains 
half of the material I assigned from the print anthology as well as 
free texts that are not included in the print anthology and that I 
used to provide through links to free, decentralized content or for 
sale in a printed coursepack. 
Certainly, there are drawbacks to using this anthology over the 
traditional print textbook. Because I was limited to material in the 
public domain, only early texts in literary theory and criticism are 
compiled here. To make up for this, later texts from freely available 
scholarly journals and library-owned eBooks were used to 
supplement this anthology in the pilot course. Secondly, though I 
have created unit headnotes, glossary terms, translations, and 
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footnotes, this anthology lacks the expertise of the traditional print 
textbook. Finally, the anthology is still a work in progress; it is not 
polished or professionally edited. These drawbacks were weighed 
against student frustration with both the cost and heft of the 
previously-assigned print textbook. Though students (and I) found 
these and other drawbacks in using an OER textbook, 100% of 
students surveyed at the end of the semester responded that they 
found the benefits outweighed the drawbacks, that they would 
prefer to use this textbook again over a traditional textbook, and 
that they would like to see more OER resources used in the future. 
This anthology was created by importing, correcting, and editing 
source texts that are freely available and in the public domain. 
Though I tried to choose the most well-regarded and accessible 
free translations, for the most part these translations should not 
be considered authoritative, standard, or preferred. The textbook is 
a work in progress and will continue to be updated and corrected 
for use in future courses. Because of the limitations of Pressbooks, 
some features appearing in the webbook will be absent from eBook 
and PDF versions of this anthology. For example, the interactive 
glossary terms available in the webbook will not appear in eBook 
or PDF versions. In eBook and PDF versions, glossary terms are in 
bold and appear in a list at the end of the anthology. There are also 
formatting problems and bugs visible in eBook and PDF versions. 
For the best reading experience, the webbook is recommended. 
As part of the pilot course and as an assignment, students 
contributed to the textbook by checking portions of texts against 
the original sources as well as researching words, phrases, and 
concepts that they found perplexing or thought might be perplexing 
to a college student who had never encountered literary theory 
or criticism. They also created explanatory notes based on their 
research and rhetorical assessment of the imagined audience. In 
some cases, the notes produced were so well done and useful that I 
have retained them, noting the student author. All students named 
below acted in the role of editorial assistants and are contributors 
to this textbook: Michael Barrientos, Chesley Bond, Madeline 
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Campbell, Mark Fenton, Alyssa Fleck, Chloe Groom, Katrina Jeude, 
Mikal Keihl, Emily King, Alexandra Lasater, Andrea Livo, Austin 
Macy, Colin McGuire, Taylor Planchon, Blake Roberts, Elijah Solt, 
Brenna Timm, Joshua Wiggins, and Taylor Zangari. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all headnotes, footnotes, glossary 
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PART I 
PART ONE: CLASSICISM 
AND NEO-CLASSICISM 
Many ideas in Western literary theory about what literature is, what 
it should be, or what it should do, can be traced back to a time 
before the term “literature” even existed. The texts in this unit raise 
questions we are still asking today. If you have ever questioned 
literature’s cultural value or the value of federally funding the 
humanities, you are asking what Plato was asking: Does reading 
literature benefit the public? 
As we will see in the excerpts from the Republic, Plato’s answer 
is “no.” In fact, for Plato (429-347 BCE), what came to be called 
literature threatened the “safety of the city” within the minds of 
citizens. Poetry was dangerous because it imitated the material 
world through mimēsis (imitation), which Plato saw as already an 
imitation of the world of Ideas or Forms. Plato’s student, Aristotle 
(384-322 BCE), thought differently. Aristotle applied the Ancient 
Greek term poiêsis (“making”) to dramatic, epic, and lyric poetry. 
For him, mimēsis was natural and when used to create literary 
representations, it could be beneficial. 
In Ars Poetica, the Roman writer Horace (65-27 BCE) answers the 
question “What makes good poetry?” Many years later, Alexander 
Pope turned to Horace’s guidelines for creating good poetry to 
produce his own. Interestingly, he did this by imitating Horace; he 
used mimēsis to make an argument for the benefits of mimēsis. 
 
–Molly Desjardins 
Part One: Classicism and
Neo-Classicism  |  1

1. Plato - from The Republic 
(On the Allegory of the Cave) 
Plato - from The Republic (On the




[Socrates, to Glaucon] And now, I said, let me show in a figure how 
far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened — Behold! human 
beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open 
1. Plato's texts are in the literary form of the dialogue [Gk. 
dialogus]. In Plato’s dialogues truth [Gk. aletheia] is 
reached through [Gk. dia] the exercise of reason [Gk. 
logos] through question and answer. Aristotle also called 
Plato’s dialogues “Socratic discourses [σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι]” 
because they are written records (real or imagined) of 
the dialogues between Socrates and his students (e.g. 
Glaucon). The Socratic method [Gk. elenchus] uses the 
pedagogical strategy of logical refutation through 
question and answer where Socrates sometimes 
pretends not to know the answer to his questions in 
order to guide his students toward truth through the 
process of their own reasoning. This pretended 
ignorance has been called "Socratic irony." If it is difficult 
to tell who is speaking, in general Socrates is the one 
asking the questions and Glaucon is the one answering 
them. Socrates begins speaking in this excerpt, then 
Glaucon responds. The majority of the dialogue 
proceeds like this. 
4  |  Plato - from The Republic (On the Allegory of the Cave)
towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have 
been from their  childhood, and have their legs and necks chained 
so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being 
prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above 
and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the 
fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if 
you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which 
marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the 
puppets. Steph 514 a b 
[Glaucon] I see. 
And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all 
sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood 
and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some 
of them are talking, others silent. 515 a 
You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange 
prisoners. 
Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or 
the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite 
wall of the cave? 
True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they 
were never allowed to move their heads?b  
And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they 
would only see the shadows? 
Yes, he said. 
And if they were able to converse with one another, would they 
not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?2 
Very true. 
And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came 
from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of 
the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the 
passing shadow? 
2. Reading παρόντα. [Jowett] 
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No question, he replied. 
To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the 
shadows of the images. c 
That is certain. 
And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the 
prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when 
any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and 
turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will 
suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable 
to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the 
shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he 
saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching 
nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, 
he has a clearer vision,– what will be his reply? And you may further 
imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass 
and requiring him to name them, — will he not be perplexed? Will 
he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than 
the objects which are now shown to him? d 
Far truer. 
And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have 
a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take and take in 
the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to 
be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to 
him? e 
True, he said. 
And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep 
and rugged ascent, and held fast until he’s forced into the presence 
of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When 
he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be 
able to see anything at all of what are now called realities. 516 a 
Not all in a moment, he said. 
He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper 
world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections 
of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects 
themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the 
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stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars 
by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day? b 
Certainly. 
Last of he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of 
him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and 
not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is. 
Certainly. 
He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season 
and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, 
and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows 
have been accustomed to behold? c 
Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about 
him. 
And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of 
the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would 
felicitate himself on the change, and pity them? 
Certainly, he would. 
And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among 
themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing 
shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which 
followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore 
best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he 
would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of 
them? Would he not say with Homer, 
“Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,” 
and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after 
their manner? d 
Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than 
entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner. e 
Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of 
the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain 
to have his eyes full of darkness? 
To be sure, he said. 
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring 
the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the 
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den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become 
steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new 
habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be 
ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he 
came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of 
ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to 
the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him 
to death. 517 a 
No question, he said. 
This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, 
to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, 
the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if 
you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into 
the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your 
desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, 
whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge 
the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; 
and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all 
things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light 
in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth 
in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who 
would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye 
fixed. b c 
I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you. 
Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to 
this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for 
their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they 
desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory 
may be trusted. d 
Yes, very natural. 
And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine 
contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a 
ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has 
become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled 
to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or 
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the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the 
conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice? e 
Anything but surprising, he replied. 
Any one who has common sense will remember that the 
bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two 
causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the 
light, which is true of the mind’s eye, quite as much as of the bodily 
eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision 
is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask 
whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is 
unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned 
from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will 
count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will 
pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes 
from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in 
the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light 
into the den. 518 a b 
That, he said, is a very just distinction. 
But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be 
wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul 
which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes. c 
They undoubtedly say this, he replied. 
Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of 
learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was 
unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so 
too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of 
the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of 
being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the 
brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good. d 
Very true. 
And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in 
the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, 
for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, 
and is looking away from the truth? 
Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed. 
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And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be 
akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate 
they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of 
wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which 
always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and 
profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never 
observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a 
clever rogue — how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the 
way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is 
forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion 
to his cleverness. e 519 a 
Very true, he said. 
But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the 
days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual 
pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, 
were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down 
and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below–-
if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned 
in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have 
seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to 
now. b 
Very likely. 
Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely. or rather 
a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the 
uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never 
make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State; not 
the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule 
of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because 
they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they 
are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest. c 
Very true, he replied. 
Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State 
will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we 
have already shown to be the greatest of all — they must continue to 
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ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended 
and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now. d 
What do you mean? 
I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be 
allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners 
in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they 
are worth having or not. 
But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, 
when they might have a better? 
You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the 
legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State 
happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, 
and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, 
making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of 
one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, 
but to be his instruments in binding up the State. e 520 a 
… 
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2. Plato - from Republic 
(Book 3) 
Such then, I said, are our principles of theology — some tales are 
to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their 
youth upwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their 
parents, and to value friendship with one another.Steph. 386 a 
Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said. 
But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons 
besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear 
of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in 
him?b 
Certainly not, he said. 
And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle 
rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be 
real and terrible? 
Impossible. 
Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class 
of tales as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to 
revile but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them 
that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future 
warriors. 
That will be our duty, he said. 
Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, 
beginning with the verses, 
 
“I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man 
than rule over all the dead who have come to nought”1 
1. [Homer's] Od[yssey]. xi. 498 
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We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared, 
 
“Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should 




“O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly 
form but no mind at all!”3 
 
Again of Tiresias:— 
 
“[To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,] that he 




“The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her 




2. [Homer's] Il[iad]. xx. 64. 
3. Il. xxiii. 103. 
4. Od. x. 495. 
5. Il. xvi. 856. 
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“As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has 
dropped out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and 
cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as 
they moved.”7 
 
And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry 
if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they are 
unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but because the 
greater the poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for the 
ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear 
slavery more than death. 
Undoubtedly. 
Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names 
which describe the world below — Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under 
the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the 
very mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost soul of 
him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not 
have a use of some kind; but there is a danger that the nerves of our 
guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them. 
There is a real danger, he said. 
Then we must have no more of them. 
True. 
Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us. 
6. Ib[id]. xxiii. 100. 
7. Od. xxiv. 6. 
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Clearly. 
And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of 
famous men? 
They will go with the rest. 
But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle 
is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other 
good man who is his comrade. 
Yes; that is our principle. 
And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though 
he had suffered anything terrible? 
He will not. 
Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself 
and his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men. 
True, he said. 
And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation 
of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible. 
Assuredly. 
And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with 
the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall 
him. 
Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another. 
Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous 
men, and making them over to women (and not even to women who 
are good for anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are 
being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn 
to do the like. 
That will be very right. 
Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not 
to depict Achilles,8 who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his 
side, then on his back, and then on his face; then starting up and 
sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking 
8. Il. xxiv. 10. 
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the sooty ashes in both his hands9 and pouring them over his head, 
or weeping and wailing in the various modes which Homer has 
delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods 
as praying and beseeching, 
 
“Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name.”10 
 
Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to 
introduce the gods lamenting and saying, 
 
“Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow.”11 
 
But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so 
completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him 
say— 
 
“O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine 




“Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, 
subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius.”13 
9. Ib. xviii. 23. 
10. Ib. xxii. 414. 
11. Il. xviii. 54. 
12. Ib. xxii. 168. 
13. Ib. xvi. 433. 
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For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such 
unworthy representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them 
as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being 
but a man, can be dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he 
rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do 
the like. And instead of having any shame or self-control, he will be 
always whining and lamenting on slight occasions. 
Yes, he said, that is most true. 
Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the 
argument has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide 
until it is disproved by a better. 
It ought not to be. 
Neither are the guardians to be encouraged to laugh by the 
example of the gods.Neither ought our guardians to be given to 
laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess 
almost always produces a violent reaction. 
So I believe. 
Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be 
represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a 
representation of the gods be allowed. 
Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied. 
Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the 
gods as that of Homer when he describes how 
 
“Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when 
they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion.”14 
 
On your views, we must not admit them. 
14. Ib. i. 599. 
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On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not 
admit them is certain. 
Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie 
is useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then 
the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private 
individuals have no business with them. 
Clearly not, he said. 
Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers 
of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either 
with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for 
the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of 
the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private 
man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault 
than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak 
the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the 
trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about 
the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things are going with 
himself or his fellow sailors. 
Most true, he said. 
If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the 
State, 
 
“Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or 
carpenter,”15 
 
he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally 
subversive and destructive of ship or State. 
15. Od. xvii. 383 sq[equiturque, Latin, meaning "and the one 
(line) that follows"] 
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Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried 
out.16 
 In the next place our youth must be temperate? 
Certainly. 
Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, 
obedience to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures? 
True. 
Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in 
Homer, 
 
“Friend, sit still and obey my word,”17 
 
and the verses which follow, 
 
“The Greeks marched breathing prowess,”18 
. . . in silent awe of their leaders,”19 
 
and other sentiments of the same kind. 
We shall. 
What of this line, 
 
“O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a 
stag,”20 
 
16. Or, "if his words are accompanied by actions." 
17. Il. iv. 412. 
18. Od. iii. 8. 
19. Ib. iv. 431. 
20. Ib. i. 225. 
Plato - from Republic (Book 3)  |  19
and of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any 
similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to 
address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill 
spoken? 
They are ill spoken. 
They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not 
conduce to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to 
our young men — you would agree with me there? 
Yes. 
And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his 
opinion is more glorious than 
 
“When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer 
carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into 
the cups,”21 
 
is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such 
words? Or the verse 
 
“The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?”22 
 
What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods 
and men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising 
plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so 
completely overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go 
into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that 
he had never been in such a state of rapture before, even when they 
first met one another 
21. Ib. ix. 8. 
22. Ib. xii. 342. 
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“Without the knowledge of their parents;”23 
 
or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings 
on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite?24 
Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear 
that sort of thing. 
The opposite strain of endurance.But any deeds of endurance 
which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and 
hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses, 
 
“He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, 
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!”25 
 
Certainly, he said. 
In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or 
lovers of money. 
Certainly not. 
Neither must we sing to them of 
 
“Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings.”26 
 
Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or 
deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that 
23. Il. xiv. 281. 
24. Od. viii. 266. 
25. Ib. xx. 17. 
26. Quoted by Suidas as attributed to Hesiod. 
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he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them;27 but that 
without a gift he should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we 
believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to have been such a lover 
of money that he took Agamemnon’s gifts, or that when he had 
received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that 
without payment he was unwilling to do so.28 
Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be 
approved. 
Loving Homer as I do,29 I hardly like to say that in attributing 
these feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly 
attributed to him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I 
believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says, 
 
“Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of 
deities. Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power;”30 
 
or his insubordination to the river-god,31The impious behavior of 
Achilles to Apollo and the river-gods; his cruelty. on whose divinity 
he is ready to lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his 
own hair,32 which had been previously dedicated to the other 
river-god Spercheius, and that he actually performed this vow; or 
that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus,33 and 
slaughtered the captives at the pyre;34 of all this I cannot believe 
27. Il. ix. 515. 
28. Ib. xxiv. 175. 
29. Cf.[Latin confer, meaning "see also"] infra [below], x. 595. 
30. Il. xxii. 15 sq. 
31. Ib. xxi. 130, 223 sq. 
32. Il. xxiii. 151. 
33. b. xxii. 394. 
34. Ib. xxiii. 175. 
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that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe 
that he, the wise Cheiron’s pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus 
who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was 
so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two 
seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by 
avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men. 
You are quite right, he replied. 
And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the 
tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going 
forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero 
or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as 
they falsely ascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel 
the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them, 
or that they were not the sons of gods; — both in the same breath 
they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying 
to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and 
that heroes are no better than men — sentiments which, as we were 
saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have already proved that 
evil cannot come from the gods. 
Assuredly not. 
And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear 
them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is 
convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated 
by— 
 
“The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral 
altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,” 
 
and who have 
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“the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins.”35 
 
And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender 
laxity of morals among the young. 
By all means, he replied. 
But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or 
are not to be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted 
by us. The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the 
world below should be treated has been already laid down. 
Very true. 
And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining 
portion of our subject. 
Clearly so. 
But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, 
my friend. 
Why not? 
Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men 
poets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest 
misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, 
and the good miserable; and that injustice is profitable when 
undetected, but that justice is a man’s own loss and another’s gain 
— these things we shall forbid them to utter, and command them to 
sing and say the opposite. 
To be sure we shall, he replied. 
*** 
All notes written by Benjamin Jowett with clarifications added. 
35. From the Niobe of Aeschylus. 
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3. Plato - from Republic 
(Book 10) 
*** 
Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, 
there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule 
about poetry. Steph 595 a 
To what do you refer? 
To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to 
be received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul 
have been distinguished.b 
What do you mean? 
Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words 
repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe — but 
I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous 
to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their 
true nature is the only antidote to them. 
Explain the purport of your remark. 
Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth 
had an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words 
falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole 
of that charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced 
more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out.c 
Very good, he said. 
Listen to me then, or rather, answer me. 
Put your question. 
Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know. 
A likely thing, then, that I should know. 
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Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the 
keener.596a 
Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint 
notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire 
yourself? 
Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: 
Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we 
assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form — do you 
understand me? 
I do. 
Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the 
world — plenty of them, are there not?b 
Yes. 
But there are only two ideas or forms of them — one the idea of a 
bed, the other of a table. 
True. 
And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a 
table for our use, in accordance with the idea — that is our way of 
speaking in this and similar instances — but no artificer makes the 
ideas themselves: how could he? 
Impossible. 
And there is another artist, — I should like to know what you 
would say of him. 
Who is he?c 
One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen. 
What an extraordinary man! 
Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. 
For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, 
but plants and animals, himself and all other things — the earth and 
heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he 
makes the gods also. 
He must be a wizard and no mistake.d 
Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no 
such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker 
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of all these things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way 
in which you could make them all yourself? 
What way? 
An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the 
feat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than 
that of turning a mirror round and round — you would soon enough 
make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other 
animals and plants, and all the other things of which we were just 
now speaking, in the mirror.e 
Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only. 
Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the 
painter too is, as I conceive, just such another — a creator of 
appearances, is he not? 
Of course. 
But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And 
yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed? 
Yes, he said, but not a real bed. 
And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he 
too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence 
of the bed, but only a particular bed?597a 
Yes, I did. 
Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true 
existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if any one 
were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other 
workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be 
speaking the truth. 
At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not 
speaking the truth. 
No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of 
truth. 
No wonder.b 
Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we 
enquire who this imitator is? 
If you please. 
Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is 
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made by God, as I think that we may say — for no one else can be the 
maker? 
No. 
There is another which is the work of the carpenter? 
Yes. 
And the work of the painter is a third? 
Yes. 
Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who 
superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter? 
Yes, there are three of them. 
God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in 
nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have 
been nor ever will be made by God.c 
Why is that? 
Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear 
behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that 
would be the ideal bed and not the two others. 
Very true, he said. 
God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, 
not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created 
a bed which is essentially and by nature one only.d 
So we believe. 
Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the 
bed? 
Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He 
is the author of this and of all other things. 
And what shall we say of the carpenter — is not he also the maker 
of the bed? 
Yes. 
But would you call the painter a creator and maker? 
Certainly not. 
Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed? 
I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of 
that which the others make. 
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Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from 
nature an imitator? 
Certainly, he said. 
And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other 
imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth? 
That appears to be so. 
Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the 
painter? — I would like to know whether he may be thought to 
imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations 
of artists?598 
The latter. 
As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this. 
What do you mean? 
whose art is one of imitation or appearance and a long way 
removed from the truth.I mean, that you may look at a bed from 
different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point 
of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference 
in reality. And the same of all things. 
Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent. 
Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting 
designed to be — an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear 
— of appearance or of reality?b 
Of appearance. 
Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all 
things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that 
part an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, 
or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he 
is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he 
shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will 
fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.c 
Certainly. 
And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who 
knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every 
single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man 
— whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to 
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be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some 
wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing, 
because he himself was unable to analyze the nature of knowledge 
and ignorance and imitation.d 
Most true. 
And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and 
Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, 
virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet 
cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who 
has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider 
whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they 
may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they 
may not have remembered when they saw their works that these 
were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily 
be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are 
appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the 
right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to 
the many to speak so well?e 599 
The question, he said, should by all means be considered. 
He who could make the original would not make the image.Now 
do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as 
well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image — 
making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle 
of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him?b 
I should say not. 
The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be 
interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to 
leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of 
being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of 
them. 
Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater 
honour and profit. 
Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about 
medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally 
refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he 
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has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of 
medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks 
about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we have a right 
to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are 
the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly 
ask him about them. “Friend Homer,” then we say to him, “if you are 
only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and 
not in the third  — not an image maker or imitato — and if you are 
able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private 
or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your 
help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many 
other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others; 
but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have 
done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there 
is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to 
say about you?” Is there any city which he might name?cde 
I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves 
pretend that he was a legislator 
Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on 
successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?600 
There is not. 
Or is there any invention1 of his, applicable to the arts or to 
human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, 
and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to 
him? 
There is absolutely nothing of the kind. 
But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a 
guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to 
associate with him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric 
way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so 
greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day 
quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?b 
1. Omitting εἰς. 
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Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, 
Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose 
name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his 
stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and 
others in his own day when he was alive?c 
Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, 
that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind 
— if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator — 
can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, 
and been honoured and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and 
Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their 
contemporaries: You will never be able to manage either your own 
house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers 
of education — and this ingenious device of theirs has such an 
effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry 
them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the 
contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed 
either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been 
able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as 
unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them 
to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then 
the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they 
had got education enough?de 
Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true. 
Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, 
beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of 
virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a 
painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a 
cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture 
is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and 
judge only by colors and figures.601 
Quite so. 
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In like manner the poet with his words and phrases 2may be said 
to lay on the colors of the several arts, himself understanding their 
nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as 
ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if 
he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, 
in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well — such is 
the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And 
I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor 
appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours 
which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.b 
Yes, he said. 
They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only 
blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them? 
Exactly. 
Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows 
nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not 
right?c 
Yes. 
Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with 
half an explanation. 
Proceed. 
Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a 
bit? 
Yes. 
And the worker in leather and brass will make them? 
Certainly. 
But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, 
hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only 
the horseman who knows how to use them — he knows their right 
form. 
Most true. 
And may we not say the same of all things? 
2. Or, "with his nouns and verbs." 
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What? 
That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one 
which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?d 
Yes. 
And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate 
or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for 
which nature or the artist has intended them. 
True. 
Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, 
and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which 
develop themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the 
flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he 
will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend 
to his instructions?e 
Of course. 
The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the 
goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, 
will do what he is told by him? 
True. 
The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness 
of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will 
gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to 
hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?602a 
True. 
But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether 
or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right 
opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows 
and gives him instructions about what he should draw? 
Neither. 
Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have 
knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations? 
I suppose not. 
The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about 
his own creations? 
Nay, very much the reverse. 
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And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a 
thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only 
that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?b 
Just so. 
Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no 
knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only 
a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in 
Iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree? 
Very true. 
And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown 
by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the 
truth?c 
Certainly. 
And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed? 
What do you mean? 
I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears 
small when seen at a distance? 
True. 
And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the 
water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes 
convex, owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is 
liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this 
is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring 
and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices 
imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.d 
True. 
The art of measuring given to man that he may correct the variety 
of appearances.And the arts of measuring and numbering and 
weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding — there is 
the beauty of them — and the apparent greater or less, or more or 
heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before 
calculation and measure and weight? 
Most true. 
And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational 
principle in the soul?e 
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To be sure. 
And when this principle measures and certifies that some things 
are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs 
an apparent contradiction? 
True. 
But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible — 
the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time 
about the same thing? 
Very true. 
Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to 
measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in 
accordance with measure?603a 
True. 
And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to 
measure and calculation? 
Certainly. 
And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles 
of the soul? 
No doubt. 
This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I 
said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing 
their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the 
companions and friends and associates of a principle within us 
which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or 
healthy aim.b 
Exactly. 
The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has 
inferior offspring. 
Very true. 
And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the 
hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry? 
Probably the same would be true of poetry. 
Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of 
painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty 
with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.c 
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By all means. 
We may state the question thus: — Imitation imitates the actions 
of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they 
imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow 
accordingly. Is there anything more? 
No, there is nothing else. 
But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with 
himself — or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion 
and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also 
is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need 
hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been 
already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be 
full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the 
same moment?d 
And we were right, he said. 
Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission 
which must now be supplied.e 
What was the omission? 
Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to 
lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the 
loss with more equanimity than another? 
Yes. 
But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot 
help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow? 
The latter, he said, is the truer statement. 
Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his 
sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?604 
It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not. 
When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many 
things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him 
do? 
True. 
There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, 
as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge 
his sorrow?b 
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True. 
But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from 
the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct 
principles in him? 
Certainly. 
One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law? 
How do you mean? 
The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and 
that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing 
whether such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by 
impatience; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, 
and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most 
required.c 
What is most required? he asked. 
That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when 
the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason 
deems best; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of 
the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always 
accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that 
which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing 
art.d 
Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune. 
Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this 
suggestion of reason? 
Clearly. 
And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our 
troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, 
we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly? 
Indeed, we may. 
And does not the latter — I mean the rebellious principle — furnish 
a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm 
temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate 
or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when 
a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling 
represented is one to which they are strangers.e 
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Certainly.605a 
Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by 
nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the 
rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and 
fitful temper, which is easily imitated? 
Clearly. 
And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of 
the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his 
creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he is like 
him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part 
of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him 
into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and 
strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when 
the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out 
of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet 
implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature 
which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same 
thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer 
of images and is very far removed from the truth.3bc 
Exactly. 
But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our 
accusation: — the power which poetry has of harming even the good 
(and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful 
thing? 
Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say. 
Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a 
passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents 
some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, 
or weeping, and smiting his breast — the best of us, you know, 
delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the 
excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.d 
Yes, of course I know. 
3. Reading εἰδωλοποιοῦντα … ἀφεστῶτα. 
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But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may 
observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality — we would 
fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which 
delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a 
woman.e 
Very true, he said. 
Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is 
doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of 
in his own person? 
No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable. 
Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.606 
What point of view? 
If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural 
hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and 
lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in 
our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets; — the 
better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained 
by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose 
because the sorrow is another’s; and the spectator fancies that 
there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one 
who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss 
about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why 
should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few 
persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other 
men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the 
feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the 
misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.b 
How very true!c 
And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are 
jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on 
the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you 
are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their 
unseemliness; — the case of pity is repeated; — there is a principle in 
human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you 
once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought 
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a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible 
faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself 
into playing the comic poet at home. 
Quite true, he said. 
And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other 
affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be 
inseparable from every action — in all of them poetry feeds and 
waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, 
although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to 
increase in happiness and virtue.d 
I cannot deny it. 
Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the 
eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of 
Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering 
of human things, and that you should take him up again and again 
and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to 
him, we may love and honor those who say these things — they are 
excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to 
acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy 
writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to 
the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought 
to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow 
the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and 
the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been 
deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.e 
607a 
That is most true, he said. 
And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let 
this our defense serve to show the reasonableness of our former 
judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the 
tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But 
that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, 
let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy 
and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying 
of “the yelping hound howling at her lord,” or of one “mighty in 
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the vain talk of fools,” and “the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,” 
and the “subtle thinkers who are beggars after all”; and there are 
innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. 
Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister 
arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-
ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her — we are very 
conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the 
truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I 
am, especially when she appears in Homer?bcd 
Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed. 
Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but 
upon this condition only — that she make a defense of herself in 
lyrical or some other metre? 
Certainly. 
And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are 
lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose 
on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also 
useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly 
spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers — I 
mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?e 
Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. 
If her defense fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who 
are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves 
when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too 
must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without 
a struggle. Poetry is attractive but not true.We too are inspired 
by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has 
implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best 
and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defense, 
this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat 
to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away 
into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events 
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we are well aware4 that poetry being such as we have described is 
not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who 
listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, 
should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words 
his law.608ab 
Yes, he said, I quite agree with you. 
Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater 
than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will 
any one be profited if under the influence of honor or money or 
power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice 
and virtue? 
Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe 
that any one else would have been. 
*** 
All notes are by Benjamin Jowett. 
4. Or, if we accept Madvig’s ingenious but unnecessary 
emendation ᾀσόμεθα, "At all events we will sing, that" &c. 
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4. Plato - from Parmenides 
(On Forms) 
*** 
[Socrates, to Zeno]: Do you maintain that if being is many, it must be 
both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the 
like be unlike, nor the unlike like — is that your position?Just so, said 
Zeno. 
And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according 
to you, being could not be many; for this would involve an 
impossibility. In all that you say have you any other purpose except 
to disprove the being of the many? And is not each division of 
your treatise intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there 
being in all as many proofs of the not-being of the many as you 
have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have I 
misunderstood you? 
No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general 
purpose. 
*** 
I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell 
me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness 
in itself, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of 
likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to 
which we apply the term many, participate — things which 
participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like; and 
44  |  Plato - from Parmenides (On
Forms)
so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, 
or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in 
both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be 
both like and unlike, by reason of this participation? — Where is the 
wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become 
unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, 
would indeed be a wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, 
in showing that the things which only partake of likeness and 
unlikeness experience both. Nor, again, if a person were to show 
that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by 
partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. But if he were 
to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many 
one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be 
surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these 
opposite qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I 
was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many 
he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a 
back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake 
of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am 
one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that 
I am one and partake of the one. In both instances he proves his 
case. So again, if a person shows that such things as wood, stones, 
and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the 
coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the 
many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but 
a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to 
abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and 
similar ideas, and then to show that these admit of admixture and 
separation in themselves, I should be very much astonished. This 
part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very 
spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed 
if any one found in the ideas themselves which are apprehended by 
reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown 
to exist in visible objects. 
While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that 
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Parmenides and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive 
steps of the argument; but still they gave the closest attention, and 
often looked at one another, and smiled as if in admiration of him. 
When he had finished, Parmenides expressed their feelings in the 
following words: — 
Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards 
philosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between 
ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? and do 
you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness 
which we possess, and of the one and many, and of the other things 
which Zeno mentioned? 
I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates. 
Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas 
of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class? 
Yes, he said, I should. 
And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all 
other human creatures, or of fire and water? 
I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to 
include them or not. 
And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of 
which the mention may provoke a smile? — I mean such things as 
hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry; would you 
suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual 
objects with which we come into contact, or not? 
Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as 
they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity 
in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, 
and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then 
again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am 
afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; 
and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and 
occupy myself with them. 
Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; 
the time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will 
have a firmer grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the 
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meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard 
the opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean 
that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and 
from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, 
become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things 
become great, because they partake of greatness; and that just and 
beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of 
justice and beauty? 
Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning. 
Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea 
or else of a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of 
participation? 
There cannot be, he said. 
Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, 
is in each one of the many? 
Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates. 
Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same 
time in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of 
separation from itself. 
Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in 
many places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each 
idea may be one and the same in all at the same time. 
I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. 
You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a 
number of men, there would be one whole including many — is not 
that your meaning? 
I think so. 
And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part 
of it only, and different parts different men? 
The latter. 
Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things 
which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the 
whole idea existing in each of them? 
That seems to follow. 
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Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really 
divisible and yet remains one? 
Certainly not, he said. 
Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many 
great things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less 
than absolute greatness — is that conceivable? 
No. 
Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of 
equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by 
virtue of that portion only? 
Impossible. 
Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but 
a part of the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if 
the absolutely small be greater, that to which the part of the small is 
added will be smaller and not greater than before. 
How absurd! 
Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, 
if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes? 
Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily 
answered. 
Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question? 
What question? 
I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea 
of each kind is as follows: — You see a number of great objects, and 
when you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same 
idea (or nature) in them all; hence you conceive of greatness as one. 
Very true, said Socrates. 
And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace 
in one view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not 
the idea, and — to compare them, will not another greatness arise, 
which will appear to be the source of all these? 
It would seem so. 
Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and 
above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; 
and then another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they 
48  |  Plato - from Parmenides (On Forms)
will all be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be 
infinitely multiplied. 
But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have 
no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that 
case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite 
multiplication. 
And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of 
nothing? 
Impossible, he said. 
The thought must be of something? 
Yes. 
Of something which is or which is not? 
Of something which is. 
Must it not be of a single something, which the thought 
recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature? 
Yes. 
And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the 
same in all, be an idea? 
From that, again, there is no escape. 
Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates 
in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of 
thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are thoughts but 
have no thought? 
The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous 
one. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, 
and other things are like them, and resemblances of them — what 
is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really 
assimilation to them. 
But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also 
be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of 
the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than 
the like of like. 
Impossible. 
And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same 
idea? 
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They must. 
And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them 
alike, be the idea itself? 
Certainly. 
Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like 
the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will 
always be coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; 
and new ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles that 
which partakes of it? 
Quite true. 
The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by 
resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of 
participation devised? 
It would seem so. 
Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming 
the ideas to be absolute? 
Yes, indeed. 
And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small 
part of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a 
single idea, parting it off from other things. 
What difficulty? he said. 
There are many, but the greatest of all is this: — If an opponent 
argues that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, 
must remain unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, 
unless he who denies their existence be a man of great ability and 
knowledge, and is willing to follow a long and laborious 
demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they 
cannot be known. 
What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates. 
In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who 
maintains the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they 
cannot exist in us. 
No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute. 
True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in 
relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation 
50  |  Plato - from Parmenides (On Forms)
among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or 
whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from 
which we receive this or that name when we partake of them. 
*** 
And will not knowledge — I mean absolute knowledge — answer to 
absolute truth? 
Certainly. 
And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of 
absolute being? 
Yes. 
But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which 
we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a 
knowledge of each kind of being which we have? 
Certainly. 
But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot 
have? 
No, we cannot. 
And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the 
absolute idea of knowledge? 
Yes. 
And we have not got the idea of knowledge? 
No. 
Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share 
in absolute knowledge? 
I suppose not. 
Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in 
itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are 
unknown to us? 
It would seem so. 
I think that there is a stranger consequence still. 
What is it? 
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Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if 
there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our 
knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest? 
Yes. 
And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute 
knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact 
knowledge? 
Certainly. 
But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge 
of human things? 
Why not? 
Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the 
ideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things 
in relation to them; the relations of either are limited to their 
respective spheres. 
Yes, that has been admitted. 
And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his 
authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human 
thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our 
knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason 
they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the 
things of men. 
Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is 
monstrous. 
These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of 
the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we 
determine each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears 
what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them 
— and even if they do exist, he will say that they must of necessity be 
unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his side, and as 
we were remarking just now, will be very difficult to convince; a man 
must be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn 
that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more 
remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself, and 
having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to others. 
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I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is 
very much to my mind. 
And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention 
on these and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and 
will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate 
idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on 
which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of 
reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted. 
Very true, he said. 
But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we 
turn, if the ideas are unknown? 
*** 
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5. Aristotle - from Poetics 
*** 
VI 
Of the poetry which imitates in hexameter verse,1 and of Comedy; 
we will speak hereafter. Let us now discuss Tragedy, resuming its 
formal definition, as resulting from what has been already said. 
Tragedy, then, is an imitation2 of an action that is serious, 
complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with 
each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in 
separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; 
through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these 
emotions. By “language embellished,” I mean language into which 
rhythm, “harmony” and song enter. By “the several kinds in separate 
parts,” I mean, that some parts are rendered through the medium of 
verse alone, others again with the aid of song. 
Now as tragic imitation implies persons acting, it necessarily 
follows, in the first place, that Spectacular3 equipment will be a 
1. Dactylic hexameter is associated with epic poetry. Both 
The Iliad and The Odyssey are written in hexameter 
verse. 
2. Aristotle uses the same word as Plato to explain literary 
representation (mimēsis). 
3. That is, designed for visual experience. The OED traces 
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part of Tragedy. Next, Song and Diction, for these are the media of 
imitation. By “Diction” I mean the mere metrical arrangement of the 
words: as for “Song,” it is a term whose sense every one understands. 
Again, Tragedy is the imitation of an action; and an action implies 
personal agents, who necessarily possess certain distinctive 
qualities both of character and thought; for it is by these that we 
qualify actions themselves, and these — thought and character — are 
the two natural causes from which actions spring, and on actions 
again all success or failure depends. Hence, the Plot is the imitation 
of the action — for by plot I here mean the arrangement of the 
incidents. By Character I mean that in virtue of which we ascribe 
certain qualities to the agents. Thought is required wherever a 
statement is proved, or, it may be, a general truth enunciated. Every 
Tragedy, therefore, must have six parts, which parts determine its 
quality — namely, Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song. 
Two of the parts constitute the medium of imitation, one the 
manner, and three the objects of imitation. And these complete the 
fist. These elements have been employed, we may say, by the poets 
to a man; in fact, every play contains Spectacular elements as well 
as Character, Plot, Diction, Song, and Thought. 
But most important of all is the structure of the incidents. For 
Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and 
life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality. 
Now character determines men’s qualities, but it is by their actions 
that they are happy or the reverse. Dramatic action, therefore, is not 
with a view to the representation of character: character comes in 
as subsidiary to the actions. Hence the incidents and the plot are 
the end4 of a tragedy; and the end is the chief thing of all. Again, 
the etymology of "spectacle" to the Latin spectāculum 
and spectāre, meaning to look. 
4. W. H. Fyfe translates this as "the end at which tragedy 
aims." 
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without action there cannot be a tragedy; there may be without 
character. The tragedies of most of our modern poets fail in the 
rendering of character; and of poets in general this is often true. It 
is the same in painting; and here lies the difference between Zeuxis 
and Polygnotus. Polygnotus delineates character well; the style of 
Zeuxis is devoid of ethical quality. Again, if you string together a 
set of speeches expressive of character, and well finished in point 
of diction and thought, you will not produce the essential tragic 
effect nearly so well as with a play which, however deficient in 
these respects, yet has a plot and artistically constructed incidents. 
Besides which, the most powerful elements of emotional interest 
in Tragedy — Peripeteia or Reversals of Fortune, and Recognition 
scenes—are parts of the plot. A further proof is, that novices in the 
art attain to finish of diction and precision of portraiture before they 
can construct the plot. It is the same with almost all the early poets. 
The Plot,5 then, is the first principle, and, as it were, the soul of a 
tragedy: Character holds the second place. A similar fact is seen in 
painting. The most beautiful colors, laid on confusedly, will not give 
as much pleasure as the chalk outline of a portrait. Thus Tragedy is 
the imitation of an action, and of the agents, mainly with a view to 
the action. 
Third in order is the Thought — that is, the faculty of saying 
5. Aristotle distinguishes between the medium, object, and 
manner of poetic mimesis in the art of tragedy. He 
creates a hierarchy privileging the object of imitation 
(e.g. men in action) over the medium (as told in poetry or 
through a song) or manner (e.g. through spectacle in a 
drama). Thus, plot (mythos), character (ethos), and 
thought (dianoia) rank higher than diction (lexis) and 
melody (melos). Lowest in the hierarchy is spectacle 
(opsis). 
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what is possible and pertinent in given circumstances. In the case 
of oratory, this is the function of the political art and the art of 
rhetoric: for the older poets make their characters speak the 
language of civic life; the poets of our time, the language of the 
rhetoricians. Character is that which reveals moral purpose, 
showing what kinds of things a man chooses or avoids. Speeches, 
therefore, which do not make this manifest, or in which the speaker 
does not choose or avoid anything whatever, are not expressive of 
character. Thought, on the other hand, is found where something is 
proved to be or not to be, or a general maxim is enunciated. 
Fourth among the elements enumerated is Diction; by which I 
mean, as has been already said, the expression of the meaning in 
words; and its essence is the same both in verse and prose. 
Of the remaining elements Song holds the chief place among the 
embellishments. 
The Spectacle has, indeed, an emotional attraction of its own, but, 
of all the parts, it is the least artistic, and connected least with the 
art of poetry. For the power of Tragedy, we may be sure, is felt even 
apart from representation and actors. Besides, the production of 
spectacular effects depends more on the art of the stage machinist 
than on that of the poet. 
VII 
These principles being established, let us now discuss the proper 
structure of the Plot, since this is the first and most important part 
of Tragedy. 
Now, according to our definition, Tragedy is an imitation of an 
action that is complete, and whole, and of a certain magnitude; 
for there may be a whole that is wanting in magnitude. A whole 
is that which has beginning, a middle, and an end. A beginning is 
that which does not itself follow anything by causal necessity, but 
after which something naturally is or comes to be. An end, on the 
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contrary, is that which itself naturally follows some other thing, 
either by necessity, or as a rule, but has nothing following it. A 
middle is that which follows something as some other thing follows 
it. A well constructed plot, therefore, must neither begin nor end at 
haphazard, but conform to these principles. 
Again, a beautiful object — whether it be a living organism or 
a whole composed of parts — it must not only have an orderly 
arrangement of parts; for beauty depends on magnitude and order. 
Hence a very small animal cannot be beautiful; for the view of 
it is confused, the object being seen in an almost imperceptible 
moment of time. Nor, again, can one of vast size be beautiful; for 
as the eye cannot take it all in at once, the unity and sense of the 
whole is lost for the spectator; as for instance if there were one a 
thousand miles long. As, therefore, in the case of animate bodies 
and organisms a certain magnitude is necessary, and a magnitude 
which may be easily embraced in one view; so in the plot, a certain 
length is necessary, and that length one that may be embraced by 
the memory. The limit of length in relation to dramatic competition 
and sensuous presentment, is no part of artistic theory. For had 
it been the rule for a hundred tragedies to compete together, the 
performance would be regulated by the water clock6 — as indeed we 
are told was formerly done. But the limit as fixed by the nature of 
the drama itself is this: — the greater the length, the more beautiful 
will the piece be by reason of its size, provided that the whole be 
perspicuous. And to define the matter roughly, we may say that the 
proper magnitude is comprised within such limits that the sequence 
of events, according to the law of probability or necessity, will admit 
of a change from bad fortune to good, or from good fortune to bad. 
6. The water-clock (clepsydra) was a device that measured 
time based on regulating the flow of water in or out of a 
vessel. 
58  |  Aristotle - from Poetics
VIII 
Unity of plot does not, as some persons think, consist in the unity 
of the hero. For infinitely various are the incidents in one man’s 
life, which cannot be reduced to unity; and so, too, there are many 
actions of one man out of which we cannot make one action. Hence 
the error, as it appears, of all poets who have composed a Heracleid, 
a Theseid,7 or other poems of the kind. They imagine that as 
Heracles was one man, the story of Heracles must also be a unity. 
But Homer, as in all else he is of surpassing merit, here too — 
whether from art or natural genius — seems to have happily 
discerned the truth. In composing the Odyssey he did not include 
all the adventures of Odysseus — such as his wound on Parnassus, 
or his feigned madness at the mustering of the host — incidents 
between which there was no necessary or probable connection: but 
he made the Odyssey, and likewise the Iliad, to center round an 
action, that in our sense of the word is one. As therefore, in the 
other imitative arts, the imitation is one when the object imitated 
is one, so the plot, being an imitation of an action, must imitate 
one action and that a whole, the structural union of the parts being 
such that, if any one of them is displaced or removed, the whole will 
be disjointed and disturbed. For a thing which may be presence or 
absence makes no visible difference is not an organic part of the 
whole. 
IX 
It is, moreover, evident from what has been said, that it is not the 
7. Epic poems depicting the heroes Heracles and Theseus. 
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function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may 
happen — what is possible according to the law of probability or 
necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse 
or in prose. The work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and it 
would still be a species of history, with meter no less than without it. 
The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other 
what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a 
higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, 
history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a 
certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of 
probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry 
aims in the names she attaches to the personages. The particular 
is — for example — what Alcibiades did or suffered. In Comedy this 
is already apparent: for here the poet first constructs the plot on 
the lines of probability, and then inserts characteristic names — 
unlike the lampooners who write about particular individuals. But 
tragedians still keep to real names, the reason being that what is 
possible is credible: what has not happened we do not at once feel 
sure to be possible; but what has happened is manifestly possible: 
otherwise it would not have happened. Still there are even some 
tragedies in which there are only one or two well-known names, the 
rest being fictitious. In others, none are well known—as in Agathon’s 
Antheus, where incidents and names alike are fictitious, and yet they 
give none the less pleasure. We must not, therefore, at all costs keep 
to the received legends, which are the usual subjects of Tragedy. 
Indeed, it would be absurd to attempt it; for even subjects that 
are known are known only to a few, and yet give pleasure to all. 
It clearly follows that the poet or “maker”8 should be the maker of 
plots rather than of verses, since he is a poet because he imitates, 
and what he imitates are actions. And even if he chances to take a 
historical subject, he is none the less a poet; for there is no reason 
why some events that have actually happened should not conform 
8. Aristotle's word for poetry (poiesis) means "to make." 
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to the law of the probable and possible, and in virtue of that quality 
in them he is their poet or maker. 
Of all plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call a plot 
“episodic” in which the episodes or acts succeed one another 
without probable or necessary sequence. Bad poets compose such 
pieces by their own fault, good poets, to please the players; for, 
as they write show pieces for competition, they stretch the plot 
beyond its capacity, and are often forced to break the natural 
continuity. 
But again, Tragedy is an imitation not only of a complete action, 
but of events inspiring fear or pity. Such an effect is best produced 
when the events come on us by surprise; and the effect is 
heightened when, at the same time, they follows as cause and effect. 
The tragic wonder will then be greater than if they happened of 
themselves or by accident, for even coincidences are most striking 
when they have an air of design. We may instance the statue of 
Mitys at Argos, which fell upon his murderer while he was a 
spectator at a festival, and killed him. Such events seem not to 
be due to mere chance. Plots, therefore, constructed on these 
principles are necessarily the best. 
X 
Plots are either Simple or Complex, for the actions in real life, 
of which the plots are an imitation, obviously show a similar 
distinction. An action which is one and continuous in the sense 
above defined, I call Simple, when the change of fortune takes place 
without Reversal of the Situation and without Recognition. 
A Complex action is one in which the change is accompanied 
by such Reversal, or by Recognition, or by both. These last should 
arise from the internal structure of the plot, so that what follows 
should be the necessary or probable result of the preceding action. 
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It makes all the difference whether any given event is a case of 
propter hoc or post hoc. 
XI 
Reversal of the Situation is a change by which the action veers round 
to its opposite, subject always to our rule of probability or necessity. 
Thus in the Oedipus, the messenger comes to cheer Oedipus and 
free him from his alarms about his mother, but by revealing who he 
is, he produces the opposite effect. Again in the Lynceus, Lynceus is 
being led away to his death, and Danaus goes with him, meaning to 
slay him; but the outcome of the preceding incidents is that Danaus 
is killed and Lynceus saved. 
Recognition, as the name indicates, is a change from ignorance 
to knowledge, producing love or hate between the persons destined 
by the poet for good or bad fortune. The best form of recognition 
is coincident with a Reversal of the Situation, as in the Oedipus. 
There are indeed other forms. Even inanimate things of the most 
trivial kind may in a sense be objects of recognition. Again, we may 
recognize or discover whether a person has done a thing or not. 
But the recognition which is most intimately connected with the 
plot and action is, as we have said, the recognition of persons. This 
recognition, combined with Reversal, will produce either pity or 
fear; and actions producing these effects are those which, by our 
definition, Tragedy represents. Moreover, it is upon such situations 
that the issues of good or bad fortune will depend. Recognition, 
then, being between persons, it may happen that one person only 
is recognized by the other — when the latter is already known — or 
it may be necessary that the recognition should be on both sides. 
Thus Iphigenia is revealed to Orestes by the sending of the letter; 
but another act of recognition is required to make Orestes known 
to Iphigenia. 
Two parts, then, of the Plot — Reversal of the Situation and 
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Recognition — turn upon surprises. A third part is the Scene of 
Suffering. The Scene of Suffering is a destructive or painful action, 
such as death on the stage, bodily agony, wounds, and the like. 
XII 
The parts of Tragedy which must be treated as elements of the 
whole have been already mentioned. We now come to the 
quantitative parts — the separate parts into which Tragedy is divided 
— namely, Prologue, Episode, Exode, Choric song; this last being 
divided into Parode and Stasimon. These are common to all plays: 
peculiar to some are the songs of actors from the stage and the 
Commoi. 
The Prologue is that entire part of a tragedy which precedes the 
Parode of the Chorus. The Episode is that entire part of a tragedy 
which is between complete choric songs. The Exode is that entire 
part of a tragedy which has no choric song after it. Of the Choric 
part the Parode is the first undivided utterance of the Chorus: the 
Stasimon is a Choric ode without anapaests or trochaic tetrameters: 
the Commos is a joint lamentation of Chorus and actors. The parts 
of Tragedy which must be treated as elements of the whole have 
been already mentioned. The quantitative parts — the separate parts 
into which it is divided — are here enumerated. 
XIII 
As the sequel to what has already been said, we must proceed to 
consider what the poet should aim at, and what he should avoid, 
in constructing his plots; and by what means the specific effect of 
Tragedy will be produced. 
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A perfect tragedy should, as we have seen, be arranged not on 
the simple but on the complex plan. It should, moreover, imitate 
actions which excite pity and fear, this being the distinctive mark of 
tragic imitation. It follows plainly, in the first place, that the change 
of fortune presented must not be the spectacle of a virtuous man 
brought from prosperity to adversity: for this moves neither pity nor 
fear; it merely shocks us. Nor, again, that of a bad man passing from 
adversity to prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the spirit 
of Tragedy; it possesses no single tragic quality; it neither satisfies 
the moral sense nor calls forth pity or fear. Nor, again, should the 
downfall of the utter villain be exhibited. A plot of this kind would, 
doubtless, satisfy the moral sense, but it would inspire neither pity 
nor fear; for pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the 
misfortune of a man like ourselves. Such an event, therefore, will 
be neither pitiful nor terrible. There remains, then, the character 
between these two extremes — that of a man who is not eminently 
good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or 
depravity, but by some error or frailty. He must be one who is highly 
renowned and prosperous — a personage like Oedipus, Thyestes, or 
other illustrious men of such families. 
A well-constructed plot should, therefore, be single in its issue, 
rather than double as some maintain. The change of fortune should 
be not from bad to good, but, reversely, from good to bad. It should 
come about as the result not of vice, but of some great error or 
frailty, in a character either such as we have described, or better 
rather than worse. The practice of the stage bears out our view. At 
first the poets recounted any legend that came in their way. Now, 
the best tragedies are founded on the story of a few houses — on 
the fortunes of Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, 
Telephus, and those others who have done or suffered something 
terrible. A tragedy, then, to be perfect according to the rules of art 
should be of this construction. Hence they are in error who censure 
Euripides just because he follows this principle in his plays, many 
of which end unhappily. It is, as we have said, the right ending. The 
best proof is that on the stage and in dramatic competition, such 
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plays, if well worked out, are the most tragic in effect; and Euripides, 
faulty though he may be in the general management of his subject, 
yet is felt to be the most tragic of the poets. 
In the second rank comes the kind of tragedy which some place 
first. Like the Odyssey, it has a double thread of plot, and also an 
opposite catastrophe for the good and for the bad. It is accounted 
the best because of the weakness of the spectators; for the poet 
is guided in what he writes by the wishes of his audience. The 
pleasure, however, thence derived is not the true tragic pleasure. It 
is proper rather to Comedy, where those who, in the piece, are the 
deadliest enemies — like Orestes and Aegisthus — quit the stage as 
friends at the close, and no one slays or is slain. 
XIV 
Fear and pity may be aroused by spectacular means; but they may 
also result from the inner structure of the piece, which is the better 
way, and indicates a superior poet. For the plot ought to be so 
constructed that, even without the aid of the eye, he who hears the 
tale told will thrill with horror and melt to pity at what takes Place. 
This is the impression we should receive from hearing the story of 
the Oedipus. But to produce this effect by the mere spectacle is a 
less artistic method, and dependent on extraneous aids. Those who 
employ spectacular means to create a sense not of the terrible but 
only of the monstrous, are strangers to the purpose of Tragedy; for 
we must not demand of Tragedy any and every kind of pleasure, but 
only that which is proper to it. And since the pleasure which the 
poet should afford is that which comes from pity and fear through 
imitation, it is evident that this quality must be impressed upon the 
incidents. 
Let us then determine what are the circumstances which strike us 
as terrible or pitiful. 
Actions capable of this effect must happen between persons who 
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are either friends or enemies or indifferent to one another. If an 
enemy kills an enemy, there is nothing to excite pity either in the 
act or the intention — except so far as the suffering in itself is pitiful. 
So again with indifferent persons. But when the tragic incident 
occurs between those who are near or dear to one another — if, 
for example, a brother kills, or intends to kill, a brother, a son his 
father, a mother her son, a son his mother, or any other deed of 
the kind is done — these are the situations to be looked for by the 
poet. He may not indeed destroy the framework of the received 
legends — the fact, for instance, that Clytemnestra was slain by 
Orestes and Eriphyle by Alcmaeon — but he ought to show of his 
own, and skil[l]fully handle the traditional material. Let us explain 
more clearly what is meant by skilful handling. 
The action may be done consciously and with knowledge of the 
persons, in the manner of the older poets. It is thus too that 
Euripides makes Medea slay her children. Or, again, the deed of 
horror may be done, but done in ignorance, and the tie of kinship or 
friendship be discovered afterwards. The Oedipus of Sophocles is an 
example. Here, indeed, the incident is outside the drama proper; but 
cases occur where it falls within the action of the play: one may cite 
the Alcmaeon of Astydamas, or Telegonus in the Wounded Odysseus. 
Again, there is a third case — <to be about to act with knowledge of 
the persons and then not to act. The fourth case is> when some one 
is about to do an irreparable deed through ignorance, and makes 
the discovery before it is done. These are the only possible ways. 
For the deed must either be done or not done — and that wittingly 
or unwittingly. But of all these ways, to be about to act knowing the 
persons, and then not to act, is the worst. It is shocking without 
being tragic, for no disaster follows It is, therefore, never, or very 
rarely, found in poetry. One instance, however, is in the Antigone, 
where Haemon threatens to kill Creon. The next and better way is 
that the deed should be perpetrated. Still better, that it should be 
perpetrated in ignorance, and the discovery made afterwards. There 
is then nothing to shock us, while the discovery produces a startling 
effect. The last case is the best, as when in the Cresphontes Merope 
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is about to slay her son, but, recognizing who he is, spares his life. 
So in the Iphigenia, the sister recognizes the brother just in time. 
Again in the Helle, the son recognizes the mother when on the point 
of giving her up. This, then, is why a few families only, as has been 
already observed, furnish the subjects of tragedy. It was not art, but 
happy chance, that led the poets in search of subjects to impress 
the tragic quality upon their plots. They are compelled, therefore, 
to have recourse to those houses whose history contains moving 
incidents like these. 
Enough has now been said concerning the structure of the 
incidents, and the right kind of plot. 
XV 
In respect of Character there are four things to be aimed at. First, 
and most important, it must be good. Now any speech or action that 
manifests moral purpose of any kind will be expressive of character: 
the character will be good if the purpose is good. This rule is relative 
to each class. Even a woman may be good, and also a slave; though 
the woman may be said to be an inferior being, and the slave quite 
worthless. The second thing to aim at is propriety. There is a type 
of manly valor; but valor in a woman, or unscrupulous cleverness 
is inappropriate. Thirdly, character must be true to life: for this is a 
distinct thing from goodness and propriety, as here described. The 
fourth point is consistency: for though the subject of the imitation, 
who suggested the type, be inconsistent, still he must be 
consistently inconsistent. As an example of motiveless degradation 
of character, we have Menelaus in the Orestes; of character 
indecorous and inappropriate, the lament of Odysseus in the Scylla, 
and the speech of Melanippe; of inconsistency, the Iphigenia at Aulis 
— for Iphigenia the suppliant in no way resembles her later self. 
As in the structure of the plot, so too in the portraiture of 
character, the poet should always aim either at the necessary or the 
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probable. Thus a person of a given character should speak or act 
in a given way, by the rule either of necessity or of probability; just 
as this event should follow that by necessary or probable sequence. 
It is therefore evident that the unraveling of the plot, no less than 
the complication, must arise out of the plot itself, it must not be 
brought about by the Deux ex Machina — as in the Medea, or in the 
return of the Greeks in the Iliad. The Deus ex Machina should be 
employed only for events external to the drama — for antecedent 
or subsequent events, which lie beyond the range of human 
knowledge, and which require to be reported or foretold; for to 
the gods we ascribe the power of seeing all things. Within the 
action there must be nothing irrational. If the irrational cannot be 
excluded, it should be outside the scope of the tragedy. Such is the 
irrational element the Oedipus of Sophocles. 
Again, since Tragedy is an imitation of persons who are above 
the common level, the example of good portrait painters should 
be followed. They, while reproducing the distinctive form of the 
original, make a likeness which is true to life and yet more beautiful. 
So too the poet, in representing men who are irascible or indolent, 
or have other defects of character, should preserve the type and yet 
ennoble it. In this way Achilles is portrayed by Agathon and Homer. 
These then are rules the poet should observe. Nor should he 
neglect those appeals to the senses, which, though not among the 
essentials, are the concomitants of poetry; for here too there is 
much room for error. But of this enough has been said in our 
published treatises. 
XVI 
What Recognition is has been already explained. We will now 
enumerate its kinds. 
First, the least artistic form, which, from poverty of wit, is most 
commonly employed — recognition by signs. Of these some are 
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congenital — such as “the spear which the earth-born race bear on 
their bodies,” or the stars introduced by Carcinus in his Thyestes. 
Others are acquired after birth; and of these some are bodily marks, 
as scars; some external tokens, as necklaces, or the little ark in the 
Tyro by which the discovery is effected. Even these admit of more 
or less skilful treatment. Thus in the recognition of Odysseus by 
his scar, the discovery is made in one way by the nurse, in another 
by the swineherds. The use of tokens for the express purpose of 
proof — and, indeed, any formal proof with or without tokens — is a 
less artistic mode of recognition. A better kind is that which comes 
about by a turn of incident, as in the Bath Scene in the Odyssey. 
Next come the recognitions invented at will by the poet, and on 
that account wanting in art. For example, Orestes in the Iphigenia 
reveals the fact that he is Orestes. She, indeed, makes herself known 
by the letter; but he, by speaking himself, and saying what the 
poet, not what the plot requires. This, therefore, is nearly allied 
to the fault above mentioned — for Orestes might as well have 
brought tokens with him. Another similar instance is the “voice of 
the shuttle” in the Tereus of Sophocles. 
The third kind depends on memory when the sight of some object 
awakens a feeling: as in the Cyprians of Dicaeogenes, where the 
hero breaks into tears on seeing the picture; or again in the Lay of 
Alcinous, where Odysseus, hearing the minstrel play the lyre, recalls 
the past and weeps, and hence the recognition. 
The fourth kind is by process of reasoning. Thus in the Choephori: 
“Some one resembling me has come: no one resembles me but 
Orestes: therefore Orestes has come.” Such too is the discovery 
made by Iphigenia in the play of Polyidus the Sophist. It was a 
natural reflection for Orestes to make, “So I too must die at the altar 
like my sister.” So, again, in the Tydeus of Theodectes, the father 
says, “I came to find my son, and I lose my own life.” So too in the 
Phineidae: the women, on seeing the place, inferred their fate — 
“Here we are doomed to die, for here we were cast forth.” Again, 
there is a composite kind of recognition involving false inference on 
the part of one of the characters, as in the Odysseus Disguised as a 
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Messenger. A said <that no one else was able to bend the bow; . . . 
hence B (the disguised Odysseus) imagined that A would> recognize 
the bow which, in fact, he had not seen; and to bring about a 
recognition by this means — the expectation that A would recognize 
the bow — is false inference. 
But, of all recognitions, the best is that which arises from the 
incidents themselves, where the startling discovery is made by 
natural means. Such is that in the Oedipus of Sophocles, and in the 
Iphigenia; for it was natural that Iphigenia should wish to dispatch 
a letter. These recognitions alone dispense with the artificial aid 
of tokens or amulets. Next come the recognitions by process of 
reasoning. 
XVII 
In constructing the plot and working it out with the proper diction, 
the poet should place the scene, as far as possible, before his eyes. In 
this way, seeing everything with the utmost vividness, as if he were 
a spectator of the action, he will discover what is in keeping with it, 
and be most unlikely to overlook inconsistencies. The need of such a 
rule is shown by the fault found in Carcinus. Amphiaraus was on his 
way from the temple. This fact escaped the observation of one who 
did not see the situation. On the stage, however, the piece failed, the 
audience being offended at the oversight. 
Again, the poet should work out his play, to the best of his power, 
with appropriate gestures; for those who feel emotion are most 
convincing through natural sympathy with the characters they 
represent; and one who is agitated storms, one who is angry rages, 
with the most lifelike reality. Hence poetry implies either a happy 
gift of nature or a strain of madness. In the one case a man can take 
the mould of any character; in the other, he is lifted out of his proper 
self. 
As for the story, whether the poet takes it ready made or 
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constructs it for himself, he should first sketch its general outline, 
and then fill in the episodes and amplify in detail. The general plan 
may be illustrated by the Iphigenia. A young girl is sacrificed; she 
disappears mysteriously from the eyes of those who sacrificed her; 
she is transported to another country, where the custom is to offer 
up an strangers to the goddess. To this ministry she is appointed. 
Some time later her own brother chances to arrive. The fact that 
the oracle for some reason ordered him to go there, is outside 
the general plan of the play. The purpose, again, of his coming is 
outside the action proper. However, he comes, he is seized, and, 
when on the point of being sacrificed, reveals who he is. The mode 
of recognition may be either that of Euripides or of Polyidus, in 
whose play he exclaims very naturally: “So it was not my sister only, 
but I too, who was doomed to be sacrificed”; and by that remark he 
is saved. 
After this, the names being once given, it remains to fill in the 
episodes. We must see that they are relevant to the action. In the 
case of Orestes, for example, there is the madness which led to his 
capture, and his deliverance by means of the purificatory rite. In the 
drama, the episodes are short, but it is these that give extension 
to Epic poetry. Thus the story of the Odyssey can be stated briefly. 
A certain man is absent from home for many years; he is jealously 
watched by Poseidon, and left desolate. Meanwhile his home is in 
a wretched plight — suitors are wasting his substance and plotting 
against his son. At length, tempest-tossed, he himself arrives; he 
makes certain persons acquainted with him; he attacks the suitors 
with his own hand, and is himself preserved while he destroys them. 
This is the essence of the plot; the rest is episode. 
XVIII 
Every tragedy falls into two parts — Complication and Unraveling 
or Denouement. Incidents extraneous to the action are frequently 
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combined with a portion of the action proper, to form the 
Complication; the rest is the Unraveling. By the Complication I mean 
all that extends from the beginning of the action to the part which 
marks the turning-point to good or bad fortune. The Unraveling is 
that which extends from the beginning of the change to the end. 
Thus, in the Lynceus of Theodectes, the Complication consists of 
the incidents presupposed in the drama, the seizure of the child, 
and then again * * <The Unraveling> extends from the accusation of 
murder to the end. 
There are four kinds of Tragedy: the Complex, depending entirely 
on Reversal of the Situation and Recognition; the Pathetic9 (where 
the motive is passion) — such as the tragedies on Ajax and Ixion; 
the Ethical (where the motives are ethical) — such as the Phthiotides 
and the Peleus. The fourth kind is the Simple. <We here exclude 
the purely spectacular element>, exemplified by the Phorcides, the 
Prometheus, and scenes laid in Hades. The poet should endeavor, if 
possible, to combine all poetic elements; or failing that, the greatest 
number and those the most important; the more so, in face of the 
caviling criticism of the day. For whereas there have hitherto been 
good poets, each in his own branch, the critics now expect one man 
to surpass all others in their several lines of excellence. 
In speaking of a tragedy as the same or different, the best test 
to take is the plot. Identity exists where the Complication and 
Unraveling are the same. Many poets tie the knot well, but unravel 
it ill. Both arts, however, should always be mastered. 
Again, the poet should remember what has been often said, and 
not make an Epic structure into a tragedy — by an Epic structure 
I mean one with a multiplicity of plots — as if, for instance, you 
were to make a tragedy out of the entire story of the Iliad. In 
the Epic poem, owing to its length, each part assumes its proper 
magnitude. In the drama the result is far from answering to the 
9. The word "pathetic" comes from the Greek word pathos
(emotion) 
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poet’s expectation. The proof is that the poets who have dramatized 
the whole story of the Fall of Troy, instead of selecting portions, 
like Euripides; or who have taken the whole tale of Niobe, and not 
a part of her story, like Aeschylus, either fail utterly or meet with 
poor success on the stage. Even Agathon has been known to fail 
from this one defect. In his Reversals of the Situation, however, he 
shows a marvelous skill in the effort to hit the popular taste — to 
produce a tragic effect that satisfies the moral sense. This effect is 
produced when the clever rogue, like Sisyphus, is outwitted, or the 
brave villain defeated. Such an event is probable in Agathon’s sense 
of the word: “is probable,” he says, “that many things should happen 
contrary to probability.” 
The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should 
be an integral part of the whole, and share in the action, in the 
manner not of Euripides but of Sophocles. As for the later poets, 
their choral songs pertain as little to the subject of the piece as 
to that of any other tragedy. They are, therefore, sung as mere 
interludes — a practice first begun by Agathon. Yet what difference 
is there between introducing such choral interludes, and 
transferring a speech, or even a whole act, from one play to another. 
XIX 
It remains to speak of Diction and Thought, the other parts of 
Tragedy having been already discussed. concerning Thought, we 
may assume what is said in the Rhetoric,10 to which inquiry the 
subject more strictly belongs. Under Thought is included every 
effect which has to be produced by speech, the subdivisions being — 
proof and refutation; the excitation of the feelings, such as pity, fear, 
10. Aristotle's treatise On Rhetoric 
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anger, and the like; the suggestion of importance or its opposite. 
Now, it is evident that the dramatic incidents must be treated from 
the same points of view as the dramatic speeches, when the object is 
to evoke the sense of pity, fear, importance, or probability. The only 
difference is that the incidents should speak for themselves without 
verbal exposition; while the effects aimed at in speech should be 
produced by the speaker, and as a result of the speech. For what 
were the business of a speaker, if the Thought were revealed quite 
apart from what he says? 
Next, as regards Diction. One branch of the inquiry treats of the 
Modes of Utterance. But this province of knowledge belongs to the 
art of Delivery and to the masters of that science. It includes, for 
instance — what is a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, a 
question, an answer, and so forth. To know or not to know these 
things involves no serious censure upon the poet’s art. For who can 
admit the fault imputed to Homer by Protagoras — that in the words, 
“Sing, goddess, of the wrath, he gives a command under the idea 
that he utters a prayer? For to tell some one to do a thing or not to 
do it is, he says, a command. We may, therefore, pass this over as an 
inquiry that belongs to another art, not to poetry. 
XX 
Language in general includes the following parts: Letter, Syllable, 
Connecting Word, Noun, Verb, Inflection or Case, Sentence or 
Phrase. 
A Letter is an indivisible sound, yet not every such sound, but 
only one which can form part of a group of sounds. For even brutes 
utter indivisible sounds, none of which I call a letter. The sound I 
mean may be either a vowel, a semivowel, or a mute. A vowel is 
that which without impact of tongue or lip has an audible sound. A 
semivowel, that which with such impact has an audible sound, as S 
and R. A mute, that which with such impact has by itself no sound, 
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but joined to a vowel sound becomes audible, as G and D. These are 
distinguished according to the form assumed by the mouth and the 
place where they are produced; according as they are aspirated or 
smooth, long or short; as they are acute, grave, or of an intermediate 
tone; which inquiry belongs in detail to the writers on meter. 
A Syllable is a nonsignificant sound, composed of a mute and a 
vowel: for GR without A is a syllable, as also with A-GRA. But the 
investigation of these differences belongs also to metrical science. 
A Connecting word is a nonsignificant sound, which neither 
causes nor hinders the union of many sounds into one significant 
sound; it may be placed at either end or in the middle of a sentence. 
Or, a nonsignificant sound, which out of several sounds, each of 
them significant, is capable of forming one significant sound — as 
ἀμφί (amphi), περί (peri), and the like. Or, a nonsignificant sound, 
which marks the beginning, end, or division of a sentence; such, 
however, that it cannot correctly stand by itself at the beginning of 
a sentence — as μέν (men), δήτοί (etoi), δέ (de).11 
A Noun is a composite significant sound, not marking time, of 
which no part is in itself significant: for in double or compound 
words we do not employ the separate parts as if each were in itself 
significant. Thus in Theodorus, “god-given,” the δῶρον (doron) or 
“gift” is not in itself significant. 
A Verb is a composite significant sound, marking time, in which, as 
in the noun, no part is in itself significant. For “man” or “white” does 
not express the idea of “when”; but “he walks” or “he has walked” 
does connote time, present or past. 
11. Fergusson's edition of Aristotle's Poetics uses Ancient 
Greek throughout. I have attempted to reproduce all 
instances by using the Loeb Library, Perseus at Tufts, 
and other sources, but because I do not read Greek 
there are likely several errors. Please send any 
corrections or improvements. 
Aristotle - from Poetics  |  75
Inflection belongs both to the noun and verb, and expresses 
either the relation “of,” “to,” or the like; or that of number, whether 
one or many, as “man” or “men”; or the modes or tones in actual 
delivery, e.g., a question or a command. “Did he go?” and “go” are 
verbal inflections of this kind. 
A Sentence or Phrase is a composite significant sound, some at 
least of whose parts are in themselves significant; for not every such 
group of words consists of verbs and nouns — “the definition of 
man,” for example — but it may dispense even with the verb. Still 
it will always have some significant part, as “in walking,” or “Cleon 
son of Cleon.” A sentence or phrase may form a unity in two ways — 
either as signifying one thing, or as consisting of several parts linked 
together. Thus the Iliad is one by the linking together of parts, the 
definition of man by the unity of the thing signified. 
XXI 
Words are of two kinds, simple and double. By simple I mean those 
composed of nonsignificant elements, such as γῆ (ge). By double 
or compound, those composed either of a significant and 
nonsignificant element (though within the whole word no element 
is significant), or of elements that are both significant. A word may 
likewise be triple, quadruple, or multiple in form, like so many 
Massilian expressions, e.g., “Hermo-caico-xanthus <who prayed to 
Father Zeus>.” 
Every word is either current, or strange, or metaphorical, or 
ornamental, or newly-coined, or lengthened, or contracted, or 
altered. 
By a current or proper word I mean one which is in general 
use among a people; by a strange word, one which is in use in 
another country. Plainly, therefore, the same word may be at once 
strange and current, but not in relation to the same people. The 
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word sigynon, “lance,” is to the Cyprians a current term but to us a 
strange one. 
Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference 
either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from 
species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion. Thus from 
genus to species, as: “There lies my ship”; for lying at anchor is a 
species of lying. From species to genus, as: “Verily ten thousand 
noble deeds hath Odysseus wrought”; for ten thousand is a species 
of large number, and is here used for a large number generally. From 
species to species, as: “With blade of bronze drew away the life,” and 
“Cleft the water with the vessel of unyielding bronze.” Here αρυσαι 
(arusai), “to draw away” is used for ταμειν (tamein), “to cleave,” and 
ταμειν (tamein), again for αρυσαι (arusai) — each being a species of 
taking away. Analogy or proportion is when the second term is to 
the first as the fourth to the third. We may then use the fourth 
for the second, or the second for the fourth. Sometimes too we 
qualify the metaphor by adding the term to which the proper word 
is relative. Thus the cup is to Dionysus as the shield to Ares. The 
cup may, therefore, be called “the shield of Dionysus,” and the shield 
“the cup of Ares.” Or, again, as old age is to life, so is evening to 
day. Evening may therefore be called, “the old age of the day,” and 
old age, “the evening of life,” or, in the phrase of Empedocles, “life’s 
setting sun.” For some of the terms of the proportion there is at 
times no word in existence; still the metaphor may be used. For 
instance, to scatter seed is called sowing: but the action of the sun 
in scattering his rays is nameless. Still this process bears to the sun 
the same relation as sowing to the seed. Hence the expression of the 
poet “sowing the god-created light.” There is another way in which 
this kind of metaphor may be employed. We may apply an alien 
term, and then deny of that term one of its proper attributes; as if 
we were to call the shield, not “the cup of Ares,” but “the wineless 
cup”. 
<An ornamental word . . . > 
A newly-coined word is one which has never been even in local 
use, but is adopted by the poet himself. Some such words there 
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appear to be: as ερνεργεσ (ernyges), “sprouters,” for κερατα (kerata), 
“horns”; and αρετερ (areter), “supplicator”, for ηιερευσ (hiereus), 
“priest.” 
A word is lengthened when its own vowel is exchanged for a 
longer one, or when a syllable is inserted. A word is contracted 
when some part of it is removed. Instances of lengthening are: 
πόληος (polios) for πολέως (poleos), and Πηληιάδεω (Peleiadeo) for 
Πηλείδου (Peleidou); of contraction —  κρῖ (kri), δῶ (do), and ὄψ 
(ops), as in μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ (mia ginetai amphoteron ops). 
An altered word is one in which part of the ordinary form is left 
unchanged, and part is recast: as in δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν (dexiteron 
kata mazon), δεξιτερὸν (dexiteron) is for δεξιόν (dexion). 
Nouns in themselves are either masculine, feminine, or neuter. 
Masculine are such as end in n, r, s, or in some letter compounded 
with s — these being two, ps and x. Feminine, such as end in vowels 
that are always long, namely e and o, and — of vowels that admit of 
lengthening — those in a. Thus the number of letters in which nouns 
masculine and feminine end is the same; for ps and x are equivalent 
to endings in s. No noun ends in a mute or a vowel short by nature. 
Three only end in i — μέλι (meli) κόμμι (kommi), and πέπερι (peperi), 
—  five end in u. Neuter nouns end in these two latter vowels; also in 
n and s. 
XXII 
The perfection of style is to be clear without being mean. The 
clearest style is that which uses only current or proper words; at 
the same time it is mean — witness the poetry of Cleophon and 
of Sthenelus. That diction, on the other hand, is lofty and raised 
above the commonplace which employs unusual words. By unusual, 
I mean strange (or rare) words, metaphorical, lengthened — 
anything, in short, that differs from the normal idiom. Yet a style 
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wholly composed of such words is either a riddle or a jargon; a 
riddle, if it consists of metaphors; a jargon, if it consists of strange 
(or rare) words. For the essence of a riddle is to express true facts 
under impossible combinations. Now this cannot be done by any 
arrangement of ordinary words, but by the use of metaphor it can. 
Such is the riddle: “A man I saw who on another man had glued the 
bronze by aid of fire,” and others of the same kind. A diction that 
is made up of strange (or rare) terms is a jargon. A certain infusion, 
therefore, of these elements is necessary to style; for the strange (or 
rare) word, the metaphorical, the ornamental, and the other kinds 
above mentioned, will raise it above the commonplace and mean, 
while the use of proper words will make it perspicuous. But nothing 
contributes more to produce a cleanness of diction that is remote 
from commonness than the lengthening, contraction, and alteration 
of words. For by deviating in exceptional cases from the normal 
idiom, the language will gain distinction; while, at the same time, 
the partial conformity with usage will give perspicuity. The critics, 
therefore, are in error who censure these licenses of speech, and 
hold the author up to ridicule. Thus Eucleides, the elder, declared 
that it would be an easy matter to be a poet if you might lengthen 
syllables at will. He caricatured the practice in the very form of his 
diction, as in the verse: 
Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθῶνάδε βαδίζοντα (Epicharên eidon 
Marathônade badizonta), 
or, 
ουκ αν γ’εραμένος τον εκείνου ελλεβορον (Ouk an g’eramenos ton 
ekeinou elleboron). 
To employ such license at all obtrusively is, no doubt, grotesque; 
but in any mode of poetic diction there must be moderation. Even 
metaphors, strange (or rare) words, or any similar forms of speech, 
would produce the like effect if used without propriety and with 
the express purpose of being ludicrous. How great a difference is 
made by the appropriate use of lengthening, may be seen in Epic 
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poetry by the insertion of ordinary forms in the verse. So, again, if 
we take a strange (or rare) word, a metaphor, or any similar mode of 
expression, and replace it by the current or proper term, the truth 
of our observation will be manifest. For example, Aeschylus and 
Euripides each composed the same iambic line. But the alteration of 
a single word by Euripides, who employed the rarer term instead of 
the ordinary one, makes one verse appear beautiful and the other 
trivial. Aeschylus in his Philoctetes says: 
φάγεταινα δ’χε μου σάρκας εσθίει ποδός (phagedaina d’he mou 
sarkas esthiei podos). 
Euripides substitutes φάγεταινα (thoinatai), “feasts on,” for 
εσθίε (esthiei), “feeds on.” Again, in the line, 
 
νυν δε μ’αιων ολιγος τε και ουτιδανός και αεικες (nun de m’eôn oligos te 
kai outidanos kai aeikês) 
the difference will be felt if we substitute the common words, 
 
νυν δε m’ eon μικρος τε και ασθενικός καιαδες (nun de m’eôn mikros 
te kai asthenikos kai aeikês.) 
Or if for the line, 
 
δίφρων αεικελιών καταθείς ολίγην τη τράπεζαν (diphron aeikelion 
katatheis oligên te trapezan) 
we read, 
 
μοχθηρον καταθεσησ μικραν τη τραπεζα (diphron mochthêron 
katatheis mikran te trapezan.) 
Or, for ήόνες βρυχάται (eiones booosin), “the sea shores roar,” 
ήόνες κράζουσιν (eiones krazousin), “the sea shores screech.” 
Again, Ariphrades ridiculed the tragedians for using phrases 
which no one would employ in ordinary speech: for 
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example, δωμάτων από (domaton apo), “from the house away,” instead 
of από δωμάτων (apo domaton), “away from the house;” σέθεν (sethen),
εγω δε νυν (ego de nin), “to thee, and I to him;” Αχιλλεως περι (Achilleos 
peri), “Achilles about,” instead of περι Αχιλλεως (peri Achilleos), “about 
Achilles;” and the like. It is precisely because such phrases are not 
part of the current idiom that they give distinction to the style. This, 
however, he failed to see. 
It is a great matter to observe propriety in these several modes 
of expression, as also in compound words, strange (or rare) words, 
and so forth. But the greatest thing by far is to have a command 
of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the 
mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for 
resemblances. 
Of the various kinds of words, the compound are best adapted 
to dithyrambs, rare words to heroic poetry, metaphors to iambic. 
In heroic poetry, indeed, all these varieties are serviceable. But in 
iambic verse, which reproduces, as far as may be, familiar speech, 
the most appropriate words are those which are found even in 
prose. These are the current or proper, the metaphorical, the 
ornamental. 
Concerning Tragedy and imitation by means of action this may 
suffice. 
XXIII 
As to that poetic imitation which is narrative in form and employs 
a single meter, the plot manifestly ought, as in a tragedy, to be 
constructed on dramatic principles. It should have for its subject a 
single action, whole and complete, with a beginning, a middle, and 
an end. It will thus resemble a living organism in all its unity, and 
produce the pleasure proper to it. It will differ in structure from 
historical compositions, which of necessity present not a single 
action, but a single period, and all that happened within that period 
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to one person or to many, little connected together as the events 
may be. For as the sea-fight at Salamis and the battle with the 
Carthaginians in Sicily took place at the same time, but did not tend 
to any one result, so in the sequence of events, one thing sometimes 
follows another, and yet no single result is thereby produced. Such 
is the practice, we may say, of most poets. Here again, then, as 
has been already observed, the transcendent excellence of Homer 
is manifest. He never attempts to make the whole war of Troy the 
subject of his poem, though that war had a beginning and an end. 
It would have been too vast a theme, and not easily embraced in a 
single view. If, again, he had kept it within moderate limits, it must 
have been over-complicated by the variety of the incidents. As it is, 
he detaches a single portion, and admits as episodes many events 
from the general story of the war — such as the Catalogue of the 
ships and others — thus diversifying the poem. All other poets take 
a single hero, a single period, or an action single indeed, but with 
a multiplicity of parts. Thus did the author of the Cypria and of the 
Little Iliad. For this reason the Iliad and the Odyssey each furnish 
the subject of one tragedy, or, at most, of two; while the Cypria 
supplies materials for many, and the Little Iliad for eight — the Award 
of the Arms, the Philoctetes, the Neoptolemus, the Eurypylus, the 
Mendicant Odysseus, the Laconian Women, the Fall of Ilium, the 
Departure of the Fleet. 
XXIV 
Again, Epic poetry must have as many kinds as Tragedy: it must be 
simple, or complex, or “ethical,” or “pathetic.” The parts also, with 
the exception of Song and Spectacle, are the same; for it requires 
Reversals of the Situation, Recognitions, and Scenes of Suffering. 
Moreover, the thoughts and the diction must be artistic. In all these 
respects Homer is our earliest and sufficient model. Indeed each 
of his poems has a twofold character. The Iliad is at once simple 
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and “pathetic,” and the Odyssey complex (for Recognition scenes run 
through it), and at the same time “ethical.” Moreover, in diction and 
thought they are supreme. 
Epic poetry differs from Tragedy in the scale on which it is 
constructed, and in its meter. As regards scale or length, we have 
already laid down an adequate limit: the beginning and the end must 
be capable of being brought within a single view. This condition will 
be satisfied by poems on a smaller scale than the old epics, and 
answering in length to the group of tragedies presented at a single 
sitting. 
Epic poetry has, however, a great — a special — capacity for 
enlarging its dimensions, and we can see the reason. In Tragedy 
we cannot imitate several lines of actions carried on at one and 
the same time; we must confine ourselves to the action on the 
stage and the part taken by the players. But in Epic poetry, owing 
to the narrative form, many events simultaneously transacted can 
be presented; and these, if relevant to the subject, add mass and 
dignity to the poem. The Epic has here an advantage, and one 
that conduces to grandeur of effect, to diverting the mind of the 
hearer, and relieving the story with varying episodes. For sameness 
of incident soon produces satiety, and makes tragedies fail on the 
stage. 
As for the meter, the heroic measure has proved its fitness by 
the test of experience. If a narrative poem in any other meter or in 
many meters were now composed, it would be found incongruous. 
For of all measures the heroic is the stateliest and the most massive; 
and hence it most readily admits rare words and metaphors, which 
is another point in which the narrative form of imitation stands 
alone. On the other hand, the iambic and the trochaic tetrameter 
are stirring measures, the latter being akin to dancing, the former 
expressive of action. Still more absurd would it be to mix together 
different meters, as was done by Chaeremon. Hence no one has ever 
composed a poem on a great scale in any other than heroic verse. 
Nature herself, as we have said, teaches the choice of the proper 
measure. 
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Homer, admirable in all respects, has the special merit of being 
the only poet who rightly appreciates the part he should take 
himself. The poet should speak as little as possible in his own 
person, for it is not this that makes him an imitator. Other poets 
appear themselves upon the scene throughout, and imitate but little 
and rarely. Homer, after a few prefatory words, at once brings in 
a man, or woman, or other personage, none of them wanting in 
characteristic qualities, but each with a character of his own. 
The element of the wonderful is required in Tragedy. The 
irrational, on which the wonderful depends for its chief effects, has 
wider scope in Epic poetry, because there the person acting is not 
seen. Thus, the pursuit of Hector would be ludicrous if placed upon 
the stage — the Greeks standing still and not joining in the pursuit, 
and Achilles waving them back. But in the Epic poem the absurdity 
passes unnoticed. Now the wonderful is pleasing, as may be inferred 
from the fact that every one tells a story with some addition of his 
knowing that his hearers like it. It is Homer who has chiefly taught 
other poets the art of telling lies skilfully. The secret of it lies in a 
fallacy For, assuming that if one thing is or becomes, a second is or 
becomes, men imagine that, if the second is, the first likewise is or 
becomes. But this is a false inference. Hence, where the first thing is 
untrue, it is quite unnecessary, provided the second be true, to add 
that the first is or has become. For the mind, knowing the second to 
be true, falsely infers the truth of the first. There is an example of 
this in the Bath Scene of the Odyssey. 
Accordingly, the poet should prefer probable impossibilities to 
improbable possibilities. The tragic plot must not be composed of 
irrational parts. Everything irrational should, if possible, be 
excluded; or, at all events, it should lie outside the action of the play 
(as, in the Oedipus, the hero’s ignorance as to the manner of Laius’ 
death); not within the drama — as in the Electra, the messenger’s 
account of the Pythian games; or, as in the Mysians, the man who 
has come from Tegea to Mysia and is still speechless. The plea that 
otherwise the plot would have been ruined, is ridiculous; such a 
plot should not in the first instance be constructed. But once the 
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irrational has been introduced and an air of likelihood imparted to it, 
we must accept it in spite of the absurdity. Take even the irrational 
incidents in the Odyssey, where Odysseus is left upon the shore 
of Ithaca. How intolerable even these might have been would be 
apparent if an inferior poet were to treat the subject. As it is, the 
absurdity is veiled by the poetic charm with which the poet invests 
it. 
The diction should be elaborated in the pauses of the action, 
where there is no expression of character or thought. For, 
conversely, character and thought are merely obscured by a diction 
that is overbrilliant. 
XXV 
With respect to critical difficulties and their solutions, the number 
and nature of the sources from which they may be drawn may be 
thus exhibited. 
The poet being an imitator, like a painter or any other artist, must 
of necessity imitate one of three objects — things as they were or 
are, things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they 
ought to be. The vehicle of expression is language — either current 
terms or, it may be, rare words or metaphors. There are also many 
modifications of language, which we concede to the poets. Add to 
this, that the standard of correctness is not the same in poetry and 
politics, any more than in poetry and any other art. Within the art 
of poetry itself there are two kinds of faults — those which touch 
its essence, and those which are accidental. If a poet has chosen to 
imitate something, <but has imitated it incorrectly> through want 
of capacity, the error is inherent in the poetry. But if the failure is 
due to a wrong choice — if he has represented a horse as throwing 
out both his off legs at once, or introduced technical inaccuracies in 
medicine, for example, or in any other art — the error is not essential 
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to the poetry. These are the points of view from which we should 
consider and answer the objections raised by the critics. 
First as to matters which concern the poet’s own art. If he 
describes the impossible, he is guilty of an error; but the error may 
be justified, if the end of the art be thereby attained (the end being 
that already mentioned) — if, that is, the effect of this or any other 
part of the poem is thus rendered more striking. A case in point 
is the pursuit of Hector. if, however, the end might have been as 
well, or better, attained without violating the special rules of the 
poetic art, the error is not justified: for every kind of error should, if 
possible, be avoided. 
Again, does the error touch the essentials of the poetic art, or 
some accident of it? For example, not to know that a hind has no 
horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically. 
Further, if it be objected that the description is not true to fact, 
the poet may perhaps reply, “But the objects are as they ought 
to be”; just as Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought to 
be; Euripides, as they are. In this way the objection may be met. 
If, however, the representation be of neither kind, the poet may 
answer, “This is how men say the thing is.” applies to tales about the 
gods. It may well be that these stories are not higher than fact nor 
yet true to fact: they are, very possibly, what Xenophanes says of 
them. But anyhow, “this is what is said.” Again, a description may be 
no better than the fact: “Still, it was the fact”; as in the passage about 
the arms: “Upright upon their butt-ends stood the spears.” This was 
the custom then, as it now is among the Illyrians. 
Again, in examining whether what has been said or done by some 
one is poetically right or not, we must not look merely to the 
particular act or saying, and ask whether it is poetically good or 
bad. We must also consider by whom it is said or done, to whom, 
when, by what means, or for what end; whether, for instance, it be 
to secure a greater good, or avert a greater evil. 
Other difficulties may be resolved by due regard to the usage of 
language. We may note a rare word, as in oureas men proton, “the 
mules first [he killed],” where the poet perhaps employs oureas not 
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in the sense of mules, but of sentinels. So, again, of Dolon: “ill-
favored indeed he was to look upon.” It is not meant that his body 
was ill-shaped but that his face was ugly; for the Cretans use the 
word eueides, “well-flavored” to denote a fair face. Again, zoroteron 
de keraie, “mix the drink livelier” does not mean “mix it stronger” as 
for hard drinkers, but “mix it quicker.” 
Sometimes an expression is metaphorical, as “Now all gods and 
men were sleeping through the night” — while at the same time 
the poet says: “Often indeed as he turned his gaze to the Trojan 
plain, he marveled at the sound of flutes and pipes.” “All” is here 
used metaphorically for “many,” all being a species of many. So in the 
verse, “alone she hath no part . . . , οἶη (oiê), “alone” is metaphorical; 
for the best known may be called the only one. 
Again, the solution may depend upon accent or breathing. Thus 
Hippias of Thasos solved the difficulties in the lines, 
δíδομξν (dídomen) δiδóμξν (didómen) δέ οι (de hoi), and το μεν (to men) 
που (οû) κατατίθεται ομπρο (kataputhetai ombro). 
Or again, the question may be solved by punctuation, as in 
Empedocles: “Of a sudden things became mortal that before had 
learnt to be immortal, and things unmixed before mixed.” 
Or again, by ambiguity of meaning, as παράχθηκεν δε λέγω νυξ 
(parocheken de pleo nux), where the word λέγω (pleo) is ambiguous. 
Or by the usage of language. Thus any mixed drink is called οίνος 
(oinos), “wine.” Hence Ganymede is said “to pour the wine to Zeus,” 
though the gods do not drink wine. So too workers in iron are called 
χαλκεας (chalkeas), or “workers in bronze.” This, however, may also be 
taken as a metaphor. 
Again, when a word seems to involve some inconsistency of 
meaning, we should consider how many senses it may bear in the 
particular passage. For example: “there was stayed the spear of 
bronze” — we should ask in how many ways we may take “being 
checked there.” The true mode of interpretation is the precise 
opposite of what Glaucon mentions. Critics, he says, jump at certain 
groundless conclusions; they pass adverse judgement and then 
proceed to reason on it; and, assuming that the poet has said 
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whatever they happen to think, find fault if a thing is inconsistent 
with their own fancy. The question about Icarius has been treated 
in this fashion. The critics imagine he was a Lacedaemonian. They 
think it strange, therefore, that Telemachus should not have met 
him when he went to Lacedaemon. But the Cephallenian story may 
perhaps be the true one. They allege that Odysseus took a wife from 
among themselves, and that her father was Icadius, not Icarius. It is 
merely a mistake, then, that gives plausibility to the objection. 
In general, the impossible must be justified by reference to 
artistic requirements, or to the higher reality, or to received 
opinion. With respect to the requirements of art, a probable 
impossibility is to be preferred to a thing improbable and yet 
possible. Again, it may be impossible that there should be men such 
as Zeuxis painted. “Yes,” we say, “but the impossible is the higher 
thing; for the ideal type must surpass the realty.” To justify the 
irrational, we appeal to what is commonly said to be. In addition 
to which, we urge that the irrational sometimes does not violate 
reason; just as “it is probable that a thing may happen contrary to 
probability.” 
Things that sound contradictory should be examined by the same 
rules as in dialectical refutation — whether the same thing is meant, 
in the same relation, and in the same sense. We should therefore 
solve the question by reference to what the poet says himself, or to 
what is tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence. 
The element of the irrational, and, similarly, depravity of 
character, are justly censured when there is no inner necessity for 
introducing them. Such is the irrational element in the introduction 
of Aegeus by Euripides and the badness of Menelaus in the Orestes. 
Thus, there are five sources from which critical objections are 
drawn. Things are censured either as impossible, or irrational, or 
morally hurtful, or contradictory, or contrary to artistic correctness. 
The answers should be sought under the twelve heads above 
mentioned. 
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XXVI 
The question may be raised whether the Epic or Tragic mode of 
imitation is the higher. If the more refined art is the higher, and 
the more refined in every case is that which appeals to the better 
sort of audience, the art which imitates anything and everything 
is manifestly most unrefined. The audience is supposed to be too 
dull to comprehend unless something of their own is thrown by 
the performers, who therefore indulge in restless movements. Bad 
flute-players twist and twirl, if they have to represent “the quoit-
throw,” or hustle the coryphaeus when they perform the Scylla. 
Tragedy, it is said, has this same defect. We may compare the 
opinion that the older actors entertained of their successors. 
Mynniscus used to call Callippides “ape” on account of the 
extravagance of his action, and the same view was held of Pindarus. 
Tragic art, then, as a whole, stands to Epic in the same relation as 
the younger to the elder actors. So we are told that Epic poetry 
is addressed to a cultivated audience, who do not need gesture; 
Tragedy, to an inferior public. Being then unrefined, it is evidently 
the lower of the two. 
Now, in the first place, this censure attaches not to the poetic 
but to the histrionic art; for gesticulation may be equally overdone 
in epic recitation, as by Sosistratus, or in lyrical competition, as by 
Mnasitheus the Opuntian. Next, all action is not to be condemned 
— any more than all dancing — but only that of bad performers. 
Such was the fault found in Callippides, as also in others of our own 
day, who are censured for representing degraded women. Again, 
Tragedy like Epic poetry produces its effect even without action; it 
reveals its power by mere reading. If, then, in all other respects it is 
superior, this fault, we say, is not inherent in it. 
And superior it is, because it has all the epic elements — it may 
even use the epic meter — with the music and spectacular effects 
as important accessories; and these produce the most vivid of 
pleasures. Further, it has vividness of impression in reading as well 
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as in representation. Moreover, the art attains its end within 
narrower limits for the concentrated effect is more pleasurable than 
one which is spread over a long time and so diluted. What, for 
example, would be the effect of the Oedipus of Sophocles, if it were 
cast into a form as long as the Iliad? Once more, the Epic imitation 
has less unity; as is shown by this, that any Epic poem will furnish 
subjects for several tragedies. Thus if the story adopted by the 
poet has a strict unity, it must either be concisely told and appear 
truncated; or, if it conforms to the Epic canon of length, it must 
seem weak and watery. <Such length implies some loss of unity,> if, 
I mean, the poem is constructed out of several actions, like the Iliad 
and the Odyssey, which have many such parts, each with a certain 
magnitude of its own. Yet these poems are as perfect as possible in 
structure; each is, in the highest degree attainable, an imitation of a 
single action. 
If, then, tragedy is superior to epic poetry in all these respects, 
and, moreover, fulfills its specific function better as an art — for each 
art ought to produce, not any chance pleasure, but the pleasure 
proper to it, as already stated — it plainly follows that tragedy is the 
higher art, as attaining its end more perfectly. 
Thus much may suffice concerning Tragic and Epic poetry in 
general; their several kinds and parts, with the number of each and 
their differences; the causes that make a poem good or bad; the 
objections of the critics and the answers to these objections. 
* * * 
Notes are by Molly Desjardins. 
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6. Aristotle - from Organon, 




We must first determine what a noun, and what a verb, are; next, 
what are negation, affirmation, enunciation, and a sentence. 
Those things therefore which are in the voice, are symbols of the 
passions of the soul, and when written, are symbols of the (passions) 
in the voice, and as there are not the same letters among all men, 
so neither have all the same voices, yet those passions of the soul, 
of which these are primarily the signs, are the same among all, the 
things also, of which these are the similitudes, are the same. About 
these latter, we have spoken in the treatise “Of the Soul,” for they 
are parts belonging to another discussion, but as in the soul, there is 
sometimes a conception, without truth or falsehood, and at another 
time, it is such, as necessarily to have one of these, inherent in it, 
so also is it with the voice, for falsehood and truth are involved in 
composition and division. Nouns therefore and verbs of themselves 
resemble conception, without composition and division, as “man,” or 
“white,” when something is not added, for as yet it is neither true 
nor false, an instance of which is that the word τραγέλαφος [goat-
stag] signifies something indeed, but not yet any thing true or false, 
unless to be, or not to be, is added, either simply, or according to 
time. 
1. The translator's notes have been omitted. 
Aristotle - from Organon, "De
Interpretatione" (On
Chapter 2 
A noun therefore is a sound significant by compact without time, of 
which no part is separately significant; thus in the noun κάλλιππος 
[fair-horse], the ἵππος signifies nothing by itself, as it does in the 
sentence καλὸς ἵππος; neither does it happen with simple nouns as it 
does with composite, for in the former there is by no means the part 
significant, but in the latter a part would be, yet signifies nothing 
separately, as in the word ἐπακτροκέλης [piratical ship], the κέλης 
signifies nothing by itself. But it is according to compact, because 
naturally there is no noun; but when it becomes a symbol, since 
illiterate sounds also signify something, as the sounds of beasts, of 
which there is no noun. 
“Not man,” however, is not a noun, neither is a name instituted 
by which we ought to call it, since it is neither a sentence, nor a 
negation; but let it be an indefinite noun because it exists in respect 
of every thing alike, both of that which is, and of that which is not. 
Φίλωνος indeed, or Φίλωνι, and such like words are not nouns, but 
cases of a noun, but the definition of it (that is, of the case) is the 
same as to other things (with the definition of a noun), but (it differs 
in) that, with (the verb) “is” or “was” or “will be,” it does not signify 
what is true or false, but the noun always (signifies this), as “Philonus 
is,” or “is not,” for as yet, this neither signifies what is true, nor what 
is false. 
Chapter 3 
A verb, is that which, besides something else, signifies time; of 
which no part is separately significant, and it is always indicative of 
those things which are asserted of something else. But I say that it 
signifies time, besides something else, as for instance, “health” is a 
noun, but “is well” is a verb; for it signifies, besides being well, that 
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such is the case now: it is always also significant of things asserted 
of something else, as of those which are predicated of a subject, or 
which are in a subject. 
Nevertheless I do not call, “is not well,” and, “is not ill”—verbs; for 
indeed they signify time, besides something else, and are always 
(significant) of something, yet a name is not given to this difference, 
let either be therefore an indefinite verb, because it is similarly 
inherent both in whatever does, and does not exist. So also “was 
well” or “will be well” are not verbs, but they are cases of a verb, 
and differ from a verb, because the latter, besides something else, 
signifies present time; but the others, that which is about the 
present time. 
Verbs therefore so called, by themselves, are nouns, and have a 
certain signification, for the speaker establishes conception, and the 
hearer acquiesces, but they do not yet signify whether a thing “is” or 
“is not,” for neither is “to be” or “not to be” a sign of a thing, nor if you 
should say merely, “being,” for that is nothing; they signify however, 
besides something else, a certain composition, which without the 
composing members it is impossible to understand. 
Chapter 4 
A sentence is voice significant by compact, of which any part 
separately possesses signification, as indeed a word, yet not as 
affirmation or negation; now I say for example “man” is significant, 
but does not imply that it “is” or “is not”; it will however be 
affirmation or negation, if any thing be added to it. One syllable of 
the word ἄνθρωπος [human], is not however (significant), neither the 
“ῦς” in “μῦς,” but it is now merely sound; still in compound words a 
part is significant, but not by itself, as we have observed. 
Now every sentence is significant, not as an instrument, but, as 
we have said, by compact, still not every sentence is enunciative, 
but that in which truth or falsehood is inherent, which things do 
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not exist in all sentences, as prayer is a sentence, but it is neither 
true nor false. Let therefore the other sentences be dismissed, their 
consideration belongs more properly to Rhetoric or Poetry; but the 
enunciative sentence to our present theory. 
Chapter 5 
One first enunciative sentence is affirmation; afterwards negation, 
and all the rest are one by conjunction. It is necessary however that 
every enunciative sentence should be from a verb, or from the case 
of a verb, for the definition of “man,” unless “is,” or “was,” or “will 
be,” or something of this kind, be added, is not yet an enunciative 
sentence. Why indeed is the sentence “a terrestrial biped animal” 
one thing, and not many things? for it will not be one, because 
it is consecutively pronounced: this however belongs to another 
discussion. One enunciative sentence, moreover, is either that 
which signifies one thing, or which is one by conjunction, and many 
(such sentences) are either those which signify many things and not 
one thing, or which are without conjunction. Let therefore a noun or 
a verb be only a word, since we cannot say that he enunciates who 
thus expresses any thing by his voice whether he is interrogated 
by any one or not, but that he speaks from deliberate intention. 
Now of these enunciations one is simple, for instance something of 
something, or from something, but another is composed of these, 
as a certain sentence which is already a composite; simple 
enunciation, then, is voice significant about something being 
inherent, or non-inherent, according as times are divided. 
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Chapter 6 
Affirmation is the enunciation of something concerning something, 
but negation is the enunciation of something from something. 
Since, however, a man may enunciate what is inherent as though it 
were not, and what is not as though it were; that which is, as if it 
were, and that which is not, as if it were not, and in like manner 
about times external to the present; it is possible that whatever any 
one affirms may be denied, and that whatever any one denies may 
be affirmed, whence it is evident that to every affirmation there is 
an opposite negation, and to every negation an opposite affirmation. 
Let this be contradiction, affirmation and negation being opposites, 
but I call that opposition which is of the same respecting the same, 
not equivocally, and such other particulars of the kind as we have 
concluded against sophistical importunities. 
Chapter 7 
Of things, since some are universal, but others singular, (and by 
universal I mean whatever may naturally be predicated of many 
things, but by singular, that which may not: as “man” is universal, but 
“Callias” singular), it is necessary to enunciate that something is, or 
is not, inherent, at one time, in an universal, at another in a singular 
thing. Now, if any one universally enunciates of an universal, that 
something is or is not inherent, these enunciations will be contrary: 
I mean universally enunciates of an universal, as that “every man is 
white,” “no man is white.” When on the other hand he enunciates 
of universals, not universally, these are not contraries, though the 
things signified may sometimes be contrary; but I mean by not 
universally enunciating of universals, as that “man is white,” “man is 
not white”: for man being universal, is not employed as an universal 
in the enunciation, since the word “every” does not signify the 
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universal, but (shows that the subject is) universally (taken). Now to 
predicate universally of what is universally predicated is not true, 
for no affirmation will be true in which the universal is predicated of 
an universal predicate, as for instance, “every man” is “every animal.” 
Wherefore I say affirmation is opposed to negation contradictorily, 
the affirmation which signifies the universal to that which is not 
universal, as “every man is white,” “not every man is white,” “no man 
is white,” “some man is white.” But contrarily is between universal 
affirmative and universal negative, as “every man is white,” “no man 
is white,” “every man is just,” “no man is just.” Wherefore it is 
impossible that these should at one and the same time be true, but 
the opposites to these may sometimes possibly be co-verified about 
the same thing, as that “not every man is white,” and “some man is 
white.” Of such contradictions then of universals, as are universally 
made, one must necessarily be true or false, and also such as are of 
singulars, as “Socrates is white,” “Socrates is not white”; but of such 
contradictions as are indeed of universals, yet are not universally 
made, one is not always true, but the other false. For at one and the 
same time we may truly say that “man is white,” and that “man is 
not white,” and “man is handsome,” and “man is not handsome,” for if 
he is deformed he is not handsome, and if any thing is becoming to 
be, it is, not. This however may at once appear absurd, because the 
assertion “man is not white,” seems at the same time to signify the 
same thing, as “no man is white,” but it neither necessarily signifies 
the same thing, nor at the same time. 
Notwithstanding it is evident that of one affirmation there is one 
negation, for it is necessary that the negation should deny the same 
thing which the affirmation affirmed, and also from the same, (i.e.) 
either from some singular or some universal, universally or not 
universally; I say, for instance, that “Socrates is white,” “Socrates is 
not white.” If however there is something else from the same thing, 
or the same thing from something else, that (enunciation) will not 
be opposite, but different from it; to the one, “every man is white,” 
the other (is opposed) “not every man is white,” and to the one, “a 
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certain man is white,” the other, “no man is white”; and to the one, 
“man is white,” the other, “man is not white.” 
That there is then one affirmation contradictorily opposed to 
one negation, and what these are, has been shown, also that there 
are other contraries, and what they are, and that not every 
contradiction is true or false, and why and when it is true or false. 
Chapter 8 
The affirmation and negation are one, which indicate one thing of 
one, either of an universal, being taken universally, or in like manner 
if it is not, as “every man is white,” “not every man is white,” “man 
is white,” “man is not white,” “no man is white,” “some man is white,” 
if that which is white signifies one thing. But it one name be given 
to two things, from which one thing does not arise, there is not one 
affirmation nor one negation; as if any one gave the name “garment” 
to a “horse,” and to “a man”; that “the garment is white,” this will not 
be one affirmation, nor one negation, since it in no respect differs 
from saying “man” and “horse” are “white,” and this is equivalent to 
“man is white,” and “horse is white.” If therefore these signify many 
things, and are many, it is evident that the first enunciation either 
signifies many things or nothing, for “some man is not a horse,” 
wherefore neither in these is it necessary that one should be a true, 
but the other a false contradiction. 
Chapter 9 
In those things which are, and have been, the affirmation and 
negation must of necessity be true or false; in universals, as 
universals, always one true but the other false, and also in singulars, 
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as we have shown; but in the case of universals not universally 
enunciated, there is no such necessity, and concerning these we 
have also spoken, but as to singulars and futures, this is not the 
case. For if every affirmation or negation be true or false, it is also 
necessary that every thing should exist or should not exist, for if one 
man says that a thing will be, but another denies the same, one of 
them must evidently of necessity speak truth, if every affirmation or 
negation be true or false, for both will not subsist in such things at 
one and the same time. Thus if it is true to say that “a thing is white,” 
or that “it is not white,” it must of necessity be “white” or not “white,” 
and if it is white or not white, it was true to affirm or to deny it: also 
if it is not, it is falsely said to be, and if it is falsely said to be, it is not; 
so that it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation 
should be true or false. Indeed there is nothing which either is, or 
is generated fortuitously, nor casually, nor will be, or not be, but all 
things are from necessity, and not casually, for either he who affirms 
speaks truth, or he who denies, for in like manner it might either 
have been or not have been, for that which subsists casually neither 
does nor will subsist more in this way than in that. Moreover if a 
thing is now “white,” it was true to say before that it will be “white,” 
so that it was always true to say of any thing generated that it either 
is, or that it will be; but if it was always true to say that it is, or 
will be, it is impossible that this is not, nor should be; and whatever 
must of necessity be, it is impossible that it should not have been 
generated, and what it is impossible should not have been generated 
must of necessity have been generated; wherefore all things that 
will be, it is necessary should be generated, and hence there will be 
nothing casual nor fortuitous, for if it were fortuitous it would not 
be of necessity. Nor is it possible to say, that neither of them is true, 
as that it will neither be, nor will not be, for in the first place the 
affirmation being false, the negation will not be true, and this being 
false, it results that the affirmation is not true. And besides, if it were 
true to say that a thing is at the same time “white” and “great,” both 
must of necessity be, but if it shall be to-morrow, it must necessarily 
be to-morrow, and if it will neither be nor will not be to-morrow, 
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it will not be a casual thing, for example, a naval engagement, for it 
would be requisite that the engagement should neither occur nor 
not occur. 
These and similar absurdities then will happen, if of every 
affirmation and negation, whether in respect of universals 
enunciated universally, or of singulars, it is necessary that one of 
the opposites be true and the other false, but that nothing happens 
casually in those things which subsist, but that all are, and are 
generated of necessity; so that it will neither be necessary to 
deliberate nor to trouble ourselves, as if we shall do this thing, 
something definite will occur, but if we do not, it will not occur. 
For there is nothing to prevent a person for ten thousand years 
asserting that this will happen, and another person denying it, so 
that of necessity it will have been then true to assert either of them. 
And it makes no difference whether any persons have uttered a 
contradiction or not, for it is evident that the things are so, although 
the one should not have affirmed any thing, or the other have 
denied it, since it is not, because it has been affirmed or denied, that 
therefore a thing will or will not be, neither will it be more so for 
ten thousand years than for any time whatever. Hence if a thing so 
subsisted in every time that one of these is truly asserted of it, it 
was necessary that this should take place; and each thing generated, 
always so subsisted, as to have been generated from necessity, for 
when any one truly said that it will be, it was not possible not to have 
been generated, and of that which is generated, it was always true 
to say that it will be. 
But if these things are impossible — (for we see that there is a 
beginning of future things, both from our deliberation and practice, 
and briefly in things which do not always energize, there is equally 
a power of being and of not being, in which both to be and not 
to be occurs, as well as to have been generated and not to have 
been generated; and, indeed, we have many things which evidently 
subsist in this manner, for example, it is possible for this garment to 
have been cut in pieces, and it may not be cut in pieces, but be worn 
out beforehand, so also it is possible that it may not be cut in pieces, 
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for it would not have been worn out before, unless it had been 
possible that it might not be cut in pieces, and so also in respect 
of other productions, which are spoken of according to a power 
of this kind—) then it is evident that all things neither are, nor are 
generated of necessity, but that some things subsist casually, and 
that their affirmation is not more true than their negation, and that 
there are others in which one of these subsists more frequently, and 
for the most part, yet so, that either might possibly have occurred, 
but the other not. 
Wherefore, being, must of necessity be when it is, and non-being, 
not be, when it is not; but it is not necessary that every being should 
be, nor that non-being should not be, since it is not the same thing 
for every being to be from necessity, when it is, and simply to be 
from necessity, and in like manner as to non-being. There is the 
same reasoning also in the case or contradiction; to be or not to be 
is necessary for every thing, also that it shall, or shall not be, yet it 
is not requisite to speak of each separately, but I say, for instance, 
that it is necessary for a naval action to occur or not occur to-
morrow, yet it is not necessary that there should be a naval action 
to-morrow, nor that there should not be; it is necessary, however, 
that it should either be or not be. Wherefore, since assertions and 
things are similarly true, it is evident that things which so subsist, as 
that whatever have happened, the contraries also were possible, it 
is necessary that contradiction should subsist in the same manner, 
which happens to those things which are not always, or which not 
always, are not. For of these, one part of the contradiction must 
necessarily be true or false, not indeed this or that, but just as it may 
happen, and one must be the rather true, yet not already true nor 
false; so that it is evidently not necessary that of every affirmation 
and negation of opposites, one should be true, but the other false; 
for it does not happen in the same manner with things which are 
not, but which either may or may not be, as with things which are, 
but it happens as we have said. 
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7. Horace - Ars Poetica 
To the Pisos
1
edition (1926), Horace is 
addressing a father and two sons, one of 
whom may have been writing a play in the 
style of Homer or the Greek satryic drama. 
The advice given, then, may have been 
directed to that end. 
If a painter should wish to unite a horse’s neck to a human head, and 
spread a variety of plumage over limbs [of different animals]2 taken 
from every part [of nature], so that what is a beautiful woman in the 
upper part terminates unsightly in an ugly fish below; could you, my 
friends, refrain from laughter, were you admitted to such a sight? 
Believe, ye Pisos, the book will be perfectly like such a picture, the 
ideas of which, like a sick man’s dreams, are all vain and fictitious: 
1. Horace's treatise was originally composed as a letter to 
the Piso family. It was given the name Ars Poetica by 
Quintilian, a Roman rhetorician (~35 BC to ~95 BC). The 
Piso family was a large prominent family in Rome but it is 
unclear which members Horace is addressing here. 
According to H. Ruston Fairclough, the translator of the 
Loeb Classical Library 
2. Additions in square brackets from Translator. 
Translator's explanatory and discursive notes have been 
removed. 
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so that neither head nor foot can correspond to any one form. 
“Poets and painters [you will say] have ever had equal authority for 
attempting any thing.” We are conscious of this, and this privilege 
we demand and allow in turn: but not to such a degree, that the 
tame should associate with the savage; nor that serpents should be 
coupled with birds, lambs with tigers. 
In pompous introductions, and such as promise a great deal, it 
generally happens that one or two verses of purple patch-work, that 
may make a great show, are tagged on; as when the grove and the 
altar of Diana and the meandering of a current hastening through 
pleasant fields, or the river Rhine, or the rainbow is described. But 
here there was no room for these [fine things]: perhaps, too, you 
know how to draw a cypress: but what is that to the purpose, if 
he, who is painted for the given price, is [to be represented as] 
swimming hopeless out of a shipwreck? A large vase at first was
designed: why, as the wheel revolves, turns out a little pitcher? In 
a word, be your subject what it will, let it be merely simple and 
uniform. 
The great majority of us poets, father, and youths worthy such a 
father, are misled by the appearance of right. I labor to be concise, 
I become obscure: nerves and spirit fail him, that aims at the easy: 
one, that pretends to be sublime, proves bombastical: he who is too 
cautious and fearful of the storm, crawls along the ground: he who 
wants to vary his subject in a marvelous manner, paints the dolphin 
in the woods, the boar in the sea. The avoiding of an error leads to a 
fault, if it lack skill. 
A statuary about the Æmilian school shall of himself, with singular 
skill, both express the nails, and imitate in brass the flexible hair; 
unhappy yet in the main, because he knows not how to finish a 
complete piece. I would no more choose to be such a one as this, 
had I a mind to compose any thing, than to live with a distorted 
nose, [though] remarkable for black eyes and jetty hair. 
Ye who write, make choice of a subject suitable to your abilities; 
and revolve in your thoughts a considerable time what your 
strength declines, and what it is able to support. Neither elegance of 
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style, nor a perspicuous disposition, shall desert the man, by whom 
the subject matter is chosen judiciously. This, or I am mistaken, will 
constitute the merit and beauty of arrangement, that the poet just 
now say what ought just now to be said, put off most of his thoughts, 
and waive them for the present. 
In the choice of his words, too, the author of the projected poem 
must be delicate and cautious, he must embrace one and reject 
another: you will express yourself eminently well, if a dexterous 
combination should give an air of novelty to a well-known word. If 
it happen to be necessary to explain some abstruse subjects by new 
invented terms; it will follow that you must frame words never heard 
of by the old-fashioned Cethegi: and the license will be granted, 
if modestly used: and the new and lately-formed words will have 
authority, if they descend from a Greek source, with a slight 
deviation. But why should the Romans grant to Plutus and Cæcilius 
a privilege denied to Virgil and Varius? Why should I be envied, if 
I have it in my power to acquire a few words, when the language 
of Cato and Ennius has enriched our native tongue, and produced 
new names of things? It has been, and ever will be, allowable to coin 
a word marked with the stamp in present request. As leaves in the 
woods are changed with the fleeting years; the earliest fall off first: 
in this manner words perish with old age, and those lately invented 
nourish and thrive, like men in the time of youth. We, and our 
works, are doomed to death: Whether Neptune, admitted into the 
continent, defends our fleet from the north winds, a kingly work; or 
the lake, for a long time unfertile and fit for oars, now maintains its 
neighboring cities and feels the heavy plow; or the river, taught to 
run in a more convenient channel, has changed its course which was 
so destructive to the fruits. Mortal works must perish: much less 
can the honor and elegance of language be long-lived. Many words 
shall revive, which now have fallen off; and many which are now in 
esteem shall fall off, if it be the will of custom, in whose power is the 
decision and right and standard of language. 
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Homer has instructed us in what measure the achievements of 
kings, and chiefs, and direful war might be written. 
Plaintive strains originally were appropriated to the unequal 
numbers [of the elegiac]: afterward [love and] successful desires 
were included. Yet what author first published humble elegies, the 
critics dispute, and the controversy still waits the determination of a 
judge. Rage armed Archilochus with the iambic of his own invention. 
The sock and the majestic buskin assumed this measure as adapted 
for dialogue, and to silence the noise of the populace, and calculated 
for action. 
To celebrate gods, and the sons of gods, and the victorious 
wrestler, and the steed foremost in the race, and the inclination of 
youths, and the free joys of wine, the muse has allotted to the lyre. 
If I am incapable and unskillful to observe the distinction 
described, and the complexions of works [of genius], why am I 
accosted by the name of “Poet?” Why, out of false modesty, do I 
prefer being ignorant to being learned? 
A comic subject will not be handled in tragic verse: in like manner 
the banquet of Thyestes will not bear to be held in familiar verses, 
and such as almost suit the sock. Let each peculiar species [of 
writing] fill with decorum its proper place. Nevertheless sometimes 
even comedy exalts her voice, and passionate Chremes rails in a 
tumid strain: and a tragic writer generally expresses grief in a 
prosaic style. Telephus and Peleus, when they are both in poverty 
and exile, throw aside their rants and gigantic expressions if they 
have a mind to move the heart of the spectator with their complaint. 
It is not enough that poems be beautiful; let them be tender and 
affecting, and bear away the soul of the auditor whithersoever they 
please. As the human countenance smiles on those that smile, so 
does it sympathize with those that weep. If you would have me weep 
you must first express the passion of grief yourself; then, Telephus 
or Peleus, your misfortunes hurt me: if you pronounce the parts 
assigned you ill, I shall either fall asleep or laugh. 
Pathetic accents suit a melancholy countenance; words full of 
menace, an angry one; wanton expressions, a sportive look; and 
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serious matter, an austere one. For nature forms us first within 
to every modification of circumstances; she delights or impels us 
to anger, or depresses us to the earth and afflicts us with heavy 
sorrow: then expresses those emotions of the mind by the tongue, 
its interpreter. If the words be discordant to the station of the 
speaker, the Roman knights and plebians will raise an immoderate 
laugh. It will make a wide difference, whether it be Davus that 
speaks, or a hero; a man well-stricken in years, or a hot young fellow 
in his bloom; and a matron of distinction, or an officious nurse; 
a roaming merchant, or the cultivator of a verdant little farm; a 
Colchian, or an Assyrian; one educated at Thebes, or one at Argos. 
You, that write, either follow tradition, or invent such fables as 
are congruous to themselves. If as poet you have to represent the 
renowned Achilles; let him be indefatigable, wrathful, inexorable, 
courageous, let him deny that laws were made for him, let him 
arrogate every thing to force of arms. Let Medea be fierce and 
untractable, Ino an object of pity, Ixion perfidious, Io wandering, 
Orestes in distress. 
If you offer to the stage any thing unattempted, and venture to 
form a new character; let it be preserved to the last such as it set 
out at the beginning, and be consistent with itself. It is difficult to 
write with propriety on subjects to which all writers have a common 
claim; and you with more prudence will reduce the Iliad into acts, 
than if you first introduce arguments unknown and never treated 
of before. A public story will become your own property, if you do 
not dwell upon the whole circle of events, which is paltry and open 
to every one; nor must you be so faithful a translator, as to take 
the pains of rendering [the original] word for word; nor by imitating 
throw yourself into straits, whence either shame or the rules of 
your work may forbid you to retreat. Nor must you make such an 
exordium, as the Cyclic writer of old: “I will sing the fate of Priam, 
and the noble war.” What will this boaster produce worthy of all 
this gaping? The mountains are in labor, a ridiculous mouse will be 
brought forth. How much more to the purpose he, who attempts 
nothing improperly? “Sing for me, my muse, the man who, after the 
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time of the destruction of Troy, surveyed the manners and cities 
of many men.” He meditates not [to produce] smoke from a flash, 
but out of smoke to elicit fire, that he may thence bring forth his 
instances of the marvelous with beauty, [such as] Antiphates, Scylla, 
the Cyclops, and Charybdis. Nor does he date Diomede’s return 
from Meleager’s death, nor trace the rise of the Trojan war from 
[Leda’s] eggs: he always hastens on to the event; and hurries away 
his reader in the midst of interesting circumstances, no otherwise 
than as if they were [already] known; and what he despairs of, as to 
receiving a polish from his touch, he omits; and in such a manner 
forms his fictions, so intermingles the false with the true, that the 
middle is not inconsistent with the beginning, nor the end with the 
middle. 
Do you attend to what I, and the public in my opinion, expect 
from you [as a dramatic writer]. If you are desirous of an applauding 
spectator, who will wait for [the falling of] the curtain, and till the 
chorus calls out “your plaudits;” the manners of every age must be 
marked by you, and a proper decorum assigned to men’s varying 
dispositions and years. The boy, who is just able to pronounce his 
words, and prints the ground with a firm tread, delights to play with 
his fellows, and contracts and lays aside anger without reason, and 
is subject to change every hour. The beardless youth, his guardian 
being at length discharged, joys in horses, and dogs, and the verdure 
of the sunny Campus Martius; pliable as wax to the bent of vice, 
rough to advisers, a slow provider of useful things, prodigal of his 
money, high-spirited, and amorous, and hasty in deserting the 
objects of his passion. [After this,] our inclinations being changed, 
the age and spirit of manhood seeks after wealth, and [high] 
connections, is subservient to points of honor; and is cautious of 
committing any action, which he would subsequently be industrious 
to correct. Many inconveniences encompass a man in years; either 
because he seeks [eagerly] for gain, and abstains from what he has 
gotten, and is afraid to make use of it; or because he transacts 
every thing in a timorous and dispassionate manner, dilatory, slow 
in hope, remiss, and greedy of futurity. Peevish, querulous, a 
Horace - Ars Poetica  |  107
panegyrist of former times when he was a boy, a chastiser and 
censurer of his juniors. Our advancing years bring many advantages 
along with them. Many our declining ones take away. That the parts 
[therefore] belonging to age may not be given to youth, and those of 
a man to a boy, we must dwell upon those qualities which are joined 
and adapted to each person’s age. 
An action is either represented on the stage, or being done 
elsewhere is there related. The things which enter by the ear affect 
the mind more languidly, than such as are submitted to the faithful 
eyes, and what a spectator presents to himself. You must not, 
however, bring upon the stage things fit only to be acted behind 
the scenes: and you must take away from view many actions, which 
elegant description may soon after deliver in presence [of the 
spectators]. Let not Medea murder her sons before the people; nor 
the execrable Atreus openly dress human entrails: nor let Progue be 
metamorphosed into a bird, Cadmus into a serpent. Whatever you 
show to me in this manner, not able to give credit to, I detest. Let 
a play which would be inquired after, and though seen, represented 
anew, be neither shorter nor longer than the fifth act. Neither let 
a god interfere, unless a difficulty worthy a god’s unraveling should 
happen; nor let a fourth person be officious to speak. 
Let the chorus sustain the part and manly character of an actor: 
nor let them sing any thing between the acts which is not conducive 
to, and fitly coherent with, the main design. Let them both patronize 
the good,  and give them friendly advice, and regulate the 
passionate, and love to appease those who swell [with rage]: let 
them praise the repast of a short meal, and salutary effects of 
justice, laws, and peace with her open gates; let them conceal what 
is told to them in confidence, and supplicate and implore the gods 
that prosperity may return to the wretched, and abandon the 
haughty. The flute, (not as now, begirt with brass and emulous of 
the trumpet, but) slender and of simple form, with few stops, was of 
service to accompany and assist the chorus, and with its tone was 
sufficient to fill the rows that were not as yet too crowded, where 
an audience, easily numbered, as being small and sober, chaste and 
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modest, met together. But when the victorious Romans began to 
extend their territories, and an ampler wall encompassed the city, 
and their genius was indulged on festivals by drinking wine in the 
day-time without censure; a greater freedom arose both, to the 
numbers [of poetry], and the measure [of music]. For what taste 
could an unlettered clown and one just dismissed from labors have, 
when in company with the polite; the base, with the man of honor? 
Thus the musician added new movements and a luxuriance to the 
ancient art, and strutting backward and forward, drew a length of 
train over the stage; thus likewise new notes were added to the 
severity of the lyre, and precipitate eloquence produced an unusual 
language [in the theater]: and the sentiments [of the chorus, then] 
expert in teaching useful things and prescient of futurity, differ 
hardly from the oracular Delphi. 
The poet, who first tried his skill in tragic verse for the paltry 
[prize of a] goat, soon after exposed to view wild satyrs naked, 
and attempted raillery with severity, still preserving the gravity [of 
tragedy]: because the spectator on festivals, when heated with wine 
and disorderly, was to be amused with captivating shows and 
agreeable novelty. But it will be expedient so to recommend the 
bantering, so the rallying satyrs, so to turn earnest into jest; that 
none who shall be exhibited as a god, none who is introduced as a 
hero lately conspicuous in regal purple and gold, may deviate into 
the low style of obscure, mechanical shops; or, [on the contrary,] 
while he avoids the ground, effect cloudy mist and empty jargon. 
Tragedy disdaining to prate forth trivial verses, like a matron 
commanded to dance on the festival days, will assume an air of 
modesty, even in the midst of wanton satyrs. As a writer of satire, ye 
Pisos, I shall never be fond of unornamented and reigning terms: nor 
shall I labor to differ so widely from the complexion of tragedy, as 
to make no distinction, whether Davus be the speaker. And the bold 
Pythias, who gained a talent by gulling Simo; or Silenus, the guardian 
and attendant of his pupil-god [Bacchus]. I would so execute a 
fiction taken from a well-known story, that any body might 
entertain hopes of doing the same thing; but, on trial, should sweat 
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and labor in vain. Such power has a just arrangement and 
connection of the parts: such grace may be added to subjects 
merely common. In my judgment the Fauns, that are brought out of 
the woods, should not be too gamesome with their tender strains, 
as if they were educated in the city, and almost at the bar; nor, on 
the other hand; should blunder out their obscene and scandalous 
speeches. For [at such stuff] all are offended, who have a horse, a 
father, or an estate: nor will they receive with approbation, nor give 
the laurel crown, as the purchasers of parched peas and nuts are 
delighted with. 
A long syllable put after a short one is termed an iambus, a lively 
measure, whence also it commanded the name of trimeters to be 
added to iambics, though it yielded six beats of time, being similar to 
itself from first to last. Not long ago, that it might come somewhat 
slower and with more majesty to the ear, it obligingly and 
contentedly admitted into its paternal heritage the steadfast 
spondees; agreeing however, by social league, that it was not to 
depart from the second and fourth place. But this [kind of measure] 
rarely makes its appearance in the notable trimeters of Accius, and 
brands the verse of Ennius brought upon the stage with a clumsy 
weight of spondees, with the imputation of being too precipitate 
and careless, or disgracefully accuses him of ignorance in his art. 
It is not every judge that discerns inharmonious verses, and an 
undeserved indulgence is [in this case] granted to the Roman poets. 
But shall I on this account run riot and write licentiously? Or should 
not I rather suppose, that all the world are to see my faults; secure, 
and cautious [never to err] but with hope of being pardoned? 
Though, perhaps, I have merited no praise, I have escaped censure. 
Ye [who are desirous to excel,] turn over the Grecian models by 
night, turn them by day. But our ancestors commended both the 
numbers of Plautus, and his strokes of pleasantry; too tamely, I will 
not say foolishly, admiring each of them; if you and I but know how 
to distinguish a coarse joke from a smart repartee, and understand 
the proper cadence, by [using] our fingers and ears. 
Thespis is said to have invented a new kind of tragedy, and to 
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have carried his pieces about in carts, which [certain strollers], who 
had their faces besmeared with lees of wine, sang and acted. After 
him Æschylus, the inventor of the vizard mask and decent robe, laid 
the stage over with boards of a tolerable size, and taught to speak 
in lofty tone, and strut in the buskin. To these succeeded the old 
comedy, not without considerable praise: but its personal freedom 
degenerated into excess and violence, worthy to be regulated by 
law; a law was made accordingly, and the chorus, the right of 
abusing being taken away, disgracefully became silent. 
Our poets have left no species [of the art] unattempted; nor have 
those of them merited the least honor, who dared to forsake the 
footsteps of the Greeks, and celebrate domestic facts; whether they 
have instructed us in tragedy, of comedy. Nor would Italy be raised 
higher by valor and feats of arms, than by its language, did not 
the fatigue and tediousness of using the file disgust every one of 
our poets. Do you, the descendants of Pompilius, reject that poem, 
which many days and many a blot have not ten times subdued to the 
most perfect accuracy. Because Democritus believes that genius is 
more successful than wretched art, and excludes from Helicon all 
poets who are in their senses, a great number do not care to part 
with their nails or beard, frequent places of solitude, shun the baths. 
For he will acquire, [he thinks,] the esteem and title of a poet, if he 
neither submits his head, which is not to be cured by even three 
Anticyras, to Licinius the barber. What an unlucky fellow am I, who 
am purged for the bile in spring-time! Else nobody would compose 
better poems; but the purchase is not worth the expense. Therefore 
I will serve instead of a whetstone, which though not able of itself 
to cut, can make steel sharp: so I, who can write no poetry myself, 
will teach the duty and business [of an author]; whence he may be 
stocked with rich materials; what nourishes and forms the poet; 
what gives grace, what not; what is the tendency of excellence, what 
that of error. 
To have good sense, is the first principle and fountain of writing 
well. The Socratic papers will direct you in the choice of your 
subjects; and words will spontaneously accompany the subject, 
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when it is well conceived. He who has learned what he owes to his 
country, and what to his friends; with what affection a parent, a 
brother, and a stranger, are to be loved; what is the duty of a senator, 
what of a judge; what the duties of a general sent out to war; he, 
[I say,] certainly knows how to give suitable attributes to every 
character. I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to 
the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions 
to the life. Sometimes a play, that is showy with common-places, 
and where the manners are well marked, though of no elegance, 
without force or art, gives the people much higher delight and more 
effectually commands their attention, than verse void of matter, and 
tuneful trifles. 
To the Greeks, covetous of nothing but praise, the muse gave 
genius; to the Greeks the power of expressing themselves in round 
periods. The Roman youth learn by long computation to subdivide a 
pound into an hundred parts. Let the son of Albinus tell me, if from 
five ounces one be subtracted, what remains? He would have said 
the third of a pound.–Bravely done! you will be able to take care of 
your own affairs. An ounce is added: what will that be? Half a pound. 
When this sordid rust and hankering after wealth has once tainted 
their minds, can we expect that such verses should be made as are 
worthy of being anointed with the oil of cedar, and kept in the well-
polished cypress? 
Poets wish either to profit or to delight; or to deliver at once both 
the pleasures and the necessaries of life. Whatever precepts you 
give, be concise; that docile minds may soon comprehend what is 
said, and faithfully retain it. All superfluous instructions flow from 
the too full memory. Let what ever is imagined for the sake of 
entertainment, have as much likeness to truth as possible; let not 
your play demand belief for whatever [absurdities] it is inclinable [to 
exhibit]: nor take out of a witch’s belly a living child that she had 
dined upon. The tribes of the seniors rail against every thing that 
is void of edification: the exalted knights disregard poems which 
are austere. He who joins the instructive with the agreeable, carries 
off every vote, by delighting and at the same time admonishing the 
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reader. This book gains money for the Sosii; this crosses the sea, and 
continues to its renowned author a lasting duration. 
Yet there are faults, which we should be ready to pardon: for 
neither does the string [always] form the sound which the hand 
and conception [of the performer] intends, but very often returns 
a sharp note when he demands a flat; nor will the bow always hit 
whatever mark it threatens. But when thereis a great majority of 
beauties in a poem, I will not be offended with a few blemishes, 
which either inattention has dropped, or human nature has not 
sufficiently provided against. What therefore [is to be determined 
in this matter]? As a transcriber, if he still commits the same fault 
though he has been reproved, is without excuse; and the harper 
who always blunders on the same string, is sure to be laughed at; so 
he who is excessively deficient becomes another Chœrilus; whom, 
when I find him tolerable in two or three places, I wonder at with 
laughter; and at the same time am I grieved whenever honest Homer 
grows drowsy? But it is allowable, that sleep should steal upon [the 
progress of] a king work. 
As is painting, so is poetry: some pieces will strike you more if 
you stand near, and some, if you are at a greater distance: one loves 
the dark; another, which is not afraid of the critic’s subtle judgment, 
chooses to be seen in the light; the one has pleased once, the other 
will give pleasure if ten times repeated. 
O ye elder of the youths, though you are framed to a right 
judgment by your father’s instructions, and are wise in yourself, yet 
take this truth along with you, [and] remember it; that in certain 
things a medium and tolerable degree of eminence may be 
admitted: a counselor and pleader at the bar of the middle rate is 
far removed from the merit of eloquent Messala, nor has so much 
knowledge of the law as Casselius Aulus, but yet he is in request; 
[but] a mediocrity in poets neither gods, nor men, nor [even] the 
booksellers’ shops have endured. As at an agreeable entertainment 
discordant music, and muddy perfume, and poppies mixed with 
Sardinian honey give offense, because the supper might have passed 
without them; so poetry, created and invented for the delight of our 
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souls, if it comes short ever so little of the summit, sinks to the 
bottom. He who does not understand the game, abstains from the 
weapons of the Campus Martius: and the unskillful in the tennis-
ball, the quoit, and the troques keeps himself quiet; lest the crowded 
ring should raise a laugh at his expense: notwithstanding this, he 
who knows nothing of verses presumes to compose. Why not! He 
is free-born, and of a good family; above all, he is registered at 
an equestrian sum of moneys, and clear from every vice. You, [I 
am persuaded,] will neither say nor do any thing in opposition to 
Minerva: such is your judgment, such your disposition. But if ever 
you shall write anything, let it be submitted to the ears of Metius 
[Tarpa], who is a judge, and your father’s, and mine; and let it be 
suppressed till the ninth year, your papers being held up within your 
own custody. You will have it in your power to blot out what you 
have not made public: a word ice sent abroad can never return. 
Orpheus, the priest and Interpreter of the gods, deterred the 
savage race of men from slaughters and inhuman diet; once said 
to tame tigers and furious lions: Amphion too, the builder of the 
Theban wall, was said to give the stones moon with the sound 
of his lyre, and to lead them whithersover he would, by engaging 
persuasion. This was deemed wisdom of yore, to distinguish the 
public from private weal; things sacred from things profane; to 
prohibit a promiscuous commerce between the sexes; to give laws 
to married people; to plan out cities; to engrave laws on [tables 
of] wood. Thus honor accrued to divine poets, and their songs. 
After these, excellent Homer and Tyrtæus animated the manly mind 
to martial achievements with their verses. Oracles were delivered 
in poetry, and the economy of life pointed out, and the favor of 
sovereign princes was solicited by Pierian strains, games were 
instituted, and a [cheerful] period put to the tedious labors of the 
day; [this I remind you of,] lest haply you should be ashamed of the 
lyric muse, and Apollo the god of song. 
It has been made a question, whether good poetry be derived 
from nature or from art. For my part, I can neither conceive what 
study can do without a rich [natural] vein, nor what rude genius 
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can avail of itself: so much does the one require the assistance of 
the other, and so amicably do they conspire [to produce the same 
effect]. He who is industrious to reach the wished-for goal, has done 
and suffered much when a boy; he has sweated and shivered with 
cold; he has abstained from love and wine; he who sings the Pythian 
strains, was a learner first, and in awe of a master. But [in poetry] 
it is now enough for a man to say of himself: “I make admirable 
verses: a murrain seize the hindmost: it is scandalous for me to be 
outstripped, and fairly to Acknowledge that I am ignorant of that 
which I never learned.” 
As a crier who collects the crowd together to buy his goods, so a 
poet rich in land, rich in money put out at interest, invites flatterers 
to come [and praise his works] for a reward. But if he be one who 
is well able to set out an elegant table, and give security for a poor 
man, and relieve when entangled in gloomy law-suits; I shall wonder 
if with his wealth he can distinguish a true friend from false one. 
You, whether you have made, or intend to make, a present to any 
one, do not bring him full of joy directly to your finished verses: for 
then he will cry out, “Charming, excellent, judicious,” he will turn 
pale; at some parts he will even distill the dew from his friendly eyes; 
he will jump about; he will beat the ground [with ecstasy]. As those 
who mourn at funerals for pay, do and say more than those that 
are afflicted from their hearts; so the sham admirer is more moved 
than he that praises with sincerity. Certain kings are said to ply with 
frequent bumpers, and by wine make trial of a man whom they are 
sedulous to know whether he be worthy of their friendship or not. 
Thus, if you compose verses, let not the fox’s concealed intentions 
impose upon you. 
If you had recited any thing to Quintilius, he would say, “Alter, I 
pray, this and this:” if you replied, you could do it no better, having 
made the experiment twice or thrice in vain; he would order you to 
blot out, and once more apply to the anvil your ill-formed verses: 
if you choose rather to defend than correct a fault, he spent not 
a word more nor fruitless labor, but you alone might be fond of 
yourself and your own works, without a rival. A good and sensible 
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man will censure spiritless verses, he will condemn the rugged, on 
the incorrect he will draw across a black stroke with his pen; he 
will lop off ambitious [and redundant] ornaments; he will make him 
throw light on the parts that are not perspicuous; he will arraign 
what is expressed ambiguously; he will mark what should be altered; 
[in short,] he will be an Aristarchus: he will not say, “Why should I 
give my friend offense about mere trifles?” These trifles will lead 
into mischiefs of serious consequence, when once made an object 
of ridicule, and used in a sinister manner. 
Like one whom an odious plague or jaundice, fanatic phrensy 
or lunacy, distresses; those who are wise avoid a mad poet, and 
are afraid to touch him; the boys jostle him, and the incautious 
pursue him. If, like a fowler intent upon his game, he should fall 
into a well or a ditch while he belches out his fustian verses and 
roams about, though he should cry out for a long time, “Come 
to my assistance, O my countrymen;” not one would give himself 
the trouble of taking him up. Were any one to take pains to give 
him aid, and let down a rope; “How do you know, but he threw 
himself in hither on purpose?” I shall say: and will relate the death 
of the Sicilian poet. Empedocles, while he was ambitious of being 
esteemed an immortal god, in cold blood leaped into burning Ætna. 
Let poets have the privilege and license to die [as they please]. He 
who saves a man against his will, does the same with him who kills 
him [against his will]. Neither is it the first time that he has behaved 
in this manner; nor, were he to be forced from his purposes, would 
he now become a man, and lay aside his desire of such a famous 
death. Neither does it appear sufficiently, why he makes verses: 
whether he has defiled his father’s ashes, or sacrilegiously removed 
the sad enclosure of the vindictive thunder: it is evident that he is 
mad, and like a bear that has burst through the gates closing his 
den, this unmerciful rehearser chases the learned and unlearned. 
And whomsoever he seizes, he fastens on and assassinates with 
recitation: a leech that will not quit the skin, till satiated with blood. 
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8. Alexander Pope - An Essay 
on Criticism 
— Is quid novisti recites istis, 
Candidus impart; is non, his utter mecum. 
— Horat1 
Part 1 
‘Tis hard to say, if greater want of skill 
Appear in writing or in judging ill; 
But, of the two, less dang’rous is th’ offence 
To tire our patience, than mislead our sense. 
Some few in that, but numbers err in this,     5 
Ten censure wrong for one who writes amiss; 
1. "If you know any maxims better than these be so candid 
as to impart them; if not, make use of these with 
me." This quotation comes from Horace's Epistles 
1.6.67-68. This translation is from Odes, Epodes, and 
Carmen Seculare of Horace, printed for John Davidson, 
1743. This translation notes that "Horace concludes this 
epistle with a very handsome and polite turn, borrowed 
from a maxim of the Stoics, who taught, that mankind 
ought always to be communicative of knowledge, and to 
follow truth wherever it could be found." 
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A fool might once himself alone expose, 
Now one in verse makes many more in prose. 
‘Tis with our judgments as our watches, none 
Go just alike, yet each believes his own.     10 
In poets as true genius is but rare, 
True taste as seldom is the critic’s share; 
Both must alike from Heav’n derive their light, 
These born to judge, as well as those to write. 
Let such teach others who themselves excel,     15 
And censure freely who have written well. 
Authors are partial to their wit, ’tis true, 
But are not critics to their judgment too? 
Yet if we look more closely we shall find 
Most have the seeds of judgment in their mind;     20 
Nature affords at least a glimm’ring light; 
The lines, tho’ touch’d but faintly, are drawn right. 
But as the slightest sketch, if justly trac’d, 
Is by ill colouring but the more disgrac’d, 
So by false learning is good sense defac’d;     25 
Some are bewilder’d in the maze of schools, 
And some made coxcombs Nature meant but fools. 
In search of wit these lose their common sense, 
And then turn critics in their own defence: 
Each burns alike, who can, or cannot write,     30 
Or with a rival’s, or an eunuch’s spite. 
All fools have still an itching to deride, 
And fain would be upon the laughing side. 
If Mævius scribble in Apollo’s spite, 
There are, who judge still worse than he can write.     35 
Some have at first for wits, then poets pass’d, 
Turn’d critics next, and prov’d plain fools at last; 
Some neither can for wits nor critics pass, 
As heavy mules are neither horse nor ass. 
Those half-learn’d witlings, num’rous in our isle     40 
As half-form’d insects on the banks of Nile; 
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Unfinish’d things, one knows not what to call, 
Their generation’s so equivocal: 
To tell ’em, would a hundred tongues require, 
Or one vain wit’s, that might a hundred tire.     45 
But you who seek to give and merit fame, 
And justly bear a critic’s noble name, 
Be sure your self and your own reach to know, 
How far your genius, taste, and learning go; 
Launch not beyond your depth, but be discreet,     50 
And mark that point where sense and dulness meet. 
Nature to all things fix’d the limits fit, 
And wisely curb’d proud man’s pretending wit: 
As on the land while here the ocean gains, 
In other parts it leaves wide sandy plains;     55 
Thus in the soul while memory prevails, 
The solid pow’r of understanding fails; 
Where beams of warm imagination play, 
The memory’s soft figures melt away. 
One science only will one genius fit;     60 
So vast is art, so narrow human wit: 
Not only bounded to peculiar arts, 
But oft in those, confin’d to single parts. 
Like kings we lose the conquests gain’d before, 
By vain ambition still to make them more;     65 
Each might his sev’ral province well command, 
Would all but stoop to what they understand. 
First follow NATURE, and your judgment frame 
By her just standard, which is still the same: 
Unerring Nature, still divinely bright,     70 
One clear, unchang’d, and universal light, 
Life, force, and beauty, must to all impart, 
At once the source, and end, and test of art. 
Art from that fund each just supply provides, 
Works without show, and without pomp presides:     75 
In some fair body thus th’ informing soul 
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With spirits feeds, with vigour fills the whole, 
Each motion guides, and ev’ry nerve sustains; 
Itself unseen, but in th’ effects, remains. 
Some, to whom Heav’n in wit has been profuse,     80 
Want as much more, to turn it to its use; 
For wit and judgment often are at strife, 
Though meant each other’s aid, like man and wife. 
‘Tis more to guide, than spur the Muse’s steed; 
Restrain his fury, than provoke his speed;     85 
The winged courser, like a gen’rous horse, 
Shows most true mettle when you check his course. 
Those RULES of old discover’d, not devis’d, 
Are Nature still, but Nature methodis’d; 
Nature, like liberty, is but restrain’d     90 
By the same laws which first herself ordain’d. 
Hear how learn’d Greece her useful rules indites, 
When to repress, and when indulge our flights: 
High on Parnassus’ top her sons she show’d, 
And pointed out those arduous paths they trod;     95 
Held from afar, aloft, th’ immortal prize, 
And urg’d the rest by equal steps to rise. 
Just precepts thus from great examples giv’n, 
She drew from them what they deriv’d from Heav’n. 
The gen’rous critic fann’d the poet’s fire,     100 
And taught the world with reason to admire. 
Then criticism the Muse’s handmaid prov’d, 
To dress her charms, and make her more belov’d; 
But following wits from that intention stray’d; 
Who could not win the mistress, woo’d the maid;     105 
Against the poets their own arms they turn’d, 
Sure to hate most the men from whom they learn’d. 
So modern ‘pothecaries, taught the art 
By doctor’s bills to play the doctor’s part, 
Bold in the practice of mistaken rules,     110 
Prescribe, apply, and call their masters fools. 
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Some on the leaves of ancient authors prey, 
Nor time nor moths e’er spoil’d so much as they: 
Some drily plain, without invention’s aid, 
Write dull receipts how poems may be made:     115 
These leave the sense, their learning to display, 
And those explain the meaning quite away. 
You then whose judgment the right course would steer, 
Know well each ANCIENT’S proper character; 
His fable, subject, scope in ev’ry page;     120 
Religion, country, genius of his age: 
Without all these at once before your eyes, 
Cavil you may, but never criticise. 
Be Homer’s works your study and delight, 
Read them by day, and meditate by night;     125 
Thence form your judgment, thence your maxims bring, 
And trace the Muses upward to their spring; 
Still with itself compar’d, his text peruse; 
And let your comment be the Mantuan Muse. 
When first young Maro in his boundless mind     130 
A work t’ outlast immortal Rome design’d, 
Perhaps he seem’d above the critic’s law, 
And but from Nature’s fountains scorn’d to draw: 
But when t’ examine ev’ry part he came, 
Nature and Homer were, he found, the same.     135 
Convinc’d, amaz’d, he checks the bold design, 
And rules as strict his labour’d work confine, 
As if the Stagirite o’erlook’d each line. 
Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem; 
To copy nature is to copy them.     140 
Some beauties yet, no precepts can declare, 
For there’s a happiness as well as care. 
Music resembles poetry, in each 
Are nameless graces which no methods teach, 
And which a master-hand alone can reach.    145 
If, where the rules not far enough extend, 
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(Since rules were made but to promote their end) 
Some lucky LICENCE answers to the full 
Th’ intent propos’d, that licence is a rule. 
Thus Pegasus, a nearer way to take,     150 
May boldly deviate from the common track. 
Great wits sometimes may gloriously offend, 
And rise to faults true critics dare not mend; 
From vulgar bounds with brave disorder part, 
And snatch a grace beyond the reach of art,     155 
Which, without passing through the judgment, gains 
The heart, and all its end at once attains. 
In prospects, thus, some objects please our eyes, 
Which out of nature’s common order rise, 
The shapeless rock, or hanging precipice.     160 
But tho’ the ancients thus their rules invade, 
(As kings dispense with laws themselves have made) 
Moderns, beware! or if you must offend 
Against the precept, ne’er transgress its end; 
Let it be seldom, and compell’d by need,     165 
And have, at least, their precedent to plead. 
The critic else proceeds without remorse, 
Seizes your fame, and puts his laws in force. 
I know there are, to whose presumptuous thoughts 
Those freer beauties, ev’n in them, seem faults.     170 
Some figures monstrous and misshap’d appear, 
Consider’d singly, or beheld too near, 
Which, but proportion’d to their light, or place, 
Due distance reconciles to form and grace. 
A prudent chief not always must display     175 
His pow’rs in equal ranks, and fair array, 
But with th’ occasion and the place comply, 
Conceal his force, nay seem sometimes to fly. 
Those oft are stratagems which errors seem, 
Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream.     180 
Still green with bays each ancient altar stands, 
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Above the reach of sacrilegious hands, 
Secure from flames, from envy’s fiercer rage, 
Destructive war, and all-involving age. 
See, from each clime the learn’d their incense bring!     185 
Hear, in all tongues consenting pæans ring! 
In praise so just let ev’ry voice be join’d, 
And fill the gen’ral chorus of mankind! 
Hail, bards triumphant! born in happier days; 
Immortal heirs of universal praise!     190 
Whose honours with increase of ages grow, 
As streams roll down, enlarging as they flow! 
Nations unborn your mighty names shall sound, 
And worlds applaud that must not yet be found! 
Oh may some spark of your celestial fire     195 
The last, the meanest of your sons inspire, 
(That on weak wings, from far, pursues your flights; 
Glows while he reads, but trembles as he writes) 
To teach vain wits a science little known, 
T’ admire superior sense, and doubt their own!  200 
Part 2 
Of all the causes which conspire to blind 
Man’s erring judgment, and misguide the mind, 
What the weak head with strongest bias rules, 
Is pride, the never-failing vice of fools. 
Whatever Nature has in worth denied,     205 
She gives in large recruits of needful pride; 
For as in bodies, thus in souls, we find 
What wants in blood and spirits, swell’d with wind; 
Pride, where wit fails, steps in to our defence, 
And fills up all the mighty void of sense!     210 
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If once right reason drives that cloud away, 
Truth breaks upon us with resistless day; 
Trust not yourself; but your defects to know, 
Make use of ev’ry friend—and ev’ry foe. 
A little learning is a dang’rous thing;     215 
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring: 
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, 
And drinking largely sobers us again. 
Fir’d at first sight with what the Muse imparts, 
In fearless youth we tempt the heights of arts,     220 
While from the bounded level of our mind, 
Short views we take, nor see the lengths behind, 
But more advanc’d, behold with strange surprise 
New, distant scenes of endless science rise! 
So pleas’d at first, the tow’ring Alps we try,     225 
Mount o’er the vales, and seem to tread the sky; 
Th’ eternal snows appear already past, 
And the first clouds and mountains seem the last; 
But those attain’d, we tremble to survey 
The growing labours of the lengthen’d way,     230 
Th’ increasing prospect tires our wand’ring eyes, 
Hills peep o’er hills, and Alps on Alps arise! 
A perfect judge will read each work of wit 
With the same spirit that its author writ, 
Survey the whole, nor seek slight faults to find,     235 
Where nature moves, and rapture warms the mind; 
Nor lose, for that malignant dull delight, 
The gen’rous pleasure to be charm’d with wit. 
But in such lays as neither ebb, nor flow, 
Correctly cold, and regularly low,     240 
That shunning faults, one quiet tenour keep; 
We cannot blame indeed—but we may sleep. 
In wit, as nature, what affects our hearts 
Is not th’ exactness of peculiar parts; 
‘Tis not a lip, or eye, we beauty call,     245 
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But the joint force and full result of all. 
Thus when we view some well-proportion’d dome, 
(The world’s just wonder, and ev’n thine, O Rome!) 
No single parts unequally surprise; 
All comes united to th’ admiring eyes;     250 
No monstrous height, or breadth, or length appear; 
The whole at once is bold, and regular. 
Whoever thinks a faultless piece to see, 
Thinks what ne’er was, nor is, nor e’er shall be. 
In ev’ry work regard the writer’s end,     255 
Since none can compass more than they intend; 
And if the means be just, the conduct true, 
Applause, in spite of trivial faults, is due. 
As men of breeding, sometimes men of wit, 
T’ avoid great errors, must the less commit:     260 
Neglect the rules each verbal critic lays, 
For not to know such trifles, is a praise. 
Most critics, fond of some subservient art, 
Still make the whole depend upon a part: 
They talk of principles, but notions prize,     265 
And all to one lov’d folly sacrifice. 
Once on a time, La Mancha’s knight, they say, 
A certain bard encount’ring on the way, 
Discours’d in terms as just, with looks as sage, 
As e’er could Dennis of the Grecian stage;     270 
Concluding all were desp’rate sots and fools, 
Who durst depart from Aristotle’s rules. 
Our author, happy in a judge so nice, 
Produc’d his play, and begg’d the knight’s advice, 
Made him observe the subject and the plot,     275 
The manners, passions, unities, what not? 
All which, exact to rule, were brought about, 
Were but a combat in the lists left out. 
“What! leave the combat out?” exclaims the knight; 
“Yes, or we must renounce the Stagirite.”     280 
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“Not so by Heav’n” (he answers in a rage) 
“Knights, squires, and steeds, must enter on the stage.” 
So vast a throng the stage can ne’er contain. 
“Then build a new, or act it in a plain.” 
Thus critics, of less judgment than caprice,     285 
Curious not knowing, not exact but nice, 
Form short ideas; and offend in arts 
(As most in manners) by a love to parts. 
Some to conceit alone their taste confine, 
And glitt’ring thoughts struck out at ev’ry line;     290 
Pleas’d with a work where nothing’s just or fit; 
One glaring chaos and wild heap of wit. 
Poets, like painters, thus, unskill’d to trace 
The naked nature and the living grace, 
With gold and jewels cover ev’ry part,     295 
And hide with ornaments their want of art. 
True wit is nature to advantage dress’d, 
What oft was thought, but ne’er so well express’d, 
Something, whose truth convinc’d at sight we find, 
That gives us back the image of our mind.     300 
As shades more sweetly recommend the light, 
So modest plainness sets off sprightly wit. 
For works may have more wit than does ’em good, 
As bodies perish through excess of blood. 
Others for language all their care express,     305 
And value books, as women men, for dress: 
Their praise is still—”the style is excellent”: 
The sense, they humbly take upon content. 
Words are like leaves; and where they most abound, 
Much fruit of sense beneath is rarely found.     310 
False eloquence, like the prismatic glass, 
Its gaudy colours spreads on ev’ry place; 
The face of Nature we no more survey, 
All glares alike, without distinction gay: 
But true expression, like th’ unchanging sun,     315 
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Clears, and improves whate’er it shines upon, 
It gilds all objects, but it alters none. 
Expression is the dress of thought, and still 
Appears more decent, as more suitable; 
A vile conceit in pompous words express’d,     320 
Is like a clown in regal purple dress’d: 
For diff’rent styles with diff’rent subjects sort, 
As several garbs with country, town, and court. 
Some by old words to fame have made pretence, 
Ancients in phrase, mere moderns in their sense;     325 
Such labour’d nothings, in so strange a style, 
Amaze th’ unlearn’d, and make the learned smile. 
Unlucky, as Fungoso in the play, 
These sparks with awkward vanity display 
What the fine gentleman wore yesterday!     330 
And but so mimic ancient wits at best, 
As apes our grandsires, in their doublets dress’d. 
In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold; 
Alike fantastic, if too new, or old; 
Be not the first by whom the new are tried,     335 
Not yet the last to lay the old aside. 
But most by numbers judge a poet’s song; 
And smooth or rough, with them is right or wrong: 
In the bright Muse though thousand charms conspire, 
Her voice is all these tuneful fools admire,     340 
Who haunt Parnassus but to please their ear, 
Not mend their minds; as some to church repair, 
Not for the doctrine, but the music there. 
These equal syllables alone require, 
Tho’ oft the ear the open vowels tire,     345 
While expletives their feeble aid do join, 
And ten low words oft creep in one dull line, 
While they ring round the same unvaried chimes, 
With sure returns of still expected rhymes. 
Where’er you find “the cooling western breeze”,     350 
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In the next line, it “whispers through the trees”: 
If “crystal streams with pleasing murmurs creep”, 
The reader’s threaten’d (not in vain) with “sleep”. 
Then, at the last and only couplet fraught 
With some unmeaning thing they call a thought,     355 
A needless Alexandrine ends the song, 
That, like a wounded snake, drags its slow length along. 
Leave such to tune their own dull rhymes, and know 
What’s roundly smooth, or languishingly slow; 
And praise the easy vigour of a line,     360 
Where Denham’s strength, and Waller’s sweetness join. 
True ease in writing comes from art, not chance, 
As those move easiest who have learn’d to dance. 
‘Tis not enough no harshness gives offence, 
The sound must seem an echo to the sense.     365 
Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows, 
And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows; 
But when loud surges lash the sounding shore, 
The hoarse, rough verse should like the torrent roar. 
When Ajax strives some rock’s vast weight to throw,     370 
The line too labours, and the words move slow; 
Not so, when swift Camilla scours the plain, 
Flies o’er th’ unbending corn, and skims along the main. 
Hear how Timotheus’ varied lays surprise, 
And bid alternate passions fall and rise!     375 
While, at each change, the son of Libyan Jove 
Now burns with glory, and then melts with love; 
Now his fierce eyes with sparkling fury glow, 
Now sighs steal out, and tears begin to flow: 
Persians and Greeks like turns of nature found,     380 
And the world’s victor stood subdu’d by sound! 
The pow’r of music all our hearts allow, 
And what Timotheus was, is Dryden now. 
Avoid extremes; and shun the fault of such, 
Who still are pleas’d too little or too much.     385 
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At ev’ry trifle scorn to take offence, 
That always shows great pride, or little sense; 
Those heads, as stomachs, are not sure the best, 
Which nauseate all, and nothing can digest. 
Yet let not each gay turn thy rapture move,     390 
For fools admire, but men of sense approve; 
As things seem large which we through mists descry, 
Dulness is ever apt to magnify. 
Some foreign writers, some our own despise; 
The ancients only, or the moderns prize.     395 
Thus wit, like faith, by each man is applied 
To one small sect, and all are damn’d beside. 
Meanly they seek the blessing to confine, 
And force that sun but on a part to shine; 
Which not alone the southern wit sublimes,     400 
But ripens spirits in cold northern climes; 
Which from the first has shone on ages past, 
Enlights the present, and shall warm the last; 
(Though each may feel increases and decays, 
And see now clearer and now darker days.)     405 
Regard not then if wit be old or new, 
But blame the false, and value still the true. 
Some ne’er advance a judgment of their own, 
But catch the spreading notion of the town; 
They reason and conclude by precedent,     410 
And own stale nonsense which they ne’er invent. 
Some judge of authors’ names, not works, and then 
Nor praise nor blame the writings, but the men. 
Of all this servile herd, the worst is he 
That in proud dulness joins with quality,     415 
A constant critic at the great man’s board, 
To fetch and carry nonsense for my Lord. 
What woeful stuff this madrigal would be, 
In some starv’d hackney sonneteer, or me? 
But let a Lord once own the happy lines,     420 
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How the wit brightens! how the style refines! 
Before his sacred name flies every fault, 
And each exalted stanza teems with thought! 
The vulgar thus through imitation err; 
As oft the learn’d by being singular;     425 
So much they scorn the crowd, that if the throng 
By chance go right, they purposely go wrong: 
So Schismatics the plain believers quit, 
And are but damn’d for having too much wit. 
Some praise at morning what they blame at night;     430 
But always think the last opinion right. 
A Muse by these is like a mistress us’d, 
This hour she’s idoliz’d, the next abus’d; 
While their weak heads, like towns unfortified, 
Twixt sense and nonsense daily change their side.     435 
Ask them the cause; they’re wiser still, they say; 
And still tomorrow’s wiser than today. 
We think our fathers fools, so wise we grow; 
Our wiser sons, no doubt, will think us so. 
Once school divines this zealous isle o’erspread;     440 
Who knew most Sentences, was deepest read; 
Faith, Gospel, all, seem’d made to be disputed, 
And none had sense enough to be confuted: 
Scotists and Thomists, now, in peace remain, 
Amidst their kindred cobwebs in Duck Lane.     445 
If Faith itself has different dresses worn, 
What wonder modes in wit should take their turn? 
Oft, leaving what is natural and fit, 
The current folly proves the ready wit; 
And authors think their reputation safe     450 
Which lives as long as fools are pleased to laugh. 
Some valuing those of their own side or mind, 
Still make themselves the measure of mankind; 
Fondly we think we honour merit then, 
When we but praise ourselves in other men.     455 
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Parties in wit attend on those of state, 
And public faction doubles private hate. 
Pride, Malice, Folly, against Dryden rose, 
In various shapes of Parsons, Critics, Beaus; 
But sense surviv’d, when merry jests were past;     460 
For rising merit will buoy up at last. 
Might he return, and bless once more our eyes, 
New Blackmores and new Milbourns must arise; 
Nay should great Homer lift his awful head, 
Zoilus again would start up from the dead.     465 
Envy will merit, as its shade, pursue, 
But like a shadow, proves the substance true; 
For envied wit, like Sol eclips’d, makes known 
Th’ opposing body’s grossness, not its own. 
When first that sun too powerful beams displays,     470 
It draws up vapours which obscure its rays; 
But ev’n those clouds at last adorn its way, 
Reflect new glories, and augment the day. 
Be thou the first true merit to befriend; 
His praise is lost, who stays till all commend.     475 
Short is the date, alas, of modern rhymes, 
And ’tis but just to let ’em live betimes. 
No longer now that golden age appears, 
When patriarch wits surviv’d a thousand years: 
Now length of Fame (our second life) is lost,     480 
And bare threescore is all ev’n that can boast; 
Our sons their fathers’ failing language see, 
And such as Chaucer is, shall Dryden be. 
So when the faithful pencil has design’d 
Some bright idea of the master’s mind,     485 
Where a new world leaps out at his command, 
And ready Nature waits upon his hand; 
When the ripe colours soften and unite, 
And sweetly melt into just shade and light; 
When mellowing years their full perfection give,     490 
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And each bold figure just begins to live, 
The treacherous colours the fair art betray, 
And all the bright creation fades away! 
Unhappy wit, like most mistaken things, 
Atones not for that envy which it brings.     495 
In youth alone its empty praise we boast, 
But soon the short-liv’d vanity is lost: 
Like some fair flow’r the early spring supplies, 
That gaily blooms, but ev’n in blooming dies. 
What is this wit, which must our cares employ?     500 
The owner’s wife, that other men enjoy; 
Then most our trouble still when most admir’d, 
And still the more we give, the more requir’d; 
Whose fame with pains we guard, but lose with ease, 
Sure some to vex, but never all to please;     505 
‘Tis what the vicious fear, the virtuous shun; 
By fools ’tis hated, and by knaves undone! 
If wit so much from ign’rance undergo, 
Ah let not learning too commence its foe! 
Of old, those met rewards who could excel,    510 
And such were prais’d who but endeavour’d well: 
Though triumphs were to gen’rals only due, 
Crowns were reserv’d to grace the soldiers too. 
Now, they who reach Parnassus’ lofty crown, 
Employ their pains to spurn some others down;     515 
And while self-love each jealous writer rules, 
Contending wits become the sport of fools: 
But still the worst with most regret commend, 
For each ill author is as bad a friend. 
To what base ends, and by what abject ways,     520 
Are mortals urg’d through sacred lust of praise! 
Ah ne’er so dire a thirst of glory boast, 
Nor in the critic let the man be lost! 
Good nature and good sense must ever join; 
To err is human; to forgive, divine.     525 
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But if in noble minds some dregs remain, 
Not yet purg’d off, of spleen and sour disdain, 
Discharge that rage on more provoking crimes, 
Nor fear a dearth in these flagitious times. 
No pardon vile obscenity should find,     530 
Though wit and art conspire to move your mind; 
But dulness with obscenity must prove 
As shameful sure as impotence in love. 
In the fat age of pleasure, wealth, and ease, 
Sprung the rank weed, and thriv’d with large increase:     535 
When love was all an easy monarch’s care; 
Seldom at council, never in a war: 
Jilts ruled the state, and statesmen farces writ; 
Nay wits had pensions, and young Lords had wit: 
The fair sat panting at a courtier’s play,     540 
And not a mask went unimprov’d away: 
The modest fan was lifted up no more, 
And virgins smil’d at what they blush’d before. 
The following licence of a foreign reign 
Did all the dregs of bold Socinus drain;     545 
Then unbelieving priests reform’d the nation, 
And taught more pleasant methods of salvation; 
Where Heav’n’s free subjects might their rights dispute, 
Lest God himself should seem too absolute: 
Pulpits their sacred satire learned to spare,     550 
And Vice admired to find a flatt’rer there! 
Encourag’d thus, wit’s Titans brav’d the skies, 
And the press groan’d with licenc’d blasphemies. 
These monsters, critics! with your darts engage, 
Here point your thunder, and exhaust your rage!     555 
Yet shun their fault, who, scandalously nice, 
Will needs mistake an author into vice; 
All seems infected that th’ infected spy, 
As all looks yellow to the jaundic’d eye. 
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Part 3 
Learn then what morals critics ought to show,     560 
For ’tis but half a judge’s task, to know. 
‘Tis not enough, taste, judgment, learning, join; 
In all you speak, let truth and candour shine: 
That not alone what to your sense is due, 
All may allow; but seek your friendship too.     565 
Be silent always when you doubt your sense; 
And speak, though sure, with seeming diffidence: 
Some positive, persisting fops we know, 
Who, if once wrong, will needs be always so; 
But you, with pleasure own your errors past,     570 
And make each day a critic on the last. 
‘Tis not enough, your counsel still be true; 
Blunt truths more mischief than nice falsehoods do; 
Men must be taught as if you taught them not; 
And things unknown proposed as things forgot.     575 
Without good breeding, truth is disapprov’d; 
That only makes superior sense belov’d. 
Be niggards of advice on no pretence; 
For the worst avarice is that of sense. 
With mean complacence ne’er betray your trust,     580 
Nor be so civil as to prove unjust. 
Fear not the anger of the wise to raise; 
Those best can bear reproof, who merit praise. 
‘Twere well might critics still this freedom take, 
But Appius reddens at each word you speak,     585 
And stares, Tremendous ! with a threatening eye, 
Like some fierce tyrant in old tapestry! 
Fear most to tax an honourable fool, 
Whose right it is, uncensur’d, to be dull; 
Such, without wit, are poets when they please,     590 
As without learning they can take degrees. 
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Leave dangerous truths to unsuccessful satires, 
And flattery to fulsome dedicators, 
Whom, when they praise, the world believes no more, 
Than when they promise to give scribbling o’er.     595 
‘Tis best sometimes your censure to restrain, 
And charitably let the dull be vain: 
Your silence there is better than your spite, 
For who can rail so long as they can write? 
Still humming on, their drowsy course they keep,     600 
And lash’d so long, like tops, are lash’d asleep. 
False steps but help them to renew the race, 
As after stumbling, jades will mend their pace. 
What crowds of these, impenitently bold, 
In sounds and jingling syllables grown old,     605 
Still run on poets, in a raging vein, 
Even to the dregs and squeezings of the brain, 
Strain out the last, dull droppings of their sense, 
And rhyme with all the rage of impotence! 
Such shameless bards we have; and yet ’tis true,     610 
There are as mad, abandon’d critics too. 
The bookful blockhead, ignorantly read, 
With loads of learned lumber in his head, 
With his own tongue still edifies his ears, 
And always list’ning to himself appears.     615 
All books he reads, and all he reads assails, 
From Dryden’s Fables down to Durfey’s Tales. 
With him, most authors steal their works, or buy; 
Garth did not write his own Dispensary. 
Name a new play, and he’s the poet’s friend,     620 
Nay show’d his faults—but when would poets mend? 
No place so sacred from such fops is barr’d, 
Nor is Paul’s church more safe than Paul’s churchyard: 
Nay, fly to altars; there they’ll talk you dead: 
For fools rush in where angels fear to tread.     625 
Distrustful sense with modest caution speaks; 
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It still looks home, and short excursions makes; 
But rattling nonsense in full volleys breaks; 
And never shock’d, and never turn’d aside, 
Bursts out, resistless, with a thund’ring tide.     630 
But where’s the man, who counsel can bestow, 
Still pleas’d to teach, and yet not proud to know? 
Unbias’d, or by favour or by spite; 
Not dully prepossess’d, nor blindly right; 
Though learn’d, well-bred; and though well-bred, sincere;     635 
Modestly bold, and humanly severe? 
Who to a friend his faults can freely show, 
And gladly praise the merit of a foe? 
Blest with a taste exact, yet unconfin’d; 
A knowledge both of books and human kind;     640 
Gen’rous converse; a soul exempt from pride; 
And love to praise, with reason on his side? 
Such once were critics; such the happy few, 
Athens and Rome in better ages knew. 
The mighty Stagirite first left the shore,     645 
Spread all his sails, and durst the deeps explore: 
He steer’d securely, and discover’d far, 
Led by the light of the Mæonian Star. 
Poets, a race long unconfin’d and free, 
Still fond and proud of savage liberty,     650 
Receiv’d his laws; and stood convinc’d ’twas fit, 
Who conquer’d nature, should preside o’er wit. 
Horace still charms with graceful negligence, 
And without methods talks us into sense, 
Will, like a friend, familiarly convey     655 
The truest notions in the easiest way. 
He, who supreme in judgment, as in wit, 
Might boldly censure, as he boldly writ, 
Yet judg’d with coolness, though he sung with fire; 
His precepts teach but what his works inspire.     660 
Our critics take a contrary extreme, 
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They judge with fury, but they write with fle’me: 
Nor suffers Horace more in wrong translations 
By wits, than critics in as wrong quotations. 
See Dionysius Homer’s thoughts refine,     665 
And call new beauties forth from ev’ry line! 
Fancy and art in gay Petronius please, 
The scholar’s learning, with the courtier’s ease. 
In grave Quintilian’s copious work we find 
The justest rules, and clearest method join’d;     670 
Thus useful arms in magazines we place, 
All rang’d in order, and dispos’d with grace, 
But less to please the eye, than arm the hand, 
Still fit for use, and ready at command. 
Thee, bold Longinus! all the Nine inspire,     675 
And bless their critic with a poet’s fire. 
An ardent judge, who zealous in his trust, 
With warmth gives sentence, yet is always just; 
Whose own example strengthens all his laws; 
And is himself that great sublime he draws.     680 
Thus long succeeding critics justly reign’d, 
Licence repress’d, and useful laws ordain’d; 
Learning and Rome alike in empire grew, 
And arts still follow’d where her eagles flew; 
From the same foes, at last, both felt their doom,     685 
And the same age saw learning fall, and Rome. 
With tyranny, then superstition join’d, 
As that the body, this enslav’d the mind; 
Much was believ’d, but little understood, 
And to be dull was constru’d to be good;     690 
A second deluge learning thus o’er-run, 
And the monks finish’d what the Goths begun. 
At length Erasmus, that great, injur’d name, 
(The glory of the priesthood, and the shame!) 
Stemm’d the wild torrent of a barb’rous age,     695 
And drove those holy Vandals off the stage. 
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But see! each Muse, in Leo’s golden days, 
Starts from her trance, and trims her wither’d bays! 
Rome’s ancient genius, o’er its ruins spread, 
Shakes off the dust, and rears his rev’rend head!     700 
Then sculpture and her sister-arts revive; 
Stones leap’d to form, and rocks began to live; 
With sweeter notes each rising temple rung; 
A Raphael painted, and a Vida sung. 
Immortal Vida! on whose honour’d brow     705 
The poet’s bays and critic’s ivy grow: 
Cremona now shall ever boast thy name, 
As next in place to Mantua, next in fame! 
But soon by impious arms from Latium chas’d, 
Their ancient bounds the banished Muses pass’d;     710 
Thence arts o’er all the northern world advance; 
But critic-learning flourish’d most in France. 
The rules a nation born to serve, obeys, 
And Boileau still in right of Horace sways. 
But we, brave Britons, foreign laws despis’d,     715 
And kept unconquer’d, and uncivilis’d, 
Fierce for the liberties of wit, and bold, 
We still defied the Romans, as of old. 
Yet some there were, among the sounder few 
Of those who less presum’d, and better knew,     720 
Who durst assert the juster ancient cause, 
And here restor’d wit’s fundamental laws. 
Such was the Muse, whose rules and practice tell 
“Nature’s chief master-piece is writing well.” 
Such was Roscommon—not more learn’d than good,     725 
With manners gen’rous as his noble blood; 
To him the wit of Greece and Rome was known, 
And ev’ry author’s merit, but his own. 
Such late was Walsh—the Muse’s judge and friend, 
Who justly knew to blame or to commend;     730 
To failings mild, but zealous for desert; 
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The clearest head, and the sincerest heart. 
This humble praise, lamented shade! receive, 
This praise at least a grateful Muse may give: 
The Muse, whose early voice you taught to sing,     735 
Prescrib’d her heights, and prun’d her tender wing, 
(Her guide now lost) no more attempts to rise, 
But in low numbers short excursions tries: 
Content, if hence th’ unlearn’d their wants may view, 
The learn’d reflect on what before they knew:     740 
Careless of censure, nor too fond of fame, 
Still pleas’d to praise, yet not afraid to blame, 
Averse alike to flatter, or offend, 
Not free from faults, nor yet too vain to mend. 
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PART II 





In 1784 German philosopher Immanuel Kant defined 
“enlightenment” as a shaking off of what one has been told to believe 
and, instead, using one’s own mind to direct one’s action in the 
world. When thinkers took up this call to think more freely, 
revolutions in science, religion, politics, and philosophy followed. 
These revolutions in thinking came to define the “Enlightenment 
period” (late 17th century-the French Revolution in 1789). 
Writing during what has been called the “Scottish Enlightenment,” 
David Hume tied human progress to the rethinking of established 
ideas. Instead of asking “what is literature?” like some of the 
theorists in Part One, Hume asks “what is good literature and how 
do we identify it?” In “On Taste,” Hume attempts to develop a 
universal standard to determine what is good literature. For Hume, 
“good” means, among other things, what is “beautiful.” You may 
notice in this unit that many of the writers almost assume that 
beauty has something to do with what makes literature good. This 
assumption comes from the period during which this unit begins — 
the eighteenth century, when the philosophical field of aesthetics 
was born. 
Aesthetics as a field comes into being in the first half of the 
eighteenth century primarily in Germany (which is why we are 
reading the German writers Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel). The 
word “aesthetic” comes from the Greek and means “to perceive.” 
Part Two: The Enlightenment,
Romantic Idealism, and Victorian
In 1735, Alexander Baumgarten was the first to use the term 
“aesthetics” to define the study of artistic beauty. Perception is 
the act of experiencing the world through our senses. When we 
perceive, we register impressions from the external world — our 
visual impression of objects (like trees) and qualities of objects (the 
relative largeness of trees). These impressions are then organized 
and comprehended by the mind. Philosophers of aesthetics were 
interested in what happened in the mind when we perceived 
something that could not be categorized under an existing concept. 
Instead of being organized in the mind conceptually, art affected 
the mind by causing an emotional response. Philosophers wanted 
to know why. Some, like Kant, wanted to figure out if there were 
universal categories for determining how art affects the mind and 
what constitutes “taste.” Others, like Hume, wanted to figure out if 
it were possible to create a standard to determine “taste.” By this, he 
meant a reliable measure or set of principles to determine what is 
good art and what is not. Because there was no objective definition 
of “taste,” philosophers asked if a definition could be created based 
on how art affected one’s emotions. They asked: Does looking at it 
or imagining it cause me pain or pleasure? How can determining the 
effect of pain or pleasure on the mind lead me to determine what 
constitutes “good” literature? What are the qualities it must have? Is 
it what endures? What gives us pleasure? Or something else? How 
can there be a universal standard for a subjective experience? Hegel 
attempted to systematize a science of beauty in art. For Hegel, there 
was a hierarchy organizing different types of art that correlated 
with different stages in history. In The Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel tries to create a science of consciousness, outlining a 
progressing of Spirit working its way dialectically through the 
history of human experience. In The Philosophy of Art, Hegel argues 
that the progressive stages of history correlate to the progression 
of Art toward the Ideal. 
German aesthetic theory spread to Britain and was taken up by 
some of the most widely-studied British writers of all time, such 
as the Romantic writers Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William 
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Wordsworth. You may also recognize influence to some extent in 
the work of American Romantics like Ralph Waldo Emerson and 
Henry David Thoreau. Like Kant and Burke, Wordsworth and others 
were interested in how art could be used to produce pleasure — 
both positive pleasure, in the experience of beauty, and negative 
pleasure, in the experience of the sublime. In part as a response to 
the emphasis on creativity in the Romantic period, Matthew Arnold 
writes “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.” The “present 
time” (and place) for Arnold was the Victorian period in England. 
Arnold returns, in a way, to Hume and to Pope. He asks literary 
critics to use their expert judgment to seek out the best literature 
— which, for Arnold, meant the most beautiful and “enlightening” — 
and to advance those works to perfect culture. 
 
–Molly Desjardins 
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9. David Hume - Of the 
Standard of Taste 
The great variety of Taste, as well as of opinion, which prevails 
in the world, is too obvious not to have fallen under every one’s 
observation. Men of the most confined knowledge are able to 
remark a difference of taste in the narrow circle of their 
acquaintance, even where the persons have been educated under 
the same government, and have early imbibed the same prejudices. 
But those, who can enlarge their view to contemplate distant 
nations and remote ages, are still more surprised at the great 
inconsistence and contrariety. We are apt to call barbarous 
whatever departs widely from our own taste and apprehension; but 
soon find the epithet of reproach retorted on us. And the highest 
arrogance and self-conceit is at last startled, on observing an equal 
assurance on all sides, and scruples, amidst such a contest of 
sentiment, to pronounce positively in its own favour. 
As this variety of taste is obvious to the most careless inquirer; 
so will it be found, on examination, to be still greater in reality than 
in appearance. The sentiments of men often differ with regard to 
beauty and deformity of all kinds, even while their general discourse 
is the same. There are certain terms in every language, which 
import blame, and others praise; and all men, who use the same 
tongue, must agree in their application of them. Every voice is 
united in applauding elegance, propriety, simplicity, spirit in writing; 
and in blaming fustian, affectation, coldness, and a false brilliancy: 
But when critics come to particulars, this seeming unanimity 
vanishes; and it is found, that they had affixed a very different 
meaning to their expressions. In all matters of opinion and science, 
the case is opposite: The difference among men is there oftener 
found to lie in generals than in particulars; and to be less in reality 
than in appearance. An explanation of the terms commonly ends the 
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controversy; and the disputants are surprised to find, that they had 
been quarrelling, while at bottom they agreed in their judgment. 
Those who found morality on sentiment, more than on reason, 
are inclined to comprehend ethics under the former observation, 
and to maintain, that in all questions, which regard conduct and 
manners, the difference among men is really greater than at first 
sight it appears. It is indeed obvious, that writers of all nations 
and all ages concur in applauding justice, humanity, magnanimity, 
prudence, veracity; and in blaming the opposite qualities. Even 
poets and other authors, whose compositions are chiefly calculated 
to please the imagination, are yet found, from Homer down to 
Fenelon, to inculcate the same moral precepts, and to bestow their 
applause and blame on the same virtues and vices. This great 
unanimity is usually ascribed to the influence of plain reason; which, 
in all these cases, maintains similar sentiments in all men, and 
prevents those controversies, to which the abstract sciences are so 
much exposed. So far as the unanimity is real, this account may 
be admitted as satisfactory: But we must also allow, that some part 
of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the 
very nature of language. The word virtue, with its equivalent in 
every tongue, implies praise; as that of vice does blame: And no 
man, without the most obvious and grossest impropriety, could affix 
reproach to a term, which in general acceptation is understood 
in a good sense; or bestow applause, where the idiom requires 
disapprobation. Homer’s general precepts, where he delivers any 
such, will never be controverted; but it is obvious, that, when he 
draws particular pictures of manners, and represents heroism in 
Achilles and prudence in Ulysses, he intermixes a much greater 
degree of ferocity in the former, and of cunning and fraud in the 
latter, than Fenelon would admit of. The sage Ulysses in the Greek 
poet seems to delight in lies and fictions, and often employs them 
without any necessity or even advantage: But his more scrupulous 
son, in the French epic writer, exposes himself to the most 
imminent perils, rather than depart from the most exact line of 
truth and veracity. 
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The admirers and followers of the Alcoran insist on the excellent 
moral precepts interspersed through that wild and absurd 
performance. But it is to be supposed, that the Arabic words, which 
correspond to the English, equity, justice, temperance, meekness, 
charity were such as, from the constant use of that tongue, must 
always be taken in a good sense; and it would have argued the 
greatest ignorance, not of morals, but of language, to have 
mentioned them with any epithets, besides those of applause and 
approbation. But would we know, whether the pretended prophet 
had really attained a just sentiment of morals? Let us attend to 
his narration; and we shall soon find, that he bestows praise on 
such instances of treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry, 
as are utterly incompatible with civilized society. No steady rule of 
right seems there to be attended to; and every action is blamed or 
praised, so far only as it is beneficial or hurtful to the true believers. 
The merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is indeed 
very small. Whoever recommends any moral virtues, really does no 
more than is implied in the terms themselves. That people, who 
invented the word charity, and used it in a good sense, inculcated 
more clearly and much more efficaciously, the precept, be 
charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet, who should 
insert such a maxim in his writings. Of all expressions, those, which, 
together with their other meaning, imply a degree either of blame 
or approbation, are the least liable to be perverted or mistaken. 
It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which 
the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision 
afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. 
There is a species of philosophy, which cuts off all hopes of 
success in such an attempt, and represents the impossibility of ever 
attaining any standard of taste. The difference, it is said, is very wide 
between judgment and sentiment. All sentiment is right; because 
sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always 
real, wherever a man is conscious of it. But all determinations of 
the understanding are not right; because they have a reference 
to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact; and 
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are not always conformable to that standard. Among a thousand 
different opinions which different men may entertain of the same 
subject, there is one, and but one, that is just and true; and the 
only difficulty is to fix and ascertain it. On the contrary, a thousand 
different sentiments, excited by the same object, are all right: 
Because no sentiment represents what is really in the object. It only 
marks a certain conformity or relation between the object and the 
organs or faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not really 
exist, the sentiment could never possibly have being. Beauty is no 
quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which 
contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. 
One person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible 
of beauty; and every individual ought to acquiesce in his own 
sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others. To seek 
the real beauty, or real deformity is as fruitless an inquiry, as to 
pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According to 
the disposition of the organs, the same object may be both sweet 
and bitter; and the proverb has justly determined it to be fruitless 
to dispute concerning tastes. It is very natural, and even quite 
necessary, to extend this axiom to mental, as well as bodily taste; 
and thus common sense, which is so often at variance with 
philosophy, especially with the sceptical kind, is found, in one 
instance at least, to agree in pronouncing the same decision. 
But though this axiom, by passing into a proverb, seems to have 
attained the sanction of common sense; there is certainly a species 
of common sense, which opposes it, at least serves to modify and 
restrain it. Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance 
between Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, would be 
thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had 
maintained a mole-hill to be as high as Teneriffe, or a pond as 
extensive as the ocean. Though there may be found persons, who 
give the preference to the former authors; no one pays attention to 
such a taste; and we pronounce, without scruple, the sentiment of 
these pretended critics to be absurd and ridiculous. The principle 
of the natural equality of tastes is then totally forgot, and while 
148  |  David Hume - Of the Standard of Taste
we admit it on some occasions, where the objects seem near an 
equality, it appears an extravagant paradox, or rather a palpable 
absurdity, where objects so disproportioned are compared together. 
It is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by 
reasonings a priori, or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of 
the understanding, from comparing those habitudes and relations 
of ideas, which are eternal and immutable. Their foundation is the 
same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are 
there anything but general observations, concerning what has been 
universally found to please in all countries and in all ages. Many 
of the beauties of poetry, and even of eloquence, are founded on 
falsehood and fiction, on hyperboles, metaphors, and an abuse or 
perversion of terms from their natural meaning. To check the sallies 
of the imagination, and to reduce every expression to geometrical 
truth and exactness, would be the most contrary to the laws of 
criticism; because it would produce a work, which, by universal 
experience, has been found the most insipid and disagreeable. But 
though poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be confined 
by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or 
observation. If some negligent or irregular writers have pleased, 
they have not pleased by their transgressions of rule or order, but in 
spite of these transgressions: They have possessed other beauties, 
which were conformable to just criticism; and the force of these 
beauties has been able to overpower censure, and give the mind 
a satisfaction superior to the disgust arising from the blemishes. 
Ariosto pleases; but not by his monstrous and improbable fictions, 
by his bizarre mixture of the serious and comic styles, by the want 
of coherence in his stories, or by the continual interruptions of his 
narration. He charms by the force and clearness of his expression, 
by the readiness and variety of his inventions, and by his natural 
pictures of the passions, especially those of the gay and amorous 
kind: And however his faults may diminish our satisfaction, they are 
not able entirely to destroy it. Did our pleasure really arise from 
those parts of his poem, which we denominate faults, this would be 
no objection to criticism in general: It would only be an objection 
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to those particular rules of criticism, which would establish such 
circumstances to be faults, and would represent them as universally 
blameable. If they are found to please, they cannot be faults; let 
the pleasure, which they produce, be ever so unexpected and 
unaccountable. 
But though all the general rules of art are founded only on 
experience, and on the observation of the common sentiments of 
human nature, we must not imagine, that, on every occasion, the 
feelings of men will be conformable to these rules. Those finer 
emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and 
require the concurrence of many favourable circumstances to make 
them play with facility and exactness, according to their general and 
established principles. The least exterior hindrance to such small 
springs, or the least internal disorder, disturbs their motion, and 
confounds the operation of the whole machine. When we would 
make an experiment of this nature, and would try the force of any 
beauty or deformity, we must choose with care a proper time and 
place, and bring the fancy to a suitable situation and disposition. A 
perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention 
to the object; if any of these circumstances be wanting, our 
experiment will be fallacious, and we shall be unable to judge of the 
catholic and universal beauty. The relation, which nature has placed 
between the form and the sentiment, will at least be more obscure; 
and it will require greater accuracy to trace and discern it. We shall 
be able to ascertain its influence, not so much from the operation 
of each particular beauty, as from the durable admiration, which 
attends those works, that have survived all the caprices of mode and 
fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy. 
The same Homer, who pleased at Athens and Rome two thousand 
years ago, is still admired at Paris and at London. All the changes 
of climate, government, religion, and language, have not been able 
to obscure his glory. Authority or prejudice may give a temporary 
vogue to a bad poet or orator; but his reputation will never be 
durable or general. When his compositions are examined by 
posterity or by foreigners, the enchantment is dissipated, and his 
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faults appear in their true colours. On the contrary, a real genius, 
the longer his works endure, and the more wide they are spread, 
the more sincere is the admiration which he meets with. Envy and 
jealousy have too much place in a narrow circle; and even familiar 
acquaintance with his person may diminished the applause due to 
his performances: But when these obstructions are removed, the 
beauties, which are naturally fitted to excite agreeable sentiments, 
immediately display their energy; while the world endures, they 
maintain their authority over the minds of men. 
It appears then, that amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, 
there are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whose 
influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind. 
Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of 
the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; 
and if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from 
some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ. A man in a fever 
would not insist on his palate as able to decide concerning flavours; 
nor would one, affected with the jaundice, pretend to give a verdict 
with regard to colours. In each creature, there is a sound and a 
defective state; and the former alone can be supposed to afford us 
a true standard of taste and sentiment. If, in the sound state of the 
organ, there be an entire or a considerable uniformity of sentiment 
among men, we may thence derive an idea of the perfect beauty; in 
like manner as the appearance of objects in day-light, to the eye of a 
man in health, is denominated their true and real colour, even while 
colour is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses. 
Many and frequent are the defects in the internal organs, which 
prevent or weaken the influence of those general principles, on 
which depends our sentiment of beauty or deformity. Though some 
objects, by the structure of the mind, be naturally calculated to 
give pleasure, it is not to be expected, that in every individual the 
pleasure will be equally felt. Particular incidents and situations 
occur, which either throw a false light on the objects, or hinder the 
true from conveying to the imagination the proper sentiment and 
perception. 
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One obvious cause, why many feel not the proper sentiment of 
beauty, is the want of that delicacy of imagination, which is requisite 
to convey a sensibility of those finer emotions. This delicacy every 
one pretends to: Every one talks of it; and would reduce every kind 
of taste or sentiment to its standard. But as our intention in this 
essay is to mingle some light of the understanding with the feelings 
of sentiment, it will be proper to give a more accurate definition 
of delicacy than has hitherto been attempted. And not to draw our 
philosophy from too profound a source, we shall have recourse to a 
noted story in Don Quixote. 
It is with good reason, says Sancho to the squire with the great 
nose, that I pretend to have a judgment in wine: This is a quality 
hereditary in our family. Two of my kinsmen were once called to 
give their opinion of a hogshead, which was supposed to be 
excellent, being old and of a good vintage. One of them tastes it; 
considers it; and, after mature reflection, pronounces the wine to 
be good, were it not for a small taste of leather, which he perceived 
in it. The other, after using the same precautions, gives also his 
verdict in favour of the wine; but with the reserve of a taste of iron, 
which he could easily distinguish. You cannot imagine how much 
they were both ridiculed for their judgment. But who laughed in the 
end? On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom an 
old key with a leathern thong tied to it. 
The great resemblance between mental and bodily taste will easily 
teach us to apply this story. Though it be certain, that beauty and 
deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, 
but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must 
be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which are 
fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings. Now as these 
qualities may be found in a small degree, or may be mixed and 
confounded with each other, it often happens that the taste is not 
affected with such minute qualities, or is not able to distinguish 
all the particular flavours, amidst the disorder in which they are 
presented. Where the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to 
escape them; and at the same time so exact, as to perceive every 
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ingredient in the composition: This we call delicacy of taste, 
whether we employ these terms in the literal or metaphorical sense. 
Here then the general rules of beauty are of use, being drawn from 
established models, and from the observation of what pleases or 
displeases, when presented singly and in a high degree: And if the 
same qualities, in a continued composition, and in a smaller degree, 
affect not the organs with a sensible delight or uneasiness, we 
exclude the person from all pretensions to this delicacy. To produce 
these general rules or avowed patterns of composition, is like 
finding the key with the leathern thong; which justified the verdict 
of Sancho’s kinsmen, and confounded those pretended judges who 
had condemned them. Though the hogshead had never been 
emptied, the taste of the one was still equally delicate, and that of 
the other equally dull and languid: But it would have been more 
difficult to have proved the superiority of the former, to the 
conviction of every by-stander. In like manner, though the beauties 
of writing had never been methodized, or reduced to general 
principles; though no excellent models had ever been 
acknowledged; the different degrees of taste would still have 
subsisted, and the judgment of one man been preferable to that of 
another; but it would not have been so easy to silence the bad critic, 
who might always insist upon his particular sentiment, and refuse 
to submit to his antagonist. But when we show him an avowed 
principle of art; when we illustrate this principle by examples, 
whose operation, from his own particular taste, he acknowledges 
to be conformable to the principle; when we prove that the same 
principle may be applied to the present case, where he did not 
perceive or feel its influence: He must conclude, upon the whole, 
that the fault lies in himself, and that he wants the delicacy, which is 
requisite to make him sensible of every beauty and every blemish, in 
any composition or discourse. 
It is acknowledged to be the perfection of every sense or faculty, 
to perceive with exactness its most minute objects, and allow 
nothing to escape its notice and observation. The smaller the 
objects are, which become sensible to the eye, the finer is that 
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organ, and the more elaborate its make and composition. A good 
palate is not tried by strong flavours, but by a mixture of small 
ingredients, where we are still sensible of each part, 
notwithstanding its minuteness and its confusion with the rest. In 
like manner, a quick and acute perception of beauty and deformity 
must be the perfection of our mental taste; nor can a man be 
satisfied with himself while he suspects that any excellence or 
blemish in a discourse has passed him unobserved. In this case, the 
perfection of the man, and the perfection of the sense or feeling, 
are found to be united. A very delicate palate, on many occasions, 
may be a great inconvenience both to a man himself and to his 
friends: But a delicate taste of wit or beauty must always be a 
desirable quality, because it is the source of all the finest and most 
innocent enjoyments of which human nature is susceptible. In this 
decision the sentiments of all mankind are agreed. Wherever you 
can ascertain a delicacy of taste, it is sure to meet with approbation; 
and the best way of ascertaining it is to appeal to those models and 
principles which have been established by the uniform consent and 
experience of nations and ages. 
But though there be naturally a wide difference in point of 
delicacy between one person and another, nothing tends further to 
increase and improve this talent, than practice in a particular art, 
and the frequent survey or contemplation of a particular species 
of beauty. When objects of any kind are first presented to the eye 
or imagination, the sentiment which attends them is obscure and 
confused; and the mind is, in a great measure, incapable of 
pronouncing concerning their merits or defects. The taste cannot 
perceive the several excellencies of the performance, much less 
distinguish the particular character of each excellency, and 
ascertain its quality and degree. If it pronounce the whole in general 
to be beautiful or deformed, it is the utmost that can be expected; 
and even this judgment, a person so unpractised will be apt to 
deliver with great hesitation and reserve. But allow him to acquire 
experience in those objects, his feeling becomes more exact and 
nice: He not only perceives the beauties and defects of each part, 
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but marks the distinguishing species of each quality, and assigns 
it suitable praise or blame. A clear and distinct sentiment attends 
him through the whole survey of the objects; and he discerns that 
very degree and kind of approbation or displeasure which each part 
is naturally fitted to produce. The mist dissipates which seemed 
formerly to hang over the object: The organ acquires greater 
perfection in its operations; and can pronounce, without danger or 
mistake, concerning the merits of every performance. In a word, the 
same address and dexterity, which practice gives to the execution 
of any work, is also acquired by the same means, in the judging of it. 
So advantageous is practice to the discernment of beauty, that, 
before we can give judgment on any work of importance, it will 
even be requisite that that very individual performance be more 
than once perused by us, and be surveyed in different lights with 
attention and deliberation. There is a flutter or hurry of thought 
which attends the first perusal of any piece, and which confounds 
the genuine sentiment of beauty. The relation of the parts is not 
discerned: The true characters of style are little distinguished. The 
several perfections and defects seem wrapped up in a species of 
confusion, and present themselves indistinctly to the imagination. 
Not to mention, that there is a species of beauty, which, as it is florid 
and superficial, pleases at first; but being found incompatible with 
a just expression either of reason or passion, soon palls upon the 
taste, and is then rejected with disdain, at least rated at a much 
lower value. 
It is impossible to continue in the practice of contemplating any 
order of beauty, without being frequently obliged to form 
comparisons between the several species and degrees of excellence, 
and estimating their proportion to each other. A man, who had 
had no opportunity of comparing the different kinds of beauty, 
is indeed totally unqualified to pronounce an opinion with regard 
to any object presented to him. By comparison alone we fix the 
epithets of praise or blame, and learn how to assign the due degree 
of each. The coarsest daubing contains a certain lustre of colours 
and exactness of imitation, which are so far beauties, and would 
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affect the mind of a peasant or Indian with the highest admiration. 
The most vulgar ballads are not entirely destitute of harmony or 
nature; and none but a person familiarised to superior beauties 
would pronounce their numbers harsh, or narration uninteresting. 
A great inferiority of beauty gives pain to a person conversant in the 
highest excellence of the kind, and is for that reason pronounced 
a deformity: As the most finished object with which we are 
acquainted is naturally supposed to have reached the pinnacle of 
perfection, and to be entitled to the highest applause. One 
accustomed to see, and examine, and weigh the several 
performances, admired in different ages and nations, can alone rate 
the merits of a work exhibited to his view, and assign its proper rank 
among the productions of genius. 
But to enable a critic the more fully to execute this undertaking, 
he must preserve his mind free from all prejudice, and allow nothing 
to enter into his consideration but the very object which is 
submitted to his examination. We may observe, that every work of 
art, in order to produce its due effect on the mind, must be surveyed 
in a certain point of view, and cannot be fully relished by persons, 
whose situation, real or imaginary, is not conformable to that which 
is required by the performance. An orator addresses himself to 
a particular audience, and must have a regard to their particular 
genius, interests, opinions, passions, and prejudices; otherwise he 
hopes in vain to govern their resolutions, and inflame their 
affections. Should they even have entertained some prepossessions 
against him, however unreasonable, he must not overlook this 
disadvantage; but, before he enters upon the subject, must 
endeavour to conciliate their affection, and acquire their good 
graces. A critic of a different age or nation, who should peruse this 
discourse, must have all these circumstances in his eye, and must 
place himself in the same situation as the audience, in order to form 
a true judgment of the oration. In like manner, when any work is 
addressed to the public, though I should have a friendship or enmity 
with the author, I must depart from this situation; and considering 
myself as a man in general, forget, if possible, my individual being, 
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and my peculiar circumstances. A person influenced by prejudice, 
complies not with this condition, but obstinately maintains his 
natural position, without placing himself in that point of view which 
the performance supposes. If the work be addressed to persons of 
a different age or nation, he makes no allowance for their peculiar 
views and prejudices; but, full of the manners of his own age and 
country, rashly condemns what seemed admirable in the eyes of 
those for whom alone the discourse was calculated. If the work 
be executed for the public, he never sufficiently enlarges his 
comprehension, or forgets his interest as a friend or enemy, as a 
rival or commentator. By this means, his sentiments are perverted; 
nor have the same beauties and blemishes the same influence upon 
him, as if he had imposed a proper violence on his imagination, 
and had forgotten himself for a moment. So far his taste evidently 
departs from the true standard, and of consequence loses all credit 
and authority. 
It is well known, that in all questions submitted to the 
understanding, prejudice is destructive of sound judgment, and 
perverts all operations of the intellectual faculties: It is no less 
contrary to good taste: nor has it less influence to corrupt our 
sentiment of beauty. It belongs to good sense to check its influence 
in both cases; and in this respect, as well as in many others, reason, 
if not an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations 
of this latter faculty. In all the nobler productions of genius, there 
is a mutual relation and correspondence of parts; nor can either 
the beauties or blemishes be perceived by him, whose thought is 
not capacious enough to comprehend all those parts, and compare 
them with each other, in order to perceive the consistence and 
uniformity of the whole. Every work of art has also a certain end or 
purpose for which it is calculated; and is to be deemed more or less 
perfect, as it is more or less fitted to attain this end. The object of 
eloquence is to persuade, of history to instruct, of poetry to please, 
by means of the passions and the imagination. These ends we must 
carry constantly in our view when we peruse any performance; and 
we must be able to judge how far the means employed are adapted 
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to their respective purposes. Besides, every kind of composition, 
even the most poetical, is nothing but a chain of propositions and 
reasonings; not always indeed, the justest and most exact, but still 
plausible and specious, however disguised by the colouring of the 
imagination. The persons introduced in tragedy and epic poetry, 
must be represented as reasoning, and thinking, and concluding, 
and acting, suitably to their character and circumstances; and 
without judgment, as well as taste and invention, a poet can never 
hope to succeed in so delicate an undertaking. Not to mention, 
that the same excellence of faculties which contributes to the 
improvement of reason, the same clearness of conception, the same 
exactness of distinction, the same vivacity of apprehension, are 
essential to the operations of true taste, and are its infallible 
concomitants. It seldom or never happens, that a man of sense, who 
has experience in any art, cannot judge of its beauty; and it is no 
less rare to meet with a man who has a just taste without a sound 
understanding. 
Thus, though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly, if not 
entirely, the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment 
on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard 
of beauty. The organs of internal sensation are seldom so perfect 
as to allow the general principles their full play, and produce a 
feeling correspondent to those principles. They either labour under 
some defect, or are vitiated by some disorder; and by that means, 
excite a sentiment, which may be pronounced erroneous. When 
the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any distinction, and 
is only affected by the grosser and more palpable qualities of the 
object: The finer touches pass unnoticed and disregarded. Where 
he is not aided by practice, his verdict is attended with confusion 
and hesitation. Where no comparison has been employed, the most 
frivolous beauties, such as rather merit the name of defects, are 
the object of his admiration. Where he lies under the influence 
of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where good 
sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the beauties of design 
and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent. Under 
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some or other of these imperfections, the generality of men labour; 
and hence a true judge in the finer arts is observed, even during 
the most polished ages, to be so rare a character: Strong sense, 
united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by 
comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to 
this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they 
are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty. 
But where are such critics to be found? By what marks are they to 
be known? How distinguish them from pretenders? These questions 
are embarrassing; and seem to throw us back into the same 
uncertainty, from which, during the course of this essay, we have 
endeavoured to extricate ourselves. 
But if we consider the matter aright, these are questions of fact, 
not of sentiment. Whether any particular person be endowed with 
good sense and a delicate imagination, free from prejudice, may 
often be the subject of dispute, and be liable to great discussion and 
inquiry: But that such a character is valuable and estimable, will be 
agreed in by all mankind. Where these doubts occur, men can do 
no more than in other disputable questions which are submitted 
to the understanding: They must produce the best arguments, that 
their invention suggests to them; they must acknowledge, a true 
and decisive standard to exist somewhere, to wit, real existence 
and matter of fact; and they must have indulgence to such as differ 
from them in their appeals to this standard. It is sufficient for our 
present purpose, if we have proved, that the taste of all individuals 
is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general, however 
difficult to be particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by 
universal sentiment to have a preference above others. 
But in reality, the difficulty of finding, even in particulars, the 
standard of taste, is not so great as it is represented. Though in 
speculation, we may readily avow a certain criterion in science, 
and deny it in sentiment, the matter is found in practice to be 
much more hard to ascertain in the former case than in the latter. 
Theories of abstract philosophy, systems of profound theology, have 
prevailed during one age: In a successive period, these have been 
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universally exploded: Their absurdity has been detected: Other 
theories and systems have supplied their place, which again gave 
place to their successors: And nothing has been experienced more 
liable to the revolutions of chance and fashion than these pretended 
decisions of science. The case is not the same with the beauties of 
eloquence and poetry. Just expressions of passion and nature are 
sure, after a little time, to gain public applause, which they maintain 
for ever. Aristotle, and Plato, and Epicurus, and Descartes, may 
successively yield to each other: But Terence and Virgil maintain an 
universal, undisputed empire over the minds of men. The abstract 
philosophy of Cicero has lost its credit: The vehemence of his 
oratory is still the object of our admiration. 
Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be 
distinguished in society by the soundness of their understanding, 
and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of mankind. 
The ascendant, which they acquire, gives a prevalence to that lively 
approbation, with which they receive any productions of genius, 
and renders it generally predominant. Many men, when left to 
themselves, have but a faint and dubious perception of beauty, who 
yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke which is pointed out to 
them. Every convert to the admiration of the real poet or orator 
is the cause of some new conversion. And though prejudices may 
prevail for a time, they never unite in celebrating any rival to the 
true genius, but yield at last to the force of nature and just 
sentiment. Thus, though a civilized nation may easily be mistaken in 
the choice of their admired philosopher, they never have been found 
long to err, in their affection for a favourite epic or tragic author. 
But notwithstanding all our endeavours to fix a standard of taste, 
and reconcile the discordant apprehensions of men, there still 
remain two sources of variation, which are not sufficient indeed to 
confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but will often 
serve to produce a difference in the degrees of our approbation 
or blame. The one is the different humours of particular men; the 
other, the particular manners and opinions of our age and country. 
The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature: Where 
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men vary in their judgments, some defect or perversion in the 
faculties may commonly be remarked; proceeding either from 
prejudice, from want of practice, or want of delicacy: and there is 
just reason for approving one taste, and condemning another. But 
where there is such a diversity in the internal frame or external 
situation as is entirely blameless on both sides, and leaves no room 
to give one the preference above the other; in that case a certain 
degree of diversity in judgment is unavoidable, and we seek in vain 
for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary sentiments. 
A young man, whose passions are warm, will be more sensibly 
touched with amorous and tender images, than a man more 
advanced in years, who takes pleasure in wise, philosophical 
reflections, concerning the conduct of life and moderation of the 
passions. At twenty, Ovid may be the favourite author; Horace at 
forty; and perhaps Tacitus at fifty. Vainly would we, in such cases, 
endeavour to enter into the sentiments of others, and divest 
ourselves of those propensities which are natural to us. We choose 
our favourite author as we do our friend, from a conformity of 
humour and disposition. Mirth or passion, sentiment or reflection; 
which ever of these most predominates in our temper, it gives us a 
peculiar sympathy with the writer who resembles us. 
One person is more pleased with the sublime; another with the 
tender; a third with raillery. One has a strong sensibility to 
blemishes, and is extremely studious of correctness: Another has 
a more lively feeling of beauties, and pardons twenty absurdities 
and defects for one elevated or pathetic stroke. The ear of this 
man is entirely turned towards conciseness and energy; that man 
is delighted with a copious, rich, and harmonious expression. 
Simplicity is affected by one; ornament by another. Comedy, 
tragedy, satire, odes, have each its partizans, who prefer that 
particular species of writing to all others. It is plainly an error in a 
critic, to confine his approbation to one species or style of writing, 
and condemn all the rest. But it is almost impossible not to feel a 
predilection for that which suits our particular turn and disposition. 
Such preferences are innocent and unavoidable, and can never 
David Hume - Of the Standard of Taste  |  161
reasonably be the object of dispute, because there is no standard by 
which they can be decided. 
For a like reason, we are more pleased, in the course of our 
reading, with pictures and characters that resemble objects which 
are found in our own age or country, than with those which describe 
a different set of customs. It is not without some effort, that we 
reconcile ourselves to the simplicity of ancient manners, and behold 
princesses carrying water from the spring, and kings and heroes 
dressing their own victuals. We may allow in general, that the 
representation of such manners is no fault in the author, nor 
deformity in the piece; but we are not so sensibly touched with 
them. For this reason, comedy is not easily transferred from one 
age or nation to another. A Frenchman or Englishman is not pleased 
with the Andria of Terence, or Clitia of Machiavel; where the fine 
lady, upon whom all the play turns, never once appears to the 
spectators, but is always kept behind the scenes, suitably to the 
reserved humour of the ancient Greeks and modern Italians. A man 
of learning and reflection can make allowance for these peculiarities 
of manners; but a common audience can never divest themselves so 
far of their usual ideas and sentiments, as to relish pictures which 
nowise resemble them. 
But here there occurs a reflection, which may, perhaps, be useful 
in examining the celebrated controversy concerning ancient and 
modern learning; where we often find the one side excusing any 
seeming absurdity in the ancients from the manners of the age, 
and the other refusing to admit this excuse, or at least admitting 
it only as an apology for the author, not for the performance. In 
my opinion, the proper boundaries in this subject have seldom been 
fixed between the contending parties. Where any innocent 
peculiarities of manners are represented, such as those above 
mentioned, they ought certainly to be admitted; and a man, who 
is shocked with them, gives an evident proof of false delicacy and 
refinement. The poet’s monument more durable than brass, must 
fall to the ground like common brick or clay, were men to make no 
allowance for the continual revolutions of manners and customs, 
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and would admit of nothing but what was suitable to the prevailing 
fashion. Must we throw aside the pictures of our ancestors, because 
of their ruffs and fardingales? But where the ideas of morality and 
decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners 
are described, without being marked with the proper characters 
of blame and disapprobation, this must be allowed to disfigure the 
poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, 
enter into such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet, 
on account of the manners of his age, I never can relish the 
composition. The want of humanity and of decency, so conspicuous 
in the characters drawn by several of the ancient poets, even 
sometimes by Homer and the Greek tragedians, diminishes 
considerably the merit of their noble performances, and gives 
modern authors an advantage over them. We are not interested 
in the fortunes and sentiments of such rough heroes; We are 
displeased to find the limits of vice and virtue so much confounded; 
and whatever indulgence we may give to the writer on account 
of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his 
sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly 
discover to be blameable. 
The case is not the same with moral principles as with speculative 
opinions of any kind. These are in continual flux and revolution. The 
son embraces a different system from the father. Nay there scarcely 
is any man, who can boast of great constancy and uniformity in 
this particular. Whatever speculative errors may be found in the 
polite writings of any age or country, they detract but little from 
the value of those compositions. There needs but a certain turn of 
thought or imagination to make us enter into all the opinions, which 
then prevail, and relish the sentiments or conclusions derived from 
them. But a very violent effort is requisite to change our judgment 
of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation or blame, love or 
hatred, different from those to which the mind, from long custom, 
has been familiarized. And where a man is confident of the rectitude 
of that moral standard, by which he judges, he is justly jealous of it, 
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and will not pervert the sentiments of his heart for a moment, in 
complaisance to any writer whatsoever. 
Of all speculative errors, those which regard religion are the most 
excusable in compositions of genius; nor is it ever permitted to 
judge of the civility or wisdom of any people, or even of single 
persons, by the grossness or refinement of their theological 
principles. The same good sense, that directs men in the ordinary 
occurrences of life, is not hearkened to in religious matters, which 
are supposed to be placed altogether above the cognisance of 
human reason. On this account, all the absurdities of the pagan 
system of theology must be overlooked by every critic, who would 
pretend to form a just notion of ancient poetry; and our posterity, in 
their turn, must have the same indulgence to their forefathers. No 
religious principles can ever be imputed as a fault to any poet, while 
they remain merely principles, and take not such strong possession 
of his heart, as to lay him under the imputation of bigotry or 
superstition. Where that happens, they confound the sentiments of 
morality, and alter the natural boundaries of vice and virtue. They 
are therefore eternal blemishes, according to the principle above 
mentioned; nor are the prejudices and false opinions of the age 
sufficient to justify them. 
It is essential to the Roman Catholic religion to inspire a violent 
hatred of every other worship, and to represent all pagans, 
mahometans, and heretics, as the objects of Divine wrath and 
vengeance. Such sentiments, though they are in reality very 
blameable, are considered as virtues by the zealots of that 
communion, and are represented in their tragedies and epic poems 
as a kind of divine heroism. This bigotry has disfigured two very 
fine tragedies of the French theatre, Polieucte and Athalia; where an 
intemperate zeal for particular modes of worship is set off with all 
the pomp imaginable, and forms the predominant character of the 
heroes. “What is this,” says the sublime Joad to Josabet, finding her 
in discourse with Mathan the priest of Baal, “Does the daughter of 
David speak to this traitor? Are you not afraid, lest the earth should 
open and pour forth flames to devour you both? Or lest these holy 
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walls should fall and crush you together? What is his purpose? Why 
comes that enemy of God hither to poison the air, which we breathe, 
with his horrid presence?”1 Such sentiments are received with great 
applause on the theatre of Paris; but at London the spectators would 
be full as much pleased to hear Achilles tell Agamemnon, that he was 
a dog in his forehead, and a deer in his heart; or Jupiter threaten 
Juno with a sound drubbing, if she will not be quiet. 
Religious principles are also a blemish in any polite composition, 
when they rise up to superstition, and intrude themselves into every 
sentiment, however remote from any connection with religion. It 
is no excuse for the poet, that the customs of his country had 
burthened life with so many religious ceremonies and observances, 
that no part of it was exempt from that yoke. It must for ever 
be ridiculous in Petrarch to compare his mistress, Laura, to Jesus 
Christ. Nor is it less ridiculous in that agreeable libertine, Boccace, 
very seriously to give thanks to God Almighty and the ladies, for 
their assistance in defending him against his enemies. 
1. Racine, Athalie, Act 3, Scene 5. Both Athalie and Polyeucte 
are religious dramas steeped in Roman Catholicism. 
Hume is saying that a Catholic audience in Paris might 
appreciate the "sentiments" of these plays, a Protestant 
audience in London would not. 
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10. Edmund Burke - from A 
Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful 
PART I 
SECTION VII. 
Of the Sublime. 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, 
that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about 
terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is 
a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest 
emotion which the mind is capable of feeling. I say the strongest 
emotion, because I am satisfied the ideas of pain are much more 
powerful than those which enter on the part of pleasure. Without 
all doubt, the torments which we may be made to suffer are much 
greater in their effect on the body and mind, than any pleasures 
which the most learned voluptuary could suggest, or than the 
liveliest imagination, and the most sound and exquisitely sensible 
body, could enjoy. Nay, I am in great doubt whether any man could 
be found, who would earn a life of the most perfect satisfaction at 
the price of ending it in the torments, which justice inflicted in a 
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few hours on the late unfortunate regicide in France.1 But as pain 
is stronger in its operation than pleasure, so death is in general a 
much more affecting idea than pain; because there are very few 
pains, however exquisite, which are not preferred to death: nay, 
what generally makes pain itself, if I may say so, more painful, is, that 
it is considered as an emissary of this king of terrors. When danger 
or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, 
and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain 
modifications, they may be, and they are, delightful, as we every 





Of the Passion Caused by the Sublime 
The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those 
causes operate most powerfully, is astonishment: and astonishment 
1. On January 1757, Robert-François Damiens attempted to 
assassinate King Louis XV. He was caught, brutally 
tortured, and executed. 
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is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with 
some degree of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with 
its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence 
reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great 
power of the sublime, that, far from being produced by them, it 
anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force. 
Astonishment, as I have said, is the effect of the sublime in its 




No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting 
and reasoning as fear. For fear being an apprehension of pain or 
death, it operates in a manner that resembles actual pain. Whatever 
therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is sublime too, whether 
this cause of terror be endued with greatness of dimensions or not; 
for it is impossible to look on anything as trifling, or contemptible, 
that may be dangerous. There are many animals, who, though far 
from being large, are yet capable of raising ideas of the sublime, 
because they are considered as objects of terror. As serpents and 
poisonous animals of almost all kinds. And to things of great 
dimensions, if we annex an adventitious idea of terror, they become 
without comparison greater. A level plain of a vast extent on land, 
is certainly no mean idea; the prospect of such a plain may be 
as extensive as a prospect of the ocean; but can it ever fill the 
mind with anything so great as the ocean itself? This is owing to 
several causes; but it is owing to none more than this, that the 
ocean is an object of no small terror. Indeed terror is in all cases 
whatsoever, either more openly or latently,  the  ruling principle 
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of the sublime. Several languages bear a strong testimony to the 
affinity of these ideas. They frequently use the same word to signify 
indifferently the modes of astonishment or admiration and those 
of terror. Θάμβος [Gk: thámbos] is in Greek either fear or wonder; 
δεινός [Gk: deinós] is terrible or respectable; αἰδέο [Gk: ahideo], to 
reverence or to fear. Vereor in Latin is what αἰδέο is in Greek. The 
Romans used the verb stupeo, a term which strongly marks the state 
of an astonished mind, to express the effect either of simple fear, 
or of astonishment; the word attonitus (thunderstruck) is equally 
expressive of the alliance of these ideas; and do not the French 
étonnement, and the English astonishment and amazement, point 
out as clearly the kindred emotions which attend fear and wonder? 
They who have a more general knowledge of languages, could 




To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be 
necessary. When we know the full extent of any danger, when we 
can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension 
vanishes. Every one will be sensible of this, who considers how 
greatly night adds to our dread, in all cases of danger, and how much 
the notions of ghosts and goblins, of which none can form clear 
ideas, affect minds which give credit to the popular tales concerning 
such sorts of beings. Those despotic governments which are 
founded on the passions of men, and principally upon the passion 
of fear, keep their chief as much as may be from the public eye. 
The policy has been the same in many cases of religion. Almost all 
the heathen temples were dark. Even in the barbarous temples of 
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the Americans at this day, they keep their idol in a dark part of the 
hut, which is consecrated to his worship. For this purpose too the 
Druids performed all their ceremonies in the bosom of the darkest 
woods, and in the shade of the oldest and most spreading oaks. No 
person seems better to have understood the secret of heightening, 
or of setting terrible things, if I may use the expression, in their 
strongest light, by the force of a judicious obscurity than Milton. His 
description of death in the second book is admirably studied; it is 
astonishing with what a gloomy pomp, with what a significant and 
expressive uncertainty of strokes and coloring, he has finished the 
portrait of the king of terrors: 
“The other shape, 
If shape it might be called that shape had none 
Distinguishable, in member, joint, or limb; 
Or substance might be called that shadow seemed; 
For each seemed either; black he stood as night; 
Fierce as ten furies; terrible as hell; 
And shook a deadly dart. What seemed his head 
The likeness of a kingly crown had on.”2 
In this description all is dark, uncertain, confused, terrible, and 
sublime to the last degree. 
SECTION IV. 
Of the Difference between Clearness and 
Obscurity with Regard to the Passions. 
It is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting 
2. John Milton, Paradise Lost 2.666-673. 
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to the imagination. If I make a drawing of a palace, or a temple, 
or a landscape, I present a very clear idea of those objects; but 
then (allowing for the effect of imitation which is something) my 
picture can at most affect only as the palace, temple, or landscape, 
would have affected in the reality. On the other hand, the most 
lively and spirited verbal description I can give raises a very obscure 
and imperfect idea of such objects; but then it is in my power 
to raise a stronger emotion by the description than I could do by 
the best painting. This experience constantly evinces. The proper 
manner of conveying the affections of the mind from one to another 
is by words; there is a great insufficiency in all other methods of 
communication; and so far is a clearness of imagery from being 
absolutely necessary to an influence upon the passions, that they 
may be considerably operated upon, without presenting any image 
at all, by certain sounds adapted to that purpose; of which we 
have a sufficient proof in the acknowledged and powerful effects 
of instrumental music. In reality, a great clearness helps but little 
towards affecting the passions, as it is in some sort an enemy to all 
enthusiasms whatsoever. 
SECTION IV 
The same subject continued. 
There are two verses in Horace’s Art of Poetry [Ars Poetica] that 
seem to contradict this opinion; for which reason I shall take a little 
more pains in clearing it up. The verses are, 
 
 
Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures 
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus 
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On this the Abbé du Bos founds a criticism, wherein he gives 
painting the preference to poetry in the article of moving the 
passions; and on that account principally of the greater clearness of 
the ideas it represents.  I believe this excellent judge was led into 
this mistake (if it be a mistake) by his system; to which he found 
it more conformable than I imagine it will be found to experience. 
I know several who admire and love painting, and yet who regard 
the objects of their admiration in that art with coolness enough 
in comparison of that warmth with which they are animated by 
affecting pieces of poetry or rhetoric. Among the common sort of 
people, I never could perceive that painting had much influence on 
their passions. It is true that the best sorts of painting, as well as 
the best sorts of poetry, are not much understood in that sphere. 
But it is most certain that their passions are very strongly roused 
by a fanatic preacher, or by the ballads of Chevy Chase, or the 
Children in the Wood,3 and by other little popular poems and tales 
that are current in that rank of life. I do not know of any paintings, 
bad or good, that produce the same effect. So that poetry, with 
all its obscurity, has a more general, as well as a more powerful 
dominion over the passions, than the other art. And I think there are 
reasons in nature, why the obscure idea, when properly conveyed, 
should be more affecting than the clear. It is our ignorance of things 
that causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our passions. 
Knowledge and acquaintance make the most striking causes affect 
but little. It is thus with the vulgar; and all men are as the vulgar in 
what they do not understand. The ideas of eternity, and infinity, are 
among the most affecting we have: and yet perhaps there is nothing 
of which we really understand so little, as of infinity and eternity. We 
do not anywhere meet  a more sublime description than this justly-
celebrated one of Milton, wherein he gives the portrait of Satan with 
a dignity so suitable to the subject: 
3. ~15th and 16th English ballads in the oral tradition. 
172  |  Edmund Burke - from A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful
“He above the rest 
In shape and gesture proudly eminent 
Stood like a tower; his form had yet not lost 
All her original brightness, nor appeared 
Less than archangel ruined, and th’ excess 
Of glory obscured: as when the sun new risen 
Looks through the horizontal misty air 
Shorn of his beams; or from behind the moon 
In dim eclipse disastrous twilight sheds 
On half the nations; and with fear of change 
Perplexes monarchs.”4 
Here is a very noble picture; and in what does this poetical picture 
consist? In images of a tower, an archangel, the sun rising through 
mists, or in an eclipse, the ruin of monarchs and the revolutions 
of kingdoms. The mind is hurried out of itself, by a crowd of great 
and confused images; which affect because they are crowded and 
confused. For separate them, and you lose much of the greatness; 
and join them, and you infallibly lose the clearness. The images 
raised by poetry are always of this obscure kind; though in general 
the effects of poetry are by no means to be attributed to the images 
it raises; which point we shall examine more at large hereafter. But 
painting, when we have allowed for the pleasure of imitation, can 
only affect simply by the images it presents; and even in painting, a 
judicious obscurity in some things contributes to the effect of the 
picture; because the images in painting are exactly similar to those 
in nature; and in nature, dark, confused, uncertain images have a 
greater power on the fancy to form the grander passions, than those 
have which are more clear and determinate. But where and when 
this observation may be applied to practice, and how far it shall be 
extended, will be better deduced from the nature of the subject, and 
from the occasion, than from any rules that can be given. 
I am sensible that this idea has met with opposition, and is likely 
4. Milton, Paradise Lost 1.589-99 
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still to be rejected by several. But let it be considered that hardly 
anything can strike the mind with its greatness, which does not 
make some sort of approach towards infinity; which nothing can 
do whilst we are able to perceive its bounds; but to see an object 
distinctly, and to perceive its bounds, is one and the same thing. 
A clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea. There is a 
passage in the book of Job amazingly sublime, and this sublimity is 
principally due to the terrible uncertainty of the thing described: In 
thoughts from the visions of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon 
men, fear came upon me and trembling, which made all my bones to 
shake. Then a spirit passed before my face. The hair of my flesh stood 
up. It stood still, but I could not discern the form thereof; an image 
was before mine eyes; there was silence; and I heard a voice — Shall 
mortal man be more just than God?5 We are first prepared with the 
utmost solemnity for the vision; we are first terrified, before we are 
let even into the obscure cause of our emotion: but when this grand 
cause of terror makes its appearance, what is it? Is it not wrapt up 
in the shades of its own incomprehensible darkness, more awful, 
more striking, more terrible, than the liveliest  description, than the 
clearest  painting, could possibly represent it? When painters have 
attempted to give us clear representations of these very fanciful 
and terrible ideas, they have, I think, almost always failed; insomuch 
that I have been at a loss, in all the pictures I have seen of hell, to 
determine whether the painter did not intend something ludicrous. 
Several painters have handled a subject of this kind, with a view 
of assembling as many horrid phantoms as their imagination could 
suggest; but all the designs I have chanced to meet of the 
temptations of St. Anthony were rather a sort of odd, wild 
grotesques, than any thing capable of producing a serious passion. 
In all these subjects poetry is very happy. Its apparitions, its 
chimeras, its harpies, its allegorical figures, are grand and affecting; 
5. Job 4.13-14. Burke consistently uses the King James 
Version. All citations from KJV. 
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and though Virgil’s Fame and Homer’s Discord are obscure, they 
are magnificent figures. These figures in painting would be clear 
enough, but I fear they might become ridiculous. 
SECTION V. 
Power. 
Besides those things which directly suggest the idea of danger, and 
those which produce a similar effect from a mechanical cause, I 
know of nothing sublime, which is not some modification of power. 
And this branch rises, as naturally as the other two branches, from 
terror, the common stock of everything that is sublime. The idea 
of power, at first view, seems of the class of those indifferent ones, 
which may equally belong to pain or to pleasure. But in reality, the 
affection arising from the idea of vast power is extremely remote 
from that neutral character. For first, we must remember that the 
idea of pain, in its highest degree, is much stronger than the highest 
degree of pleasure; and that it preserves the same superiority 
through all the subordinate gradations. From hence it is, that where 
the chances for equal degrees of suffering or enjoyment are in 
any sort equal, the idea of the suffering must always be prevalent. 
And indeed the ideas of pain, and, above all, of death, are so very 
affecting, that whilst we remain in the presence of whatever is 
supposed to have the power of inflicting either, it is impossible to 
be perfectly free from terror. Again, we know by experience, that, 
for the enjoyment of pleasure, no great efforts of power are at all 
necessary; nay, we know that such efforts would go a great way 
towards destroying our satisfaction: for pleasure must be stolen, 
and not forced upon us; pleasure follows the will; and therefore 
we are generally affected with it by many things of a force greatly 
inferior to our own. But pain is always inflicted by a power in some 
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way superior, because we never submit to pain willingly. So that 
strength, violence, pain, and terror, are ideas that rush in upon the 
mind together. Look at a man, or any other animal of prodigious 
strength, and what is your idea before reflection? Is it that this 
strength will be subservient to you, to your ease, to your pleasure, 
to your interest in any sense? No; the emotion you feel is, lest this 
enormous strength should be employed to the purposes of rapine 
and destruction. That power derives all its sublimity from the terror 
with which it is generally accompanied, will appear evidently from 
its effect in the very few cases, in which it may be possible to 
strip a considerable degree of strength of its ability to hurt. When 
you do this, you spoil it of everything sublime, and it immediately 
becomes contemptible. An ox is a creature of vast strength; but 
he is an innocent creature, extremely serviceable, and not at all 
dangerous; for which reason the idea of an ox is by no means grand. 
A bull is strong too; but his strength is of another kind; often very 
destructive, seldom (at least amongst us) of any use in our business; 
the idea of a bull is therefore great, and it has frequently a place 
in sublime descriptions, and elevating comparisons. Let us look at 
another strong animal, in the two distinct lights in which we may 
consider him. The horse in the light of an useful beast, fit for the 
plough, the road, the draft; in every social useful light, the horse has 
nothing sublime; but is it thus that we are affected with him, whose 
neck is clothed with thunder, the glory of whose nostrils is terrible, 
who swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage, neither believeth 
that it is the sound of the trumpet?6 In this description, the useful 
character of the horse entirely disappears, and the terrible and 
sublime blaze out together. We have continually about us animals of 
a strength that is considerable, but not pernicious. Amongst these 
we never look for the sublime; it comes upon us in the gloomy 
forest, and in the howling wilderness, in the form of the lion, the 
tiger, the panther, or rhinoceros. Whenever strength is only useful, 
6. Job 39.24 
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and employed for our benefit or our pleasure, then it is never 
sublime; for nothing can act agreeably to us, that does not act in 
conformity to our will; but to act agreeably to our will, it must 
be subject to us, and therefore can never be the cause of a grand 
and commanding conception. The description of the wild ass, in 
Job, is worked up into no small sublimity, merely by insisting on 
his freedom, and his setting mankind at defiance; otherwise the 
description of such an animal could have had nothing noble in it. 
Who hath loosed (says he) the bands of the wild ass? whose house 
I have made the wilderness and the barren land his dwellings. He 
scorneth the multitude of the city, neither regardeth he the voice of the 
driver. The range of the mountains is his pasture.7 The magnificent 
description of the unicorn and of leviathan, in the same book, is 
full of the same heightening circumstances: Will the unicorn be 
willing to serve thee? canst thou bind the unicorn with his band in 
the furrow? wilt thou trust him because his strength is great?8—Canst 
thou draw out leviathan with an hook?9 will he make a covenant with 
thee? wilt thou take him for a servant forever?10 shall not one be 
cast down even at the sight of him?11 In short, wheresoever we find 
strength, and in what light soever we look upon power, we shall all 
along observe the sublime the concomitant of terror, and contempt 
the attendant on a strength that is subservient and innoxious. The 
race of dogs, in many of their kinds, have generally a competent 
degree of strength and swiftness; and they exert these and other 
valuable qualities which they possess, greatly to our convenience 
and pleasure. Dogs are indeed the most social, affectionate, and 
amiable animals of the whole brute creation; but love approaches 
7. Job 39.7-8 
8. Job 39.10-11 
9. Job 41.1 
10. Job 41.4 
11. Job 41.9 
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much nearer to contempt than is commonly imagined; and 
accordingly, though we caress dogs, we borrow from them an 
appellation of the most despicable kind, when we employ terms 
of reproach; and this appellation is the common mark of the last 
vileness and contempt in every language. Wolves have not more 
strength than several species of dogs; but, on account of their 
unmanageable fierceness, the idea of a wolf is not despicable; it 
is not excluded from grand descriptions and similitudes. Thus we 
are affected by strength, which is natural power. The power which 
arises from institution in kings and commanders, has the same 
connection with terror. Sovereigns are frequently addressed with 
the title of dread majesty. And it may be observed, that young 
persons, little acquainted with the world, and who have not been 
used to approach men in power, are commonly struck with an awe 
which takes away the free use of their faculties. When I prepared 
my seat in the street, (says Job,) the young men saw me, and hid 
themselves.12 Indeed so natural is this timidity with regard to power, 
and so strongly does it inhere in our constitution, that very few are 
able to conquer it, but by mixing much in the business of the great 
world, or by using no small violence to their natural dispositions. 
I know some people are of opinion, that no awe, no degree of 
terror, accompanies the idea of power; and have hazarded to affirm, 
that we can contemplate the idea of God himself without any such 
emotion. I purposely avoided, when I first considered this subject, 
to introduce the idea of that great and tremendous Being, as an 
example in an argument so light as this; though it frequently 
occurred to me, not as an objection to, but as a strong confirmation 
of, my notions in this matter. I hope, in what I am going to say, I shall 
avoid presumption, where it is almost impossible for any mortal 
to speak with strict propriety. I say then, that whilst we consider 
the Godhead merely as he is an object of the understanding, which 
forms a complex idea of power, wisdom, justice, goodness, all 
12. Job 29.7-8 
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stretched to a degree far exceeding the bounds of our 
comprehension, whilst we consider the divinity in this refined and 
abstracted light, the imagination and passions are little or nothing 
affected. But because we are bound, by the condition of our nature, 
to ascend to these pure and intellectual ideas, through the medium 
of sensible images, and to judge of these divine qualities by their 
evident acts and exertions, it becomes extremely hard to 
disentangle our idea of the cause from the effect by which we are 
led to know it. Thus, when we contemplate the Deity, his attributes 
and their operation, coming united on the mind, form a sort of 
sensible image, and as such are capable of affecting the imagination. 
Now, though in a just idea of the Deity, perhaps none of his 
attributes are predominant, yet, to our imagination, his power is 
by far the most striking. Some reflection, some comparing, is 
necessary to satisfy us of his wisdom, his justice, and his goodness. 
To be struck with his power, it is only necessary that we should 
open our eyes. But whilst we contemplate so vast an object, under 
the arm, as it were, of almighty power, and invested upon every 
side with omnipresence, we shrink into the minuteness of our own 
nature, and are, in a manner, annihilated before him. 
*** 
And they who consider with what infinite attention, by what a 
disregard of every perishable object, through what long habits of 
piety and contemplation it is that any man is able to attain an 
entire love and devotion to the Deity, will easily perceive that it is 
not the first, the most natural, and the most striking effect which 
proceeds from that idea. Thus we have traced power through its 
several gradations unto the highest of all, where our imagination is 
finally lost; and we find terror, quite throughout the progress, its 
inseparable companion, and growing along with it, as far as we can 
possibly trace them. Now, as power is undoubtedly a capital source 
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of the sublime, this will point out evidently from whence its energy 
is derived, and to what class of ideas we ought to unite it. 
SECTION VI. 
Privation. 
All general privations are great, because they are all terrible; vacuity, 
darkness, solitude, and silence. With what a fire of imagination, yet 
with what severity of judgment, has Virgil amassed all these 
circumstances, where he knows that all the images of a tremendous 
dignity ought to be united at the mouth of hell! Where, before he 
unlocks the secrets of the great deep, he seems to be seized with a 
religious horror, and to retire astonished at the boldness of his own 
design: 
 
Dii, quibus imperium est animarum, umbræque silentes! 
Et Chaos, et Phlegethon! loca nocte silentia late! 
Sit mihi fas audita loqui! sit numine vestro 
Pandere res alta terra et caligine mersas! 
Ibant obscuri, sola sub nocte, per umbram, 
Perque domos Ditis vacuas, et inania regus. 
 
“Ye subterraneous gods! whose awful sway 
The gliding ghosts, and silent shades obey: 
O Chaos hoar! and Phlegethon profound! 
Whose solemn empire stretches wide around; 
Give me, ye great, tremendous powers, to tell 
Of scenes and wonders in the depth of hell; 
Give me your mighty secrets to display 
From those black realms of darkness to the day.” 
180  |  Edmund Burke - from A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful
— PITT. 
 
“Obscure they went through dreary shades that led 




Greatness of dimension is a powerful cause of the sublime. This 
is too evident, and the observation too common, to need any 
illustration; it is not so common to consider in what ways greatness 
of dimension, vastness of extent or quantity, has the most striking 
effect. For, certainly, there are ways and modes wherein the same 
quantity of extension shall produce greater effects than it is found 
to do in others. Extension is either in length, height, or depth. Of 
these the length strikes least; a hundred yards of even ground will 
never work such an effect as a tower a hundred yards high, or a 
rock or mountain of that altitude. I am apt to imagine, likewise, 
that height is less grand than depth; and that we are more struck 
at looking down from a precipice, than looking up at an object of 
equal height; but of that I am not very positive. A perpendicular has 
more force in forming the sublime, than an inclined plane, and the 
effects of a rugged and broken surface seem stronger than where it 
is smooth and polished. It would carry us out of our way to enter 
in this place into the cause of these appearances, but certain it 
is they afford a large and fruitful field of speculation. However, it 
may not be amiss to add to these remarks upon magnitude, that 
as the great extreme of dimension is sublime, so the last extreme 
of littleness is in some measure sublime likewise; when we attend 
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to the infinite divisibility of matter, when we pursue animal life 
into these excessively  small, and yet organized beings, that escape 
the  nicest inquisition of the sense; when we push our discoveries 
yet downward, and consider those creatures so many degrees yet 
smaller, and the still diminishing scale of existence, in tracing which 
the imagination is lost as well as the sense; we become amazed and 
confounded at the wonders of minuteness; nor can we distinguish in 
its effect this extreme of littleness from the vast itself. For division 
must be infinite as well as addition; because the idea of a perfect 
unity can no more be arrived at, than that of a complete whole, to 
which nothing may be added. 
SECTION VIII. 
Infinity. 
Another source of the sublime is infinity; if it does not rather belong 
to the last. Infinity has a tendency to fill the mind with that sort of 
delightful horror, which is the most genuine effect, and truest test 
of the sublime. There are scarce any things which can become the 
objects of our senses, that are really and in their own nature infinite. 
But the eye not being able to perceive the bounds of many things, 
they seem to be infinite, and they produce the same effects as if 
they were really so. We are deceived in the like manner, if the parts 
of some large object are so continued to any indefinite number, that 
the imagination meets no check which may hinder its extending 
them at pleasure. 
Whenever we repeat any idea frequently, the mind, by a sort 
of mechanism, repeats it long after the first cause has ceased to 
operate. After whirling about, when we sit down, the objects about 
us still seem to whirl. After a long succession of noises, as the fall 
of waters, or the beating of forge-hammers, the hammers beat and 
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the waters roar in the imagination long after the first sounds have 
ceased to affect it; and they die away at last by gradations which 
are scarcely perceptible. If you hold up a straight pole, with your 
eye to one end, it will seem extended to a length almost incredible. 
Place a number of uniform and equi-distant marks on this pole, 
they will cause the same deception, and seem multiplied without 
end. The senses, strongly affected in some one manner, cannot 
quickly change their tenor, or adapt themselves to other things; but 
they continue in their old channel until the strength of the first 
mover decays. This is the reason of an appearance very frequent in 
madmen; that they remain whole days and nights, sometimes whole 
years, in the constant repetition of some remark, some complaint, 
or song; which having struck powerfully on their disordered 
imagination, in the beginning of their frenzy, every repetition 
reinforces it with new strength, and the hurry of their spirits, 




Infinity in Pleasing Objects. 
Infinity, though of another kind, causes much of our pleasure in 
agreeable, as well as of our delight in sublime images. The spring 
is the pleasantest of the seasons; and the young of most animals, 
though far from being completely fashioned, afford a more 
agreeable sensation than the full-grown; because the imagination 
is entertained with the promise of something more, and does not 
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acquiesce in the present object of the sense. In unfinished sketches 
of drawing, I have often seen something which pleased me beyond 
the best finishing; and this I believe proceeds from the cause I have 
just now assigned. 
SECTION XII. 
Difficulty. 
Another source of greatness is difficulty. When any work seems to 
have required immense force and labor to effect it, the idea is grand. 
Stonehenge, neither for disposition nor ornament, has anything 
admirable; but those huge rude masses of stone, set on end, and 
piled each on other, turn the mind on the immense force necessary 
for such a work. Nay, the rudeness of the work increases this cause 
of grandeur, as it excludes the idea of art and contrivance; for 




Magnificence is likewise a source of the sublime. A great profusion 
of things, which are splendid or valuable in themselves, is 
magnificent. The starry heaven, though it occurs so very frequently 
to our view never fails to excite an idea of grandeur. This cannot be 
owing to the stars themselves, separately considered. The number is 
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certainly the cause. The apparent disorder augments the grandeur, 
for the appearance of care is highly contrary to our ideas of 
magnificence. Besides, the stars lie in such apparent confusion, as 
makes it impossible on ordinary occasions to reckon them. This 
gives them the advantage of a sort of infinity. In works of art, this 
kind of grandeur which consists in multitude, is to be very 
cautiously admitted; because a profusion of excellent things is not 
to be attained, or with too much difficulty; and because in many 
cases this splendid confusion would destroy all use, which should 
be attended to in most of the works of art with the greatest care; 
besides, it is to be considered, that unless you can produce an 
appearance of infinity by your disorder, you will have disorder only 
without magnificence. There are, however, a sort of fireworks, and 
some other things, that in this way succeed well, and are truly 
grand. There are also many descriptions in the poets and orators, 
which owe their sublimity to a richness and profusion of images, 
in which the mind is so dazzled as to make it impossible to attend 
to that exact coherence and agreement of the allusions, which we 
should require on every other occasion. I do not now remember a 
more striking example of this, than the description which is given of 
the king’s army in the play of Henry IV.:— 
“All furnished, all in arms, 
All plumed like ostriches that with the wind 
Baited like eagles having lately bathed: 
As full of spirit us the month of May, 
And gorgeous as the sun in midsummer, 
Wanton as youthful goats, wild as young bulls. 
I saw young Harry with his beaver on 
Rise from the ground like feathered Mercury; 
And vaulted with such ease into his seat, 
As if an angel dropped down from the clouds 
To turn and wind a fiery Pegasus.”13 
13. William Shakespeare, Henry IV 4.1.107-119 
Edmund Burke - from A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas
of the Sublime and Beautiful  |  185
In that excellent book, so remarkable for the vivacity of its 
descriptions, as well as the solidity and penetration of its 
sentences, the Wisdom of the Son of Sirach, there is a noble 
panegyric on the high-priest Simon the son of Onias; and it is a 
very fine example of the point before us:— 
How was he honored in the midst of the people, in his coming out 
of the sanctuary! He was as the morning star in the midst of a cloud, 
and as the moon at the full; as the sun shining upon the temple of the 
Most High, and as the rainbow giving light in the bright clouds: and 
as the flower of roses in the spring of the year, as lilies by the rivers of 
waters, and as the frankincense-tree in summer; as fire and incense 
in the censer, and as a vessel of gold set with precious stones; as a fair 
olive-tree budding forth fruit, and as a cypress which groweth up to 
the clouds. When he put on the robe of honor, and was clothed with 
the perfection of glory, when he went up to the holy altar, he made 
the garment of holiness honorable. He himself stood by the hearth of 
the altar, compassed with his brethren round about; as a young cedar 
in Libanus, and as palm-trees compassed they him about. So were all 




Having considered extension, so far as it is capable of raising ideas 
of greatness; color comes next under consideration. All colors 
depend on light. Light therefore ought previously to be examined; 
14. Eccles. 50.5-13 
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and with it its opposite, darkness. With regard to light, to make 
it a cause capable of producing the sublime, it must  be attended 
with some  circumstances, besides its bare faculty of showing other 
objects. Mere light is too common a thing to make a strong 
impression on the mind, and without a strong impression nothing 
can be sublime. But such a light as that of the sun, immediately 
exerted on the eye, as it overpowers the sense, is a very great 
idea. Light of an inferior strength to this, if it moves with great 
celerity, has the same power; for lightning is certainly productive 
of grandeur, which it owes chiefly to the extreme velocity of its 
motion. A quick transition from light to darkness, or from darkness 
to light, has yet a greater effect. But darkness is more productive 
of sublime ideas than light. Our great poet was convinced of this; 
and indeed so full was he of this idea, so entirely possessed with 
the power of a well-managed darkness, that in describing the 
appearance of the Deity, amidst that profusion of magnificent 
images, which the grandeur of his subject provokes him to pour 
out upon every side, he is far from forgetting the obscurity which 
surrounds the most incomprehensible of all beings, but 
“With majesty of darkness round 
Circles his throne.”15 
And what is no less remarkable, our author had the secret of 
preserving this idea, even when he seemed to depart the farthest 
from it, when he describes the light and glory which flows from the 
Divine presence; a light which by its very excess is converted into a 
species of darkness:— 
“Dark with excessive light thy skirts appear.”16 
Here is an idea not only poetical in a high degree, but strictly 
and philosophically just. Extreme light, by overcoming the organs of 
15. Milton, Paradise Lost 2.266-67. 
16. Milton, Paradise Lost 3.380. Burke misquotes Milton 
here. The line should be "Dark with excessive bright." 
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sight, obliterates all objects, so as in its effect exactly to resemble 
darkness. After looking for some time at the sun, two black spots, 
the impression which it leaves, seem to dance before our eyes. 
Thus are two ideas as opposite as can be imagined reconciled in 
the extremes of both; and both, in spite of their opposite nature, 
brought to concur in producing the sublime. And this is not the only 
instance wherein the opposite extremes operate equally in favor of 
the sublime, which in all things abhors mediocrity. 
*** 
SECTION XVI. 
Color Considered as Productive of the Sublime. 
Among colors, such as are soft or cheerful (except perhaps a strong 
red, which is cheerful) are unfit to produce grand images. An 
immense mountain covered with a shining green turf, is nothing, 
in this respect, to one dark and gloomy; the cloudy sky is more 
grand than the blue; and night more sublime and solemn than day. 
Therefore in historical painting, a gay or gaudy drapery can never 
have a happy effect: and in buildings, when the highest degree of 
the sublime is intended, the materials and ornaments ought neither 
to be white, nor green, nor yellow, nor blue, nor of a pale red, nor 
violet, nor spotted, but of sad and fuscous colors, as black, or brown, 
or deep purple, and the like. Much of gilding, mosaics, painting, 
or statues, contribute but little to the sublime. This rule need not 
be put in practice, except where an uniform degree of the most 
striking sublimity is to be produced, and that in every particular; 
for it ought to be observed, that this melancholy kind of greatness, 
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though it be certainly the highest, ought not to be studied in all 
sorts of edifices, where yet grandeur must be studied; in such cases 
the sublimity must be drawn from the other sources; with a strict 
caution however against anything light and riant; as nothing so 
effectually deadens the whole taste of the sublime. 
SECTION XVII. 
Sound and Loudness. 
The eye is not the only organ of sensation by which a sublime 
passion may be produced. Sounds have a great power in these as 
in most other passions. I do not mean words, because words do 
not affect simply by their sounds, but by means altogether different. 
Excessive loudness alone is sufficient to overpower the soul, to 
suspend its action, and to fill it with terror. The noise of vast 
cataracts, raging storms, thunder, or artillery, awakes a great and 
awful sensation in the mind, though we can observe no nicety or 
artifice in those sorts of music. The shouting of multitudes has a 
similar effect; and by the sole strength of the sound, so amazes and 
confounds the imagination, that, in this staggering and hurry of the 
mind, the best established tempers can scarcely forbear being borne 
down, and joining in the common cry, and common resolution of the 
crowd. 
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SECTION XVIII. 
Suddenness. 
A sudden beginning, or sudden cessation of sound of any 
considerable force, has the same power. The attention is roused by 
this; and the faculties driven forward, as it were, on their guard. 
Whatever, either in sights or sounds, makes the transition from one 
extreme to the other easy, causes no terror, and consequently can 
be no cause of greatness. In everything sudden and unexpected, we 
are apt to start; that is, we have a perception of danger, and our 
nature rouses us to guard against it. It may be observed that a single 
sound of some strength, though but of short duration, if repeated 
after intervals, has a grand effect. Few things are more awful than 
the striking of a great clock, when the silence of the night prevents 
the attention from being too much dissipated. The same may be 
said of a single stroke on a drum, repeated with pauses; and of the 
successive firing of cannon at a distance. All the effects mentioned 
in this section have causes very nearly alike. 
SECTION XIX. 
Intermitting. 
A low, tremulous, intermitting sound, though it seems, in some 
respects, opposite to that just mentioned, is productive of the 
sublime. It is worth while to examine this a little. The fact itself must 
be determined by every man’s own experience and reflection. I have 
already observed, that night increases our terror, more perhaps 
than anything else; it is our nature, when we do not know what may 
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happen to us, to fear the worst that can happen; and hence it is 
that uncertainty is so terrible, that we often seek to be rid of it, at 
the hazard of a certain mischief. Now some low, confused, uncertain 
sounds, leave us in the same fearful anxiety concerning their causes, 
that no light, or an uncertain light, does concerning the objects that 
surround us. 
*** 
But light now appearing, and now leaving us, and so off and on, 
is even more terrible than total darkness; and a sort of uncertain 
sounds are, when the necessary dispositions concur, more alarming 
than a total silence. 
*** 
SECTION XXI. 
Smell and Taste.—Bitters and Stenches 
Smells and tastes have some share too in ideas of greatness; but it is 
a small one, weak in its nature, and confined in its operations. I shall 
only observe that no smells or tastes can produce a grand sensation, 
except excessive bitters, and intolerable stenches. It is true that 
these affections of the smell and taste, when they are in their full 
force, and lean directly upon the sensory, are simply painful, and 
accompanied with no sort of delight; but when they are moderated, 
as in a description or narrative, they become sources of the sublime, 
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as genuine as any other, and upon the very same principle of a 
moderated pain. “A cup of bitterness”; “to drain the bitter cup of 
fortune”; “the bitter apples of Sodom”; these are all ideas suitable to 
a sublime description. 
*** 
[I]t is one of the tests by which the sublimity of an image is to be 
tried, not whether it becomes mean when associated with mean 
ideas; but whether, when united with images of an allowed 
grandeur, the whole composition is supported with dignity. Things 
which are terrible are always great; but when things possess 
disagreeable qualities, or such as have indeed some degree of 
danger, but of a danger easily overcome, they are merely odious; as 
toads and spiders. 
SECTION XXII. 
Feeling. —Pain. 
Of feeling little more can be said than that the idea of bodily pain, 
in all the modes and degrees of labor, pain, anguish, torment, is 
productive of the sublime; and nothing else in this sense can 
produce it. I need not give here any fresh instances, as those given 
in the former sections abundantly illustrate a remark that, in reality, 
wants only an attention to nature, to be made by everybody. 
Having thus run through the causes of the sublime with reference 
to all the senses, my first observation (Sect. 7) will be found very 
nearly true; that the sublime is an idea belonging to self-
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preservation; that it is, therefore, one of the most affecting we have; 
that its strongest emotion is an emotion of distress; and that no 




The Real Cause of Beauty 
Having endeavored to show what beauty is not, it remains that 
we should examine, at least with equal attention, in what it really 
consists. Beauty is a thing much too affecting not to depend upon 
some positive qualities. And since it is no creature of our reason, 
since it strikes us without any reference to use, and even where no 
use at all can be discerned, since the order and method of nature 
is generally very different from our measures and proportions, we 
must conclude that beauty is, for the greater part, some quality 
in bodies acting mechanically upon the human mind by the 
intervention of the senses. We ought, therefore, to consider 
attentively in what manner those sensible qualities are disposed, in 
such things as by experience we find beautiful, or which excite in us 
the passion of love, or some correspondent affection. 
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SECTION XIII. 
Beautiful Objects Small. 
The most obvious point that presents itself to us in examining any 
object is its extent or quantity. And what degree of extent prevails 
in bodies that are held beautiful, may be gathered from the usual 
manner of expression concerning it. I am told that, in most 
languages, the objects of love are spoken of under diminutive 
epithets. It is so in all the languages of which I have any knowledge. 
In Greek the ιον Gk: ion] and other diminutive terms are almost 
always the terms of affection and tenderness. These diminutives 
were commonly added by the Greeks to the names of persons with 
whom they conversed on terms of friendship and familiarity. 
Though the Romans were a people of less quick and delicate 
feelings, yet they naturally slid into the lessening termination upon 
the same occasions. Anciently, in the English language, the 
diminishing ling was added to the names of persons and things that 
were the objects of love. Some we retain still, as darling (or little 
dear), and a few others. But to this day, in ordinary conversation, it 
is usual to add the endearing name of little to everything we love; 
the French and Italians make use of these affectionate diminutives 
even more than we. In the animal creation, out of our own species, 
it is the small we are inclined to be fond of; little birds, and some 
of the smaller kinds of beasts. A great beautiful thing is a manner 
of expression scarcely ever used; but that of a great ugly thing 
is very common. There is a wide difference between admiration 
and love. The sublime, which is the cause of the former, always 
dwells on great objects, and terrible; the latter on small ones, and 
pleasing; we submit to what we admire, but we love what submits 
to us; in one case we are forced, in the other we are flattered, into 
compliance. In short, the ideas of the sublime and the beautiful 
stand on foundations so different, that it is hard, I had almost said 
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impossible, to think of reconciling them in the same subject, 
without considerably lessening the effect of the one or the other 
upon the passions. So that, attending to their quantity, beautiful 
objects are comparatively small. 
SECTION XIV. 
Smoothness. 
The next property constantly observable in such objects is 
smoothness; a quality so essential to beauty, that I do not now 
recollect anything beautiful that is not smooth. In trees and flowers, 
smooth leaves are beautiful; smooth slopes of earth in gardens; 
smooth streams in the landscape; smooth coats of birds and beasts 
in animal beauties; in fine women, smooth skins; and in several 
sorts of ornamental furniture, smooth and polished surfaces. A very 
considerable part of the effect of beauty is owing to this quality; 
indeed the most considerable. For, take any beautiful object, and 
give it a broken, and rugged surface; and, however well formed 
it may be in other respects, it pleases no longer. Whereas, let it 
want ever so many of the other constituents, if it wants not this, it 
becomes more pleasing than almost all the others without it. This 
seems to me so evident, that I am a good deal surprised that none 
who have handled the subject have made any mention of the quality 
of smoothness in the enumeration of those that go to the forming 
of beauty. For, indeed, any ruggedness, any sudden, projection, any 
sharp angle, is in the highest degree contrary to that idea. 
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SECTION XV. 
Gradual Variation. 
But as perfectly beautiful bodies are not composed of angular parts, 
so their parts never continue long in the same right line. They 
vary their direction every moment, and they change under the eye 
by a deviation continually carrying on, but for whose beginning 
or end you will find it difficult to ascertain a point. The view of 
a beautiful bird will illustrate this observation. Here we see the 
head increasing insensibly to the middle, from whence it lessens 
gradually until it mixes with the neck; the neck loses itself in a larger 
swell, which continues to the middle of the body, when the whole 
decreases again to the tail; the tail takes a new direction, but it soon 
varies its new course, it blends again with the other parts, and the 
line is perpetually changing, above, below, upon every side. In this 
description I have before me the idea of a dove; it agrees very well 
with most of the conditions of beauty. It is smooth and downy; its 
parts are (to use that expression) melted into one another; you are 
presented with no sudden protuberance through the whole, and yet 
the whole is continually changing. Observe that part of a beautiful 
woman where she is perhaps the most beautiful, about the neck 
and breasts; the smoothness, the softness, the easy and insensible 
swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the smallest 
space the same; the deceitful maze through which the unsteady eye 
slides giddily, without knowing where to fix, or whither it is carried. 
Is not this a demonstration of that change of surface, continual, 
and yet hardly perceptible at any point, which forms one of the 
great constituents of beauty? It gives me no small pleasure to find 
that I can strengthen my theory in this point by the opinion of the 
very ingenious Mr. Hogarth, whose idea of the line of beauty I take 
in general to be extremely just. But the idea of variation, without 
attending so accurately to the manner of the variation, has led him 
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to consider angular figures as beautiful; these figures, it is true, 
vary greatly, yet they vary in a sudden and broken manner, and I 
do not find any natural object which is angular, and at the same 
time beautiful. Indeed, few natural objects are entirely angular. But 
I think those which approach the most nearly to it are the ugliest. I 
must add, too, that so for as I could observe of nature, though the 
varied line is that alone in which complete beauty is found, yet there 
is no particular line which is always found in the most completely 
beautiful, and which is therefore beautiful in preference to all other 
lines. At least I never could observe it. 
SECTION XVI. 
Delicacy. 
An air of robustness and strength is very prejudicial to beauty. An 
appearance of delicacy, and even of fragility, is almost essential to 
it. Whoever examines the vegetable or animal creation will find 
this observation to be founded in nature. It is not the oak, the 
ash, or the elm, or any of the robust trees of the forest which we 
consider as beautiful; they are awful and majestic, they inspire a 
sort of reverence. It is the delicate myrtle, it is the orange, it is the 
almond, it is the jasmine, it is the vine which we look on as vegetable 
beauties. It is the flowery species, so remarkable for its weakness 
and momentary duration, that gives us the liveliest idea of beauty 
and elegance. Among animals, the greyhound is more beautiful than 
the mastiff, and the delicacy of a jennet, a barb, or an Arabian horse, 
is much more amiable than the strength and stability of some horses 
of war or carriage. I need here say little of the fair sex, where I 
believe the point will be easily allowed me. The beauty of women 
is considerably owing to their weakness or delicacy, and is even 
enhanced by their timidity,  a quality of mind analogous to it. I would 
Edmund Burke - from A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas
of the Sublime and Beautiful  |  197
not here  be understood to say, that weakness betraying very bad 
health has any share in beauty; but the ill effect of this is not because 
it is weakness, but because the ill state of health, which produces 
such weakness, alters the other conditions of beauty; the parts in 
such a case collapse, the bright color, the lumen purpureum juventæ 
is gone, and the fine variation is lost in wrinkles, sudden breaks, and 
right lines. 
SECTION XVII. 
Beauty in Color. 
As to the colors usually found in beautiful bodies, it may be 
somewhat difficult to ascertain them, because, in the several parts 
of nature, there is an infinite variety. However, even in this variety, 
we may mark out something on which to settle. First, the colors 
of beautiful bodies must not be dusky or muddy, but clean and 
fair. Secondly, they must not be of the strongest kind. Those which 
seem most appropriated to beauty, are the milder of every sort; light 
greens; soft blues; weak whites; pink reds; and violets. Thirdly, if 
the colors be strong and vivid, they are always diversified, and the 
object is never of one strong color; there are almost always such 
a number of them (as in variegated flowers) that the strength and 
glare of each is considerably abated. In a fine complexion there is 
not only some variety in the coloring, but the colors: neither the 
red nor the white are strong and glaring. Besides, they are mixed in 
such a manner, and with such gradations, that it is impossible to fix 
the bounds. On the same principle it is that the dubious color in the 
necks and tails of peacocks, and about the heads of drakes, is so very 
agreeable. In reality, the beauty both of shape and coloring are as 
nearly related as we can well suppose it possible for things of such 
different natures to be. 
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SECTION XVIII. 
Recapitulation. 
On the whole, the qualities of beauty, as they are merely sensible 
qualities, are the following: First, to be comparatively small. 
Secondly, to be smooth. Thirdly, to have a variety in the direction of 
the parts; but, fourthly, to have those parts not angular, but melted, 
as it were, into each other. Fifthly, to be of a delicate frame, without 
any remarkable appearance of strength. Sixthly, to have its colors 
clear and bright, but not very strong and glaring. Seventhly, or if 
it should have any glaring color, to have it diversified with others. 
These are, I believe, the properties on which beauty depends; 
properties that operate by nature, and are less liable to be altered 
by caprice, or confounded by a diversity of tastes, than any other. 
SECTION XIX. 
The Physiognomy. 
The physiognomy has a considerable share in beauty, especially in 
that of our own species. The manners give a certain determination 
to the countenance; which, being observed to correspond pretty 
regularly with them, is capable of joining the effect of certain 
agreeable qualities of the mind to those of the body. So that to 
form a finished human beauty, and to give it its full influence, the 
face must be expressive of such gentle and amiable qualities, as 
correspond with the softness, smoothness, and delicacy of the 
outward form. 
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SECTION XX. 
The Eye. 
I have hitherto purposely omitted to speak of the eye, which has so 
great a share in the beauty of the animal creation, as it did not fall so 
easily under the foregoing heads, though in fact it is reducible to the 
same principles. I think, then, that the beauty of the eye consists, 
first, in its clearness; what colored eye shall please most, depends a 
good deal on particular fancies; but none are pleased with an eye 
whose water (to use that term) is dull and muddy. We are pleased 
with the eye in this view, on the principle upon which we like 
diamonds, clear water, glass, and such like transparent substances. 
Secondly, the motion of the eye contributes to its beauty, by 
continually shifting its direction; but a slow and languid motion is 
more beautiful than a brisk one; the latter is enlivening; the former 
lovely. Thirdly, with regard to the union of the eye with the 
neighboring parts, it is to hold the same rule that is given of other 
beautiful ones; it is not to make a strong deviation from the line 
of the neighboring parts; nor to verge into any exact geometrical 
figure. Besides all this, the eye affects, as it is expressive of some 
qualities of the mind, and its principal power generally arises from 




It may perhaps appear like a sort of repetition of what we have 
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before said, to insist here upon the nature of ugliness; as I imagine 
it to be in all respects the opposite to those qualities which we have 
laid down for the constituents of beauty. But though ugliness be the 
opposite to beauty, it is not the opposite to proportion and fitness. 
For it is possible that a thing may be very ugly with any proportions, 
and with a perfect fitness to any uses. Ugliness I imagine likewise 
to be consistent enough with an idea of the sublime. But I would by 
no means insinuate that ugliness of itself is a sublime idea, unless 
united with such qualities as excite a strong terror. 
SECTION XXII. 
Grace. 
Gracefulness is an idea not very different from beauty; it consists in 
much the same things. Gracefulness is an idea belonging to posture 
and motion. In both these, to be graceful, it is requisite that there 
be no appearance of difficulty; there is required a small inflection 
of the body; and a composure of the parts in such a manner, as 
not to incumber each other, not to appear divided by sharp and 
sudden angles. In this case, this roundness, this delicacy of attitude 
and motion, it is that all the magic of grace consists, and what is 
called its je ne sçai quoi; as will be obvious to any observer, who 
considers attentively the Venus de Medicis, the Antinous or any 
statue generally allowed to be graceful in a high degree. 
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SECTION XXIII. 
Elegance and Speciousness. 
When any body is composed of parts smooth and polished, without 
pressing upon each other, without showing any ruggedness or 
confusion, and at the same time affecting some regular shape, I 
call it elegant. It is closely allied to the beautiful, differing from it 
only in this regularity; which, however, as it makes a very material 
difference in the affection produced, may very well constitute 
another species. Under this head I rank those delicate and regular 
works of art, that imitate no determinate object in nature, as elegant 
buildings, and pieces of furniture. When any object partakes of the 
above-mentioned qualities, or of those of beautiful bodies, and is 
withal of great dimensions, it is full as remote from the idea of mere 
beauty; I call fine or specious. 
SECTION XXIV. 
The Beautiful in Feeling. 
The foregoing description of beauty, so far as it is taken in by the 
eye, may he greatly illustrated by describing the nature of objects, 
which produce a similar effect through the touch. This I call the 
beautiful in feeling. It corresponds wonderfully with what causes 
the same species of pleasure to the sight. There is a chain in all our 
sensations; they are all but different sorts of feelings calculated to 
be affected by various sorts of objects, but all to be affected after 
the same manner. All bodies that are pleasant to the touch, are so 
by the slightness of the resistance they make. Resistance is either 
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to motion along the surface, or to the pressure of the parts on one 
another: if the former be slight, we call the body smooth; if the 
latter, soft. The chief pleasure we receive by feeling, is in the one or 
the other of these qualities; and if there be a combination of both, 
our pleasure is greatly increased. This is so plain, that it is rather 
more fit to illustrate other things, than to be illustrated itself by 
an example. The next source of pleasure in this sense, as in every 
other, is the continually presenting somewhat new; and we find 
that bodies which continually vary their surface, are much the most 
pleasant or beautiful to the feeling, as any one that pleases may 
experience. The third property in such objects is, that though the 
surface continually varies its direction, it never varies it suddenly. 
The application of anything sudden, even though the impression 
itself have little or nothing of violence, is disagreeable. The quick 
application of a finger a little warmer or colder than usual, without 
notice, makes us start; a slight tap on the shoulder, not expected, 
has the same effect. Hence it is that angular bodies, bodies that 
suddenly vary the direction of the outline, afford so little pleasure 
to the feeling. Every such change is a sort of climbing or falling in 
miniature; so that squares, triangles, and other angular figures are 
neither beautiful to the sight nor feeling. Whoever compares his 
state of mind, on feeling soft, smooth, variated, unangular bodies, 
with that in which he finds himself, on the view of a beautiful object, 
will perceive a very striking analogy in the effects of both; and 
which may go a good way towards discovering their common cause. 
Feeling and sight, in this respect, differ in but a few points. The 
touch takes in the pleasure of softness, which is not primarily an 
object of sight; the sight, on the other hand, comprehends color, 
which can hardly he made perceptible to the touch: the touch, 
again, has the advantage in a new idea of pleasure resulting from 
a moderate degree of warmth; but the eye triumphs in the infinite 
extent and multiplicity of its objects. But there is such a similitude 
in the pleasures of these senses, that I am apt to fancy, if it were 
possible that one might discern color by feeling (as it is said some 
blind men have done) that the same colors, and the same disposition 
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of coloring, which are found beautiful to the sight, would be found 
likewise most grateful to the touch. But, setting aside conjectures, 
let us pass to the other sense; of hearing. 
SECTION XXV. 
The Beautiful in Sounds. 
In this sense we find an equal aptitude to be affected in a soft and 
delicate manner; and how far sweet or beautiful sounds agree with 
our descriptions of beauty in other senses, the experience of every 
one must decide. Milton has described this species of music in one 
of his juvenile poems.18 I need not say that Milton was perfectly well 
versed in that art; and that no man had a finer ear, with a happier 
manner of expressing the affections of one sense by metaphors 
taken from another. The description is as follows:— 
“And ever against eating cares, 
Lap me in soft Lydian airs; 
In notes with many a winding bout 
Of linked sweetness long drawn out; 
With wanton heed, and giddy cunning, 
The melting voice through mazes running; 
Untwisting all the chains that tie 
The hidden soul of harmony.”17 
Let us parallel this with the softness, the winding surface, the 
unbroken continuance, the easy gradation of the beautiful in other 
things; and all the diversities of the several senses, with all their 
several affections, will rather help to throw lights from one another 
17. John Milton, "L'Allegro" 135-44 
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to finish one clear, consistent idea of the whole, than to obscure it 
by their intricacy and variety. 
To the above-mentioned description I shall add one or two 
remarks. The first is; that the beautiful in music will not hear that 
loudness and strength of sounds, which may be used to raise other 
passions; nor notes which are shrill, or harsh, or deep; it agrees best 
with such as are clear, even, smooth, and weak. The second is; that 
great variety, and quick transitions from one measure or tone to 
another, are contrary to the genius of the beautiful in music. Such19 
transitions often excite mirth, or other sudden or tumultuous 
passions; but not that sinking, that melting, that languor, which is 
the characteristical effect of the beautiful as it regards every sense. 
The passion excited by beauty is in fact nearer to a species of 
melancholy, than to jollity and mirth. I do not here mean to confine 
music to any one species of notes, or tones, neither is it an art in 
which I can say I have any great skill. My sole design in this remark 
is to settle a consistent idea of beauty. The infinite variety of the 
affections of the soul will suggest to a good head, and skilful ear, 
a variety of such sounds as are fitted to raise them. It can be no 
prejudice to this, to clear and distinguish some few particulars that 
belong to the same class, and are consistent with each other, from 
the immense crowd of different and sometimes contradictory ideas, 
that rank vulgarly under the standard of beauty. And of these it is 
my intention to mark such only of the leading points as show the 
conformity of the sense of hearing with all the other senses, in the 
article of their pleasures. 
SECTION XXVI. 
Taste and Smell. 
This general agreement of the senses is yet more evident on 
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minutely considering those of taste and smell. We metaphorically 
apply the idea of sweetness to sights and sounds; but as the qualities 
of bodies by which they are fitted to excite either pleasure or pain 
in these senses are not so obvious as they are in the others, we 
shall refer an explanation of their analogy, which is a very close one, 
to that part wherein we come to consider the common efficient 
cause of beauty, as it regards all the senses. I do not think anything 
better fitted to establish a clear and settled idea of visual beauty 
than this way of examining the similar pleasures of other senses; 
for one part is sometimes clear in one of the senses that is more 
obscure in another; and where there is a clear concurrence of all, we 
may with more certainty speak of any one of them. By this means, 
they bear witness to each other; nature is, as it were, scrutinized; 
and we report nothing of her but what we receive from her own 
information. 
SECTION XXVII. 
The Sublime and the Beautiful Compared. 
On closing this general view of beauty, it naturally occurs that we 
should compare it  with the sublime;  and in this  comparison there 
appears  a remarkable contrast. For sublime objects are vast in their 
dimensions, beautiful ones comparatively  small; beauty should  be 
smooth  and polished; the great, rugged and negligent: beauty 
should shun the right line, yet deviate from it insensibly; the great 
in many cases loves the right line; and when it deviates, it often 
makes a strong deviation: beauty should not be obscure; the great 
ought to be dark and gloomy: beauty should be light and delicate; 
the great ought to be solid, and even massive. They are indeed 
ideas of a very different nature, one being founded on pain, the 
other on pleasure; and, however they may vary afterwards from the 
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direct nature of their causes, yet these causes keep up an eternal 
distinction between them, a distinction never to be forgotten by any 
whose business it is to affect the passions. In the infinite variety of 
natural combinations, we must expect to find the qualities of things 
the most remote imaginable from each other united in the same 
object. We must expect also to find combinations of the same kind 
in the works of art. But when we consider the power of an object 
upon our passions, we must know that when anything is intended 
to affect the mind by the force of some predominant property, the 
affection produced is like to be the more uniform and perfect, if all 
the other properties or qualities of the object be of the same nature, 
and tending to the same design as the principal. 
“If black and white blend, soften, and unite 
A thousand ways, are there no black and white?”18 
If the qualities of the sublime and beautiful are sometimes found 
united, does this prove that they are the same; does it prove that 
they are any way allied; does it prove even that they are not opposite 
and contradictory? Black and white may soften, may blend; but they 
are not therefore the same. Nor, when they are so softened and 
blended with each other, or with different colors, is the power of 
black as black, or of white as white, so strong as when each stands 
uniform and distinguished. 
18. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, 2.213-14. 
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11. Kant - from The Critique 
of Judgement 
First Section. Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment.1 
1. This edition of James Creed Meredith's translation of 
Kant's Critique was revised by philosopher Denis Dutton 
[February 9, 1944 – December 28, 2010] on his website: 
www.denisdutton.com. Unfortunately, Dutton passed 
away before his plans for this resource were completed. 
His vision for the resource aligned strongly with OER 
principles. He created this version to make it more 
accessible for students -- both in terms of cost and 
content. I have, in some places, made further alterations, 
following what Dutton had already created. All my 
alterations are in square brackets. I have corrected 
typographical errors and begun adding Kant's original 
italics by comparing this version against Meredith's; this 
process is ongoing. Here are Dutton's intention for this 
resource in his own words: "Note on the translation, by 
Denis Dutton.This version of the first part of Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment, the “Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment,” is designed for student use. It was created by 
me from open text versions of James Creed 
Meredith’s 1911 translation for Oxford University Press 
(now in the public domain). As I continue to use this 
version in teaching, I will incorporate corrections of 
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I also plan to include illustrations where desirable, such as that 
of the Maori moko (tattoo is actually a Tahitian word) in § 16. Many 
of Kant’s references to art are literary, but here and 
typos, add missing italics, check formatting against the 
original Akademie edition, and so forth [I have checked 
Dutton's OER edition against original 1911 Meredith text. 
If possible, I plan to look at Academy version mysel.f 
(md).]. . . .  Scholarship is one thing, and there is no 
pretense on my part that a cobbled-together and 
tinkered-with translation of the Critique of Judgment 
represents an advance for serious Kant studies. On the 
other hand, there is much to be said for making freely 
available a readable version of what is in my opinion the 
greatest work of philosophical aesthetics ever 
written.My tinkering is work in progress. It is governed 
by the notion that it is hard enough already for English-
speaking students to wrap their minds around Kant: 
there should be no more Verfremdungseffekt in 
the translation than is absolutely necessary. For 
example, the first change I made to this version was in § 
2. It is true that the ethnologically-informed Kant speaks 
of an Iroquois sachem. But all sachem means in English is 
chief, so why not render it thus? And why the 
obsolete eating-house for Garküchen? Kant wrote, “. . 
.wie jener Irokesische Sachem, ihm gefalle in Paris nichts 
besser als die Garkchen.” I think it best to let it go as “. . 
.like that Iroquois chief who said that nothing in Paris 
pleased him more than the restaurants.” 
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there opportunities arise for useful illustrative material. Again, 
reader suggestions are most welcome. [Ditto. In true OER spirit, if 
someone adds illustrations, please share with us!] 
One major change incorporated here is the uniform translation 
of Zweckmäßigkeit as purposiveness, rather than Meredith’s 
finality. Along with this, Zweck is translated both as purpose and as 
end, depending on context (in one or two places, I’ve left it as final). 
As I continue to read over this translation, I hope to clarify 
passages that use these terms. 
For anyone who wishes seriously to probe Kant’s aesthetics, I 
heartily recommend Werner S. Pluhar’s complete translation, 
which includes his own introduction: Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Judgment, foreward by Mary J. Gregor (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987)." 
First Book. Analytic of the Beautiful. 
First Moment. Of the Judgment of Taste: 
Moment of Quality. 
§ 1. The judgment of taste is aesthetic. 
If we wish to discern whether something is beautiful or not, we do 
not relate 
the representation of it to its object by means of rational 
understanding. 
Instead, we relate the representation [by means of the] imagination 
(acting perhaps in conjunction with reason) to the subject and its 
feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure. The judgment of taste, therefore, is not a cognitive 
judgment, 
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is not logical, but is aesthetic — which means that it is one 
whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective. Every 
reference 
of representations is capable of being objective, even that of 
sensations 
(in which case it signifies the real in an empirical representation). 
The 
one exception to this is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This 
denotes 
nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the subject has within 
itself 
and in the manner in which it is affected by the representation.To 
apprehend a regular and appropriate building with 
one’s cognitive faculties, be the mode of representation clear or 
confused, is quite a different thing from being conscious of this 
representation 
with an accompanying sensation of delight. In the experience of 
delight 
the representation is referred wholly to the subject, and what is 
more 
to its feeling of life — under the name of the feeling of pleasure 
or displeasure. This forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of 
discriminating 
and estimating, that contributes nothing to knowledge. All it does is 
to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire 
faculty 
of representations of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of 
its 
state. Given representations in a judgment may be empirical (and 
therefore 
aesthetic); but the judgment which is pronounced by their means is 
logical, 
provided it refers them to the object. Conversely, even though the 
given 
representations were rational, the judgment itself would be 
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aesthetic 
if it related solely to the subject (to its feeling). 
§ 2. The delight which determines the judgment of taste is 
independent of all interest. 
The delight which we connect with the representation of the real 
existence 
of an object is called interest. Such a delight, therefore, always 
involves 
a reference to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground, 
or else as necessarily implicated with its determining ground. Now, 
where 
the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to 
know, 
whether we, or any one else, are, or even could be, concerned in the 
real 
existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on 
mere 
contemplation (intuition or reflection). If any one asks me whether I 
consider that the palace I see before me is beautiful, I may, perhaps, 
reply that I do not care for things of that sort that are merely made 
to be gaped at. Or I may reply like that Iroquois chief who said that 
nothing in Paris pleased him more than the restaurants. I may even 
go 
a step further and inveigh with the vigor of a Rousseau against the 
vigor 
of a great against the vanity of the great who spend the sweat of 
the people on such superfluous things. Or, in fine, I may quite easily 
persuade myself that if I found myself on an uninhabited island, 
without hope of ever again coming among 
men, and could conjure such a palace into existence by a mere wish, 
I 
should still not trouble to do so, so long as I had a hut there that was 
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comfortable enough for me. All this may be admitted and approved; 
only 
it is not the point now at issue. All one wants to know is whether the 
mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how 
indifferent 
I may be to the real existence of the object of this representation. It 
is quite plain that in order to say that the object is beautiful, and 
to show that I have taste, everything turns on the meaning which I 
can 
give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me 
dependent 
on the real existence of the object. Every one must allow that a 
judgment 
on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very 
partial and not a pure judgment of taste. One must not be in the 
least 
prepossessed in favor of the real existence of the thing, but must 
preserve 
complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of 
judge 
in matters of taste. 
This proposition, which is of the utmost importance, cannot be 
better 
explained than by contrasting the pure disinterested2 delight which 
2. Kant's note: A judgment upon an object of our delight 
may be wholly disinterested but [also] very interesting, 
i.e., it relies on no interest, but it produces [interest]. Of 
this kind are all pure moral judgments. But, of 
themselves judgments of taste do not even set up any 
interest whatsoever. Only in society is it interesting to 
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appears 
in the judgment of taste with that allied to an interest — especially 
if we can also assure ourselves that there are no other kinds of 
interest 
beyond those presently to be mentioned. 
§ 3. Delight in the Agreeable is coupled with interest. 
That is agreeable which the senses find pleasing in sensation. This 
at once affords a convenient opportunity for condemning and 
directing 
particular attention to a prevalent confusion of the double meaning 
of 
which the word “sensation” is capable. All delight (as is said or 
thought) 
is itself sensation (of a pleasure). Consequently everything that 
pleases, 
and for the very reason that it pleases, is agreeable — and according 
to its different degrees, or its relations to other agreeable 
sensations, 
is attractive, charming, delicious, enjoyable, etc. But if this is 
conceded, 
then impressions of sense, which determine inclination, or 
principles 
of reason, which determine the will, or mere contemplated forms of 
intuition, 
which determine judgment, are all on a par in everything relevant to 
their effect upon the feeling of pleasure, for this would be 
agreeableness 
have taste — a point which will be explained in the 
sequel. 
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in the sensation of one’s state; and since, in the last resort, all 
the elaborate work of our faculties must issue in and unite in the 
practical 
as its goal, we could credit our faculties with no other appreciation 
of things and the worth of things, than that consisting in the 
gratification 
which they promise. How this is attained is in the end immaterial; 
and, 
as the choice of the means is here the only thing that can make a 
difference, 
men might indeed blame one another for folly or imprudence, but 
never 
for baseness or wickedness; for they are all, each according to his 
own 
way of looking at things, pursuing one goal, which for each is the 
gratification 
in question. 
When a modification of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is 
termed 
sensation, this expression is given quite a different meaning to that 
which it bears when I call the representation of a thing (through 
sense 
as a receptivity pertaining to the faculty of knowledge) sensation. 
For 
in the latter case the representation is referred to the object, but in 
the former it is referred solely to the subject and is not available for 
any cognition, not even for that by which the subject cognizes itself. 
Now in the above definition the word sensation is used to denote 
an 
objective representation of sense; and, to avoid continually running 
the 
risk of misinterpretation, we shall call that which must always 
remain 
purely subjective, and is absolutely incapable of forming a 
representation 
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of an object, by the familiar name of feeling. The green color of the 
meadows belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of an 
object 
of sense; but its agreeableness to subjective sensation, by which no 
object 
is represented; i.e., to feeling, through which the object is regarded 
as an object of delight (which involves no cognition of the object). 
Now, that a judgment on an object by which its agreeableness is 
affirmed, 
expresses an interest in it, is evident from the fact that through 
sensation 
it provokes a desire for similar objects, consequently the delight 
presupposes, 
not the simple judgment about it, but the bearing its real existence 
has upon my state so far as affected by such an object. Hence we do 
not 
merely say of the agreeable that it pleases, but that it gratifies. I 
do not accord it a simple approval, but inclination is aroused by it, 
and where agreeableness is of the liveliest type a judgment on the 
character 
of the object is so entirely out of place that those who are always 
intent 
only on enjoyment (for that is the word used to denote intensity of 
gratification) 
would fain dispense with all judgment. 
§ 4. Delight in the Good is coupled with interest. 
That is good which by means of reason commends itself by its mere 
concept. 
We call that good for something which only pleases as a means; but 
that 
which pleases on its own account we call good in itself. In both cases 
the concept of an end is implied, and consequently the relation of 
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reason 
to (at least possible) willing, and thus a delight in the existence of 
an object or action, i.e., some interest or other. 
To deem something good, I must always know what sort of a thing 
the 
object is intended to be, i.e., I must have a concept of it. That is not 
necessary to enable me to see beauty in a thing. Flowers, free 
patterns, 
lines aimlessly intertwining — technically termed foliage — 
have no signification, depend upon no definite concept, and yet 
please. 
Delight in the beautiful must depend upon the reflection on an 
object 
precursory to some (not definitely determined) concept. It is thus 
also 
differentiated from the agreeable, which rests entirely upon 
sensation. 
In many cases, no doubt, the agreeable and the good seem 
convertible 
terms. Thus it is commonly said that all (especially lasting) 
gratification 
is of itself good; which is almost equivalent to saying that to be 
permanently 
agreeable and to be good are identical. But it is readily apparent that 
this is merely a vicious confusion of words, for the concepts 
appropriate 
to these expressions are far from interchangeable. The agreeable, 
which, 
as such, represents the object solely in relation to sense, must in the 
first instance be brought under principles of reason through the 
concept 
of an end, to be, as an object of will, called good. But that the 
reference 
to delight is wholly different where what gratifies is at the same 
time 
Kant - from The Critique of Judgement  |  217
called good, is evident from the fact that with the good the question 
always is whether it is mediately or immediately good, i.e., useful or 
good in itself; whereas with the agreeable this point can never arise, 
since the word always means what pleases immediately — and it is 
just the same with what I call beautiful. 
Even in everyday parlance, a distinction is drawn between the 
agreeable 
and the good. We do not scruple to say of a dish that stimulates the 
palate 
with spices and other condiments that it is agreeable owning all the 
while 
that it is not good: because, while it immediately satisfies the senses, 
it is mediately displeasing, i.e., in the eye of reason that looks ahead 
to the consequences. Even in our estimate of health, this same 
distinction 
may be traced. To all that possess it, it is immediately agreeable — 
at least negatively, i.e., as remoteness of all bodily pains. But, if 
we are to say that it is good, we must further apply to reason to 
direct 
it to ends, that is, we must regard it as a state that puts us in a 
congenial 
mood for all we have to do. Finally, in respect of happiness every one 
believes that the greatest aggregate of the pleasures of life, taking 
duration as well as number into account, merits the name of a true, 
nay 
even of the highest, good. But reason sets its face against this too. 
Agreeableness is enjoyment. But if this is all that we are bent on, it 
would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means that procure it 
for 
us — whether it be obtained passively by the bounty of nature or 
actively and by the work of our own hands. But that there is any 
intrinsic 
worth in the real existence of a man who merely lives for enjoyment, 
however 
busy he may be in this respect, even when in so doing he serves 
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others 
— all equally with himself intent only on enjoyment — as an 
excellent means to that one end, and does so, moreover, because 
through 
sympathy he shares all their gratifications — this is a view to which 
reason will never let itself be brought round. Only by what a man 
does 
heedless of enjoyment, in complete freedom, and independently of 
what 
he can procure passively from the hand of nature, does be give to 
his 
existence, as the real existence of a person, an absolute worth. 
Happiness, 
with all its plethora of pleasures, is far from being an unconditioned 
good.3 
But, despite all this difference between the agreeable and the 
good, 
they both agree in being invariably coupled with an interest in their 
object. This is true, not alone of the agreeable, § 3, and of the 
mediately good, i, e., the useful, which pleases as a means to some 
pleasure, 
but also of that which is good absolutely and from every point of 
3. Kant's note: An obligation to enjoyment is a patent 
absurdity. 
And the same, then, must also be said of a supposed 
obligation to actions 
that have merely enjoyment for their aim, no matter how 
spiritually 
this enjoyment may be refined in thought (or 
embellished), and even 
if it be a mystical, so-called heavenly, enjoyment. 
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view, 
namely the moral good which carries with it the highest interest. 
For 
the good is the object of will (i.e., of a rationally determined faculty 
of desire). But to will something, and to take a delight in its 
existence, 
i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical. 
§ 5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of 
delight. 
Both the agreeable and the good involve a reference to the faculty 
of 
desire, and are thus attended, the former with a delight 
pathologically 
conditioned (by stimuli), the latter with a pure practical delight. 
Such 
delight is determined not merely by the representation of the 
object, 
but also by the represented bond of connection between the subject 
and 
the real existence of the object. It is not merely the object, but also 
its real existence, that pleases. On the other hand, the judgment of 
taste is simply contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment which is 
indifferent 
as to the existence of an object, and only decides how its character 
stands 
with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But not even is this 
contemplation 
itself directed to concepts; for the judgment of taste is not a 
cognitive 
judgment (neither a theoretical one nor a practical), and hence, also, 
is not grounded on concepts, nor yet intentionally directed to them. 
The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good thus denote three 
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different 
relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure, 
as a feeling in respect of which we distinguish different objects or 
modes 
of representation. Also, the corresponding expressions which 
indicate 
our satisfaction in them are different The agreeable is what 
GRATIFIES 
a man; the beautiful what simply PLEASES him; the 
good what is ESTEEMED (approved), i.e., that on 
which he sets an objective worth. Agreeableness is a significant 
factor 
even with irrational animals; beauty has purport and significance 
only 
for human beings, i.e., for beings at once animal and rational (but 
not 
merely for them as rational — intelligent beings — but only 
for them as at once animal and rational); whereas the good is good 
for 
every rational being in general — a proposition which can only 
receive 
its complete justification and explanation in the sequel. Of all these 
three kinds of delight, that of taste in the beautiful may be said to 
be the one and only disinterested and free delight; for, with it, no 
interest, 
whether of sense or reason, extorts approval. And so we may say 
that delight, 
in the three cases mentioned, is related to inclination, to favor, or 
to respect. For FAVOR is the only free liking. 
An object of inclination, and one which a law of reason imposes 
upon our 
desire, leaves us no freedom to turn anything into an object of 
pleasure. 
All interest presupposes a want, or calls one forth; and, being a 
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ground 
determining approval, deprives the judgment on the object of its 
freedom. 
So far as the interest of inclination in the case of the agreeable 
goes, 
every one says “Hunger is the best sauce; and people with a healthy 
appetite relish everything, so long as it is something they can eat.” 
Such delight, consequently, gives no indication of taste having 
anything 
to say to the choice. Only when men have got all they want can we 
tell 
who among the crowd has taste or not. Similarly there may be 
correct habits 
(conduct) without virtue, politeness without good-will, propriety 
without 
honor, etc. For where the moral law dictates, there is, objectively, 
no room left for free choice as to what one has to do; and to show 
taste 
in the way one carries out these dictates, or in estimating the way 
others 
do so, is a totally different matter from displaying the moral frame 
of 
one’s mind. For the latter involves a command and produces a need 
of something, whereas moral taste only plays with the objects of 
delight 
without devoting itself sincerely to any. 
Definition of the Beautiful derived from the First 
Moment: 
Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of 
representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any 
interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful. 
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Second Moment of Judgment of Taste, As To Its 
Quantity. 
§ 6. The beautiful is that which, apart from concepts, is 
represented 
as the Object of a universal delight. 
This definition of the beautiful is deducible from the foregoing 
definition 
of it as an object of delight apart from any interest. For where any 
one 
is conscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of 
interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one 
containing 
a ground of delight for all men. For, since the delight is not based on 
any inclination of the subject (or on any other deliberate interest), 
but the subject feels himself completely free in respect of the liking 
which he accords to the object, he can find as reason for his delight 
no personal conditions to which his own subjective self might alone 
be 
party. Hence he must regard it as resting on what he may also 
presuppose 
in every other person; and therefore he must believe that he has 
reason 
for demanding a similar delight from every one. Accordingly he will 
speak 
of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the 
judgment 
logical (forming a cognition of the object by concepts of it); although 
it is only aesthetic, and contains merely a reference of the 
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representation 
of the object to the subject; because it still bears this resemblance 
to the logical judgment, that it may be presupposed to be valid for 
all 
men. But this universality cannot spring from concepts. For from 
concepts 
there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (save 
in the case of pure practical laws, which, however, carry an interest 
with them; and such an interest does not attach to the pure 
judgment 
of taste). The result is that the judgment of taste, with its attendant 
consciousness of detachment from all interest, must involve a claim 
to 
validity for all men, and must do so apart from universality attached 
to objects, i.e., there must be coupled with it a claim to subjective 
universality. 
§ 7. Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the 
good by means of the above characteristic. 
As regards the agreeable, every one concedes that his judgment, 
which 
he bases on a private feeling, and in which he declares that an object 
pleases him, is restricted merely to himself personally. Thus he does 
not take it amiss if, when he says that Canary-wine is agreeable, 
another 
corrects the expression and reminds him that he ought to say: “It 
is agreeable to me.” This applies not only to the taste of the tongue, 
the palate, and the throat, but to what may with any one be 
agreeable 
to eye or ear. A violet color is to one soft and lovely, to another dull 
and faded. One man likes the tone of wind instruments, another 
prefers 
that of strings. To quarrel over such points with the idea of 
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condemning 
another’s judgment as incorrect when it differs from our own, as 
if the opposition between the two judgments were logical, would be 
folly. 
With the agreeable, therefore, the axiom holds good: Every one has 
his 
own taste (that of sense). 
The beautiful stands on quite a different footing. It would, on the 
contrary, be ridiculous if any one who plumed himself on his taste 
were 
to think of justifying himself by saying: “This object (the building 
we see, the dress that person has on, the concert we hear, the poem 
submitted 
to our criticism) is beautiful for me.” For if it merely pleases 
him, he must not call it beautiful. Many things may for him possess 
charm 
and agreeableness — no one cares about that; but when he puts a 
thing 
on a pedestal and calls it beautiful, he demands the same delight 
from 
others. He judges not merely for himself, but for all men, and then 
speaks 
of beauty as if it were a property of things. Thus he says the thing is 
beautiful; and it is not as if he counted on others agreeing in his 
judgment 
of liking owing to his having found them in such agreement on a 
number 
of occasions, but he demands this agreement of them. He blames 
them if 
they judge differently, and denies them taste, which he still requires 
of them as something they ought to have; and to this extent it is not 
open to men to say: “Every one has his own taste.” This would 
be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing at all as taste, i.e., 
no aesthetic judgment capable of making a rightful claim upon the 
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assent 
of all men. 
Yet even in the case of the agreeable, we find that the estimates 
men 
form do betray a prevalent agreement among them, which leads to 
our crediting 
some with taste and denying it to others, and that, too, not as an 
organic 
sense but as a critical faculty in respect of the agreeable generally. 
So of one who knows how to entertain his guests with pleasures (of 
enjoyment 
through all the senses) in such a way that one and all are pleased, we 
say that he has taste. But the universality here is only understood in 
a comparative sense; and the rules that apply are, like all empirical 
rules, general only, not universal, the latter being what the judgment 
of taste upon the beautiful deals or claims to deal in. It is a judgment 
in respect of sociability so far as resting on empirical rules. In 
respect 
of the good, it is true that judgments also rightly assert a claim to 
validity for every one; but the good is only represented as an object 
of universal delight by means of a concept, which is the case neither 
with the agreeable nor the beautiful. 
§ 8. In a judgment of taste the universality of delight is 
only represented as subjective. 
This particular form of the universality of an aesthetic judgment, 
which is to be met in a judgment of taste, is a significant feature, 
not for the logician certainly, but for the transcendental 
philosopher. 
It calls for no small effort on his part to discover its origin, but in 
return it brings to light a property of our cognitive faculty which, 
without 
this analysis, would have remained unknown. 
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First, one must get firmly into one’s mind that by the judgment 
of taste (upon the beautiful) the delight in an object is imputed to 
every 
one, yet without being founded on a concept (for then it would be 
the 
good), and that this claim to universality is such an essential factor 
of a judgment by which we describe anything as beautiful, that were 
it 
not for its being present to the mind it would never enter into any 
one’s 
head to use this expression, but everything that pleased without a 
concept 
would be ranked as agreeable. For in respect of the agreeable, every 
one 
is allowed to have his own opinion, and no one insists upon others 
agreeing 
with his judgment of taste, which is what is invariably done in the 
judgment 
of taste about beauty. The first of these I may call the taste of sense, 
the second, the taste of reflection: the first laying down judgments 
merely private, the second, on the other hand, judgments ostensibly 
of 
general validity (public), but both alike being aesthetic (not practical) 
judgments about an object merely in respect of the bearings of its 
representation 
on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Now it does seem strange 
that 
while with the taste of sense it is not alone experience that shows 
that 
its judgment (of pleasure or displeasure in something) is not 
universally 
valid, but every one willingly refrains from imputing this agreement 
to 
others (despite the frequent actual prevalence of a considerable 
consensus 
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of general opinion even in these judgments), the taste of reflection, 
which, as experience teaches, has often enough to put up with a 
rude dismissal 
of its claims to universal validity of its judgment (upon the beautiful), 
can (as it actually does) find it possible for all that to formulate 
judgments 
capable of demanding this agreement in its universality. Such 
agreement 
it does in fact require from every one for each of its judgments of 
taste 
the persons who pass these judgments not quarreling over the 
possibility 
of such a claim, but only failing in particular cases to come to terms 
as to the correct application of this faculty. 
First of all we have here to note that a universality which does not 
rest upon concepts of the object (even though these are only 
empirical) 
is in no way logical, but aesthetic, i.e., does not involve any objective 
quantity of the judgment, but only one that is subjective. For this 
universality 
I use the expression general validity, which denotes the validity of 
the 
reference of a representation, not to the cognitive faculties, but to 
the feeling of pleasure or displeasure for every subject. (The same 
expression, 
however, may also be employed for the logical quantity of the 
judgment, 
provided we add objective universal validity, to distinguish it from 
the 
merely subjective validity which is always aesthetic.) 
Now a judgment that has objective universal validity has always 
got 
the subjective also, i.e., if the judgment is valid for everything which 
is contained under a given concept, it is valid also for all who 
represent 
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an object by means of this concept. But from a subjective universal 
validity, 
i.e., the aesthetic, that does not rest on any concept, no conclusion 
can be drawn to the logical; because judgments of that kind have no 
bearing 
upon the object. But for this very reason the aesthetic universality 
attributed 
to a judgment must also be of a special kind, seeing that it does not 
join the predicate of beauty to the concept of the object taken in its 
entire logical sphere, and yet does extend this predicate over the 
whole 
sphere of judging subjects. 
In their logical quantity, all judgments of taste are singular 
judgments. 
For, since I must present the object immediately to my feeling of 
pleasure 
or displeasure, and that, too, without the aid of concepts, such 
judgments 
cannot have the quantity of judgments with objective general 
validity. 
Yet by taking the singular representation of the object of the 
judgment 
of taste, and by comparison converting it into a concept according 
to 
the conditions determining that judgment, we can arrive at a 
logically 
universal judgment. For instance, by a judgment of the taste I 
describe 
the rose at which I am looking as beautiful. The judgment, on the 
other 
hand, resulting from the comparison of a number of singular 
representations: 
“Roses in general are beautiful,” is no longer pronounced as 
a purely aesthetic judgment, but as a logical judgment founded on 
one 
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that is aesthetic. Now the judgment, “The rose is agreeable” 
(to smell) is also, no doubt, an aesthetic and singular judgment, but 
then it is not one of taste but of sense. For it has this point of 
difference 
from a judgment of taste, that the latter imports an aesthetic 
quantity 
of universality, i.e., of validity for everyone which is not to be met 
with in a judgment upon the agreeable. It is only judgments upon 
the 
good which, while also determining the delight in an object, possess 
logical 
and not mere aesthetic universality; for it is as involving a cognition 
of the object that they are valid of it, and on that account valid 
for everyone. 
In forming an estimate of objects merely from concepts, all 
representation 
of beauty goes by the board. There can, therefore, be no rule 
according 
to which any one is to be compelled to recognize anything as 
beautiful. 
Whether a dress, a house, or a flower is beautiful is a matter upon 
which 
one declines to allow one’s judgment to be swayed by any reasons 
or principles. We want to get a look at the object with our own eyes, 
just as if our delight depended on sensation. And yet, if upon so 
doing, 
we call the object beautiful, we believe ourselves to be speaking with 
a universal voice, and lay claim to the concurrence of everyone, 
whereas 
no private sensation would be decisive except for the observer alone 
and 
his liking. 
Here, now, we may perceive that nothing is postulated in the 
judgment 
of taste but such a universal voice in respect of delight that it is not 
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mediated by concepts; consequently, only the possibility of an 
aesthetic 
judgment capable of being at the same time deemed valid for 
everyone. 
The judgment of taste itself does not postulate the agreement of 
everyone 
(for it is only competent for a logically universal judgment to do this, 
in that it is able to bring forward reasons); it only imputes this 
agreement 
to everyone, as an instance of the rule in respect of which it looks 
for 
confirmation, not from concepts, but from the concurrence of 
others. The 
universal voice is, therefore, only an idea — resting upon grounds 
the investigation of which is here postponed. It may be a matter of 
uncertainty 
whether a person who thinks he is laying down a judgment of taste 
is, 
in fact, judging in conformity with that idea; but that this idea is 
what 
is contemplated in his judgment, and that, consequently, it is meant 
to be a judgment of taste, is proclaimed by his use of the expression 
“beauty.” For himself he can be certain on the point from his 
mere consciousness of the separation of everything belonging to 
the agreeable 
and the good from the delight remaining to him; and this is all for 
which 
be promises himself the agreement of everyone — a claim which, 
under 
these conditions, he would also be warranted in making, were it not 
that 
he frequently sinned against them, and thus passed an erroneous 
judgment 
of taste. 
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§ 9. Investigation of the question of the relative priority 
in a judgment of taste of the feeling of pleasure and the 
estimating 
of the object. 
The solution of this problem is the key to the critique of taste, and 
so is worthy of all attention. 
Were the pleasure in a given object to be the antecedent, and 
were the 
universal communicability of this pleasure to be all that the 
judgment 
of taste is meant to allow to the representation of the object, such a 
sequence would be self-contradictory. For a pleasure of that kind 
would 
be nothing but the feeling of mere agreeableness to the senses, and 
so, 
from its very nature, would possess no more than private validity, 
seeing 
that it would be immediately dependent on the representation 
through which 
the object is given. 
Hence it is the universal capacity for being communicated 
incident to 
the mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective 
condition of the judgment of taste, must be, fundamental, with the 
pleasure 
in the object as its consequent. Nothing, however, is capable of 
being 
universally communicated but cognition and representation so far 
as appurtenant 
to cognition. For it is only as thus appurtenant that the 
representation 
is objective, and it is this alone that gives it a universal point of 
reference with which the power of representation of every one is 
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obliged 
to harmonize. If, then, the determining ground of the judgment as 
to 
this universal communicability of the representation is to be merely 
subjective, 
that is to say, to be conceived independently of any concept of the 
object, 
it can be nothing else than the mental state that presents itself in 
the 
mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer 
a 
given representation to cognition in general. 
The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are 
here 
engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a 
particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this 
representation 
must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of 
representation 
in a given representation for a cognition in general. Now a 
representation, 
whereby an object is given, involves, in order that it may become a 
source 
of cognition at all, imagination for bringing together the manifold of 
intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the 
representations. This state of free play of the cognitive faculties 
attending 
a representation by which an object is given must admit of universal 
communication: 
because cognition, as a definition of the object with which given 
representations 
(in any subject whatever) are to accord, is the one and only 
representation 
which is valid for everyone. 
As the subjective universal communicability of the mode of 
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representation 
in a judgment of taste is to subsist apart from the presupposition of 
any definite concept, it can be nothing else than the mental state 
present 
in the free play of imagination and understanding (so far as these 
are 
in mutual accord, as is requisite for cognition in general); for we are 
conscious that this subjective relation suitable for a cognition in 
general 
must be just as valid for every one, and consequently as universally 
communicable, 
as is any indeterminate cognition, which always rests upon that 
relation 
as its subjective condition. 
Now this purely subjective (aesthetic) estimating of the object, or 
of the representation through which it is given, is antecedent to the 
pleasure in it, and is the basis of this pleasure in the harmony of the 
cognitive faculties. Again, the above-described universality of the 
subjective 
conditions of estimating objects forms the sole foundation of this 
universal 
subjective validity of the delight which we connect with the 
representation 
of the object that we call beautiful. 
That an ability to communicate one’s mental state, even though 
it be only in respect of our cognitive faculties, is attended with a 
pleasure, 
is a fact which might easily be demonstrated from the natural 
propensity 
of mankind to social life, i.e., empirically and psychologically. But 
what we have here in view calls for something more than this. In a 
judgment 
of taste, the pleasure felt by us is exacted from every one else as 
necessary, 
just as if, when we call something beautiful, beauty was to be 
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regarded 
as a quality of the object forming part of its inherent determination 
according to concepts; although beauty is for itself, apart from any 
reference 
to the feeling of the subject, nothing. But the discussion of this 
question 
must be reserved until we have answered the further one of 
whether, and 
how, aesthetic judgments are possible a priori. 
At present we are exercised with the lesser question of the way in 
which 
we become conscious, in a judgment of taste, of a reciprocal 
subjective 
common accord of the powers of cognition. Is it aesthetically by 
sensation 
and our mere internal sense? Or is it intellectually by consciousness 
of our intentional activity in bringing these powers into play? 
Now if the given representation occasioning the judgment of taste 
were 
a concept which united understanding and imagination in the 
estimate of 
the object so as to give a cognition of the object, the consciousness 
of this relation would be intellectual (as in the objective schematism 
of judgment dealt with in the Critique of Pure Reason). But, then, 
in that case the judgment would not be laid down with respect to 
pleasure 
and displeasure, and so would not be a judgment of taste. But, now, 
the 
judgment of taste determines the object, independently of 
concepts, in 
respect of delight and of the predicate of beauty. There is, therefore, 
no other way for the subjective unity of the relation in question to 
make 
itself known than by sensation. The quickening of both faculties 
(imagination 
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and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given 
representation, 
harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally, is the 
sensation 
whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgment of 
taste. 
An objective relation can, of course, only be thought, yet in so far as, 
in respect of its conditions, it is subjective, it may be felt in its 
effect upon the mind, and, in the case of a relation (like that of the 
powers of representation to a faculty of cognition generally) which 
does 
not rest on any concept, no other consciousness of it is possible 
beyond 
that through sensation of its effect upon the mind — an effect 
consisting 
in the more facile play of both mental powers (imagination and 
understanding) 
as quickened by their mutual accord. A representation which is 
singular 
and independent of comparison with other representations, and, 
being such, 
yet accords with the conditions of the universality that is the 
general 
concern of understanding, is one that brings the cognitive faculties 
into 
that proportionate accord which we require for all cognition and 
which 
we therefore deem valid for every one who is so constituted as to 
judge 
by means of understanding and sense conjointly (i.e., for every man). 
Definition of the Beautiful drawn from the 
Second 
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Moment: 
The beautiful is that which pleases universally without a concept. 
 
Third Moment of Judgments of Taste: Moment 
of the 
relation of Purposes Brought under Review in 
Such Judgments. 
§ 10. Purposiveness in general. 
Let us define the meaning of “a purpose” in transcendental 
terms (i.e., without presupposing anything empirical, such as the 
feeling 
of pleasure). A purpose is the object of a concept so far as this 
concept 
is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its 
possibility); 
and the causality of a concept in respect of its object is 
purposiveness 
(forma finalis). Where, then, not the cognition of an object merely, 
but the object itself (its form or real existence) as an effect, is 
thought 
to be possible only through a concept of it, there we imagine a 
purpose. 
The representation of the effect is here the determining ground of 
its 
cause and takes the lead of it. The consciousness of the causality of 
a representation in respect of the state of the subject as one tending 
to preserve a continuance of that state, may here be said to denote 
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in 
a general way what is called pleasure; whereas displeasure is that 
representation 
which contains the ground for converting the state of the 
representations 
into their opposite (for hindering or removing them). 
The faculty of desire, so far as determinable only through 
concepts, 
i.e., so as to act in conformity with the representation of a purpose, 
would be the Will. But an object, or state of mind, or even an action 
may, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the 
representation 
of a purpose, be called purposive simply on account of its possibility 
being only explicable and intelligible for us by virtue of an 
assumption 
on our part of fundamental causality according to purposes, i.e., a 
will 
that would have so ordained it according to a certain represented 
rule. 
Purposiveness, therefore, may exist apart from a purpose, in so far 
as 
we do not locate the causes of this form in a will, but yet are able to 
render the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only 
by deriving it from a will. Now we are not always obliged to look with 
the eye of reason into what we observe (i.e., to consider it in its 
possibility). 
So we may at least observe a purposiveness of form, and trace it in 
objects 
— though by reflection only — without basing it on a purpose 
(as the material of the nexus finalis). 
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§ 11. The sole foundation of the judgment of taste is the 
form of purposiveness of an object (or mode of representing 
it). 
Whenever an end is regarded as a source of delight, it always 
imports 
an interest as determining ground of the judgment on the object of 
pleasure. 
Hence the judgment of taste cannot rest on any subjective end as its 
ground. But neither can any representation of an objective end, i.e., 
of the possibility of the object itself on principles of purposive 
connection, 
determine the judgment of taste, and, consequently, neither can any 
concept 
of the good. For the judgment of taste is an aesthetic and not a 
cognitive 
judgment, and so does not deal with any concept of the nature or of 
the 
internal or external possibility, by this or that cause, of the object, 
but simply with the relative bearing of the representative powers so 
far 
as determined by a representation. 
Now this relation, present when an object is characterized as 
beautiful, 
is coupled with the feeling of pleasure. This pleasure is by the 
judgment 
of taste pronounced valid for every one; hence an agreeableness 
attending 
the representation is just as incapable of containing the determining 
ground of the judgment as the representation of the perfection of 
the 
object or the concept of the good. We are thus left with the 
subjective 
purposiveness in the representation of an object, exclusive of any 
end 
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(objective or subjective) — consequently the bare form of 
purposiveness 
in the representation whereby an object is given to us, so far as we 
are 
conscious of it as that which is alone capable of constituting the 
delight 
which, apart from any concept, we estimate as universally 
communicable, 
and so of forming the determining ground of the judgment of taste. 
§ 12. The judgment of taste rests upon a priori grounds. 
To determine a priori the connection of the feeling of pleasure 
or displeasure as an effect, with some representation or other 
(sensation 
or concept) as its cause, is utterly impossible; for that would be a 
causal 
relation which (with objects of experience) is always one that can 
only 
be cognized a posteriori and with the help of experience. True, 
in the Critique of Practical Reason we did actually derive a 
priori from universal moral concepts the feeling of respect (as a 
particular and peculiar modification of this feeling which does not 
strictly 
answer either to the pleasure or displeasure which we receive from 
empirical 
objects). But there we were further able to cross the border of 
experience 
and call in aid a causality resting on a supersensible attribute of the 
subject, namely that of freedom. But even there it was not this 
feeling 
exactly that we deduced from the idea of the moral as cause, but 
from 
this was derived simply the determination of the will. But the mental 
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state present in the determination of the will by any means is at 
once 
in itself a feeling of pleasure and identical with it, and so does not 
issue from it as an effect. Such an effect must only be assumed 
where 
the concept of the moral as a good precedes the determination of 
the will 
by the law; for in that case it would be futile to derive the pleasure 
combined with the concept from this concept as a mere cognition. 
Now the pleasure in aesthetic judgments stands on a similar 
footing: 
only that here it is merely contemplative and does not bring about 
an 
interest in the object; whereas in the moral judgment it is practical, 
The consciousness of mere formal purposiveness in the play of the 
cognitive 
faculties of the subject attending a representation whereby an 
object 
is given, is the pleasure itself, because it involves a determining 
ground 
of the subject’s activity in respect of the quickening of its cognitive 
powers, and thus an internal causality (which is purposive) in 
respect 
of cognition generally, but without being limited to a definite 
cognition, 
and consequently a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a 
representation 
in an aesthetic judgment. This pleasure is also in no way practical, 
neither resembling that form the pathological ground of 
agreeableness 
nor that from the intellectual ground of the represented good. But 
still 
it involves an inherent causality, that, namely, of preserving a 
continuance 
of the state of the representation itself and the active engagement 
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of 
the cognitive powers without ulterior aim. We dwell on the 
contemplation 
of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and 
reproduces 
itself. The case is analogous (but analogous only) to the way we 
linger 
on a charm in the representation of an object which keeps arresting 
the 
attention, the mind all the while remaining passive. 
§ 13. The pure judgment of taste is independent of charm and 
emotion. 
Every interest vitiates the judgment of taste and robs it of its 
impartiality. 
This is especially so where, instead of, like the interest of reason, 
making purposiveness take the lead of the lead of the feeling of 
pleasure, 
it grounds it upon this feeling — which is what always happens in 
aesthetic judgments upon anything so far as it gratifies or pains. 
Hence 
judgments so influenced can either lay no claim at all to a 
universally 
valid delight, or else must abate their claim in proportion as 
sensations 
of the kind in question enter into the determining grounds of taste. 
Taste 
that requires an added element of charm and emotion for its delight, 
not 
to speak of adopting this as the measure of its approval, has not yet 
emerged from barbarism. 
And yet charms are frequently not alone ranked with beauty 
(which ought 
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properly to be a question merely of the form) as supplementary to 
the 
aesthetic universal delight, but they have been accredited as 
intrinsic 
beauties, and consequently the matter of delight passed off for the 
form. 
This is a misconception which, like many others that have still an 
underlying 
element of truth, may be removed by a careful definition of these 
concepts. 
A judgment of taste which is uninfluenced by charm or emotion 
(though 
these may be associated with the delight in the beautiful), and 
whose 
determining ground, therefore, is simply purposiveness of form, is a 
pure 
judgment of taste. 
§ 14. Exemplification. 
Aesthetic, just like theoretical (logical) judgments, are divisible 
into empirical and pure. The first are those by which agreeableness 
or 
disagreeableness, the second those by which beauty is predicated of 
an 
object or its mode of representation. The former are judgments of 
sense 
(material aesthetic judgments), the latter (as formal) alone 
judgments 
of taste proper. 
A judgment of taste, therefore, is only pure so far as its 
determining 
ground is tainted with no merely empirical delight. But such a taint 
is 
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always present where charm or emotion have a share in the 
judgment by 
which something is to be described as beautiful. 
Here now there is a recrudescence of a number of specious pleas 
that 
go the length of putting forward the case that charm is not merely a 
necessary 
ingredient of beauty, but is even of itself sufficient to merit the name 
of beautiful. A mere color, such as the green of a plot of grass, or 
a mere tone (as distinguished from sound or noise), like that of a 
violin, 
is described by most people as in itself beautiful, notwithstanding 
the 
fact that both seem to depend merely on the matter of the 
representations 
in other words, simply on sensation — which only entitles them to 
be called agreeable. But it will at the same time be observed that 
sensations 
of color as well as of tone are only entitled to be immediately 
regarded 
as beautiful where, in either case, they are pure. This is a 
determination 
which at once goes to their form, and it is the only one which these 
representations 
possess that admits with certainty of being universally 
communicated. 
For it is not to be assumed that even the quality of the sensations 
agrees 
in all subjects, and we can hardly take it for granted that the 
agreeableness 
of a color, or of the tone of a musical instrument, which we judge to 
be preferable to that of another, is given a like preference in the 
estimate 
of every one. 
Assuming vibrations vibration sound, and, what is most 
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important, that 
the mind not alone perceives by sense their effect in stimulating the 
organs, but also, by reflection, the regular play of the impressions 
(and 
consequently the form in which different representations are 
united) — 
which I, still, in no way doubt — then color and tone would not 
be mere sensations. They would be nothing short of formal 
determinations 
of the unity of a manifold of sensations, and in that case could even 
be ranked as intrinsic beauties. 
But the purity of a simple mode of sensation means that its 
uniformity 
is not disturbed or broken by any foreign sensation. It belongs 
merely 
to the form; for abstraction may there be made from the quality of 
the 
mode of such sensation (what color or tone, if any, it represents). 
For 
this reason, all simple colors are regarded as beautiful so far as pure. 
Composite colors have not this advantage, because, not being 
simple, 
there is no standard for estimating whether they should be called 
pure 
or impure. 
But as for the beauty ascribed to the object on account of its form, 
and the supposition that it is capable of being enhanced by charm, 
this 
is a common error and one very prejudicial to genuine, 
uncorrupted, sincere 
taste. Nevertheless charms may be added to beauty to lend to the 
mind, 
beyond a bare delight, an adventitious interest in the representation 
of the object, and thus to advocate taste and its cultivation. This 
applies 
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especially where taste is as yet crude and untrained. But they are 
positively 
subversive of the judgment of taste, if allowed to obtrude 
themselves 
as grounds of estimating beauty. For so far are they from 
contributing 
to beauty that it is only where taste is still weak and untrained that, 
like aliens, they are admitted as a favor, and only on terms that they 
do not violate that beautiful form. 
In painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the formative arts, in 
architecture 
and horticulture, so far as fine arts, the design is what is essential. 
Here it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by 
its form, that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste. The colors 
which give brilliancy to the sketch are part of the charm. They may 
no 
doubt, in their own way, enliven the object for sensation, but make 
it 
really worth looking at and beautiful they cannot. Indeed, more 
often 
than not the requirements of the beautiful form restrict them to a 
very 
narrow compass, and, even where charm is admitted, it is only this 
form 
that gives them a place of honor. 
All form of objects of sense (both of external and also, mediately, 
of internal sense) is either figure or play. In the latter case it is 
either play of figures (in space: mimic and dance), or mere play of 
sensations 
(in time). The charm of colors, or of the agreeable tones of 
instruments, 
may be added: but the design in the former and the composition in 
the 
latter constitute the proper object of the pure judgment of taste. To 
say that the purity alike of colors and of tones, or their variety and 
246  |  Kant - from The Critique of Judgement
contrast, seem to contribute to beauty, is by no means to imply that, 
because in themselves agreeable, they therefore yield an addition to 
the 
delight in the form and one on a par with it. The real meaning rather 
is that they make this form more clearly, definitely, and completely 
intuitable, 
and besides stimulate the representation by their charm, as they 
excite 
and sustain the attention directed to the object itself. 
Even what is called ornamentation (parerga), i.e., what is only 
an adjunct and not an intrinsic constituent in the complete 
representation 
of the object, in augmenting the delight of taste does so only by 
means 
of its form. Thus it is with the frames of pictures or the drapery on 
statues, or the colonnades of palaces. But if the ornamentation does 
not 
itself enter into the composition of the beautiful form — if it is 
introduced like a gold frame merely to win approval for the picture 
by 
means of its charm — it is then called finery and takes away 
from the genuine beauty. 
Emotion — a sensation where an agreeable feeling is produced 
merely 
by means of a momentary check followed by a more powerful 
outpouring of 
the vital force — is quite foreign to beauty. Sublimity (with which 
the feeling of emotion is connected) requires, however, a different 
standard 
of estimation from that relied upon by taste. A pure judgment of 
taste 
has, then, for its determining ground neither charm nor emotion, in 
a 
word, no sensation as matter of the aesthetic judgment. 
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§ 15. The judgment of taste is entirely independent of the 
concept of perfection. 
Objective purposiveness can only be cognized by means of a 
reference 
of the manifold to a definite end, and hence only through a concept. 
This 
alone makes it clear that the beautiful, which is estimated on the 
ground 
of a mere formal purposiveness, i.e., a purposiveness apart from an 
end, 
is wholly independent of the representation of the good. For the 
latter 
presupposes an objective purposiveness, i.e., the reference of the 
object 
to a definite end. 
Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e., the utility, or 
internal, 
i.e., the perfection, of the object. That the delight in an object on 
account of which we call it beautiful is incapable of resting on the 
representation 
of its utility, is abundantly evident from the two preceding articles; 
for in that case, it would not be an immediate delight in the object, 
which latter is the essential condition of the judgment upon beauty. 
But in an objective, internal purposiveness, i.e., perfection, we have 
what is more akin to the predicate of beauty, and so this has been 
held 
even by philosophers of reputation to be convertible with beauty, 
though 
subject to the qualification: where it is thought in a confused way. In 
a critique of taste it is of the utmost importance to decide whether 
beauty 
is really reducible to the concept of perfection. 
For estimating objective purposiveness we always require the 
concept 
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of an end, and, where such purposiveness has to be, not an external 
one 
(utility), but an internal one, the concept of an internal end 
containing 
the ground of the internal possibility of the object. Now an end is in 
general that, the concept of which may be regarded as the ground 
of the 
possibility of the object itself. So in order to represent an objective 
purposiveness in a thing we must first have a concept of what sort 
of 
a thing it is to be. The agreement of the manifold in a thing with this 
concept (which supplies the rule of its synthesis) is the qualitative 
perfection of the thing. Quantitative perfection is entirely distinct 
from this. It consists in the completeness of anything after its kind, 
and is a mere concept of quantity (of totality). In its case the 
question 
of what the thing is to be is regarded as definitely disposed of, and 
we only ask whether it is possessed of all the requisites that go to 
make 
it such. What is formal in the representation of a thing, i.e., the 
agreement 
of its manifold with a unity (i.e., irrespective of what it is to be), 
does not, of itself, afford us any cognition whatsoever of objective 
purposiveness. 
For since abstraction is made from this unity as end (what the thing 
is 
to be), nothing is left but the subjective purposiveness of the 
representations 
in the mind of the subject intuiting. This gives a certain 
purposiveness 
of the representative state of the subject, in which the subject feels 
itself quite at home in its effort to grasp a given form in the 
imagination, 
but no perfection of any object, the latter not being here thought 
through 
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any concept. For instance, if in a forest I light upon a plot of grass, 
round which trees stand in a circle, and if I do not then form any 
representation 
of an end, as that it is meant to be used, say, for country dances, 
then 
not the least hint of a concept of perfection is given by the mere 
form. 
To suppose a formal objective purposiveness that is yet devoid of an 
end, 
i.e., the mere form of a perfection (apart from any matter or concept 
of that to which the agreement relates, even though there was the 
mere 
general idea of a conformity to law) is a veritable contradiction. 
Now the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, one resting 
on 
subjective grounds. No concept can be its determining ground, and 
hence 
not one of a definite end. Beauty, therefore, as a formal subjective 
purposiveness, 
involves no thought whatsoever of a perfection of the object, as a 
would 
— be formal purposiveness which yet, for all that, is objective: 
and the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and the 
good, 
which represents both as differing only in their logical form, the 
first 
being merely a confused, the second a clearly defined, concept of 
perfection, 
while otherwise alike in content and origin, all goes for nothing: for 
then there would be no specific difference between them, but the 
judgment 
of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgment as one by which 
something 
is described as good — just as the man in the street, when be says 
that deceit is wrong, bases his judgment on confused, but the 
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philosopher 
on clear grounds, while both appeal in reality to identical principles 
of reason. But I have already stated that an aesthetic judgment is 
quite 
unique, and affords absolutely no (not even a confused) knowledge 
of the 
object. It is only through a logical judgment that we get knowledge. 
The aesthetic judgment, on the other hand, refers the 
representation, 
by which an object is given, solely to the subject, and brings to our 
notice no quality of the object, but only the final form in the 
determination 
of the powers of representation engaged upon it. The judgment is 
called 
aesthetic for the very reason that its determining ground cannot be 
a 
concept, but is rather the feeling (of the internal sense) of the 
concert 
in the play of the mental powers as a thing only capable of being felt. 
If, on the other band, confused concepts, and the objective 
judgment 
based on them, are going to be called aesthetic, we shall find 
ourselves 
with an understanding judging by sense, or a sense representing its 
objects 
by concepts — a mere choice of contradictions. The faculty of 
concepts, 
be they confused or be they clear, is understanding; and although 
understanding 
has (as in all judgments) its role in the judgment of taste, as an 
aesthetic 
judgment, its role there is not that of a faculty for cognizing an 
object, 
but of a faculty for determining that judgment and its 
representation 
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(without a concept) according to its relation to the subject and its 
internal 
feeling, and for doing so in so far as that judgment is possible 
according 
to a universal rule. 
§ 16. A judgment of taste by which an object is described as 
beautiful, under the condition of a definite concept, is not 
pure. 
There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga), 
or beauty which is merely dependent (pulchritudo adhaerens). The 
first presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the 
second 
does presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering 
perfection of 
the object. Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) 
beauties 
of this thing or that thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached 
to a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to objects which come 
under 
the concept of a particular end. 
Flowers are free beauties of nature. Hardly anyone but a botanist 
knows 
the true nature of a flower, and even he, while recognizing in the 
flower 
the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to this natural 
end when using his taste to judge of its beauty. Hence no perfection 
of 
any kind — no internal purposiveness, as something to which the 
arrangement 
of the manifold is related — underlies this judgment. Many birds 
(the parrot, the hummingbird, the bird of paradise), and a number of 
crustaceans, 
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are self-subsisting beauties which are not appurtenant to any object 
defined 
with respect to its end, but please freely and on their own account. 
So 
designs à la grecque, foliage for framework or on wallpapers, 
etc., have no intrinsic meaning; they represent nothing — no object 
under a definite concept — and are free beauties. We may also rank 
in the same class what in music are called fantasias (without a 
theme), 
and, indeed, all music that is not set to words. 
In the estimate of a free beauty (according to mere form) we have 
the 
pure judgment of taste. No concept is here presupposed of any end 
for 
which the manifold should serve the given object, and which the 
latter, 
therefore, should represent — an incumbrance which would only 
restrict 
the freedom of the imagination that, as it were, is at play in the 
contemplation 
of the outward form. 
But the beauty of man (including under this head that of a man, 
woman, 
or child), the beauty of a horse, or of a building (such as a church, 
palace, arsenal, or summer house), presupposes a concept of the 
end that 
defines what the thing has to be, and consequently a concept of its 
perfection; 
and is therefore merely appendant beauty. Now, just as it is a clog 
on 
the purity of the purity of the judgment of taste to have the 
agreeable 
(of sensation) joined with beauty to which properly only the form is 
relevant, 
so to combine the good with beauty (the good, namely, of the 
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manifold 
to the thing itself according to its end) mars its purity. 
Much might be added to a building that would immediately please 
the 
eye, were it not intended to be a church. A figure might be 
beautified with 
all manner of flourishes and light but regular lines, as is done by the 
New Zealanders with their tattooing, were we dealing with anything 
but 
the figure of a human being. And here is one whose rugged features 
might 
be softened and given a more pleasing aspect, only he has got to be 
a 
man, or is, perhaps, a warrior who has to have a warlike appearance. 
Now the delight in the manifold of a thing, in reference to the 
internal 
end that determines its possibility, is a delight based on a concept, 
whereas delight in the beautiful is such as does not presuppose any 
concept, 
but is immediately coupled with the representation through which 
the object 
is given (not through which it is thought). If, now, the judgment of 
taste in respect of the latter delight is made dependent upon the 
end 
involved in the former delight as a judgment of reason, and is thus 
placed 
under a restriction, then it is no longer a free and pure judgment of 
taste. 
Taste, it is true, stands to gain by this combination of intellectual 
delight with the aesthetic. For it becomes fixed, and, while not 
universal, 
it enables rules to be prescribed for it in respect of certain definite 
final objects. But these rules are then not rules of taste, but merely 
rules for establishing a union of taste with reason, i.e., of the 
beautiful 
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with the good — rules by which the former becomes available as an 
intentional instrument in respect of the latter, for the purpose of 
bringing 
that temper of the mind which is self-sustaining and of subjective 
universal 
validity to the support and maintenance of that mode of thought 
which, 
while possessing objective universal validity, can only be preserved 
by 
a resolute effort. But, strictly speaking, perfection neither gains by 
beauty, nor beauty by perfection. The truth is rather this, when we 
compare 
the representation through which an object is given to us with the 
object 
(in respect of what it is meant to be) by means of a concept, we 
cannot 
help reviewing it also in respect of the sensation in the subject. 
Hence 
there results a gain to the entire faculty of our representative power 
when harmony prevails between both states of mind. 
In respect of an object with a definite internal end, a judgment of 
taste would only be pure where the person judging either has no 
concept 
of this end, or else makes abstraction from it in his judgment. But in 
cases like this, although such a person should lay down a correct 
judgment 
of taste, since he would be estimating the object as a free beauty, he 
would still be found fault with by another who saw nothing in its 
beauty 
but a dependent quality (i.e., who looked to the end of the object) 
and 
would be accused by him of false taste, though both would, in their 
own 
way, be judging correctly: the one according to what he had present 
to 
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his senses, the other according to what was present in his thoughts. 
This 
distinction enables us to settle many disputes about beauty on the 
part 
of critics; for we may show them how one side is dealing with free 
beauty, 
and the other with that which is dependent: the former passing a 
pure 
judgment of taste, the latter one that is applied intentionally.4 
§ 17. The ideal of beauty. 
There can be no objective rule of taste by which what is beautiful 
may 
be defined by means of concepts. For every judgment from that 
source 
is aesthetic, i.e., its determining ground is the feeling of the subject, 
and not any concept of an object. It is only throwing away labour to 
look 
for a principle of taste that affords a universal criterion of the 
beautiful 
by definite concepts; because what is sought is a thing impossible 
and 
inherently contradictory. But in the universal communicability of 
the 
sensation (of delight or aversion) — a communicability, too, that 
exists apart from any concept — in the accord, so far as possible, 
of all ages and nations as to this feeling in the representation of 
4. Dutton's note: My own analytical examination of 
competing interpretations of Kant’s notion of free and 
dependent beauty can be found here. —D.D. 
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certain 
objects, we have the empirical criterion, weak indeed and scarce 
sufficient 
to raise a presumption, of the derivation of a taste, thus confirmed 
by 
examples, from grounds deep seated and shared alike by all men, 
underlying 
their agreement in estimating the forms under which objects are 
given 
to them. 
For this reason some products of taste are looked on as exemplary 
— 
not meaning thereby that by imitating others taste may be acquired. 
For 
taste must be an original faculty; whereas one who imitates a model, 
while 
showing skill commensurate with his success, only displays taste as 
himself 
a critic of this model.5 Hence it follows that the highest model, the 
archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which each person must beget in 
his 
5. Kant's note: Models of taste with respect to the arts of 
speech must be composed in a dead and learned 
language; the first, to prevent their having to suffer the 
changes that inevitably overtake living ones, making 
dignified expressions become degraded, common ones 
antiquated, and ones newly coined after a short 
currency obsolete: the second to ensure its having a 
grammar that is not subject to the caprices of fashion, 
but has fixed rules of its own. All remaining notes are 
Kant's own. 
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own consciousness, and according to which he must form his 
estimate of 
everything that is an object of taste, or that is an example of critical 
taste, and even of universal taste itself. Properly speaking, an idea 
signifies a concept of reason, and an ideal the representation of an 
individual 
existence as adequate to an idea. Hence this archetype of taste — 
which rests, indeed, upon reason’s indeterminate idea of a 
maximum, 
but is not, however, capable of being represented by means of 
concepts, 
but only in an individual presentation — may more appropriately be 
called the ideal of the beautiful. While not having this ideal in our 
possession, we still strive to beget it within us. But it is bound to 
be merely an ideal of the imagination, seeing that it rests, not upon 
concepts, but upon the presentation — the faculty of presentation 
being the imagination. Now, how do we arrive at such an ideal of 
beauty? 
Is it a priori or empirically? Further, what species of the beautiful 
admits of an ideal? 
First of all, we do well to observe that the beauty for which an 
ideal 
has to be sought cannot be a beauty that is free and at large, but 
must 
be one fixed by a concept of objective purposiveness. Hence it 
cannot belong to the object of an altogether pure judgment of taste, 
but must attach to one that is partly intellectual. In other words, 
where 
an ideal is to have place among the grounds upon which any 
estimate is 
formed, then beneath grounds of that kind there must lie some idea 
of 
reason according to determinate concepts, by which the end 
underlying 
the internal possibility of the object is determined a priori. 
258  |  Kant - from The Critique of Judgement
An ideal of beautiful flowers, of a beautiful suite of furniture, or of 
a beautiful view, is unthinkable. But, it may also be impossible to 
represent 
an ideal of a beauty dependent on definite ends, e.g., a beautiful 
residence, 
a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc., presumably because their 
ends 
are not sufficiently defined and fixed by their concept, with the 
result 
that their purposiveness is nearly as free as with beauty that is quite 
at large. Only what has in itself the end of its real existence — 
only man that is able himself to determine his ends by reason, or, 
where 
he has to derive them from external perception, can still compare 
them 
with essential and universal ends, and then further pronounce 
aesthetically 
upon their accord with such ends, only he, among all objects in the 
world, 
admits, therefore, of an ideal of beauty, just as humanity in his 
person, 
as intelligence, alone admits of the ideal of perfection. 
Two factors are here involved. First, there is the aesthetic normal 
idea, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination). This 
represents 
the norm by which we judge of a man as a member of a particular 
animal 
species. Secondly, there is the rational idea. This deals with the ends 
of humanity so far as capable of sensuous representation, and 
converts 
them into a principle for estimating his outward form, through 
which these 
ends are revealed in their phenomenal effect. The normal idea must 
draw 
from experience the constituents which it requires for the form of 
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an 
animal of a particular kind. But the greatest purposiveness in the 
construction 
of this form — that which would serve as a universal norm for 
forming 
an estimate of each individual of the species in question — the image 
that, as it were, forms an intentional basis underlying the technic of 
nature, to which no separate individual, but only the race as a whole, 
is adequate, has its seat merely in the idea of the judging subject. Yet 
it is, with all its proportions, an aesthetic idea, and, as such, capable 
of being fully presented in concreto in a model image. Now, how is 
this 
effected? In order to render the process to some extent intelligible 
(for 
who can wrest nature’s whole secret from her?), let us attempt a 
psychological explanation. 
It is of note that the imagination, in a manner quite 
incomprehensible 
to us, is able on occasion, even after a long lapse of time, not alone 
to recall the signs for concepts, but also to reproduce the image and 
shape of an object out of a countless number of others of a different, 
or even of the very same, kind. And, further, if the mind is engaged 
upon 
comparisons, we may well suppose that it can in actual fact, though 
the 
process is unconscious, superimpose as it were one image upon 
another, 
and from the coincidence of a number of the same kind arrive at a 
mean 
contour which serves as a common standard for all. Say, for 
instance, 
a person has seen a thousand full-grown men. Now if he wishes to 
judge 
normal size determined upon a comparative estimate, then 
imagination (to 
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my mind) allows a great number of these images (perhaps the whole 
thousand) 
to fall one upon the other, and, if I may be allowed to extend to the 
case the analogy of optical presentation, in the space where they 
come 
most together, and within the contour where the place is 
illuminated by 
the greatest concentration of color, one gets a perception of the 
average 
size, which alike in height and breadth is equally removed from the 
extreme 
limits of the greatest and smallest statures; and this is the stature 
of a beautiful man. (The same result could be obtained in a 
mechanical 
way, by taking the measures of all the thousand, and adding together 
their 
heights, and their breadths [and thicknesses], and dividing the sum 
in 
each case by a thousand.) But the power of imagination does all this 
by 
means of a dynamical effect upon the organ of internal sense, 
arising 
from the frequent apprehension of such forms. If, again, for our 
average 
man we seek on similar lines for the average head, and for this the 
average 
nose, and so on, then we get the figure that underlies the normal 
idea 
of a beautiful man in the country where the comparison is 
instituted. 
For this reason a Negro must necessarily (under these empirical 
conditions) 
have a different normal idea of the beauty of forms from what a 
white 
man has, and the Chinaman one different from the European. And 
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the. process 
would be just the same with the model of a beautiful horse or dog 
(of 
a particular breed). This normal idea is not derived from proportions 
taken from experience as definite rules: rather is it according to this 
idea that rules forming estimates first become possible. It is an 
intermediate 
between all singular intuitions of individuals, with their manifold 
variations 
— a floating image for the whole genus, which nature has set as an 
archetype underlying those of her products that belong to the same 
species, 
but which in no single case she seems to have completely attained. 
But 
the normal idea is far from giving the complete archetype of beauty 
in 
the genus. It only gives the form that constitutes the indispensable 
condition 
of all beauty, and, consequently, only correctness in the 
presentation 
of the genus. It is, as the famous “Doryphorus” of Polycletus 
was called, the rule (and Myron’s “Cow” might be similarly 
employed for its kind). It cannot, for that very reason, contain 
anything 
specifically characteristic; for otherwise it would not be the normal 
idea for the genus. Further, it is not by beauty that its presentation 
pleases, but merely because it does not contradict any of the 
conditions 
under which alone a thing belonging to this genus can be beautiful. 
The 
presentation is merely academically correct.6 
6. It will be found that a perfectly regular face one that a 
painter might fix his eye on for a model — ordinarily 
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But the ideal of the beautiful is still something different from its 
normal idea. For reasons already stated it is only to be sought in the 
human figure. Here the ideal consists in the expression of the moral, 
apart from which the object would not please at once universally 
and positively 
(not merely negatively in a presentation academically correct). The 
visible 
expression of moral ideas that govern men inwardly can, of course, 
only 
be drawn from experience; but their combination with all that our 
reason 
connects with the morally good in the idea of the highest 
purposiveness 
— benevolence, purity, strength, or equanimity, etc. — may be 
conveys nothing. This is because it is devoid of anything 
characteristic, and so the idea of the race is expressed in 
it rather than the specific qualities of a person. The 
exaggeration of what is characteristic in this way, i.e., 
exaggeration violating the normal idea (the 
purposiveness of the race), is called caricature. Also 
experience shows that these quite regular faces indicate 
as a rule internally only a mediocre type of man; 
presumably — if one may assume that nature in its 
external form expresses the proportions of the internal 
— because, where none of the mental qualities exceed 
the proportion requisite to constitute a man free from 
faults, nothing can be expected in the way of what is 
called genius, in which nature seems to make a 
departure from its wonted relations of the mental 
powers in favor of some special one. 
Kant - from The Critique of Judgement  |  263
made, as it were, visible in bodily manifestation (as effect of what is 
internal), and this embodiment involves a union of pure ideas of 
reason 
and great imaginative power, in one who would even form an 
estimate of 
it, not to speak of being the author of its presentation. The 
correctness 
of such an ideal of beauty is evidenced by its not permitting any 
sensuous 
charm to mingle with the delight in its object, in which it still allows 
us to take a great interest. This fact in turn shows that an estimate 
formed according to such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, 
and 
that one formed according to an ideal of beauty cannot be a simple 
judgment 
of taste. 
Definition of the Beautiful Derived from the 
Third 
Moment. 
Beauty is the form of purposiveness of an object, so far as perceived 
apart from the object’s purpose.7 
7. As telling against this explanation, the instance may  be 
adduced that there are things in which we see a form 
suggesting adaptation to an end, without any end being 
cognized in them — as, for example, the stone 
implements frequently obtained from sepulchral tumuli 
and supplied with a hole, as if for [inserting] a handle; 
264  |  Kant - from The Critique of Judgement
 
Fourth Moment of the Judgment of Taste, as to 
the 
Modality of the Delight in the Object. 
§ 18. Nature of the modality in a judgment of taste. 
I may assert in the case of every representation that the synthesis 
of a pleasure with the representation (as a cognition) is at least 
possible. 
Of what I call agreeable I assert that it actually causes pleasure in 
me. But what we have in mind in the case of the beautiful is a 
necessary 
reference on its part to delight. However, this necessity is of a 
special 
kind. It is not a theoretical objective necessity — such as would 
and although these by their shape manifestly indicate a 
purposiveness, the end of which is unknown, they are 
not on that account described as beautiful. But the very 
fact of their being regarded as art — products involves an 
immediate recognition that their shape is attributed to 
some purpose or other and to a definite end. For this 
reason there is no immediate delight whatever in their 
contemplation. A flower, on the other hand, such as a 
tulip, is regarded as beautiful, because we meet with a 
certain purposiveness in its perception, which, in our 
estimate of it, is not referred to any end whatever. 
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let us cognize a priori that every one will feel this delight in 
the object that is called beautiful by me. Nor yet is it a practical 
necessity, 
in which case, thanks to concepts of a pure rational will in which 
free 
agents are supplied with a rule, this delight is the necessary 
consequence 
of an objective law, and simply means that one ought absolutely 
(without 
ulterior object) to act in a certain way. Rather, being such a necessity 
as is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be termed 
exemplary. 
In other words it is a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment 
regarded 
as exemplifying a universal rule incapable of formulation. Since an 
aesthetic 
judgment is not an objective or cognitive judgment, this necessity is 
not derivable from definite concepts, and so is not apodeictic. Much 
less 
is it inferable from universality of experience (of a thoroughgoing 
agreement 
of judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For, apart from 
the 
fact that experience would hardly furnish evidences sufficiently 
numerous 
for this purpose, empirical judgments do not afford any foundation 
for 
a concept of the necessity of these judgments. 
§ 19. The subjective necessity attributed to a judgment of 
taste is conditioned. 
The judgment of taste exacts agreement from every one; and a 
person 
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who describes something as beautiful insists that every one ought 
to give 
the object in question his approval and follow suit in describing it as 
beautiful. The ought in aesthetic judgments, therefore, despite an 
accordance 
with all the requisite data for passing judgment, is still only 
pronounced 
conditionally. We are suitors for agreement from every one else, 
because 
we are fortified with a ground common to all. Further, we would be 
able 
to count on this agreement, provided we were always assured of the 
correct 
subsumption of the case under that ground as the rule of approval. 
§ 20. The condition of the necessity advanced by a judgment 
of taste is the idea of a common sense. 
Were judgments of taste (like cognitive judgments) in possession of 
a definite objective principle, then one who in his judgment followed 
such a principle would claim unconditioned necessity for it. Again, 
were 
they devoid of any principle, as are those of the mere taste of sense, 
then no thought of any necessity on their part would enter one’s 
head. Therefore they must have a subjective principle, and one 
which determines 
what pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through 
concepts, 
but yet with universal validity. Such a principle, however, could only 
be regarded as a common sense. This differs essentially from 
common understanding, 
which is also sometimes called common sense (sensus communis): 
for the 
judgment of the latter is not one by feeling, but always one by 
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concepts, 
though usually only in the shape of obscurely represented 
principles. 
The judgment of taste, therefore, depends on our presupposing 
the existence 
of a common sense. (But this is not to be taken to mean some 
external 
sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of 
cognition.) 
Only under the presupposition, I repeat, of such a common sense, 
are we 
able to lay down a judgment of taste. 
§ 21. Have we reason for presupposing a common sense? 
Cognitions and judgments must, together with their attendant 
conviction, 
admit of being universally communicated; for otherwise a 
correspondence 
with the object would not be due to them. They would be a 
conglomerate 
constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation, 
just 
as scepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit of 
communication, 
then our mental state, i.e., the way the cognitive powers are attuned 
for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative proportion suitable 
for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which 
cognition 
is to result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as, 
without 
this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, 
knowledge, 
as an effect, would not arise. And this is always what actually 
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happens 
where a given object, through the intervention of sense, sets the 
imagination 
at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination, in turn, the 
understanding 
in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts. But this 
disposition 
of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the 
diversity 
of the objects that are given. However, there must be one in which 
this 
internal ratio suitable for quickening (one faculty by the other) is 
best 
adapted for both mental powers in respect of cognition (of given 
objects) 
generally; and this disposition can only be determined through 
feeling 
(and not by concepts). Since, now this disposition itself must admit 
of 
being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in 
the 
case of a given representation), while again, the universal 
communicability 
of a feeling presupposes a common sense: it follows that our 
assumption 
of it is well founded. And here, too, we do not have to take our stand 
on psychological observations, but we assume a common sense as 
the necessary 
condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which 
is 
presupposed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is 
not 
one of scepticism. 
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§ 22. The necessity of the universal assent that is thought in 
a judgment of taste, is a subjective necessity which, under 
the presupposition of a common sense, is represented as 
objective. 
In all judgments by which we describe anything as beautiful, we 
tolerate 
no one else being of a different opinion, and in taking up this 
position 
we do not rest our judgment upon concepts, but only on our feeling. 
Accordingly 
we introduce this fundamental feeling not as a private feeling, but as 
a public sense. Now, for this purpose, experience cannot be made 
the ground 
of this common sense, for the latter is invoked to justify judgments 
containing an “ought.” The assertion is not that every one will 
fall in with our judgment, but rather that every one ought to agree 
with 
it. Here I put forward my judgment of taste as an example of the 
judgment 
of common sense, and attribute to it on that account exemplary 
validity. 
Hence common sense is a mere ideal norm. With this as 
presupposition, 
a judgment that accords with it, as well as the delight in an object 
expressed in that judgment, is rightly converted into a rule for 
everyone. 
For the principle, while it is only subjective, being yet assumed as 
subjectively 
universal (a necessary idea for everyone), could, in what concerns 
the 
consensus of different judging subjects, demand universal assent 
like 
an objective principle, provided we were assured of our 
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subsumption under 
it being correct. 
This indeterminate norm of a common sense is, as a matter of 
fact, presupposed 
by us; as is shown by our presuming to lay down judgments of taste. 
But 
does such a common sense in fact exist as a constitutive principle of 
the possibility of experience, or is it formed for us as a regulative 
principle by a still higher principle of reason, that for higher ends 
first seeks to beget in us a common sense? Is taste, in other words, 
a 
natural and original faculty, or is it only the idea of one that is 
artificial 
and to be acquired by us, so that a judgment of taste, with its 
demand 
for universal assent, is but a requirement of reason for generating 
such 
a consensus, and does the “ought,” i.e., the objective necessity 
of the coincidence of the feeling of all with the particular feeling of 
each, only betoken the possibility of arriving at some sort of 
unanimity 
in these matters, and the judgment of taste only adduce an example 
of 
the application of this principle? These are questions which as yet 
we 
are neither willing nor in a position to investigate. For the present 
we have only to resolve the faculty of taste into its elements, and to 
unite these ultimately in the idea of a common sense. 
Definition of the Beautiful drawn from the 
Fourth Moment. 
The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as 
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object 
of a necessary delight. 
General Remark on the First Section of the 
Analytic. 
The result to be extracted from the foregoing analysis is in effect 
this: that everything runs up into the concept of taste as a critical 
faculty by which an object is estimated in reference to the free 
conformity 
to law of the imagination. If, now, imagination must in the judgment 
of taste be regarded in its freedom, then, to begin with, it is not 
taken 
as reproductive, as in its subjection to the laws of association, but 
as productive and exerting an activity of its own (as originator of 
arbitrary 
forms of possible intuitions). And although in the apprehension of a 
given 
object of sense it is tied down to a definite form of this object and, 
to that extent, does not enjoy free play (as it does in poetry), still 
it is easy to conceive that the object may supply ready-made to the 
imagination 
just such a form of the arrangement of the manifold as the 
imagination, 
if it were left to itself, would freely protect in harmony with the 
general 
conformity to law of the understanding. But that the imagination 
should 
be both free and of itself conformable to law, i.e., carry autonomy 
with 
it, is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law. Where, 
however, the imagination is compelled to follow a course laid down 
by 
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a definite law, then what the form of the product is to be is 
determined 
by concepts; but, in that case, as already shown, the delight is not 
delight 
in the beautiful, but in the good (in perfection, though it be no more 
than formal perfection), and the judgment is not one due to taste. 
Hence 
it is only a conformity to law without a law, and a subjective 
harmonizing 
of the imagination and the understanding without an objective one 
— 
which latter would mean that the representation was referred to a 
definite 
concept of the object — that can consist with the free conformity 
to law of the understanding (which has also been called 
purposiveness 
apart from an end) and with the specific character of a judgment of 
taste. 
Now geometrically regular figures, a circle, a square, a cube, and 
the 
like, are commonly brought forward by critics of taste as the most 
simple 
and unquestionable examples of beauty. And yet the very reason 
why they 
are called regular, is because the only way of representing them is 
by 
looking on them as mere presentations of a determinate concept by 
which 
the figure has its rule (according to which alone it is possible) 
prescribed 
for it. One or other of these two views must, therefore, be wrong: 
either 
the verdict of the critics that attributes beauty to such figures, or 
else our own, which makes purposiveness apart from any concept 
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necessary 
for beauty. 
One would scarce think it necessary for a man to have taste to 
take 
more delight in a circle than in a scrawled outline, in an equilateral 
and equiangular quadrilateral than in one that is all lopsided, and, as 
it were, deformed. The requirements of common understanding 
ensure such 
a preference without the least demand upon taste. Where some 
purpose is 
perceived, as, for instance, that of forming an estimate of the area of 
a plot of land, or rendering intelligible the relation of divided parts 
to one another and to the whole, then regular figures, and those of 
the 
simplest kind, are needed; and the delight does not rest immediately 
upon 
the way the figure strikes the eye, but upon its serviceability for all 
manner of possible purposes. A room with the walls making oblique 
angles, 
a plot laid out in a garden in a similar way, even any violation of 
symmetry, 
as well in the figure of animals (e.g., being one-eyed) as in that of 
buildings, or of flower-beds, is displeasing because of its perversity 
of form, not alone in a practical way in respect of some definite use 
to which the thing may be put, but for an estimate that looks to all 
manner 
of possible purposes. With the judgment of taste the case is 
different. 
For, when it is pure, it combines delight or aversion immediately 
with 
the bare contemplation of the object irrespective of its use or of any 
end. 
The regularity that conduces to the concept of an object is, in fact, 
the indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non) of grasping 
the object as a single representation and giving to the manifold its 
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determinate 
form. This determination is an end in respect of knowledge; and in 
this 
connection it is invariably coupled with delight (such as attends the 
accomplishment of any, even problematical, purpose). Here, 
however, we 
have merely the value set upon the solution that satisfies the 
problem, 
and not a free and indeterminately purposive entertainment of the 
mental 
powers with what is called beautiful. In the latter case, 
understanding 
is at the service of imagination, in the former, this relation is 
reversed. 
With a thing that owes its possibility to a purpose, a building, or 
even an animal, its regularity, which consists in symmetry, must 
express 
the unity of the intuition accompanying the concept of its end, and 
belongs 
with it to cognition. But where all that is intended is the 
maintenance 
of a free play of the powers of representation (subject, however, to 
the 
condition that there is to be nothing for understanding to take 
exception 
to), in ornamental gardens, in the decoration of rooms, in all kinds 
of 
furniture that shows good taste, etc., regularity in the shape of 
constraint 
is to be avoided as far as possible. Thus English taste in gardens, and 
fantastic taste in furniture, push the freedom of imagination to the 
verge 
of what is grotesque the idea being that in this divorce from all 
constraint 
of rules the precise instance is being afforded where taste can 
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exhibit 
its perfection in projects of the imagination to the fullest extent. 
All stiff regularity (such as borders on mathematical regularity) is 
inherently repugnant to taste, in that the contemplation of it affords 
us no lasting entertainment. Indeed, where it has neither cognition 
nor 
some definite practical end expressly in view, we get heartily tired 
of 
it. On the other hand, anything that gives the imagination scope for 
unstudied 
and purposive play is always fresh to us. We do not grow to hate the 
very 
sight of it. Marsden, in his description of Sumatra, observes that the 
free beauties of nature so surround the beholder on all sides that 
they 
cease to have much attraction for him. On the other band he found 
a pepper 
garden full of charm, on coming across it in mid-forest with its rows 
of parallel stakes on which the plant twines itself. From all this he 
infers that wild, and in its appearance quite irregular beauty, is only 
pleasing as a change to one whose eyes have become surfeited with 
regular 
beauty. But he need only have made the experiment of passing one 
day in 
his pepper garden to realize that once the regularity has enabled the 
understanding to put itself in accord with the order that is the 
constant 
requirement, instead of the object diverting him any longer, it 
imposes 
an irksome constraint upon the imagination: whereas nature subject 
to 
no constraint of artificial rules, and lavish, as it there is, in its 
luxuriant variety can supply constant food for his taste. Even a bird’s 
song, which we can reduce to no musical rule, seems to have more 
freedom 
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in it, and thus to be richer for taste, than the human voice singing in 
accordance with all the rules that the art of music prescribes; for we 
grow tired much sooner of frequent and lengthy repetitions of the 
latter. 
Yet here most likely our sympathy with the mirth of a dear little 
creature 
is confused with the beauty of its song, for if exactly imitated by man 
(as has been sometimes done with the notes of the nightingale) it 
would 
strike our ear as wholly destitute of taste. 
Further, beautiful objects have to be distinguished from beautiful 
views 
of objects (where the distance often prevents a clear perception). In 
the latter case, taste appears to fasten, not so much on what the 
imagination 
grasps in this field, as on the incentive it receives to indulge in 
poetic 
fiction, i.e., in the peculiar fancies with which the mind entertains 
itself as it is being continually stirred by the variety that strikes 
the eye. It is just as when we watch the changing shapes of the fire 
or 
of a rippling brook: neither of which are things of beauty, but they 
convey 
a charm to the imagination, because they sustain its free play. 
 
Second Book. Analytic of the Sublime. 
§ 23. Transition from the faculty of estimating the beautiful 
to that of estimating the sublime. 
The beautiful and the sublime agree on the point of pleasing on their 
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own account. Further they agree in not presupposing either a 
judgment 
of sense or one logically determinant, but one of reflection. Hence 
it 
follows that the delight does not depend upon a sensation, as with 
the 
agreeable, nor upon a definite concept, as does the delight in the 
good, 
although it has, for all that, an indeterminate reference to concepts. 
Consequently the delight is connected with the mere presentation 
or faculty 
of presentation, and is thus taken to express the accord, in a given 
intuition, 
of the faculty of presentation, or the imagination, with the faculty of 
concepts that belongs to understanding or reason, in the sense of 
the 
former assisting the latter. Hence both kinds of judgments are 
singular, 
and yet such as profess to be universally valid in respect of every 
subject, 
despite the fact that their claims are directed merely to the feeling 
of pleasure and not to any knowledge of the object. 
There are, however, also important and striking differences 
between 
the two. The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of object, 
and this consists in limitation, whereas the sublime is to be found in 
an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or 
else 
by its presence provokes a representation of limitlessness, yet with 
a 
superadded thought of its totality. Accordingly, the beautiful seems 
to 
be regarded as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of 
understanding, 
the sublime as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of 
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reason. Hence 
the delight is in the former case coupled with the representation of 
quality, 
but in this case with that of quantity. Moreover, the former delight 
is 
very different from the latter in kind. For the beautiful is directly 
attended with a feeling of the furtherance of life, and is thus 
compatible 
with charms and a playful imagination. On the other hand, the 
feeling 
of the sublime is a pleasure that only arises indirectly, being brought 
about by the feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces 
followed 
at once by a discharge all the more powerful, and so it is an emotion 
that seems to be no sport, but dead earnest in the affairs of the 
imagination. 
Hence charms are repugnant to it; and, since the mind is not simply 
attracted 
by the object, but is also alternately repelled thereby, the delight in 
the sublime does not so much involve positive pleasure as 
admiration or 
respect, i.e., merits the name of a negative pleasure. 
But the most important and vital distinction between the sublime 
and 
the beautiful is certainly this: that if, as is allowable, we here confine 
our attention in the first instance to the sublime in objects of nature 
(that of art being always restricted by the conditions of an 
agreement 
with nature), we observe that whereas natural beauty (such as is 
self-subsisting) 
conveys a purposiveness in its form making the object appear, as it 
were, preadapted to our power of judgment, so that it thus forms of 
itself an object of our delight, that which, without our indulging in 
any refinements of thought, but, simply in our apprehension of it, 
excites 
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the feeling of the sublime, may appear, indeed, in point of form to 
contravene the ends of our power of judgment, to be ill-adapted to 
our 
faculty of presentation, and to be, as it were, an outrage on the 
imagination, 
and yet it is judged all the more sublime on that account. 
From this it may be seen at once that we express ourselves on the 
whole 
inaccurately if we term any object of nature sublime, although we 
may 
with perfect propriety call many such objects beautiful. For how can 
that 
which is apprehended as inherently contra-purposive be noted with 
an expression of approval? All that we can say is that the object 
lends itself to the 
presentation of a sublimity discoverable in the mind. 
For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be 
contained 
in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, 
although 
no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and 
called 
into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of 
sensuous 
presentation. Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be 
called 
sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored one’s mind 
in advance with a rich stock of ideas, if such an intuition is to raise 
it to the pitch of a feeling which is itself sublime — sublime because 
the mind has been incited to abandon sensibility and employ itself 
upon 
ideas involving higher purposiveness. 
Self-subsisting natural beauty reveals to us a technic of nature 
which 
shows it in the light of a system ordered in accordance with laws the 
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principle of which is not to be found within the range of our entire 
faculty 
of understanding. This principle is that of a purposiveness relative 
to 
the employment of judgment in respect of phenomena which have 
thus to 
be assigned, not merely to nature regarded as aimless mechanism, 
but also 
to nature regarded after the analogy of art. Hence it gives a veritable 
extension, not, of course, to our knowledge of objects of nature, but 
to our conception of nature itself — nature as mere mechanism 
being 
enlarged to the conception of nature as art — an extension inviting 
profound inquiries as to the possibility of such a form. But in what 
we 
are wont to call sublime in nature there is such an absence of 
anything 
leading to particular objective principles and corresponding forms 
of 
nature that it is rather in its chaos, or in its wildest and most 
irregular 
disorder and desolation, provided it gives signs of magnitude and 
power, 
that nature chiefly excites the ideas of the sublime. Hence we see 
that 
the concept of the sublime in nature is far less important and rich in 
consequences than that of its beauty. It gives on the whole no 
indication 
of anything purposive in nature itself, but only in the possible 
employment 
of our intuitions of it in inducing a feeling in our own selves of a 
purposiveness 
quite independent of nature. For the beautiful in nature we must 
seek 
a ground external to ourselves, but for the sublime one merely in 
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ourselves 
and the attitude of mind that introduces sublimity into the 
representation 
of nature. This is a very needful preliminary remark. It entirely 
separates 
the ideas of the sublime from that of a purposiveness of nature, and 
makes 
the theory of the sublime a mere appendage to the aesthetic 
estimate of 
the purposiveness of nature, because it does not give a 
representation 
of any particular form in nature, but involves no more than the 
development 
of a purposive employment by the imagination of its own 
representation. 
§ 24. Subdivision of an investigation of the feeling of the 
sublime. 
In the division of the moments of an aesthetic estimate of objects in 
respect of the feeling of the sublime, the course of the Analytic will 
be able to follow the same principle as in the analysis of judgments 
of taste. For, the judgment being one of the aesthetic reflective 
judgment, 
the delight in the sublime, just like that in the beautiful, must in its 
quantity be shown to be universally valid, in its quality independent 
of interest, in its relation subjective purposiveness, and the latter, 
in its modality, necessary. Hence the method here will not depart 
from 
the lines followed in the preceding section: unless something is 
made 
of the point that there, where the aesthetic judgment bore on the 
form 
of the object, we began with the investigation of its quality, whereas 
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here, considering the formlessness that may belong to what we call 
sublime, 
we begin with that of its quantity, as first moment of the aesthetic 
judgment 
on the sublime — a divergence of method the reason for which is 
evident 
from § 23. 
But the analysis of the sublime obliges a division not required by 
that 
of the beautiful, namely one into the mathematically and the 
dynamically 
sublime. 
For the feeling of sublime involves as its characteristic feature a 
mental movement combined with the estimate of the object, 
whereas taste 
in respect of the beautiful presupposes that the mind is in restful 
contemplation, 
and preserves it in this state. But this movement has to be estimated 
as subjectively purposive (since the sublime pleases). Hence it is 
referred 
through the imagination either to the faculty of cognition or to that 
of desire; but to whichever faculty the reference is made, the 
purposiveness 
of the given representation is estimated only in respect of these 
faculties 
(apart from end or interest). Accordingly the first is attributed to the 
object as a mathematical, the second as a dynamical, affection of the 
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A. THE MATHEMATICALLY SUBLIME. 
§ 25. Definition of the term “sublime”. 
Sublime is the name given to what is absolutely great. But to be 
great 
and to be a magnitude are entirely different concepts (magnitudo 
and quantitas). 
In the same way, to assert without qualification (simpliciter) that 
something 
is great is quite a different thing from saying that it is absolutely 
great (absolute, non comparative magnum). The latter is what is 
beyond 
all comparison great. What, then, is the meaning of the assertion 
that 
anything is great, or small, or of medium size? What is indicated is 
not 
a pure concept of understanding, still less an intuition of sense; and 
just as little is it a concept of reason, for it does not import any 
principle 
of cognition. It must, therefore, be a concept of judgment, or have 
its 
source in one, and must introduce as basis of the judgment a 
subjective 
purposiveness of the representation with reference to the power of 
judgment. 
Given a multiplicity of the homogeneous together constituting one 
thing, 
and we may at once cognize from the thing itself that it is a 
magnitude 
(quantum). No comparison with other things is required. But to 
determine 
how great it is always requires something else, which itself has 
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magnitude, 
for its measure. Now, since in the estimate of magnitude we have to 
take 
into account not merely the multiplicity (number of units) but also 
the 
magnitude of the unit (the measure), and since the magnitude of this 
unit 
in turn always requires something else as its measure and as the 
standard 
of its comparison, and so on, we see that the computation of the 
magnitude 
of phenomena is, in all cases, utterly incapable of affording us any 
absolute 
concept of a magnitude, and can, instead, only afford one that is 
always 
based on comparison. 
If, now, I assert without qualification that anything is great, it 
would 
seem that I have nothing in the way of a comparison present to my 
mind, 
or at least nothing involving an objective measure, for no attempt is 
thus made to determine how great the object is. But, despite the 
standard 
of comparison being merely subjective, the claim of the judgment is 
none 
the less one to universal agreement; the judgments: “that man is 
beautiful” and “He is tall”, do not purport to speak only for 
the judging subject, but, like theoretical judgments, they demand 
the 
assent of everyone. 
Now in a judgment that without qualification describes anything 
as 
great, it is not merely meant that the object has a magnitude, but 
greatness 
is ascribed to it pre-eminently among many other objects of a like 
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kind, 
yet without the extent of this pre-eminence being determined. 
Hence 
a standard is certainly laid at the basis of the judgment, which 
standard 
is presupposed to be one that can be taken as the same for every 
one, 
but which is available only for an aesthetic estimate of the 
greatness, 
and not for one that is logical (mathematically determined), for the 
standard is a merely subjective one underlying the reflective 
judgment 
upon the greatness. Furthermore, this standard may be empirical, 
as, 
let us say, the average size of the men known to us, of animals of a 
certain kind, of trees, of houses, of mountains, and so forth. Or it 
may be a standard given a priori, which by reason of the 
imperfections 
of the judging subject is restricted to subjective conditions of 
presentation 
in concreto; as, in the practical sphere, the greatness of a 
particular virtue, or of public liberty and justice in a country; or, 
in the theoretical sphere, the greatness of the accuracy or 
inaccuracy 
of an experiment or measurement, etc. 
Here, now, it is of note that, although we have no interest 
whatever 
in the object, i.e., its real existence may be a matter of no concern 
to us, still its mere greatness, regarded even as devoid of form, is 
able 
to convey a universally communicable delight and so involve the 
consciousness 
of a subjective purposiveness in the employment of our cognitive 
faculties, 
but not, be it remembered, a delight in the object, for the latter may 
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be formless, but, in contradistinction to what is the case with the 
beautiful, 
where the reflective judgment finds itself set to a key that is an end 
in respect of cognition generally, a delight in an extension affecting 
the imagination itself. 
If (subject as above) we say of an object, without qualification, that 
it is great, this is not a mathematically determinant, but a mere 
reflective 
judgment upon its representation, which is subjectively purposive 
for 
a particular employment of our cognitive faculties in the estimation 
of 
magnitude, and we then always couple with the representation a 
kind of 
respect, just as we do a kind of contempt with what we call 
absolutely 
small. Moreover, the estimate of things as great or small extends to 
everything, 
even to all their qualities. Thus we call even their beauty great or 
small. 
The reason of this is to be found in the fact that we have only got to 
present a thing in intuition, as the precept of judgment directs 
(consequently 
to represent it aesthetically), for it to be in its entirety a 
phenomenon, 
and hence a quantum. 
If, however, we call anything not alone great, but, without 
qualification, 
absolutely, and in every respect (beyond all comparison) great, that 
is 
to say, sublime, we soon perceive that for this it is not permissible 
to seek an appropriate standard outside itself, but merely in itself. 
It is a greatness comparable to itself alone. Hence it comes that the 
sublime is not to be looked for in the things of nature, but only in 
our 
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own ideas. But it must be left to the deduction to show in which of 
them 
it resides. 
The above definition may also be expressed in this way: that is 
sublime 
in comparison with which all else is small. Here we readily see that 
nothing 
can be given in nature, no matter how great we may judge it to be, 
which, 
regarded in some other relation, may not be degraded to the level of 
the 
infinitely little, and nothing so small which in comparison with some 
still smaller standard may not for our imagination be enlarged to the 
greatness of a world. Telescopes have put within our reach an 
abundance 
of material to go upon in making the first observation, and 
microscopes 
the same in making the second. Nothing, therefore, which can be an 
object 
of the senses is to be termed sublime when treated on this footing. 
But 
precisely because there is a striving in our imagination towards 
progress 
ad infinitum, while reason demands absolute totality, as a real idea, 
that same inability on the part of our faculty for the estimation of 
the 
magnitude of things of the world of sense to attain to this idea, is 
the 
awakening of a feeling of a supersensible faculty within us; and it is 
the use to which judgment naturally puts particular objects on 
behalf 
of this latter feeling, and not the object of sense, that is absolutely 
great, and every other contrasted employment small. Consequently 
it is 
the disposition of soul evoked by a particular representation 
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engaging 
the attention of the reflective judgment, and not the object, that is 
to be called sublime. 
The foregoing formulae defining the sublime may, therefore, be 
supplemented 
by yet another: The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking 
which 
evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense. 
§ 26. The estimation of the magnitude of natural things 
requisite 
for the idea of the sublime. 
The estimation of magnitude by means of concepts of number (or 
their 
signs in algebra) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (by the 
eye) is aesthetic. Now we can only get definite concepts of how 
great 
anything is by having recourse to numbers (or, at any rate, by getting 
approximate measurements by means of numerical series 
progressing ad infinitum), the unit being the measure; and to this 
extent all logical estimation 
of magnitude is mathematical. But, as the magnitude of the measure 
has 
to be assumed as a known quantity, if, to form an estimate of this, 
we 
must again have recourse to numbers involving another standard 
for their 
unit, and consequently must again proceed mathematically, we can 
never 
arrive at a first or fundamental measure, and so cannot get any 
definite 
concept of a given magnitude. The estimation of the magnitude 
of the fundamental measure must, therefore, consist merely in the 
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immediate grasp which we can get of it in intuition, and the use to 
which our imagination can put 
this in presenting the numerical concepts: i.e., all estimation of the 
magnitude of objects of nature is in the last resort aesthetic (i.e., 
subjectively and not objectively determined). 
Now for the mathematical estimation of magnitude there is, of 
course, 
no greatest possible (for the power of numbers extends to infinity), 
but 
for the aesthetic estimation there certainly is and of it I say that 
where 
it is considered an absolute measure beyond which no greater is 
possible 
subjectively (i.e., for the judging subject), it then conveys the idea 
of the sublime and calls forth that emotion which no mathematical 
estimation 
of magnitudes by numbers can evoke (unless in so far as the 
fundamental 
aesthetic measure is kept vividly present to the imagination): 
because 
the latter presents only the relative magnitude due to comparison 
with 
others of a like kind, whereas the former presents magnitude 
absolutely, 
so far as the mind can grasp it in an intuition. To take in a quantum 
intuitively in the imagination so as to be able to use it as a measure, 
or unit for estimating magnitude by numbers, involves two 
operations of 
this faculty: apprehension (apprehensio) and comprehension 
(comprehension 
aesthetica). Apprehension presents no difficulty: for this process 
can be carried on ad infinitum; but with the advance of 
apprehension comprehension becomes more difficult at every step 
and soon attains its maximum, and 
this is the aesthetically greatest fundamental measure for the 
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estimation 
of magnitude. For if the apprehension has reached a point beyond 
which 
the representations of sensuous intuition in the case of the parts 
first 
apprehended begin to disappear from the imagination as this 
advances to 
the apprehension of yet others, as much, then, is lost at one end as 
is 
gained at the other, and for comprehension we get a maximum 
which the 
imagination cannot exceed. 
This explains Savary’s observations in his account of Egypt, that 
in order to get the full emotional effect of the size of the Pyramids 
we must avoid coming too near just as much as remaining too far 
away. 
For in the latter case the representation of the apprehended parts 
(the 
tiers of stones) is but obscure, and produces no effect upon the 
aesthetic 
judgment of the Subject. In the former, however, it takes the eye 
some 
time to complete the apprehension from the base to the summit; 
but in 
this interval the first tiers always in part disappear before the 
imagination 
has taken in the last, and so the comprehension is never complete. 
The 
same explanation may also sufficiently account for the 
bewilderment, or 
sort of perplexity, which, as is said, seizes the visitor on first 
entering 
St. Peter’s in Rome. For here a feeling comes home to him of the 
inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the idea of a whole 
within 
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which that imagination attains its maximum, and, in its fruitless 
efforts 
to extend this limit, recoils upon itself, but in so doing succumbs to 
an emotional delight. 
At present I am not disposed to deal with the ground of this 
delight, 
connected, as it is, with a representation in which we would least of 
all look for it — a representation, namely, that lets us see its 
own inadequacy, and consequently its subjective want of 
purposiveness 
for our judgment in the estimation of magnitude — but confine 
myself 
to the remark that if the aesthetic judgment is to be pure (unmixed 
with 
any teleological judgment which, as such, belongs to reason), and if 
we are to give a suitable example of it for the critique of aesthetic 
judgment, we must not point to the sublime in works of art, e.g., 
buildings, 
statues and the like, where a human end determines the form as 
well as 
the magnitude, nor yet in things of nature, that in their very concept 
import a definite end, e.g., animals of a recognized natural order, but 
in rude nature merely as involving magnitude (and only in this so far 
as it does not convey any charm or any emotion arising from actual 
danger). 
For, in a representation of this kind, nature contains nothing 
monstrous 
(nor what is either magnificent or horrible) — the magnitude 
apprehended 
may be increased to any extent provided imagination is able to grasp 
it 
all in one whole. An object is monstrous where by its size it defeats 
the end that forms its concept. The colossal is the mere 
presentation 
of a concept which is almost too great for presentation, i.e., borders 
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on the relatively monstrous; for the end to be attained by the 
presentation 
of a concept is made harder to realize by the intuition of the object 
being almost too great for our faculty of apprehension. A pure 
judgment 
upon the sublime must, however, have no end belonging to the 
object as 
its determining ground, if it is to be aesthetic and not to be tainted 
with any judgment of understanding or reason. 
Since whatever is to be a source of pleasure, apart from interest, 
to 
the merely reflective judgment must involve in its representation 
subjective, 
and, as such, universally valid purposiveness — though here, 
however, 
no purposiveness of the form of the object underlies our estimate of 
it 
(as it does in the case of the beautiful) — the question arises: 
What is the subjective purposiveness, and what enables it to be 
prescribed 
as a norm so as to yield a ground for universally valid delight in the 
mere estimation of magnitude, and that, too, in a case where it is 
pushed 
to the point at which faculty of imagination breaks down in 
presenting 
the concept of a magnitude, and proves unequal to its task? 
In the successive aggregation of units requisite for the 
representation 
of magnitudes, the imagination of itself advances ad infinitum 
without 
let or hindrance — understanding, however, conducting it by means 
of concepts of number for which the former must supply the 
schema. This 
procedure belongs to the logical estimation of magnitude, and, as 
such, 
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is doubtless something objectively purposive according to the 
concept 
of an end (as all measurement is), but it is hot anything which for the 
aesthetic judgment is purposive or pleasing. Further, in this 
intentional 
purposiveness there is nothing compelling us to tax the utmost 
powers 
of the imagination, and drive it as far as ever it can reach in its 
presentations, 
so as to enlarge the size of the measure, and thus make the single 
intuition 
holding the many in one (the comprehension) as great as possible. 
For, 
in the estimation of magnitude by the understanding (arithmetic), 
we get 
just as far, whether the comprehension of the units is pushed to the 
number 
10 (as in the decimal scale) or only to 4 (as in the quaternary); the 
further production of magnitude being carried out by the successive 
aggregation 
of units, or, if the quantum is given in intuition, by apprehension, 
merely 
progressively (not comprehensively), according to an adopted 
principle 
of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magnitude, 
understanding 
is as well served and as satisfied whether imagination selects for the 
unit a magnitude which one can take in at a glance, e.g., a foot, or a 
perch, or else a German mile, or even the earth’s diameter, the 
apprehension 
of which is indeed possible, but not its comprehension in, sit 
intuition 
of the imagination (i.e., it is not possible by means of a 
comprehension 
aesthetica, thought quite so by means of a comprehension logica in 
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a numerical 
concept). In each case the logical estimation of magnitude advances 
ad 
infinitum with nothing to stop it. 
The mind, however, hearkens now to the voice of reason, which 
for all 
given magnitudes — even for those which can never be completely 
apprehended, 
though (in sensuous representation) estimated as completely given 
— 
requires totality, and consequently comprehension in one intuition, 
and 
which calls for a presentation answering to all the above members 
of a 
progressively increasing numerical series, and does not exempt 
even the 
infinite (space and time past) from this requirement, but rather 
renders 
it inevitable for us to regard this infinite (in the judgment of 
common 
reason) as completely given (i.e., given in its totality). 
But the infinite is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great. In 
comparison with this all else (in the way of magnitudes of the same 
order) 
is small. But the point of capital importance is that the mere ability 
even to think it as a whole indicates a faculty of mind transcending 
every 
standard of sense. For the latter would entail a comprehension 
yielding 
as unit a standard bearing to the infinite ratio expressible in 
numbers, 
which is impossible. Still the mere ability even to think the given 
infinite 
without contradiction, is something that requires the presence in 
the 
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human mind of a faculty that is itself supersensible. For it is only 
through 
this faculty and its idea of a noumenon, which latter, while not itself 
admitting of any intuition, is yet introduced as substrate underlying 
the intuition of the world as mere phenomenon, that the infinite of 
the 
world of sense, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, is 
completely 
comprehended under a concept, although in the mathematical 
estimation 
by means of numerical concepts it can never be completely thought. 
Even 
a faculty enabling the infinite of supersensible intuition to be 
regarded 
as given (in its intelligible substrate), transcends every standard of 
sensibility and is great beyond all comparison even with the faculty 
of 
mathematical estimation: not, of course, from a theoretical point of 
view 
that looks to the interests of our faculty of knowledge, but as a 
broadening 
of the mind that from another (the practical) point of view feels itself 
empowered to pass beyond the narrow confines of sensibility. 
Nature, therefore, is sublime in such of its phenomena as in their 
intuition 
convey the idea of their infinity. But this can only occur through the 
inadequacy of even the greatest effort of our imagination in the 
estimation 
of the magnitude of an object. But, now, in the case of the 
mathematical 
estimation of magnitude, imagination is quite competent to supply 
a measure 
equal to the requirements of any object. For the numerical concepts 
of 
the understanding can by progressive synthesis make any measure 
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adequate 
to any given magnitude. Hence it must be the aesthetic estimation 
of magnitude 
in which we get at once a feeling of the effort towards a 
comprehension 
that exceeds the faculty of imagination for mentally grasping the 
progressive 
apprehension in a whole of intuition, and, with it, a perception of 
the 
inadequacy of this faculty, which has no bounds to its progress, for 
taking 
in and using for the estimation of magnitude a fundamental measure 
that 
understanding could turn to account without the least trouble. Now 
the 
proper unchangeable fundamental measure of nature is its absolute 
whole, 
which, with it, regarded as a phenomenon, means infinity 
comprehended. 
But, since this fundamental measure is a self-contradictory concept 
(owing 
to the impossibility of the absolute totality of an endless 
progression), 
it follows that where the size of a natural object is such that the 
imagination 
spends its whole faculty of comprehension upon it in vain, it must 
carry 
our concept of nature, to a supersensible substrate (underlying both 
nature 
and our faculty of thought). which is, great beyond every standard 
of 
sense. Thus, instead of the object, it is rather the cast of the mind 
in appreciating it that we have to estimate as sublime. 
Therefore, just as the aesthetic judgment in its estimate of the 
beautiful 
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refers the imagination in its free play to the understanding, to bring 
out its agreement with the concepts of the latter in general (apart 
from 
their determination): so in its estimate of a thing as sublime it refers 
that faculty to reason to bring out its subjective accord with ideas of 
reason (indeterminately indicated), i.e., to induce a temper of mind 
conformable 
— to that which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would 
produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it. 
This makes it evident that true sublimity must be sought only in 
the 
mind of the judging subject, and not in the object of nature that 
occasions 
this attitude by the estimate formed of it. Who would apply the term 
“sublime” 
even to shapeless mountain masses towering one above the other in 
wild 
disorder, with their pyramids of ice, or to the dark tempestuous 
ocean, 
or such like things? But in the contemplation of them, without any 
regard 
to their form, the mind abandons itself to the imagination and to a 
reason 
placed, though quite apart from any definite end, in conjunction 
therewith, 
and merely broadening its view, and it feels itself elevated in its own 
estimate of itself on finding all the might of imagination still unequal 
to its ideas. 
We get examples of the mathematically sublime of nature in mere 
intuition 
in all those instances where our imagination is afforded, not so 
much 
a greater numerical concept as a large unit as measure (for 
shortening 
the numerical series). A tree judged by the height of man gives, at all 
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events, a standard for a mountain; and, supposing this is, say, a mile 
high, it can serve as unit for the number expressing the earth’s 
diameter, so as to make it intuitable; similarly the earth’s diameter 
for the known planetary system; this again for the system of the 
Milky 
Way; and the immeasurable host of such systems, which go by the 
name of 
nebulae, and most likely in turn themselves form such a system, 
holds 
out no prospect of a limit. Now in the aesthetic estimate of such an 
immeasurable 
whole, the sublime does not lie so much in the greatness of the 
number, 
as in the fact that in our onward advance we always arrive at 
proportionately 
greater units. The systematic division of the cosmos conduces to 
this 
result. For it represents all that is great in nature as in turn 
becoming 
little; or, to be more exact, it represents our imagination in all its 
boundlessness, and with it nature, as sinking into insignificance 
before 
the ideas of reason, once their adequate presentation is attempted. 
§ 27. Quality of the delight in our estimate of the sublime. 
The feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea that is a law for 
us, is respect. Now the idea of the comprehension of any 
phenomenon whatever, 
that may be given us, in a whole of intuition, is an idea imposed upon 
us by a law of reason, which recognizes no definite, universally valid 
and unchangeable measure except the absolute whole. But our 
imagination, 
even when taxing itself to the uttermost on the score of this 
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required 
comprehension of a given object in a whole of intuition (and so with 
a 
view to the presentation of the idea of reason), betrays its limits and 
its inadequacy, but still, at the same time, its proper vocation of 
making 
itself adequate to the same as law. Therefore the feeling of the 
sublime 
in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute to an 
object 
of nature by a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the 
object 
in place of one for the idea of humanity in our own self — the 
subject); 
and this feeling renders, as it were, intuitable the supremacy of our 
cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest faculty of 
sensibility. 
The feeling of the sublime is, therefore, at once a feeling of 
displeasure, 
arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic 
estimation 
of magnitude to attain to its estimation by reason, and a 
simultaneously 
awakened pleasure, arising from this very judgment of the 
inadequacy 
of the greatest faculty of sense being in accord with ideas of reason, 
so far as the effort to attain to these is for us a law. It is, in other 
words, for us a law (of reason), which goes to make us what we are, 
that 
we should esteem as small in comparison with ideas of reason 
everything 
which for us is great in nature as an object of sense; and that which 
makes us alive to the feeling of this supersensible side of our being 
harmonizes with that law. Now the greatest effort of the 
imagination in 
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the presentation of the unit for the estimation of magnitude involves 
in itself a reference to something absolutely great, consequently a 
reference 
also to the law of reason that this alone is to be adopted as the 
supreme 
measure of what is great. Therefore the inner perception of the 
inadequacy 
of every standard of sense to serve for the rational estimation of 
magnitude 
is a coming into accord with reason’s laws, and a displeasure that 
makes us alive to the feeling of the supersensible side of our being, 
according to which it is purposive, and consequently a pleasure, to 
find 
every standard of sensibility falling short of the ideas of reason. 
The mind feels itself set in motion in the representation of the 
sublime 
in nature; whereas in the aesthetic judgment upon what is beautiful 
therein 
it is in restful contemplation. This movement, especially in its 
inception, 
may be compared with vibration, i.e., with a rapidly alternating 
repulsion 
and attraction produced by one and the same object. The point of 
excess 
for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension 
of 
the intuition) is like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself, yet 
again for the rational idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, 
but conformable to law, and directed to drawing out such an effort 
on 
the part of the imagination: and so in turn as much a source of 
attraction 
as it was repellent to mere sensibility. But the judgment itself all 
the while steadfastly preserves its aesthetic character, because it 
represents, 
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without being grounded on any definite concept of the object, 
merely the 
subjective play of the mental powers (imagination and reason) as 
harmonious 
by virtue of their very contrast. For just as in the estimate of the 
beautiful 
imagination and understanding by their concert generate subjective 
purposiveness of the mental faculties, so imagination and reason do 
so here by their conflict — that is to say they induce a feeling of our 
possessing 
a pure and self-sufficient reason, or a faculty for the estimation of 
magnitude, whose preeminence can only be made intuitively 
evident by the 
inadequacy of that faculty which in the presentation of magnitudes 
(of 
objects of sense) is itself unbounded. 
Measurement of a space (as apprehension) is at the same time a 
description 
of it, and so an objective movement in the imagination and a 
progression. 
On the other hand, the comprehension of the manifold in the unity, 
not 
of thought, but of intuition, and consequently the comprehension of 
the 
successively apprehended parts at one glance, is a retrogression 
that 
removes the time — condition in the progression of the imagination, 
and renders coexistence intuitable. Therefore, since the time — 
series 
is a condition of the internal sense and of an intuition, it is a 
subjective 
movement of the imagination by which it does violence to the 
internal 
sense — a violence which must be proportionately more striking the 
greater the quantum which the imagination comprehends in one 
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intuition. 
The effort, therefore, to receive in a single intuition a measure for 
magnitudes which it takes an appreciable time to apprehend, is a 
mode 
of representation which, subjectively considered, is contra-
puposive, 
but objectively, is requisite for the estimation of magnitude, and is 
consequently purposive. Here the very same violence that is 
wrought on 
the subject through the imagination is estimated as purposive for 
the 
whole province of the mind. 
The quality of the feeling of the sublime consists in being, in 
respect 
of the faculty of forming aesthetic estimates, a feeling of displeasure 
at an object, which yet, at the same time, is represented as being 
purposive 
— a representation which derives its possibility from the fact that 
the subject’s very incapacity betrays the consciousness of an 
unlimited 
faculty of the same subject, and that the mind can only form an 
aesthetic 
estimate of the latter faculty by means of that incapacity. 
In the case of the logical estimation of magnitude, the 
impossibility 
of ever arriving at absolute totality by the progressive measurement 
of 
things of the sensible world in time and space was cognized as an 
objective 
impossibility, i.e., one of thinking the infinite as given, and not as 
simply subjective, i.e., an incapacity for grasping it; for nothing turns 
there on the amount of the comprehension in one intuition, as 
measure, 
but everything depends on a numerical concept. But in an aesthetic 
estimation 
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of magnitude the numerical concept must drop out of count or 
undergo a 
change. The only thing that is purposive for such estimation is the 
comprehension 
on the part of imagination in respect of the unit of measure (the 
concept 
of a law of the successive production of the concept of magnitude 
being 
consequently avoided). If, now, a magnitude begins to tax the 
utmost stretch 
of our faculty of comprehension in an intuition, and still numerical 
magnitudes 
— in respect of which we are conscious of the boundlessness of our 
faculty — call upon the imagination for aesthetic comprehension in 
a greater unit, the mind then gets a feeling of being aesthetically 
confined 
within bounds. Nevertheless, with a view to the extension of 
imagination 
necessary for adequacy with what is unbounded in our faculty of 
reason, 
namely the idea of the absolute whole, the attendant displeasure, 
and, 
consequently, the want of purposiveness in our faculty of 
imagination, 
is still represented as purposive for ideas of reason and their 
animation. 
But in this very way the aesthetic judgment itself is subjectively 
purposive 
for reason as source of ideas, i.e., of such an intellectual 
comprehension 
as makes all aesthetic comprehension small, and the object is 
received 
as sublime with a pleasure that is only possible through the 
mediation 
of a displeasure. 
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B. THE DYNAMICALLY SUBLIME IN 
NATURE. 
§ 28. Nature as Might. 
Might is a power which is superior to great hindrances. It is termed 
dominion if it is also superior to the resistance of that which itself 
possesses might. Nature, considered in an aesthetic judgment as 
might 
that has no dominion over us, is dynamically sublime. 
If we are to estimate nature as dynamically sublime, it must be 
represented 
as a source of fear (though the converse, that every object that is a 
source of fear, in our aesthetic judgment, sublime, does not hold). 
For 
in forming an aesthetic estimate (no concept being present) the 
superiority 
to hindrances can only be estimated according to the greatness of 
the 
resistance. Now that which we strive to resist is an evil, and, if we 
do not find our powers commensurate to the task, an object of fear. 
Hence 
the aesthetic judgment can only deem nature a might, and so 
dynamically 
sublime, in so far as it is looked upon as an object of fear. 
But we may look upon an object as fearful, and yet not be afraid of 
it, if, that is, our estimate takes the form of our simply picturing to 
ourselves the case of our wishing to offer some resistance to it and 
recognizing 
that all such resistance would be quite futile. So the righteous man 
Kant - from The Critique of Judgement  |  305
fears 
God without being afraid of Him, because he regards the case of his 
wishing 
to resist God and His commandments as one which need cause him 
no anxiety. 
But in every such case, regarded by him as not intrinsically 
impossible, 
he cognizes Him as One to be feared. 
One who is in a state of fear can no more play the part of a judge 
of 
the sublime of nature than one captivated by inclination and 
appetite 
can of the beautiful. He flees from the sight of an object filling him 
with dread; and it is impossible to take delight in terror that is 
seriously 
entertained. Hence the agreeableness arising from the cessation of 
an 
uneasiness is a state of joy. But this, depending upon deliverance 
from 
a danger, is a rejoicing accompanied with a resolve never again to 
put 
oneself in the way of the danger: in fact we do not like bringing back 
to mind how we felt on that occasion not to speak of going in search 
of 
an opportunity for experiencing it again. 
Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks, 
thunderclouds 
piled up the vault of heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, 
volcanos 
in all their violence of destruction, hurricanes leaving desolation in 
their track, the boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, the 
high 
waterfall of some mighty river, and the like, make our power of 
resistance 
of trifling moment in comparison with their might. But, provided 
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our own 
position is secure, their aspect is all the more attractive for its 
fearfulness; 
and we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the 
forces 
of the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace, and discover 
within 
us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us 
courage 
to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence 
of nature. 
In the immeasurableness of nature and the incompetence of our 
faculty 
for adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of 
the 
magnitude of its realm, we found our own limitation. But with this 
we 
also found in our rational faculty another non — sensuous standard, 
one which has that infinity itself under it as a unit, and in 
comparison 
with which everything in nature is small, and so found in our minds 
a 
pre-eminence over nature even in it immeasurability. Now in just 
the same 
way the irresistibility of the might of nature forces upon us the 
recognition 
of our physical helplessness as beings of nature, but at the same 
time 
reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as independent of nature, 
and 
discovers a pre — eminence above nature that is the foundation of 
a self-preservation of quite another kind from that which may be 
assailed 
and brought into danger by external nature. This saves humanity in 
our 
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own person from humiliation, even though as mortal men we have 
to submit 
to external violence. In this way, external nature is not estimated in 
our aesthetic judgment as sublime so far as exciting fear, but rather 
because it challenges our power (one not of nature) to regard as 
small 
those things of which we are wont to be solicitous (worldly goods, 
health, 
and life), and hence to regard its might (to which in these matters 
we 
are no doubt subject) as exercising over us and our personality no 
such 
rude dominion that we should bow down before it, once the 
question becomes 
one of our highest principles and of our asserting or forsaking them. 
Therefore nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the 
imagination 
to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself 
sensible 
of the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, even 
above 
nature. 
This estimation of ourselves loses nothing by the fact that we 
must 
see ourselves safe in order to feel this soul — stirring delight 
— a fact from which it might be plausibly argued that, as there is 
no seriousness in the danger, so there is just as little seriousness in 
the sublimity of our faculty of soul. For here the delight only 
concerns 
the province of our faculty disclosed in such a case, so far as this 
faculty 
has its root in our nature; notwithstanding that its development and 
exercise 
is left to ourselves and remains an obligation. Here indeed there is 
truth 
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— no matter how conscious a man, when he stretches his reflection 
so far abroad, may be of his actual present helplessness. 
This principle has, doubtless, the appearance of being too far-
fetched 
and subtle, and so of lying beyond the reach of an aesthetic 
judgment. 
But observation of men proves the reverse, and that it may be the 
foundation 
of the commonest judgments, although one is not always conscious 
of its 
presence. For what is it that, even to the savage, is the object of the 
greatest admiration? It is a man who is undaunted, who knows no 
fear, 
and who, therefore, does not give way to danger, but sets manfully 
to 
work with full deliberation. Even where civilization has reached a 
high 
pitch, there remains this special reverence for the soldier; only that 
there is then further required of him that he should also exhibit all 
the virtues of peace — gentleness, sympathy, and even becoming 
thought 
for his own person; and for the reason that in this we recognize that 
his mind is above the threats of danger. And so, comparing the 
statesman 
and the general, men may argue as they please as to the pre-
eminent respect 
which is due to either above the other; but the verdict of the 
aesthetic 
judgment is for the latter. War itself, provided it is conducted with 
order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has something 
sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a manner 
a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the 
dangers to 
which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with 
fortitude. 
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On the other hand, a prolonged peace favors the predominance of a 
mere 
commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, 
and 
effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character of the nation. 
So far as sublimity is predicated of might, this solution of the 
concept 
of it appears at variance with the fact that we are wont to represent 
God in the tempest, the storm, the earthquake, and the like, as 
presenting 
Himself in His wrath, but at the same time also in His sublimity, and 
yet here it would be alike folly and presumption to imagine a pre-
eminence 
of our minds over the operations and, as it appears, even over the 
direction 
of such might. Here, instead of a feeling of the sublimity of our own 
nature, submission, prostration, Aristotle’s remarks on Courage, 
in the utter helplessness seem more to constitute the attitude of 
mind 
befitting the manifestation of such an object, and to be that also 
more 
customarily associated with the idea of it on the occasion of a 
natural 
phenomenon of this kind. In religion, as a rule, prostration, 
adoration 
with bowed head, coupled with contrite, timorous posture and 
voice, seems 
to be the only becoming demeanour in presence of the Godhead, 
and accordingly 
most nations have assumed and still observe it. Yet this cast of mind 
is far from being intrinsically and necessarily involved in the idea of 
the sublimily of a religion and of its object. The man that is actually 
in a state of fear, finding in himself good reason to be so, because he 
is conscious of offending with his evil disposition against a might 
directed 
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by a will at once irresistible and just, is far from being in the frame 
of mind for admiring divine greatness, for which a temper of calm 
reflection 
and a quite free judgment are required. Only when he becomes 
conscious 
of having a disposition that is upright and acceptable to God, do 
those 
operations of might serve, to stir within him the idea of the 
sublimity 
of this Being, so far as he recognizes the existence in himself of a 
sublimity 
of disposition consonant with His will, and is thus raised above the 
dread 
of such operations of nature, in which he no longer sees God 
pouring forth 
the vials of the wrath. Even humility, taking the form of an 
uncompromising 
judgment upon his shortcomings, which, with consciousness of 
good intentions, 
might readily be glossed over on the ground of the frailty of human 
nature, 
is a sublime temper of the mind voluntarily to undergo the pain of 
remorse 
as a means of more and more effectually eradicating its cause. In 
this 
way religion is intrinsically distinguished from superstition, which 
latter 
rears in the mind, not reverence for the sublime, but dread and 
apprehension 
of the all-powerful Being to whose will terror-stricken man sees 
himself 
subjected, yet without according Him due honor. From this nothing 
can 
arise but grace-begging and vain adulation, instead of a religion 
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consisting 
in a good life. 
Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, 
but only in our own mind, in so far as we may become conscious of 
our 
superiority over nature within, and thus also over nature without us 
(as 
exerting influence upon us). Everything that provokes this feeling in 
us, including the might of nature which challenges our strength, is 
then, 
though improperly, called sublime, and it is only under 
presupposition 
of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we are capable of 
attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that Being Which inspires 
deep 
respect in us, not by the mere display of its might in nature, but 
more 
by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might 
without 
fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above it. 
§ 29. Modality of the judgment on the sublime in nature. 
Beautiful nature contains countless things as to which we at once 
take 
every one as in their judgment concurring with our own, and as to 
which 
we may further expect this concurrence without facts finding us far 
astray. 
But in respect of our judgment upon the sublime in nature, we 
cannot 
so easily vouch for ready acceptance by others. For a far higher 
degree 
of culture, not merely of the aesthetic judgment, but also of the 
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faculties 
of cognition which lie at its basis, seems to be requisite to enable us 
to lay down a judgment upon this high distinction of natural objects. 
The proper mental mood for a feeling of the sublime postulates 
the 
mind’s susceptibility for ideas, since it is precisely in the failure 
of nature to attain to these — and consequently only under 
presupposition 
of this susceptibility and of the straining of the imagination to use 
nature as a schema for ideas — that there is something forbidding 
to sensibility, but which, for all that, has an attraction for us, arising 
from the fact of its being a dominion which reason exercises over 
sensibility 
with a view to extending it to the requirements of its own realm (the 
practical) and letting it look out beyond itself into the infinite, 
which for it is an abyss. In fact, without the development of moral 
ideas, that which, thanks to preparatory culture, we call sublime, 
merely 
strikes the untutored man as terrifying. He will see in the evidences 
which the ravages of nature give of her dominion, and in the vast 
scale 
of her might, compared with which his own is diminished to 
insignificance, 
only the misery, peril, and distress that would compass the man who 
was thrown to its mercy. So the decent, and, for the most part, 
intelligent, 
Savoyard peasant, (as Herr von Sassure relates), unhesitatingly 
called 
anyone who loves snowy mountains a fool. And who can tell whether 
he 
would have been so wide of the mark, if that student of nature had 
taken 
the risk of the dangers to which he exposed himself merely, as most 
travellers do, for a fad, or so as some day to be able to give a thrilling 
account of his adventures? But the mind of Sassure was bent on the 
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instruction 
of mankind, and soul-stirring sensations that excellent man indeed 
had, 
and the reader of his travels got them thrown into the bargain. 
But the fact that culture is requisite for the judgment upon the 
sublime 
in nature (more than for that upon the beautiful) does not involve its 
being an original product of culture and something introduced in a 
more 
or less conventional way into society. Rather is it in human nature 
that 
its foundations are laid, and, in fact, in that which, at once with 
common 
understanding, we may expect every one to possess and may 
require of him, 
namely, a native capacity for the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., 
for moral feeling. 
This, now, is the foundation of the necessity of that agreement 
between 
other men’s judgments upon the sublime and our own, which we 
make 
our own imply. For just as we taunt a man who is quite 
inappreciative 
when forming an estimate of an object of nature in which we see 
beauty, 
with want of taste, so we say of a man who remains unaffected in 
the presence 
of what we consider sublime, that he has no feeling. But we demand 
both 
taste and feeling of every man, and, granted some degree of culture, 
we 
give him credit for both. Still, we do so with this difference: that, 
in the, case of the former, since judgment there refers the 
imagination 
merely to the understanding, as a the faculty of concepts, we make 
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the 
requirement as a matter of course, whereas in the case of the latter, 
since here the judgment refers the imagination to reason, as a 
faculty 
of ideas, we do so only under a subjective presupposition (which, 
however, 
we believe we are warranted in making), namely, that of the moral 
feeling 
in man. And, on this assumption, we attribute necessity to the latter 
aesthetic judgment also. 
In this modality of aesthetic judgments, namely, their assumed 
necessity, 
lies what is for the Critique of judgment a moment of capital 
importance. 
For this is exactly what makes an a priori principle apparent in 
their case, and lifts them out of the sphere of empirical psychology, 
in which otherwise they would remain buried amid the feelings of 
gratification 
and pain (only with the senseless epithet of finer feeling), so as to 
place them, and, thanks to them, to place the faculty of judgment 
itself, 
in the class of judgments of which the basis of an a priori principle 
is the distinguishing feature, and, thus distinguished, to introduce 
them 
into transcendental philosophy. 
General Remark upon the Exposition of 
Aesthetic Reflective Judgments. 
In relation to the feeling of pleasure an object is to be counted either 
as agreeable, or beautiful, or sublime, or good (absolutely), 
(incundum, 
pulchrum, sublime, honestum). 
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As the motive of desires the agreeable is invariably of one and the 
same kind, no matter what its source or how specifically different 
the 
representation (of sense and sensation objectively considered). 
Hence 
in estimating its influence upon the mind, the multitude of its 
charms 
(simultaneous or successive) is alone revelant, and so only, as it 
were, 
the mass of the agreeable sensation, and it is only by the quantity, 
therefore, 
that this can be made intelligible. Further it in no way conduces to 
our 
culture, but belongs only to mere enjoyment. The beautiful, on the 
other 
hand, requires the representation of a certain quality of the object, 
that permits also of being understood and reduced to concepts 
(although 
in the aesthetic judgment it is not reduced), and it cultivates, as it 
instructs us to attend to, purposiveness in the feeling of pleasure. 
The 
sublime consists merely in the relation exhibited by the estimate of 
the 
serviceability of the sensible in the representation of nature for a 
possible 
supersensible employment. The absolutely good, estimated 
subjectively 
according to the feeling it inspires (the object of the moral feeling), 
as the determinability of the powers of the subject by means of the 
representation 
of an absolutely necessitating law, is principally distinguished, by 
the 
modality of a necessity resting upon concepts a priori, and involving 
not a mere claim, but a command upon every one to assent, and 
belongs 
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intrinsically not to the aesthetic, but to the pure intellectual 
judgment. 
Further, it is not ascribed to nature but to freedom, and that in a 
determinant 
and not a merely reflective judgment. But the determinability of the 
subject by means of this idea, and, what is more, that of a subject 
which 
can be sensible, in the way of a modification of its state, to 
hindrances 
on the part of sensibility, while, at the same time, it can by 
surmounting 
them feel superiority over them — a determinability, in other words, 
as moral feeling — is still so allied to aesthetic judgment and 
its formal conditions as to be capable of being pressed into the 
service 
of the aesthetic representation of the conformity to law of action 
from 
duty, i.e., of the representation of this as sublime, or even as 
beautiful, 
without forfeiting its purity — an impossible result were one to 
make it naturally bound up with the feeling of the agreeable. 
The net result to be extracted from the exposition so far given of 
both 
kinds of aesthetic judgments may be summed up in the following 
brief 
definitions: 
The beautiful is what pleases in the mere estimate formed of it 
(consequently 
not by intervention of any feeling of sense in accordance with a 
concept 
of the understanding). From this it follows at once that it must 
please 
apart from all interest. 
The sublime is what pleases immediately by reason of its 
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opposition 
to the interest of sense. 
Both, as definitions of aesthetic universally valid estimates, have 
reference to subjective grounds. In the one case the reference is to 
grounds 
of sensibility, in so far as these are purposive on behalf of the 
contemplative 
understanding, in the other case in so far as, in their opposition to 
sensibility, they are, on the contrary, purposive in reference to the 
ends of practical reason. Both, however, as united in the same 
subject, 
are purposive in reference to the moral feeling. The beautiful 
prepares 
us to love something, even nature, apart from any interest: the 
sublime 
to esteem something highly even in opposition to our (sensible) 
interest. 
The sublime may be described in this way: it is an object (of 
nature) 
the representation of which determines the mind to regard the 
elevation 
of nature beyond our reach as equivalent to a presentation of ideas. 
In a literal sense and according to their logical import, ideas 
cannot 
be presented. But if we enlarge our empirical faculty of 
representation 
(mathematical or dynamical) with a view to the intuition of nature, 
reason 
inevitably steps forward, as the faculty concerned with the 
independence 
of the absolute totality, and calls forth the effort of the mind, 
unavailing 
though it be, to make representation of sense adequate to this 
totality. 
This effort, and the feeling of the unattainability of the idea by 
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means 
of imagination, is itself a presentation of the subjective 
purposiveness 
of our mind in the employment of the imagination in the interests of 
the 
mind’s supersensible province, and compels us subjectively to think 
nature itself in its totality as a presentation of something 
supersensible, 
without our being able to effectuate this presentation objectively. 
For we readily see that nature in space and time falls entirely 
short 
of the unconditioned, consequently also of the absolutely great, 
which 
still the commonest reason demands. And by this we are also 
reminded that 
we have only to do with nature as phenomenon, and that this itself 
must 
be regarded as the mere presentation of a nature-in-itself (which 
exists 
in the idea of reason). But this idea of the supersensible, which no 
doubt 
we cannot further determine so that we cannot cognize nature as 
its presentation, but only think it as such — is awakened in us by an 
object the aesthetic estimating of which strains the imagination to 
its utmost, whether in 
respect of its extension (mathematical), or of its might over the mind 
(dynamical). For it is founded upon the feeling of a sphere of the 
mind 
which altogether exceeds the realm of nature (i.e., upon the moral 
feeling), 
with regard to which the representation of the object is estimated 
as 
subjectively purposive. 
As a matter of fact, a feeling for the sublime in nature is hardly 
thinkable 
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unless in association with an attitude of mind resembling the moral. 
And 
though, like that feeling, the immediate pleasure in the beautiful in 
nature presupposes and cultivates a certain liberality of thought, 
i.e., 
makes our delight independent of any mere enjoyment of sense, still 
it 
represents freedom rather as in play than as exercising a law — 
ordained 
function, which is the genuine characteristic of human morality, 
where 
reason has to impose its dominion upon sensibility. There is, 
however, 
this qualification, that in the aesthetic judgment upon the sublime 
this 
dominion is represented as exercised through the imagination itself 
as 
an instrument of reason. 
Thus, too, delight in the sublime in nature is only negative 
(whereas 
that in the beautiful is positive): that is to say, it is a feeling 
of imagination by its own act depriving itself of its freedom by 
receiving 
a purposive determination in accordance with a law other than that 
of 
its empirical employment. In this way it gains an extension and a 
might 
greater than that which it sacrifices. But the ground of this is 
concealed 
from it, and in its place it feels the sacrifice or deprivation, as 
well as its cause, to which it is subjected. The astonishment 
amounting 
almost to terror, the awe and thrill of devout feeling, that takes hold 
of one when gazing upon the prospect of mountains ascending to 
heaven, 
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deep ravines and torrents raging there, deep shadowed solitudes 
that 
invite to brooding melancholy, and the like — all this, when we 
are assured of our own safety, is not actual fear. Rather is it an 
attempt 
to gain access to it through imagination, for the purpose of feeling 
the might of this faculty in combining the movement of the mind 
thereby 
aroused with its serenity, and of thus being superior to internal and, 
therefore, to external, nature, so far as the latter can have any 
bearing 
upon our feeling of well-being. For the imagination, in accordance 
with 
laws of association, makes our state of contentment dependent 
upon physical 
conditions. But acting in accordance with principles of the 
schematism 
of judgment (consequently so far as it is subordinated to freedom), 
it is at the same time an instrument of reason and its ideas. But in 
this capacity it is a might enabling us to assert our independence as 
against the influences of nature, to degrade what is great in respect 
of the latter to the level of what is little, and thus to locate the 
absolutely great only in the proper estate of the subject. This 
reflection 
of aesthetic judgment by which it raises itself to the point of 
adequacy 
with reason, though without any determinate concept of reason, is 
still 
a representation of the object as subjectively purposive, by virtue 
even of the objective inadequacy of the imagination in its greatest 
extension for meeting the demands of reason (as the faculty of 
ideas). 
Here we have to attend generally to what has been already 
adverted to, 
that in the transcendental aesthetic of judgment there must be no 
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question 
of anything but pure aesthetic judgments. Consequently examples 
are not 
to be selected from such beautiful, or sublime objects as presuppose 
the 
concept of an end. For then the purposiveness would be either 
teleological, 
or based upon mere sensations of an object: (gratification or pain) 
and 
so, in the first case, not aesthetic, and, in the second, not merely 
formal. 
So, if we call the sight of the starry heaven sublime, we must not 
found 
our estimate of it upon any concepts of worlds inhabited by rational 
beings, 
with the bright spots, which we see filling the space above us, as 
their 
suns moving in orbits prescribed for them with the wisest regard to 
ends. 
But we must take it, just as it strikes the eye, as a broad and all-
embracing 
canopy: and it is merely under such a representation that we may 
posit 
the sublimity which the pure aesthetic judgment attributes to this 
object. 
Similarly, as to the prospect of the ocean, we are not to regard it as 
we, with our minds stored with knowledge on a variety of matters 
(which, 
however, is not contained in the immediate intuition), are wont to 
represent 
it in thought, as, let us say, a spacious realm of aquatic creatures, 
or as the mighty reservoirs from which are drawn the vapours that 
fill 
the air with clouds of moisture for the good of the land, or yet as an 
element which no doubt divides continent from continent, but at 
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the same 
time affords the means of the greatest commercial intercourse 
between 
them — for in this way we get nothing beyond teleological 
judgments. 
Instead of this we must be able to see sublimity in the ocean, 
regarding 
it, as the poets do, according to what the impression upon the eye 
reveals, 
as, let us say, in its calm a clear mirror of water bounded only by the 
heavens, or, be it disturbed, as threatening to overwhelm and engulf 
everything. 
The same is to be said of the sublime and beautiful in the human 
form. 
Here, for determining grounds of the judgment, we must not have 
recourse 
to concepts of ends subserved by all: all its and members, or allow 
their 
accordance with these ends to influence our aesthetic judgment (in 
such 
case no longer pure), although it is certainly also a also a necessary 
condition of aesthetic delight that they should not conflict. With 
these 
ends. Aesthetic purposiveness is the conformity to law of judgment 
in 
its freedom. The delight in the object depends on the reference 
which 
we seek to give to the imagination, subject to the proviso that it is 
to entertain the mind in a free activity. If, on the other hand, 
something 
else — be it sensation or concept of the understanding — determines 
the judgment, it is then conformable to law, no doubt, but not an act 
of free judgment. 
Hence to speak of intellectual beauty or sublimity is to use 
expressions 
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which, in the first place, are not quite correct. For these are 
aesthetic 
modes of representation which would be entirely foreign to us were 
we 
merely pure intelligences (or if we even put ourselves in thought in 
the 
position of such). Secondly, although both, as objects of an 
intellectual 
(moral) delight, are compatible with aesthetic delight to the extent 
of 
not resting upon any interest, still, on the other hand, there is a 
difficulty 
in the way of their alliance with such delight, since their function is 
to produce an interest, and, on the assumption that the 
presentation has 
to accord with delight in the aesthetic estimate, this interest could 
only be effected by means of an interest of sense combined with it 
in 
the presentation. But in this way the intellectual purposiveness 
would 
be violated and rendered impure. 
The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual delight is the 
moral 
law in the might which it exerts in us over all antecedent motives of 
the mind. Now, since it is only through sacrifices that this might 
makes 
itself known to us aesthetically (and this involves a deprivation of 
something 
— though in the interest of inner freedom — whilst in turn it 
reveals in us an unfathomable depth of this supersensible faculty, 
the 
consequences of which extend beyond reach of the eye of sense), it 
follows 
that the delight, looked at from the aesthetic side (in reference to 
sensibility) 
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is negative, i.e., opposed to this interest, but from the intellectual 
side, positive and bound up with an interest. Hence it follows that 
the 
intellectual and intrinsically final (moral) good, estimated 
aesthetically, 
instead of being represented as beautiful, must rather be 
represented 
as sublime, with the result that it arouses more a feeling of respect 
(which disdains charm) than of love or of the heart being drawn 
towards 
it — for human nature does not of its own proper motion accord 
with 
the good, but only by virtue of the dominion which reason exercises 
over 
sensibility. Conversely, that, too, which we call sublime in external 
nature, or even internal nature (e.g., certain affections) is only 
represented 
as a might of the mind enabling it to overcome this or that 
hindrance 
of sensibility by means of moral principles, and it is from this that 
it derives its interest. 
I must dwell while on the latter point. The idea of the good to 
which 
affection is superadded is enthusiasm. This state of mind appears to 
be 
sublime: so much so that there is a common saying that nothing 
great can 
be achieved without it. But now every affection8 is blind either as to 
8. There is a specific distinction between affections and 
Passions. Affections are related merely to feeling; 
passions belong to the faculty of desire, and are 
inclinations that hinder or render impossible all 
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the choice of its end, or, supposing this has been furnished by 
reason, 
in the way it is effected for it is that mental movement whereby the 
exercise 
of free deliberation upon fundamental principles, with a view to 
determining 
oneself accordingly, is rendered impossible. On this account it 
cannot 
merit any delight on the part of reason. Yet, from an aesthetic point 
of view, enthusiasm is sublime, because it is an effort of one’s 
powers called forth by ideas which give to the mind an impetus of 
far 
stronger and more enduring efficacy than the stimulus afforded by 
sensible 
representations. But (as seems strange) even freedom from affection 
(apatheia, 
phlegma in significatu bono) in a mind that strenuously follows its 
unswerving 
principles is sublime, and that, too, in a manner vastly superior, 
because 
it has at the same time the delight of pure reason on its side. Such a 
stamp of mind is alone called noble. This expression, however, 
comes in 
determinability of the elective will by principles. 
Affections are impetuous and irresponsible; passions are 
abiding and deliberate. Thus resentment, in the form of 
anger, is an affection: but in the form of hatred 
(vindictiveness) it is a passion. Under no circumstances 
can the latter be called sublime; for, while the freedom 
of the mind is, no doubt, impeded in the case of 
affection, in passion it is abrogated. 
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time to be applied to things — such as buildings, a garment, literary 
style, the carriage of one’s person, and the like — provided they 
do not so much excite astonishment (the affection attending the 
representation of novelty exceeding expectation) as admiration (an 
astonishment which 
does not cease when the novelty wears off) — and this obtains where 
ideas undesignedly and artlessly accord in their presentation with 
aesthetic 
delight. 
Every affection of the STRENUOUS TYPE (such, that is, as excites 
the consciousness of our power of overcoming 
every resistance [animus strenuus]) is aesthetically sublime, e.g., 
anger, 
even desperation (the rage of forlorn hope but not faint-hearted 
despair). 
On the other hand, affection of the LANGUID TYPE (which converts 
the very effort of resistance into an object of displeasure 
[animus languidus] has nothing noble about it, though it may take its 
rank as possessing beauty of the sensuous order. Hence the 
emotions capable 
of attaining the strength of an affection are very diverse. We have 
spirited, 
and we have tender emotions. When the strength of the latter 
reaches that 
of an affection they can be turned to no account. The propensity to 
indulge 
in them is sentimentality. A sympathetic grief that refuses to be 
consoled, 
or one that has to do with imaginary misfortune to which we 
deliberately 
give way so far as to allow our fancy to delude us into thinking it 
actual 
fact, indicates and goes to make a tender, but at the same time weak, 
soul, which shows a beautiful side, and may no doubt be called 
fanciful, 
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but never enthusiastic. Romances, maudlin dramas, shallow 
homilies, which 
trifle with so-called (though falsely so) noble sentiments, but in fact 
make the heart enervated, insensitive to the stem precepts of duty, 
and 
incapable of respect for the worth of humanity in our own person 
and the 
rights of men (which is something quite other than their happiness), 
and 
in general incapable of all firm principles; even a religious discourse 
which recommends a cringing and abject grace-begging and favor-
seeking, 
abandoning all reliance on our own ability to resist the evil within 
us, 
in place of the vigorous resolution to try to get the better of our 
inclinations 
by means of those powers which, miserable sinners though we be, 
are still 
left to us; that false humility by which self-abasement, whining 
hypocritical 
repentance and a merely passive frame of mind are set down as the 
method 
by which alone we can become acceptable to the Supreme Being — 
these 
have neither lot nor fellowship with what may be reckoned to 
belong to 
beauty, not to speak of sublimity, of mental temperament. 
But even impetuous movements of the mind be they allied under 
the name 
of edification with ideas of religion, or, as pertaining merely to 
culture, 
with ideas involving a social interest no matter what tension of the 
imagination 
they may produce, can in no way lay claim to the honor of a sublime 
presentation, 
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if they do not leave behind them a temper of mind which, though it 
be 
only indirectly, has an influence upon the consciousness of the 
mind’s 
strength and resoluteness in respect of that which carries with it 
pure 
intellectual purposiveness (the supersensible). For, in the absence of 
this, all these emotions belong only to motion, which we welcome in 
the 
interests of good health. The agreeable lassitude that follows upon 
being 
stirred up in that way by the play of the affections, is a fruition of 
the state of well-being arising from the restoration of the 
equilibrium 
of the various vital forces within us. This, in the last resort, comes 
to no more than what the Eastern voluptuaries find so soothing 
when they 
get their bodies massaged, and all their muscles and joints softly 
pressed 
and bent; only that in the first case the principle that occasions the 
movement is chiefly internal, whereas here it is entirely external. 
Thus, 
many a man believes himself edified by a sermon in which there is 
no establishment 
of anything (no system of good maxims); or thinks himself improved 
by 
a tragedy, when he is merely glad at having got well rid of the feeling 
of being bored. Thus the sublime must in every case have reference 
to 
our way of thinking, i.e., to maxims directed to giving the intellectual 
side of our nature and the ideas of reason supremacy over 
sensibility. 
We have no reason to fear that the feeling of the sublime will 
suffer 
from an abstract mode of presentation like this, which is altogether 
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negative 
as to what is sensuous. For though the imagination, no doubt, finds 
nothing 
beyond the sensible world to which it can lay hold, still this 
thrusting 
aside of the sensible barriers gives it a feeling of being unbounded; 
and that removal is thus a presentation of the infinite. As such it can 
never be anything more than a negative presentation — but still it 
expands the soul. Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the 
Jewish 
Law than the commandment: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any 
graven 
image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven or on earth, or 
under the earth, etc.” This commandment can alone explain the 
enthusiasm 
which the Jewish people, in their moral period, felt for their religion 
when comparing themselves with others, or the pride inspired by 
Islam. 
The very same holds good of our representation of the moral law 
and of 
our native capacity for morality. The fear that, if we divest this 
representation 
of everything that can commend it to the senses, it will thereupon 
be 
attended only with a cold and lifeless approbation and not with any 
moving 
force or emotion, is wholly unwarranted. The very reverse is the 
truth. 
For when nothing any longer meets the eye of sense, and the 
unmistakable 
and ineffaceable idea of morality is left in possession of the field, 
there would be need rather of tempering the ardour of an 
unbounded imagination 
to prevent it rising to enthusiasm, than of seeking to lend these 
ideas 
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the aid of images and childish devices for fear of their being wanting 
in potency. For this reason, governments have gladly let religion be 
fully 
equipped with these accessories, seeking in this way to relieve their 
subjects of the exertion, but to deprive them, at the same time, of 
the 
ability, required for expanding their spiritual powers beyond the 
limits 
arbitrarily laid down for them, and which facilitate their being 
treated 
as though they were merely passive. 
This pure, elevating, merely negative presentation of morality 
involves, 
on the other hand, no fear of fanaticism, which is a delusion that 
would 
will some VISION beyond all the bounds of sensibility; i.e., would 
dream 
according to principles (rational raving). The safeguard is the purely 
negative character of the presentation. For the inscrutability of the 
idea of freedom precludes all positive presentation. The moral law, 
however, 
is a sufficient and original source of determination within us: so it 
does not for a moment permit us to cast about for a ground of 
determination 
external to itself. If enthusiasm is comparable to delirium, 
fanaticism 
may be compared to mania. Of these, the latter is least of all 
compatible 
with the sublime, for it is profoundly ridiculous. In enthusiasm, as an 
affection, the imagination is unbridled; in fanaticism, as a deep-
seated, 
brooding passion, it is anomalous. The first is a transitory accident 
to which the healthiest understanding is liable to become at times 
the 
victim; the second is an undermining disease. 
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Simplicity (artless purposiveness) is, as it were, the style adopted 
by nature in the sublime. It is also that of morality. The latter is a 
second (supersensible) nature, whose laws alone we know, without 
being 
able to attain to an intuition of the supersensible faculty within us 
— that which contains the ground of this legislation. 
One further remark. The delight in the sublime, no less than in the 
beautiful, by reason of its universal communicability not alone is 
plainly 
distinguished from other aesthetic judgments, but also from this 
same 
property acquires an interest in society (in which it admits of such 
communication). Yet, despite this, we have to note the fact that 
isolation from all society is looked upon as something sublime, 
provided it rests upon ideas which 
disregard all sensible interest. To be self-sufficing, and so not to 
stand 
in need of society, yet without being unsociable, i.e., without 
shunning 
it, is something approaching the sublime — a remark applicable to 
all superiority to wants. On the other hand, to shun our fellow men 
from 
misanthropy, because of enmity towards them, or from 
anthropophobia, because 
we imagine the hand of every man is against us, is partly odious, 
partly 
contemptible. There is, however, a misanthropy (most improperly 
so-called), 
the tendency towards which is to be found with advancing years in 
many 
right minded men, that, as far as good will goes, is no doubt, 
philanthropic 
enough, but as the result of long and sad experience, is widely 
removed 
from delight in mankind. We see evidences of this in the propensity 
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to 
reclusiveness, in the fanciful desire for a retired country seat, or else 
(with the young) in the dream of the happiness of being able to 
spend 
one’s life with a little family on an island unknown to the rest 
of the world — material of which novelists or writers of 
Robinsonades 
know how to make such good use. Falsehood, ingratitude, injustice, 
the 
puerility of the ends which we ourselves look upon as great and 
momentous, 
and to compass which man inflicts upon his brother man all 
imaginable 
evils — these all so contradict the idea of what men might be if 
they only would, and are so at variance with our active wish to see 
them 
better, that, to avoid hating where we cannot love, it seems but a 
slight 
sacrifice to forego all the joys of fellowship with our kind. This 
sadness, 
which is not directed to the evils which fate brings down upon 
others 
(a sadness which springs from sympathy), but to those which they 
inflict 
upon themselves (one which is based on antipathy in questions of 
principle), 
is sublime because it is founded on ideas, whereas that springing 
from 
sympathy can only be accounted beautiful. Sassure, who was no less 
ingenious 
than profound, in the description of his Alpine travels remarks of 
Bonhomme, 
one of the Savoy mountains: “There reigns there a certain insipid 
sadness.” He recognized, therefore, that, besides this, there is 
an interesting sadness, such as is inspired by the sight of some 
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desolate 
place into which men might fain withdraw themselves so as to hear 
no more 
of the world without, and be no longer versed in its affairs, a place, 
however, which must yet not be so altogether inhospitable as only 
to afford 
a most miserable retreat for a human being. I only make this 
observation 
as a reminder that even melancholy, (but not dispirited sadness), 
may 
take its place among the vigorous affections, provided it has its root 
in moral ideas. If, however, it is grounded upon sympathy, and, as 
such, 
is lovable, it belongs only to the languid affections. And this serves 
to call attention to the mental temperament which in the first case 
alone 
is sublime. 
The transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgments now 
brought 
to a close may be compared with the physiological, as worked out 
by 
Burke and many acute men among us, so that we may see where a 
merely 
empirical exposition of the sublime and beautiful would bring us. 
Burke, 
who deserves to be called the foremost author in this method of 
treatment, 
deduces, on these lines, “that the feeling of the sublime is grounded 
on the impulse towards self — preservation and on fear, i.e., on 
a pain, which, since it does not go the length of disordering the 
bodily 
parts, calls forth movements which, as they clear the vessels, 
whether 
fine or gross, of a dangerous and troublesome encumbrance, are 
capable 
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of producing delight; not pleasure but a sort of delightful horror, 
a sort of tranquility tinged With terror.” The beautiful, which 
he grounds on love (from which, still, he would have desire kept 
separate), 
he reduces to “the relaxing, slackening, and enervating of the 
fibres of the body, and consequently a softening, a dissolving, a 
languor, 
and a fainting, dying, and melting away for pleasure.” And this 
explanation he supports, not alone by instances in which the feeling 
of the beautiful as well as of the sublime is capable of being excited 
in us by the imagination in conjunction with the understanding, but 
even by instances when it is in conjunction with sensations. As 
psychological 
observations, these analyses of our mental phenomena are 
extremely fine, 
and supply a wealth of material for the favorite investigations of 
empirical anthropology. But, besides that, there is no denying the 
fact 
that all representations within us, no matter whether they are 
objectively 
merely sensible or wholly intellectual, are still subjectively 
associable 
with gratification or pain, however imperceptible either of these 
may 
be. (For these representations one and all have an influence on the 
feeling of life, and none of them, so far as it is a modification of 
the subject, can be indifferent.) We must even admit that, as 
Epicurus 
maintained, gratification and pain though proceeding from the 
imagination 
or even from representations of the understanding, are always in 
the 
last resort corporeal, since apart from any feeling of the bodily 
organ 
life would be merely a consciousness of one’s existence, and could 
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not include any feeling of well-being or the reverse, i.e., of the 
furtherance 
or hindrance of the vital forces. For, of itself alone, the mind is 
all life (the life-principle itself), and hindrance or furtherance has 
to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself, consequently in 
the connection with his body. 
But if we attribute the delight in the object wholly and entirely to 
the gratification which it affords through charm or emotion, then 
we must 
not exact from any one else agreement with the aesthetic judgment 
passed 
by us. For, in such matters each person rightly consults his own 
personal 
feeling alone. But in that case there is an end of all censorship of 
taste 
— unless the afforded by others as the result of a contingent 
coincidence 
of their judgments is to be held over us as commanding our assent. 
But 
this principle we would presumably resent, and appeal to our 
natural right 
of submitting a judgment to our own sense, where it rests upon the 
immediate 
feeling of personal well-being, instead of submitting it to that of 
others. 
Hence if the import of the judgment of taste, where we appraise it 
as a judgment entitled to require the concurrence of every one, 
cannot 
be egoistic, but must necessarily, from its inner nature, be allowed a 
pluralistic validity, i.e., on account of what taste itself is, and not 
on account of the examples which others give of their taste, then it 
must 
found upon some a priori principle (be it subjective or objective), 
and no amount of prying into the empirical laws of the changes that 
go 
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on within the mind can succeed in establishing such a principle. For 
these 
laws only yield a knowledge of how we do judge, but they do not give 
us 
a command as to how we ought to judge, and, what is more, such a 
command 
as is unconditioned — and commands of this kind are presupposed 
by 
judgments of taste, inasmuch as they require delight to be taken as 
immediately 
connected with a representation. Accordingly, though the empirical 
exposition 
of aesthetic judgments may be a first step towards accumulating the 
material 
for a higher investigation, yet a transcendental examination of this 
faculty 
is possible, and forms an essential part of the critique of taste. For, 
were not taste in possession of a priori principles, it could not 
possibly sit in judgment upon the judgments of others and pass 
sentence 
of commendation or condemnation upon them, with even the least 
semblance 
of authority. 
The remaining part of the analytic of the aesthetic judgment 
contains 
first of all the: 
 
Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments. 
§ 30. The deduction of aesthetic judgments upon 
objects of nature must not be directed to what we call 
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sublime in nature, 
but only to the beautiful. 
The claim of an aesthetic judgment to universal validity for every 
subject, being a judgment which must rely on some a priori 
principle, 
stands in need of a deduction (i.e., a derivation of its title). Further, 
where the delight or aversion turns on the form of the object this 
has 
to be something over and above the exposition of the judgment. 
Such is 
the case with judgments of taste upon the beautiful in nature. For 
there 
the purposiveness has its foundation in the object and its outward 
form 
— although it does not signify the reference of this to other objects 
according to concepts (for the purpose of cognitive judgments), but 
is 
merely concerned in general with the apprehension of this form so 
far 
as it proves accordant in the mind with the faculty of concepts as 
well 
as with that of their presentation (which is identical with that of 
apprehension). 
With regard to the beautiful in nature, therefore, we may start a 
number 
of questions touching the cause of this purposiveness of their forms 
e.g., 
How we are to explain why nature has scattered beauty abroad with 
so lavish 
a hand even in the depth of the ocean where it can but seldom be 
reached 
by the eye of man — for which this beauty alone is purposive? 
But the sublime in nature — if we pass upon it a pure aesthetic 
judgment unmixed with concepts of perfection, as objective 
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purposiveness, 
which would make the judgment teleological — may be regarded as 
completely wanting in form or figure, and none the less be looked 
upon 
as an object of pure delight, and indicate a subjective purposiveness 
of the given representation. So, now, the question suggests itself, 
whether 
in addition to the exposition of what is thought in an aesthetic 
judgment 
of this kind, we may be called upon to give a deduction of its claim 
to 
some (subjective) a priori principle. 
This we may meet with the reply that the sublime in nature is 
improperly 
so-called, and that sublimity should, in strictness, be attributed 
merely 
to the attitude of thought, or, rather, to that which serves as basis 
for this in human nature. The apprehension of an object otherwise 
formless 
and in conflict with ends supplies the mere occasion for our coming 
to a consciousness of this basis; and the object is in this way put 
to a subjectively-purposive use, but it is not estimated as 
subjectively-purposive 
on its own account and because of its form. (It is, as it were, a species 
finalis accepta, non data.)9 Consequently the exposition we gave 
of judgments upon the sublime in nature was at the same time their 
deduction. For, in our analysis of the reflection on the part of 
judgment 
in this case, we found that in such judgments there is a purposive 
relation of the cognitive faculties, which has to be laid a priori 
at the basis of the faculty of ends (the will), and which is therefore 
itself a priori a purpose. This, then, at once involves the deduction, 
9. “Purposive appearance as received, not as given.” 
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i.e., the justification of the claim of such a judgment to universally 
necessary validity. 
Hence we may confine our search to one for the deduction of 
judgments 
of taste, i.e., of judgments upon the beauty of things of nature, and 
this will satisfactorily dispose of the problem for the entire aesthetic 
faculty of judgment. 
§ 31. Of the method of the deduction of judgments of taste. 
The obligation to furnish a deduction, i.e., a guarantee of the 
legitimacy 
of judgments of a particular kind, only arises where the judgment 
lays 
claim to necessity. This is the case even where it requires subjective 
universality, i.e., the concurrence of every one, albeit the judgment 
is not a cognitive judgment, but only one of pleasure or displeasure 
in a given object, i.e., an assumption of a subjective purposiveness 
that 
has a thoroughgoing validity for every one, and which, since the 
judgment 
is one of taste, is not to be grounded upon any concept of the thing. 
Now, in the latter case, we are not dealing with a judgment of 
cognition 
— neither with a theoretical one based on the concept of a nature 
in general, supplied by understanding, nor with a (pure) practical 
one 
based on the idea of freedom, as given a priori by reason — 
and so we are not called upon to justify a priori the validity 
of a judgment which represents either what a thing is, or that there 
is something which I ought to do in order to produce it. 
Consequently, 
if for judgment generally we demonstrate the universal validity of a 
singular judgment expressing the subjective purposiveness of an 
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empirical 
representation of the form of an object, we shall do all that is needed 
to explain how it is possible that something can please in the mere 
formation 
of an estimate of it (without sensation or concept), and how, just as 
the estimate of an object for the sake of a cognition generally has 
universal 
rules, the delight of any one person may be pronounced as a rule for 
every 
other. 
Now if this universal validity is not to be based on a collection of 
votes and interrogation of others as to what sort of sensations they 
experience, 
but is to rest, as it were, upon an, autonomy of the subject passing 
judgment 
on the feeling of pleasure (in the given representation), i.e., upon his 
own taste, and yet is also not to be derived from concepts; then it 
follows 
that such a judgment — and such the judgment of taste in fact is 
— has a double and also logical peculiarity. For, first, it has universal 
validity a priori, yet without having a logical universality according 
to concepts, but only the universality of a singular judgment. 
Secondly, 
it has a necessity (which must invariably rest upon a priori grounds), 
but one which depends upon no a priori proofs by the 
representation 
of which it would be competent to enforce the assent which the 
judgment 
of taste demands of every one. 
The solution of these logical peculiarities, which distinguish a 
judgment 
of taste from all cognitive judgments, will of itself suffice for a 
deduction 
of this strange faculty, provided we abstract at the outset from all 
content 
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of the judgment, viz., from the feeling of pleasure, and merely 
compare 
the aesthetic form with the form of objective judgments as 
prescribed 
by logic. We shall first try, with the help of examples, to illustrate 
and bring out these characteristic properties of taste. 
§ 32. First peculiarity of the judgment of taste. 
The judgment of taste determines its object in respect of delight (as 
a thing of beauty) with a claim to the agreement of every one, just as 
if it were objective. 
To say, “This flower is beautiful” is tantamount to repeating 
its own proper claim to the delight of everyone. The agreeableness 
of 
its smell gives it no claim at all. One man revels in it, but it gives 
another a headache. Now what else are we to suppose from this 
than that 
its beauty is to be taken for a property of the flower itself which 
does 
not adapt itself to the diversity of heads and the individual senses of 
the multitude, but to which they must adapt themselves, if they are 
going 
to pass judgment upon it. And yet this is not the way the matter 
stands. 
For the judgment of taste consists precisely in a thing being called 
beautiful solely in respect of that quality in which it adapts itself 
to our mode of taking it in. 
Besides, every judgment which is to show the taste of the 
individual, 
is required to be an independent judgment of the individual himself. 
There must be no need of groping about among other people’s 
judgments 
and getting previous instruction from their delight in or aversion to 
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the same object. Consequently his judgment should be given out a 
priori, 
and not as an imitation relying on the general pleasure a thing gives 
as a matter of fact. One would think, however, that a judgment a 
priori 
must involve a concept of the object for the cognition of which it 
contains 
the principle. But the judgment of taste is not founded on concepts, 
and is in no way a cognition, but only an aesthetic judgment. 
Hence it is that a youthful poet refuses to allow himself to be 
dissuaded 
from the conviction that his poem is beautiful, either by the 
judgment 
of the public or of his friends. And even if he lends them an ear, he 
does so not because he has now come to a different judgment, but 
because, 
though the whole public, at least so far as his work is concerned, 
should 
have false taste, he still, in his desire for recognition, finds good 
reason to accommodate himself to the popular error (even against 
his own 
judgment). It is only in aftertime, when his judgment has been 
sharpened 
by exercise, that of his own free will and accord he deserts his 
former 
judgments behaving in just the same way as with those of his 
judgments 
which depend wholly upon reason. Taste lays claim simply to 
autonomy. 
To make the judgments of others the determining ground of one’s 
own would be heteronomy. 
The fact that we recommend the works of the ancients as models, 
and 
rightly too, and call their authors classical, as constituting sort of 
nobility among writers that leads the way and thereby gives laws to 
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the 
people, seems to indicate a posteriori sources of taste and to 
contradict the autonomy of taste in each individual. But we might 
just 
as well say that the ancient mathematicians, who, to this day, are 
looked 
upon as the almost indispensable models of perfect thoroughness 
and elegance 
in synthetic methods, prove that reason also is on our part only 
imitative, 
and that it is incompetent with the deepest intuition to produce of 
itself 
rigorous proofs by means of the construction of concepts. There is 
no 
employment of our powers, no matter how free, not even of reason 
itself 
(which must create all its judgments from the common a priori 
source), which, if each individual had always to start afresh with the 
crude equipment of his natural state, would not get itself involved in 
blundering attempts, did not those of others tie before it as a 
warning. 
Not that predecessors make those who follow in their steps mere 
imitators, 
but by their methods they set others upon the track of seeking-in-
themselves 
for the principles, and so of adopting their own, often better, course. 
Even in religion — where undoubtedly every one bas to derive his 
rule of conduct from himself, seeing that he himself remains 
responsible 
for it and, when he goes wrong, cannot shift the blame upon others 
as 
teachers or leaders — general precepts learned at the feet either 
of priests or philosophers, or even drawn from ones’ own resources, 
are never so efficacious as an example of virtue or holiness, which, 
historically 
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portrayed, does not dispense with the autonomy of virtue drawn 
from the 
spontaneous and original idea of morality (a priori), or convert 
this into a mechanical process of imitation. Following which has 
reference 
to a precedent, and not imitation, is the proper expression for all 
influence 
which the products of an exemplary author may exert upon others 
and this 
means no more than going to the same sources for a creative work 
as those 
to which he went for his creations, and learning from one’s 
predecessor 
no more than the mode of availing oneself of such sources. Taste, 
just 
because its judgment cannot be determined by concepts or 
precepts, is 
among all faculties and talents the very one that stands most in need 
of examples of what has in the course of culture maintained itself 
longest 
in esteem. Thus it avoids an early lapse into crudity and a return to 
the rudeness of its earliest efforts. 
§ 33. Second peculiarity of the judgment of taste. 
Proofs are of no avail whatever for determining the judgment of 
taste, 
and in this connection matters stand just as they would were that 
judgment 
simply subjective. 
If any one does not think a building, view, or poem beautiful, then, 
in the first place, he refuses, so far as his inmost conviction goes, 
to allow approval to be wrung from him by a hundred voices all 
lauding 
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it to the skies. Of course he may affect to be pleased with it, so as 
not to be considered as wanting in taste. He may even begin to 
harbour 
doubts as to whether he has formed his taste upon an acquaintance 
with 
a sufficient number of objects of a particular kind (just as one who 
in 
the distance recognizes, as he believes, something as a wood which 
every 
one else regards as a town, becomes doubtful of the judgment of his 
own 
eyesight). But, for all that, he clearly perceives that the approval of 
others affords no valid proof, available for the estimate of beauty. He 
recognizes that others, perchance, may see and observe for him, 
and that 
what many have seen in one and the same way may, for the purpose 
of a 
theoretical, and therefore logical, judgment, serve as an adequate 
ground 
of proof for or albeit he believes he saw otherwise, but that what has 
pleased others can never serve him as the ground of an aesthetic 
judgment. 
The judgment of others, where unfavorable to ours, may, no doubt, 
rightly 
make us suspicious in respect of our own, but convince us that it is 
wrong 
it never can. Hence there is no empirical ground of proof that can 
coerce 
any one’s judgment of taste. 
In the second place, a proof a priori according to definite rules 
is still less capable of determining the judgment as to beauty. If any 
one reads me his poem, or brings me to a play, which, all said and 
done, 
fails to commend itself to my taste, then let him adduce Batteux or 
Lessing, 
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or still older and more famous critics of taste, with all the host of 
rules laid down by them, as a proof of the beauty of his poem; let 
certain 
passages particularly displeasing to me accord completely with the 
rules 
of beauty (as set out by these critics and universally recognized): I 
stop my ears, I do not want to hear any reasons or any arguing about 
the 
matter. I would prefer to suppose that those rules of the critics were 
at fault, or at least have no application, than to allow my judgment 
to be determined by a priori proofs. I take my stand on the ground 
that my judgment is to be one of taste, and not one of understanding 
or reason. 
This would appear to be one of the chief reasons why this faculty 
of 
aesthetic judgment has been given the name of taste. For a man may 
recount 
to me all the ingredients of a dish, and observe of each and every 
one 
of them that it is just what I like, and, in addition, rightly commend 
the wholesomeness of the food; yet I am deaf to all these arguments. 
I 
try the dish with my own tongue and palate, and I pass judgment 
according 
to their verdict (not according to universal principles). 
As a matter of fact, the judgment of taste is invariably laid down 
as a singular judgment upon the object. The understanding can, 
from the 
comparison of the object, in point of delight, with the judgments of 
others, form a universal judgment, e.g.: “All tulips are beautiful.” 
But that judgment is then not one of taste, but is a logical judgment 
which converts the reference of an object to our taste into a 
predicate 
belonging to things of a certain kind. But it is only the judgment 
whereby 
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I regard an individual given tulip as beautiful, i.e., regard my delight 
in it as of universal validity, that is a judgment of taste. Its 
peculiarity, 
however, consists in the fact, that, although it has merely subjective 
validity, still it extends its claims to all subjects, as unreservedly 
as it would if it were an objective judgment, resting on grounds of 
cognition 
and capable of being proved to demonstration. 
§ 34. An objective principle of taste is not possible. 
A principle of taste would mean a fundamental premiss under the 
condition 
of which one might subsume the concept of an object, and then, by 
a syllogism, 
draw the inference that it is beautiful. That, however, is absolutely 
impossible. For I must feel the pleasure immediately in the 
representation 
of the object, and I cannot be talked into it by any grounds of proof. 
Thus although critics, as Hume says, are able to reason more 
plausibly 
than cooks, they must still share the same fate. For the determining 
ground 
of their judgment they are not able to look to the force of 
demonstrations, 
but only to the reflection of the subject upon his own state (of 
pleasure 
or displeasure), to the exclusion of precepts and rules. 
There is, however, a matter upon which it is competent for critics 
to 
exercise their subtlety, and upon which they ought to do so, so long 
as 
it tends to the rectification and extension of our judgments of taste. 
But that matter is not one of exhibiting the determining ground of 
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aesthetic 
judgments of this kind in a universally applicable formula — which 
is impossible. Rather is it the investigation of the faculties of 
cognition 
and their function in these judgments, and the illustration, by the 
analysis 
of examples, of their mutual subjective purposiveness, the form of 
which 
in a given representation has been shown above to constitute the 
beauty 
of their object. Hence with regard to the representation whereby an 
object 
is given, the critique of taste itself is only subjective; viz., it is 
the art or science of reducing the mutual relation of the 
understanding 
and the imagination in the given representation (without reference 
to 
antecedent sensation or concept), consequently their accordance or 
discordance, 
to rules, and of determining them with regard to their conditions. It 
is art if it only illustrates this by examples; it is science if it deduces 
the possibility of such an estimate from the nature of these faculties 
as faculties of knowledge — in general. It is only with the latter, 
as transcendental critique, that we have here any concern. Its 
proper 
scope is the development and justification of the subjective 
principle 
of taste, as an a priori principle of judgment. As an art, critique 
merely looks to the physiological (here psychological) and, 
consequently, 
empirical rules, according to which in actual fact taste proceeds 
(passing 
by the question of their possibility) and seeks to apply them in 
estimating 
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its objects. The latter critique criticizes the products of fine art, 
just as the former does the faculty of estimating them. 
§ 35. The principle of taste is the subjective principle of 
the general power of judgment. 
The judgment of taste is differentiated from logical judgment by the 
fact that, whereas the latter subsumes a representation under a 
concept 
of the object, the judgment of taste does not subsume under a 
concept 
at all — for, if it did, necessary and universal approval would be 
capable of being enforced by proofs. And yet it does bear this 
resemblance 
to the logical judgment, that it asserts a universality and necessity, 
not, however, according to concepts of the object, but a universality 
and necessity that are, consequently, merely subjective. Now the 
concepts 
in a judgment constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition 
of 
the object). But the judgment of taste is not determinable by means 
of 
concepts. Hence it can only have its ground in the subjective formal 
condition 
of a judgment in general. The subjective condition of all judgments 
is the judging faculty itself, or judgment. Employed in respect of a 
representation whereby an object is given, this requires the 
harmonious 
accordance of two powers of representation. These are: the 
imagination 
(for the intuition and the arrangement of the manifold of intuition), 
and the understanding (for the concept as a representation of the 
unity 
of this arrangement). Now, since no concept of the object underlies 
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the 
judgment here, it can consist only in the subsumption of the 
imagination 
itself (in the case of a representation whereby an object is given) 
under 
the conditions enabling the understanding in general to advance 
from the 
intuition to concepts. That is to say, since the freedom of the 
imagination 
consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, 
the judgment of taste must found upon a mere sensation of the 
mutually 
quickening activity of the imagination in its freedom, and of the 
understanding 
with its conformity to law. It must therefore rest upon a feeling that 
allows the object to be estimated by the purposiveness of the 
representation 
(by which an object is given) for the furtherance of the cognitive 
faculties 
in their free play. Taste, then, as a subjective power of judgment, 
contains 
a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of 
the 
faculty of intuitions or presentations, i.e., of the imagination, under 
the faculty of concepts, i.e., the understanding, so far as the former 
in its freedom accords with the latter in its conformity to law. 
For the discovery of this title by means of a deduction of 
judgments 
of taste, we can only avail ourselves of the guidance of the formal 
peculiarities 
of judgments of this kind, and consequently the mere consideration 
of 
their logical form. 
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§ 36. The problem of a deduction of judgments of taste. 
To form a cognitive judgment we may immediately connect with the 
perception 
of an object the concept of an object in general, the empirical 
predicates 
of which are contained in that perception. In this way, a judgment of 
experience is produced. Now this judgment rests on the foundation 
of 
a priori concepts of the synthetical unity of the manifold of 
intuition, 
enabling it to be thought as the determination of an object. These 
concepts 
(the categories) call for a deduction, and such was supplied in the 
Critique 
of Pure Reason. That deduction enabled us to solve the problem: 
How 
are synthetical a priori cognitive judgments possible? This problem 
had, accordingly, to do with the a priori principles of pure 
understanding 
and its theoretical judgments. 
But we may also immediately connect with a perception a feeling 
of pleasure 
(or displeasure) and a delight, attending the representation of the 
object 
and serving it instead of a predicate. In this way there arises a 
judgment 
which is aesthetic and not cognitive. Now, if such a judgment is not 
merely one of sensation, but a formal judgment of reflection that 
exacts 
this delight from everyone as necessary, something must lie at its 
basis 
as its a priori principle. This principle may, indeed, be a mere 
subjective one (supposing an objective one should be impossible for 
judgments 
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of this kind), but, even as such, it requires a deduction to make it 
intelligible 
how an aesthetic judgment can lay claim to necessity. That, now, is 
what 
lies at the bottom of the problem upon which we are at present 
engaged, 
i.e.: How are judgments of taste possible? This problem, therefore, is 
concerned with the a priori principles of pure judgment in aesthetic 
judgments, i.e., not those in which (as in theoretical judgments) it 
has merely to subsume under objective concepts of understanding, 
and in 
which it comes under a law, but rather those in which it is itself, 
subjectively, 
object as well as law. 
We may also put the problem in this way: How a judgment 
possible which, 
going merely upon the individual’s own feeling of pleasure in an 
object independent of the concept of it, estimates this as a pleasure 
attached to the representation of the same object in every other 
individual, 
and does so a priori, i.e., without being allowed to wait and see 
if other people will be of the same mind? 
It is easy to see that judgments of taste are synthetic, for they go 
beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, and join as 
predicate 
to that intuition something which is not even a cognition at all, 
namely, 
the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure). But, although the predicate 
(the personal pleasure that is connected with the representation) is 
empirical, 
still we need not go further than what is involved in the expressions 
of their claim to see that, so far as concerns the agreement required 
of everyone, they are a priori judgments, or mean to pass for 
such. This problem of the critique of judgment, therefore, is part of 
the general problem of transcendental philosophy: How are 
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synthetic a 
priori judgments possible? 
§ 37. What exactly it is that is asserted a priori of 
an object in a judgment of taste. 
The immediate synthesis of the representation of an object with 
pleasure 
can only be a matter of internal perception, and, were nothing more 
than 
this sought to be indicated, would only yield a mere empirical 
judgment. 
For with no representation can I connect a determinate feeling (of 
pleasure or displeasure) except where 
I rely upon the basis of an a priori principle in reason determining 
the will. The truth is that the pleasure (in the moral feeling) is the 
consequence of the determination of the will by the principle. It 
cannot, 
therefore, be compared with the pleasure in taste. For it requires a 
determinate 
concept of a law: whereas the pleasure in taste has to be connected 
immediately 
with the sample estimate prior to any concept. For the same reason, 
also, 
all judgments of taste are singular judgments, for they unite their 
predicate of delight, not to a concept, but to a given singular 
empirical 
representation. 
Hence, in a judgment of taste, what is represented a priori 
as a universal rule for the judgment and as valid for everyone, is not 
the pleasure but the universal validity of this pleasure perceived, as 
it is, to be combined in the mind with the mere estimate of an object. 
A judgment to the effect that it is with pleasure that I perceive and 
estimate some object is an empirical judgment. But if it asserts that 
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I think the object beautiful, i.e., that I may attribute that delight 
to everyone as necessary, it is then an a priori judgment. 
§ 38. Deduction of judgments of taste. 
Admitting that in a pure judgment of taste the delight in the object 
is connected with the mere estimate of its form, then what we feel 
to 
be associated in the mind with the representation of the object is 
nothing 
else than its subjective purposiveness for judgment. Since, now, in 
respect 
of the formal rules of estimating, apart from all matter (whether 
sensation 
or concept), judgment can only be directed to the subjective 
conditions 
of its employment in general (which is not restricted to the 
particular 
mode of sense nor to a particular concept of the understanding), 
and so 
can only be directed to that subjective factor which we may 
presuppose 
in all men (as requisite for a possible experience generally), it follows 
that the accordance of a representation with these conditions of the 
judgment 
must admit of being assumed valid a priori for every one. In other 
words, we are warranted in exacting from every one the pleasure or 
subjective 
purposiveness of the representation in respect of the relation of the 
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cognitive faculties engaged in the estimate of a sensible object in 
general.10 
Remark 
What makes this deduction so easy is that it is spared the necessity 
of having to justify the objective reality of a concept. For beauty is 
not a concept of the object, and the judgment of taste is not a 
cognitive 
judgment. All that it holds out for is that we are justified in 
presupposing 
10. In order to be justified in claiming universal agreement 
an aesthetic judgment merely resting on subjective 
grounds, it is sufficient to assume: (1) that the subjective 
conditions of this faculty of aesthetic judgment are 
identical with all men in what concerns the relation of 
the cognitive faculties, there brought into action, with a 
view to a cognition in general. This must be true, as 
otherwise men would be incapable of communicating 
their representations or even their knowledge; (2) that 
the judgment has paid regard merely to this relation 
(consequently merely to the formal condition of the 
faculty of judgment), and is pure, i.e., is free from 
confusion either with concepts of the object or 
sensations as determining grounds. If any mistake is 
made in this latter point, this only touches the incorrect 
application to a particular case of the right which a law 
gives us, and does not do away with the right generally. 
356  |  Kant - from The Critique of Judgement
that the same subjective conditions of judgment which we find in 
ourselves 
are universally present in every man, and further that we have 
rightly 
subsumed the given object under these conditions. The latter, no 
doubt, 
has to face unavoidable difficulties which do not affect the logical 
judgment. 
(For there the subsumption is under concepts; whereas in the 
aesthetic 
judgment it is under a mere sensible relation of the imagination and 
understanding mutually harmonizing with one another in the 
represented 
form of the object, in which case the subsumption may easily prove 
fallacious.) 
But this in no way detracts from the legitimacy of the claim of the 
judgment 
to count upon universal agreement — a claim which amounts to no 
more 
than this: the correctness of the principle of judging validly for every 
one upon subjective grounds. For as to the difficulty and 
uncertainty 
concerning the correctness of the subsumption under that 
principle, it 
no more casts a doubt upon the legitimacy of the claim to this 
validity 
on the part of an aesthetic judgment generally, or, therefore, upon 
the 
principle itself, than the mistakes (though. not so often or easily 
incurred), 
to which the subsumption of the logical judgment under its 
principle 
is similarly liable, can render the latter principle, which is objective, 
open to doubt. But if the question were: How is it possible to assume 
a priori that nature is a complex of objects of taste? the problem 
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would then have reference to teleology, because it would have to be 
regarded 
as an end of nature belonging essentially to its concept that it 
should 
exhibit forms that are a purpose for our judgment. But the 
correctness 
of this assumption may still be seriously questioned, while the actual 
existence of beauties of nature is patent to experience. 
§ 39. The communicability of a sensation. 
Sensation, as the real in perception, where referred to knowledge, is 
called organic sensation and its specific quality may be represented 
as 
completely communicable to others in a like mode, provided we 
assume that 
every one has a like sense to our own. This, however, is an absolutely 
inadmissible presupposition in the case of an organic sensation. 
Thus 
a person who is without a sense of smell cannot have a sensation of 
this 
kind communicated to him, and, even if be does not suffer from this 
deficiency, 
we still cannot be certain that he gets precisely the same sensation 
from 
a flower that we get from it. But still more divergent must we 
consider 
men to be in respect of the agreeableness or disagreeableness 
derived 
from the sensation of one and the same object of sense, and it is 
absolutely 
out of the question to require that pleasure in such objects should 
be 
acknowledged by every one. Pleasure of this kind, since it enters 
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into 
the mind through sense — our role, therefore, being a passive one 
— may be called the pleasure of enjoyment. 
On the other hand, delight in an action on the score of its moral 
character is not a pleasure of enjoyment, but one of self-asserting 
activity and in this coming up to the idea of what it is meant to be. 
But this feeling, which is called the moral feeling, requires concepts 
and is the presentation of a purposiveness, not free, but according 
to law. It, therefore, admits of communication only through the 
instrumentality 
of reason and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind for everyone, 
by means of very determinate practical concepts of reason. 
The pleasure in the sublime in nature, as one of rationalizing 
contemplation, 
lays claim also to universal participation, but still it presupposes 
another 
feeling, that, namely, of our supersensible sphere, which feeling, 
however 
obscure it may be, has a moral foundation. But there is absolutely no 
authority for my presupposing that others will pay attention to this 
and 
take a delight in beholding the uncouth dimensions of nature (one 
that 
in truth cannot be ascribed to its aspect, which is terrifying rather 
than otherwise). Nevertheless, having regard to the fact that 
attention 
ought to be paid upon every appropriate occasion to this moral 
birthright, 
we may still demand that delight from everyone; but we can do so 
only 
through the moral law, which, in its turn, rests upon concepts of 
reason. 
The pleasure in the beautiful is, on the other hand, neither a 
pleasure 
of enjoyment nor of an activity according to law, nor yet one of a 
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rationalizing 
contemplation according to ideas, but rather of mere reflection. 
Without 
any guiding-line of end or principle, this pleasure attends the 
ordinary 
apprehension of an object by means of the imagination, as the 
faculty 
of intuition, but with a reference to the understanding as faculty of 
concepts, and through the operation of a process of judgment 
which bas 
also to be invoked in order to obtain the commonest experience. In 
the 
latter case, however, its functions are directed to perceiving an 
empirical 
objective concept, whereas in the former (in the aesthetic mode of 
estimating) 
merely to perceiving the adequacy of the representation for 
engaging both 
faculties of knowledge in their freedom in an harmonious 
(subjectively 
purposive) employment, i.e., to feeling with pleasure the subjective 
bearings 
of the representation. This pleasure must of necessity depend for 
every 
one upon the same conditions, seeing that they are the subjective 
conditions 
of the possibility of a cognition in general, and the proportion of 
these 
cognitive faculties which is requisite for taste is requisite also for 
ordinary sound understanding, the presence of which we are 
entitled to 
presuppose in every one. And, for this reason also, one who judges 
with 
taste (provided he does not make a mistake as to this consciousness, 
and 
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does not take the matter for the form, or charm for beauty) can 
impute 
the subjective purposiveness, i.e., his delight in the object, to 
everyone 
else and suppose his feeling universally communicable, and that, 
too, 
without the mediation of concepts. 
§ 40. Taste as a kind of sensus communis. 
The name of sense is often given to judgment where what attracts 
attention 
is not so much its reflective act as merely its result. So we speak of 
a sense of truth, of a sense of propriety, or of justice, etc. And yet, 
of course, we know, or at least ought well enough to know, that a 
sense 
cannot be the true abode of these concepts, not to speak of its being 
competent, even in the slightest degree, to pronounce universal 
rules. 
On the contrary, we recognize that a representation of this kind, be 
it 
of truth, propriety, beauty, or justice, could never enter our 
thoughts 
were we not able to raise ourselves above the level of the senses to 
that 
of higher faculties of cognition. Common human understanding 
which as 
mere sound (not yet cultivated) understanding, is looked upon as 
the least 
we can expect from any one claiming the name of man, has 
therefore the 
doubtful honor of having the name of common sense (sensus 
communis) 
bestowed upon it; and bestowed, too, in an acceptation of the word 
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common 
(not merely in our own language, where it actually has a double 
meaning, 
but also in many others) which makes it amount to what is vulgar — 
what is everywhere to be met with — a quality which by no means 
confers 
credit or distinction upon its possessor. 
However, by the name sensus communis is to be understood the 
idea of 
a public sense, i.e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes 
account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, 
in order, as it were, to weigh its judgment with the collective reason 
of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective 
and 
personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an 
illusion 
that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgment. This is 
accomplished 
by weighing the judgment, not so much with actual, as rather with 
the 
merely possible, judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in 
the 
position of everyone else, as the result of a mere abstraction from 
the 
limitations which contingently affect our own estimate. This, in 
turn, 
is effected by so far as possible letting go the element of matter, i.e., 
sensation, in our general state of representative activity, and 
confining 
attention to the formal peculiarities of our representation or 
general 
state of representative activity. Now it may seem that this operation 
of reflection is too artificial to be attributed to the faculty which 
we call common sense. But this is an appearance due only to its 
expression 
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in abstract formulae. In itself nothing is more natural than to 
abstract 
from charm and emotion where one is looking for a judgment 
intended to 
serve as a universal rule. 
While the following maxims of common human understanding do 
not properly 
come in here as constituent parts of the critique of taste, they may 
still 
serve to elucidate its fundamental propositions. They are these: (I) 
to 
think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; 
(3) always to think consistently. The first is the maxim of 
unprejudiced 
thought, the second that of enlarged thought, the third that of 
consistent 
thought. The first is the maxim of a never-passive reason. To be 
given 
to such passivity, consequently to heteronomy of reason, is called 
prejudice; 
and the greatest of all prejudices is that of fancying nature not to be 
subject to rules which the understanding by virtue of its own 
essential 
laws lays at its basis, i.e., superstition. Emancipation from 
superstition 
is called enlightenment;11 for although this term applies also to 
11. We readily see that enlightenment, while easy, no doubt, 
in thesi, in hypothesis is difficult and slow of realization. 
For not to be passive with one’s reason, but always to be 
self — legislative, is doubtless quite an easy matter for a 
man who only desires to be adapted to his essential end, 
and does not seek to know what is beyond his 
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emancipation 
from prejudices generally, still superstition deserves pre-eminently 
(in 
sensu eminenti) to be called a prejudice. For the condition of 
blindness 
into which superstition puts one, which is as much as demands from 
one 
as an obligation, makes the need of being led by others, and 
consequently 
the passive state of the reason, pre-eminently conspicuous. As to 
the 
second maxim belonging to our habits of thought, we have quite got 
into 
the way of calling a man narrow (narrow, as opposed to being broad-
minded) whose talents fall short of what is required for employment 
upon 
work of any magnitude (especially that involving intensity). But the 
question 
here is not one of the faculty of cognition, but of the mental habit 
treating everything in terms of a purpose. This, however small the 
range and degree 
to which man’s natural endowments extend, still indicates a man of 
enlarged mind: if he detaches himself from the subjective personal 
conditions 
of his judgment, which cramp the minds of so many others, and 
understanding. But as the tendency in the latter 
direction is hardly avoidable, and others are always 
coming and promising with full assurance that they are 
able to satisfy one’s curiosity, it must be very difficult to 
preserve or restore in the mind (and particularly in the 
public mind) that merely negative attitude (which 
constitutes enlightenment proper). 
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reflects 
upon his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can 
only 
determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others). The 
third 
maxim — that, namely, of consistent thought — is the hardest 
of attainment, and is only attainable by the union of both the former, 
and after constant attention to them has made one at home in their 
observance. 
We may say: the first of these is the maxim of understanding, the 
second 
that of judgment, the third of that reason. 
I resume the thread of the discussion interrupted by the above 
digression, 
and I say that taste can with more justice be called a sensus 
communis 
than can sound understanding; and that the aesthetic, rather than 
the 
intellectual, judgment can bear the name of a public sense,12 i.e., 
taking 
it that we are prepared to use the word sense of an effect that mere 
reflection 
has upon the mind; for then by sense we mean the feeling of 
pleasure. 
We might even define taste as the faculty of estimating what makes 
our 
feeling in a given representation universally communicable without 
the 
mediation of a concept. 
12. Taste may be designated a sensus communis 
aestheticus, common human understanding a sensus 
communis logicus. 
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The aptitude of men for communicating their thoughts requires, 
also, 
a relation between the imagination and the understanding, in order 
to 
connect intuitions with concepts, and concepts, in turn, with 
intuitions, 
which both unite in cognition. But there the agreement of both 
mental 
powers is according to law, and under the constraint of definite 
concepts. 
Only when the imagination in its freedom stirs the understanding, 
and 
the understanding apart from concepts puts the imagination into 
regular 
play, does the representation communicate itself not as thought, 
but as 
an internal feeling of a purposive state of the mind. 
Taste is, therefore, the faculty of forming an a priori estimate 
of the communicability of the feeling that, without the mediation of 
a 
concept, are connected with a given representation. 
Supposing, now, that we could assume that the mere universal 
communicability 
of our feeling must of itself carry with it an interest for us (an 
assumption, 
however, which we are not entitled to draw as a conclusion from the 
character 
of a merely reflective judgment), we should then be in a position to 
explain how the feeling in the judgment of taste comes to be exacted 
from everyone as a sort of duty. 
§ 41. The empirical interest in the beautiful. 
Abundant proof bas been given above to show that the judgment of 
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taste 
by which something is declared beautiful must have no interest as 
its 
determining ground. But it does not follow from this that, after it 
has 
once been posited as a pure aesthetic judgment, an interest cannot 
then 
enter into combination with it. This combination, however, can 
never be 
anything but indirect. Taste must, that is to say, first of all be 
represented 
in conjunction with something else, if the delight attending the 
mere 
reflection upon an object is to admit of having further conjoined 
with 
it a pleasure in the real existence of the object (as that wherein all 
interest consists). For the saying, a posse ad esse non valet 
consequentia,13 
which is applied to cognitive judgments, holds good here in the case 
of aesthetic judgments. Now this “something else” may be 
something 
empirical, such as an inclination proper to the nature of human 
beings, 
or it may be something intellectual, as a property of the will whereby 
it admits of rational determination a priori. Both of these involve 
a delight in the existence of the object, and so can lay the foundation 
for an interest in what has already pleased of itself and without 
regard 
to any interest whatsoever. 
13. Taste may be designated a sensus communis 
aestheticus, common human understanding a sensus 
communis logicus. 
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The empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in society. And 
if we admit that the impulse to society is natural to mankind, and 
that 
the suitability for and the propensity towards it, i.e., sociability, 
is a property essential to the requirements of man as a creature 
intended 
for society, and one, therefore, that belongs to humanity, it is 
inevitable 
that we should also look upon taste in the light of a faculty for 
estimating 
whatever enables us to communicate even our feeling to every one 
else, 
and hence as a means of promoting that upon which the natural 
inclination 
of everyone is set. 
With no one to take into account but himself, a man abandoned 
on a desert 
island would not adorn either himself or his hut, nor would he look 
for 
flowers, and still less plant them, with the object of providing 
himself 
with personal adornments. Only in society does it occur to him to 
be not 
merely a man, but a man refined after the manner of his kind (the 
beginning 
of civilization) — for that is the estimate formed of one who has 
the bent and turn for communicating his pleasure to others, and 
who is 
not quite satisfied with an object unless his feeling of delight in it 
can be shared in communion with others. Further, a regard to 
universal 
communicability is a thing which every one expects and requires 
from every 
one else, just as if it were part of an original compact dictated by 
humanity 
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itself. And thus, no doubt, at first only charms, e.g., colors for 
painting 
oneself (roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the 
Iroquois), or 
flowers, sea-shells, beautifully colored feathers, then, in the course 
of time, also beautiful forms (as in canoes, wearing-apparel, etc.) 
which 
convey no gratification, i.e., delight of enjoyment, become of 
moment 
in society and attract a considerable interest. Eventually, when 
civilization 
has reached its height it makes this work of communication almost 
the 
main business of refined inclination, and the entire value of 
sensations 
is placed in the degree to which they permit of universal 
communication. 
At this stage, then, even where the pleasure which each one has in 
an 
object is but insignificant and possesses of itself no conspicuous 
interest, 
still the idea of its universal communicability almost indefinitely 
augments 
its value. 
This interest, indirectly attached to the beautiful by the 
inclination 
towards society, and, consequently, empirical, is, however, of no 
importance 
for us here. For that to which we have alone to look is what can have 
a bearing a priori, even though indirect, upon the judgment of 
taste. For, if even in this form an associated interest should betray 
itself, taste would then reveal a transition on the part of our critical 
faculty. from the enjoyment of sense to the moral feeling. This 
would 
not merely mean that we should be supplied with a more effectual 
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guide 
for the purposive employment of taste, but taste would further be 
presented 
as a link in the chain’ of the human faculties a priori upon 
which all legislation, depend. This much may certainly be said of the 
empirical interest in objects of taste, and in taste itself, that as taste 
thus pays homage to inclination, however refined, such interest will 
nevertheless 
readily fuse also with all inclinations and passions, which in society 
attain to their greatest variety and highest degree, and the interest 
in the beautiful, if this is made its ground, can but afford a very 
ambiguous 
transition from the agreeable to the good. We have reason, however, 
to 
inquire whether this transition may not still in some way be 
furthered 
by means of taste when taken in its purity. 
§ 42. The intellectual interest in the beautiful. 
It has been with the best intentions that those who love to see in the 
ultimate end of humanity, namely the morally good, the goal of all 
activities 
to which men are impelled by the inner bent of their nature, have 
regarded 
it as a mark of a good moral character to take an interest in the 
beautiful 
generally. But they have, not without reason, been contradicted, by 
others, 
who appeal to the fact of experience, that virtuosi in matters of taste 
being not alone often, but one might say as a general rule, vain, 
capricious, 
and addicted to injurious passions, could perhaps more rarely than 
others 
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lay claim to any pre-eminent attachment to moral principles. And so 
it 
would seem, not only that the feeling for the beautiful is specifically 
different from the moral feeling (which as a matter of fact is the 
case), 
but also that the interest which we may combine with it will hardly 
consort 
with the moral, and certainly not on grounds of inner affinity. 
Now I willingly admit that the interest in the beautiful of art 
(including 
under this heading the artificial use of natural beauties for personal 
adornment, and so from vanity) gives no evidence at all of a habit of 
mind attached to the morally good, or even inclined that way. But, 
on 
the other hand, I do maintain that to take an immediate interest in 
the 
beauty of nature (not merely to have taste in estimating it) is always 
a mark of a good soul; and that, where this interest is habitual, it is 
at least indicative of a temper of mind favorable to the moral feeling 
that it should readily associate itself with the contemplation of 
nature. 
It must, however, be borne in mind that I mean to refer strictly to 
the 
beautiful forms of nature, and to put to one side the charms which 
she 
is wont so lavishly to combine with them; because, though the 
interest 
in these is no doubt immediate, it is nevertheless empirical. 
One who alone (and without any intention of communicating his 
observations 
to others) regards the beautiful form of a wild flower, a bird, an 
insect, 
or the like, out of admiration and love of them, and being loath to let 
them escape him in nature, even at the risk of some misadventure 
to himself 
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— so far from there being any prospect of advantage to him — 
such a one takes an immediate, and in fact intellectual, interest in 
the 
beauty of nature. This means that he is not alone pleased with 
nature’s 
product in respect of its form, but is also pleased at its existence, 
and is so without any charm of sense having a share in the matter, 
or 
without his associating with it any end whatsoever. 
In this connection, however, it is of note that were we to play a 
trick 
on our lover of the beautiful, and plant in the ground artificial 
flowers 
(which can be made so as to look just like natural ones), and perch 
artfully 
carved birds on the branches of trees, and he were to find out how 
he 
had been taken in, the immediate interest which these things 
previously 
had for him would at once vanish — though, perhaps, a different 
interest 
might intervene in its stead, that, namely, of vanity in decorating his 
room with them for the eyes of others. The fact is that our intuition 
and reflection must have as their concomitant the thought that the 
beauty 
in question is nature’s handiwork; and this is the sole basis of 
the immediate interest that is taken in it. Failing this, we are either 
left with a bare judgment of taste void of all interest whatever, or 
else only with one that is combined with an interest that is mediate, 
involving, namely, a reference to society; which latter affords no 
reliable 
indication of morally good habits of thought. 
The superiority which natural beauty has over that of art, even 
where 
it is excelled by the latter in point of form, in yet being alone able 
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to awaken an immediate interest, accords with the refined and well-
grounded 
habits of thought of all men who have cultivated their moral feeling. 
If a man with taste enough to judge of works of fine art with the 
greatest 
correctness and refinement readily quits the room in which he 
meets with 
those beauties that minister to vanity or, at least, social joys, and 
betakes himself to the beautiful in nature, so that he may there find 
as it were a feast for his soul in a train of thought which he can never 
completely evolve, we will then regard this his choice even with 
veneration, 
and give him credit for a beautiful soul, to which no connoisseur or 
art 
collector can lay claim on the score of the interest which his objects 
have for him. Here, now, are two kinds of objects which in the 
judgment 
of mere taste could scarcely contend with one another for a 
superiority. 
What then, is the distinction that makes us hold them in such 
different 
esteem? 
We have a faculty of judgment which is merely aesthetic — a 
faculty 
of judging of forms without the aid of concepts, and of finding, in 
the 
mere estimate of them, a delight that we at the same time make into 
a 
rule for every one, without this judgment being founded on an 
interest, 
or yet producing one. On the other hand, we have also a faculty of 
intellectual 
judgment for the mere forms of practical maxims (so far as they are 
of 
themselves qualified for universal legislation) — a faculty of 
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determining 
an a priori delight, which we make into a law for everyone, without 
our judgment being founded on any interest, though here it 
produces one. 
The pleasure or displeasure in the former judgment is called that of 
taste; the latter is called that of the moral feeling. 
But, now, reason is further interested in ideas (for which in our 
moral 
feeling it brings about an immediate interest), having also objective 
reality. That is to say, it is of interest to reason that nature should 
at least show a trace or give a hint that it contains in itself some 
ground 
or other for assuming a uniform accordance of its products with our 
wholly 
disinterested delight (a delight which we cognize a priori as a 
law for every one without being able to ground it upon proofs). That 
being 
so, reason must take an interest in every manifestation on the part 
of 
nature of some such accordance. Hence the mind cannot reflect on 
the beauty 
of nature without at the same time finding its interest engaged. But 
this 
interest is akin to the moral. One, then, who takes such an interest 
in 
the beautiful in nature can only do so in so far as he has previously 
set his interest deep in the foundations of the morally good. On 
these 
grounds we have reason for presuming the presence of at least the 
germ 
of a good moral disposition in the case of a man to whom the beauty 
of 
nature is a matter of immediate interest. 
It will be said that this interpretation of aesthetic judgments on 
the basis of kinship with our moral feeling has far too studied an 
374  |  Kant - from The Critique of Judgement
appearance 
to be accepted as the true construction of the cypher in which 
nature 
speaks to us figuratively in its beautiful forms. But, first of all, this 
immediate interest in the beauty of nature is not in fact common. It 
is 
peculiar to those whose habits of thought are already trained to the 
good 
or else are eminently susceptible of such training; and under the 
circumstances 
the analogy in which the pure judgment of taste that, without 
relying 
upon any interest, gives us a feeling of delight, and at the same time 
represents it a priori as proper to mankind in general, stands 
to the moral judgment that does just the same from concepts, is one 
which, 
without any clear, subtle, and deliberate reflection, conduces to a 
like 
immediate interest being taken in the objects of the former 
judgment 
as in those of the latter — with this one difference, that the interest 
in the first case is free, while in the latter it is one founded on 
objective 
laws. In addition to this, there is our admiration of Nature, which in 
her beautiful products displays herself as art, not as mere matter of 
chance, but, as it were, designedly, according to a law-directed 
arrangement, 
and as purposiveness apart from any end. As we never meet with 
such an 
end outside ourselves, we naturally look for it in ourselves, and, in 
fact, in that which constitutes the ultimate end of our existence — 
the moral side of our being. (The inquiry into the ground of the 
possibility 
of such a natural purposiveness will, however, first come under 
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discussion 
in the Teleology.) 
The fact that the delight in beautiful art does not, in the pure 
judgment 
of taste, involve an immediate interest, as does that in beautiful 
nature, 
may be readily explained. For the former is either such an imitation 
of 
the latter as goes the length of deceiving us, in which case it acts 
upon 
us in the character of a natural beauty, which we take it to be; or 
else 
it is an intentional art obviously directed to our delight. In the latter 
case, however, the delight in the product would, it is true, be 
brought 
about immediately by taste, but there would be nothing but a 
mediate interest 
in the cause that lay beneath — an interest, namely, in an art only 
capable of interesting by its end, and never in itself. It will, perhaps, 
be said that this is also the case where an object of nature only 
interests 
by its beauty so far as a moral idea is brought into partnership 
therewith. 
But it is not the object that is of immediate interest, but rather the 
inherent character of the beauty qualifying it for such a partnership 
— a character, therefore, that belongs to the very essence of beauty. 
The charms in natural beauty, which are to be found blended, as 
it were, 
so frequently with beauty of form, belong either to the 
modifications 
of light (in coloring) or of sound (in tones). For these are the only 
sensations which permit not merely of a feeling of the senses, but 
also 
of reflection upon the form of these modifications of sense, and so 
embody 
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as it were a language in which nature speaks to us and which has the 
semblance 
of a higher meaning. Thus the white color of the lily seems to 
dispose 
the mind to ideas of innocence, and the other seven colors, 
following 
the series from the red to the violet, similarly to ideas of (1) 
sublimity, 
(2) courage, (3) candour, (4) amiability, (5) modesty, (6) constancy, 
(7) tenderness. The bird’s song tells of joyousness and contentment 
with its existence. At least so we interpret nature — whether such 
be its purpose or not. But it is the indispensable requisite of the 
interest 
which we here take in beauty, that the beauty should be that of 
nature, 
and it vanishes completely as soon as we are conscious of having 
been 
deceived, and that it is only the work of art — so completely that 
even taste can then no longer find in it anything beautiful nor sight 
anything attractive. What do poets set more store on than the 
nightingale’s 
bewitching and beautiful note, in a lonely thicket on a still summer 
evening 
by the soft light of the moon? And yet we have instances of how, 
where 
no such songster was to be found, a jovial host has played a trick on 
the guests with him on a visit to enjoy the country air, and has done 
so to their huge satisfaction, by biding in a thicket a rogue of a youth 
who (with a reed or rush in his mouth) knew how to reproduce this 
note 
so as to hit off nature to perfection. But the instant one realizes that 
it is all a fraud no one will long endure listening to this song that 
before was regarded as so attractive. And it is just the same with the 
song of any other bird. It must be nature, or be mistaken by us for 
nature, 
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to enable us to take an immediate interest in the beautiful as such; 
and 
this is all the more so if we can even call upon others to take a 
similar 
interest. And such a demand we do in fact make, since we regard as 
coarse 
and low the habits of thought of those who have no feeling for 
beautiful 
nature (for this is the word we use for susceptibility to an interest 
in the contemplation of beautiful nature), and who devote 
themselves to 
the mere enjoyments of sense found in eating and drinking. 
§ 43. Art in general. 
(1) Art is distinguished from nature as making (facere) is from 
acting or operating in general (agere), and the product or the 
result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work 
(opus) from operation (effectus). 
By right it is only production through freedom, i.e., through an act 
of will that places reason at the basis of its action, that should be 
termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce 
(their 
regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the 
strength 
of an analogy with art; that is to say, as soon as we call to mind that 
no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at 
once 
that it is a product of their nature (of instinct), and it is only to 
their Creator that we ascribe it as art. If, as sometimes happens, in 
a search through a bog, we light on a piece of hewn wood, we do not 
say 
it is a product of nature but of art. Its producing cause had an end in 
view to which the object owes its form. Apart from such cases, we 
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recognize 
an art in everything formed in such a way that its actuality must 
have 
been preceded by a representation of the thing in its cause (as even 
in 
the case of the bees), although the effect could not have been 
thought 
by the cause. But where anything is called absolutely a work of art, 
to 
distinguish it from a natural product, then some work of man is 
always 
understood. 
(2) Art, as human skill, is distinguished also from science (as ability 
from knowledge), as a practical from a theoretical faculty, as technic 
from theory (as the art of surveying from geometry). For this reason, 
also, what one can do the moment one only knows what is to be 
done, hence 
without anything more than sufficient knowledge of the desired 
result, 
is not called art. To art that alone belongs which the possession of 
the 
most complete knowledge does not involve one’s having then and 
there 
the skill to do it. Camper, describes very exactly how the best shoe 
must 
be made, but he, doubtless, was not able to turn one out himself.14 
14. In my part of the country, if you set a common man a 
problem like that of Columbus and his egg, he says, 
“There is no art in that, it is only science”: i.e., you can do 
it if you know how; and he says just the same of all the 
would — be arts of jugglers. To that of the tight — rope 
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(3) Art is further distinguished from handicraft. The first is called 
free, the other may be called industrial art. We look on the former 
as 
something which could only prove purposive (be a success) as play, 
i.e., an 
occupation which is agreeable on its own account; but on the 
second as 
labour, i.e., a business, which on its own account is disagreeable 
(drudgery), 
and is only attractive by means of what it results in (e.g., the pay), 
and which is consequently capable of being a compulsory 
imposition. Whether 
in the list of arts and crafts we are to rank watchmakers as artists, 
and smiths on the contrary as craftsmen, requires a standpoint 
different 
from that here adopted — one, that is to say, taking account of the 
proposition of the talents which the business undertaken in either 
case 
must necessarily involve. Whether, also, among the so-called seven 
free 
arts some may not have been included which should be reckoned as 
sciences, 
and many, too, that resemble handicraft, is a matter I will not 
discuss 
here. It is not amiss, however, to remind the reader of this: that in 
all free arts something of a compulsory character is still required, or, 
as it is called, a mechanism, without which the soul, which in art 
must 
be free, and which alone gives life to the work, would be bodyless 
and 
evanescent (e.g., in the poetic art there must be correctness and 
dancer, on the other hand, he has not the least 
compunction in giving the name of art. 
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wealth 
of language, likewise prosody and metre). For not a few leaders of a 
newer 
school believe that the best way to promote a free art is to sweep 
away 
all restraint and convert it from labour into mere play. 
§ 44. Fine art. 
There is no science of the beautiful, but only a critique. Nor, again, 
is there an elegant (schöne) science, but only a fine (schöne) 
art. For a science of the beautiful would have to determine 
scientifically, 
i.e., by means of proofs, whether a thing was to be considered 
beautiful 
or not; and the judgment upon beauty, consequently, would, if 
belonging 
to science, fail to be a judgment of taste. As for a beautiful science 
— a science which, as such, is to be beautiful, is a nonentity. For 
if, treating it as a science, we were to ask for reasons and proofs, we 
would be put off with elegant phrases (bons mots). What has given 
rise to the current expression elegant sciences is, doubtless, no 
more 
than this, that common observation has, quite accurately, noted the 
fact 
that for fine art, in the fulness of its perfection, a large store of 
science is required, as, for example, knowledge of ancient 
languages, 
acquaintance with classical authors, history, antiquarian learning, 
etc. 
Hence these historical sciences, owing to the fact that they form the 
necessary preparation and groundwork for fine art, and partly also 
owing 
to the fact that they are taken to comprise even the knowledge of 
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the 
products of fine art (rhetoric and poetry), have by a confusion of 
words, 
actually got the name of fine sciences. 
Where art, merely seeking to actualize a possible object to the 
cognition 
of which it is adequate, does whatever acts are required for that 
purpose. 
then it is mechanical. But should the feeling of pleasure be what it 
has 
immediately in view, it is then termed aesthetic art. As such it may 
be 
either agreeable or fine art. The description “agreeable art” 
applies where the end of the art is that the pleasure should 
accompany 
the representations considered as mere sensations, the description 
“fine 
art” where it is to accompany them considered as modes of 
cognition. 
Agreeable arts are those which have mere enjoyment for their 
object. 
Such are all the charms that can gratify a dinner party: entertaining 
narrative, the art of starting the whole table in unrestrained and 
sprightly 
conversation, or with jest and laughter inducing a certain air of 
gaiety. 
Here, as the saying goes, there may be much loose talk over the 
glasses, 
without a person wishing to be brought to book for all he utters, 
because 
it is only given out for the entertainment of the moment, and not as 
a 
lasting matter to be made the subject of reflection or repetition. (Of 
the same sort is also the art of arranging the table for enjoyment, or, 
at large banquets, the music of the orchestra — a quaint idea 
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intended 
to act on the mind merely as an agreeable noise fostering a genial 
spirit, 
which, without any one paying the smallest attention to the 
composition, 
promotes the free flow of conversation between guest and guest.) 
In addition 
must be included play of every kind which is attended with no 
further 
interest than that of making the time pass by unheeded. 
Fine art, on the other hand, is a mode of representation which is 
intrinsically 
purposive, and which, although devoid of an end, has the effect of 
advancing 
the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social 
communication. 
The universal communicability of a pleasure involves in its very 
concept 
that the pleasure is not one of enjoyment arising out of mere 
sensation, 
but must be one of reflection. Hence aesthetic art, as art which is 
beautiful, 
is one having for its standard the reflective judgment and not 
organic 
sensation. § 45. Fine art is an art, so far as it has at the same 
time the appearance of being nature. 
A product of fine art must be recognized to be art and not nature. 
Nevertheless 
the purposiveness in its form must appear just as free from the 
constraint 
of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. Upon this 
feeling 
of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties — which play has 
at the same time to be purposive rests that pleasure which alone is 
universally 
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communicable without being based on concepts. Nature proved 
beautiful 
when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed 
beautiful, 
where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the 
appearance 
of nature. 
For, whether we are dealing with beauty of nature or beauty of art, 
we may make the universal statement: That is beautiful which 
pleases in 
the mere estimate of it (not in sensation or by means of a concept). 
Now 
art has always got a definite intention of producing something. 
Were this 
“something,” however, to be mere sensation (something merely 
subjective), intended to be accompanied with pleasure, then such 
product 
would, in our estimation of it, only please through the agency of the 
feeling of the senses. On the other hand, were the intention one 
directed 
to the production of a definite object, then, supposing this were 
attained 
by art, the object would only please by means of a concept. But in 
both 
cases the art would please, not in the mere estimate of it, i.e., not 
as fine art, but rather as mechanical art. 
Hence the purposiveness in the product of fine art, intentional 
though 
it be, must not have the appearance of being intentional; i.e., fine art 
must be clothed with the aspect of nature, although we recognize it 
to 
be art. But the way in which a product of art seems like nature is by 
the presence of perfect exactness in the agreement with rules 
prescribing 
how alone the product can be what it is intended to be, but with an 
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absence 
of laboured effect (without academic form betraying itself), i.e., 
without 
a trace appearing of the artist having always had the rule present to 
him and of its having fettered his mental powers. 
§ 45. Fine art is an art, so far as it has at the same time the 
appearance of being nature. 
A product of fine art must be recognized to be art and not nature. 
Nevertheless the finality in its form must appear just as free from 
the constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere 
nature. Upon this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive 
faculties–which play has at the same time to be final rests that 
pleasure which alone is universally communicable without being 
based on concepts. Nature proved beautiful when it wore the 
appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we 
are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of 
nature. 
For, whether we are dealing with beauty of nature or beauty of 
art, we may make the universal statement: That is beautiful which 
pleases in the mere estimate of it (not in sensation or by means of 
a concept). Now art has always got a definite intention of producing 
something. Were this “something,” however, to be mere sensation 
(something merely subjective), intended to be accompanied with 
pleasure, then such product would, in our estimation of it, only 
please through the agency of the feeling of the senses. On the 
other hand, were the intention one directed to the production of a 
definite object, then, supposing this were attained by art, the object 
would only please by means of a concept. But in both cases the art 
would please, not in the mere estimate of it, i.e., not as fine art, but 
rather as mechanical art. 
Hence the finality in the product of fine art, intentional though it 
be, must not have the appearance of being intentional; i.e., fine art 
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must be clothed with the aspect of nature, although we recognize 
it to be art. But the way in which a product of art seems like nature 
is by the presence of perfect exactness in the agreement with rules 
prescribing how alone the product can be what it is intended to 
be, but with an absence of laboured effect (without academic form 
betraying itself), i.e., without a trace appearing of the artist having 
always had the rule present to him and of its having fettered his 
mental powers. 
§ 46. Fine art is the art of genius. 
Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. 
Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs 
itself 
to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental 
aptitude 
(ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art. 
Whatever may be the merits of this definition, and whether it is 
merely 
arbitrary, or whether it is adequate or not to the concept usually 
associated 
with the word genius (a point which the following sections have to 
clear 
up), it may still be shown at the outset that, according to this 
acceptation 
of the word, fine arts must necessarily be regarded as arts of genius. 
For every art presupposes rules which are laid down as the 
foundation 
which first enables a product, if it is to be called one of art, to be 
represented as possible. The concept of fine art, however, does not 
permit 
of the judgment upon the beauty of its product being derived from 
any 
rule that has a concept for its determining ground, and that 
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depends, 
consequently, on a concept of the way in which the product is 
possible. 
Consequently fine art cannot of its own self excogitate the rule 
according 
to which it is to effectuate its product. But since, for all that, a 
product 
can never be called art unless there is a preceding rule, it follows 
that 
nature in the individual (and by virtue of the harmony of his 
faculties) 
must give the rule to art, i.e., fine art is only possible as a product 
of genius. 
From this it may be seen that genius (1) is a talent for producing 
that 
for which no definite rule can be given, and not an aptitude in the 
way 
of cleverness for what can be learned according to some rule; and 
that 
consequently originality must be its primary property. (2) Since 
there 
may also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time 
be models, 
i.e., be exemplary; and, consequently, though not themselves 
derived from 
imitation, they must serve that purpose for others, i.e., as a standard 
or rule of estimating. (3) It cannot indicate scientifically how it 
brings 
about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature. Hence, where 
an 
author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how 
the 
ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to 
invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the 
same 
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to others in such precepts as would put them in a position to 
produce 
similar products. (Hence, presumably, our word Genie is derived 
from genius, 
as the peculiar guardian and guiding spirit given to a man at his 
birth, 
by the inspiration of which those original ideas were obtained.) (4) 
Nature 
prescribes the rule through genius not to science but to art, and this 
also only in so far as it is to be fine art. 
§ 47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation 
of genius 
Every one is agreed on the point of the complete opposition 
between 
genius and the spirit of imitation. Now since learning is nothing but 
imitation, the greatest ability, or aptness as a pupil (capacity), is 
still, as such, not equivalent to genius. Even though a man weaves 
his 
own thoughts or fancies, instead of merely taking in what others 
have 
thought, and even though he go so far as to bring fresh gains to art 
and 
science, this does not afford a valid reason for calling such a man of 
brains, and often great brains, a genius, in contradistinction to one 
who goes by the name of shallow-pate, because he can never do 
more than 
merely learn and follow a lead. For what is accomplished in this way 
is 
something that could have been learned. Hence it all lies in the 
natural 
path of investigation and reflection according to rules, and so is not 
specifically distinguishable from what may be acquired as the result 
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of 
industry backed up by imitation. So all that Newton bas set forth in 
his 
immortal work on the Principles of Natural Philosophy may well be 
learned, 
however great a mind it took to find it all out, but we cannot learn 
to 
write in a true poetic vein, no matter how complete all the precepts 
of 
the poetic art may be, or however excellent its models. The reason 
is 
that all the steps that Newton had to take from the first elements of 
geometry to his greatest and most profound discoveries were such 
as he 
could make intuitively evident and plain to follow, not only for 
himself 
but for every one else. On the other hand, no Homer or Wieland can 
show 
how his ideas, so rich at once in fancy and in thought, enter and 
assemble 
themselves in his brain, for the good reason that he does not himself 
know, and so cannot teach others. In matters of science, therefore, 
the 
greatest inventor differs only in degree from the most laborious 
imitator 
and apprentice, whereas he differs specifically from one endowed 
by nature 
for fine art. No disparagement, however, of those great men, to 
whom the 
human race is so deeply indebted, is involved in this comparison of 
them 
with those who on the score of their talent for fine art are the elect 
of nature. The talent for science is formed for the continued 
advances 
of greater perfection in knowledge, with all its dependent practical 
Kant - from The Critique of Judgement  |  389
advantages, 
as also for imparting the same to others. Hence scientists can boast 
a 
ground of considerable superiority over those who merit the honor 
of 
being called geniuses, since genius reaches a point at which art 
must 
make a halt, as there is a limit imposed upon it which it cannot 
transcend. 
This limit has in all probability been long since attained. In addition, 
such skill cannot be communicated, but requires to be bestowed 
directly 
from the hand of nature upon each individual, and so with him it 
dies, 
awaiting the day when nature once again endows another in the 
same way 
— one who needs no more than an example to set the talent of which 
he is conscious at work on similar lines. 
Seeing, then, that the natural endowment of art (as fine art) must 
furnish 
the rule, what kind of rule must this be? It cannot be one set down 
in 
a formula and serving as a precept — for then the judgment upon 
the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Rather 
must 
the rule be gathered from the performance, i.e., from the product, 
which 
others may use to put their own talent to the test, so as to let it 
serve 
as a model, not for imitation, but for following. The possibility of this 
is difficult to explain. The artist’s ideas arouse like ideas on 
the part of his pupil, presuming nature to have visited him with a 
like 
proportion of the mental powers. For this reason, the models of fine 
art 
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are the only means of handing down this art to posterity. This is 
something 
which cannot be done by mere descriptions (especially not in the 
line 
of the arts of speech), and in these arts, furthermore, only those 
models 
can become classical of which the ancient, dead languages, 
preserved as 
learned, are the medium. 
Despite the marked difference that distinguishes mechanical art, 
as 
an art merely depending upon industry and learning, from fine art, 
as 
that of genius, there is still no fine art in which something 
mechanical, 
capable of being at once comprehended and followed in obedience 
to rules, 
and consequently something academic, does not constitute the 
essential 
condition of the art. For the thought of something as end must be 
present, 
or else its product would not be ascribed to an art at all, but would 
be a mere product of chance. But the effectuation of an end 
necessitates 
determinate rules which we cannot venture to dispense with. Now, 
seeing 
that originality of talent is one (though not the sole) essential factor 
that goes to make up the character of genius, shallow minds fancy 
that 
the best evidence they can give of their being full-blown geniuses is 
by emancipating themselves from all academic constraint of rules, 
in 
the belief that one cuts a finer figure on the back of an ill-tempered 
than of a trained horse. Genius can do no more than furnish rich 
material 
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for products of fine art; its elaboration and its form require a talent 
academically trained, so that it may be employed in such a way as to 
stand the test of judgment. But, for a person to hold forth and pass 
sentence like a genius in matters that fall to the province of the most 
patient rational investigation, is ridiculous in the extreme. One is 
at a loss to know whether to laugh more at the impostor who 
envelops 
himself in such a cloud — in which we are given fuller scope to 
our imagination at the expense of all use of our critical faculty — 
or at the simple-minded public which imagines that its inability 
clearly 
to cognize and comprehend this masterpiece of penetration is due 
to 
its being invaded by new truths en masse, in comparison with 
which, detail, due to carefully weighed exposition and an academic 
examination 
of root principles, seems to it only the work of a numbskull. 
§ 48. The relation of genius to taste. 
For judging beautiful objects, what is required is taste; but for the 
production of fine art, one needs genius. 
If we consider genius as the talent for fine art (which the proper 
signification 
of the word imports), and if we would analyse it from this point of 
view 
into the faculties which must concur to constitute such a talent, it 
is 
imperative at the outset accurately to determine the difference 
between 
beauty of nature, which it only requires taste to estimate, and 
beauty 
of art, which requires genius for its possibility (a possibility to which 
regard must also be paid in estimating such an object). 
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A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful 
representation of a thing. 
To enable me to estimate a beauty of nature, as such, I do not 
need 
to be previously possessed of a concept of what sort of a thing the 
object 
is intended to be, i.e., I am not obliged to know its material 
purposiveness 
(its purpose), but, rather, in forming an estimate of it apart from any 
knowledge of the end, the mere form pleases on its own account. If, 
however, 
the object is presented as a product of art, and is as such to be 
declared 
beautiful, then, seeing that art always presupposes an end in the 
cause 
(and its causality), a concept of what the thing is intended to be must 
first of all be laid at its basis. And, since the agreement of the 
manifold 
in a thing with an inner character belonging to it as its end 
constitutes 
the perfection of the thing, it follows that in estimating beauty of art 
the perfection of the thing must be also taken into account — a 
matter 
which in estimating a beauty of nature, as beautiful, is quite 
irrelevant. 
It is true that in forming an estimate, especially of animate objects 
of nature, e.g., of a man or a horse, objective purposiveness 
[purpose] 
is also commonly taken into account with a view to judgment upon 
their 
beauty; but then the judgment also ceases to be purely aesthetic, 
i.e., 
a mere judgment of taste. Nature is no longer estimated as it 
appears 
like art, but rather in so far as it actually is art, though superhuman 
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art; and the teleological judgment serves as a basis and condition of 
the aesthetic, and one which the latter must regard. In such a case, 
where 
one says, for example, “That is a beautiful woman,” what one 
in fact thinks is only this, that in her form nature excellently 
portrays 
the ends present in the female figure. For one has to extend one’s 
view beyond the mere form to a concept, to enable the object to be 
thought 
in such manner by means of an aesthetic judgment logically 
conditioned. 
Where fine art evidences its superiority is in the beautiful 
descriptions 
it gives of things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The 
Furies, 
diseases, devastations of war, and the like, can (as evils) be very 
beautifully 
described, nay even represented in pictures. One kind of ugliness 
alone 
is incapable of being represented conformably to nature without 
destroying 
all aesthetic delight, and consequently artistic beauty, namely, that 
which excites disgust. For, as in this strange sensation, which 
depends 
purely on the imagination, the object is represented as insisting, as 
it were, upon our enjoying it, while we still set our face against it, 
the artificial representation of the object is no longer 
distinguishable 
from the nature of the object itself in our sensation, and so it cannot 
possibly be regarded as beautiful. The art of sculpture, again, since 
in its products art is almost confused with nature, has excluded 
from 
its creations the direct representation of ugly objects, and, instead, 
only sanctions, for example, the representation of death (in a 
beautiful 
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genius), or of the warlike spirit (in Mars), by means of an allegory, 
or attributes which wear a pleasant guise, and so only indirectly, 
through 
an interpretation on the part of reason, and not for the pure 
aesthetic 
judgment. 
So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is 
properly 
only the form of the presentation of a concept and the means by 
which 
the latter is universally communicated. To give this form, however, 
to 
the product of fine art, taste merely is required. By this the artist, 
having practised and corrected his taste by a variety of examples 
from 
nature or art, controls his work and, after many, and often laborious, 
attempts to satisfy taste, finds the form which commends itself to 
him. 
Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a free 
swing of the mental powers, but rather of a slow and even painful 
process 
of improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his 
thought without 
prejudice to the freedom in the play of those powers. 
Taste is, however, merely a critical, not a productive faculty; and 
what conforms to it is not, merely on that account, a work of fine 
art. 
It may belong to useful and mechanical art, or even to science, as a 
product 
following definite rules which are capable of being learned and 
which 
must be closely followed. But the pleasing form imparted to the 
work is 
only the vehicle of communication and a mode, as it were, of 
execution, 
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in respect of which one remains to a certain extent free, 
notwithstanding 
being otherwise tied down to a definite end. So we demand that 
table appointments, or even a moral dissertation, and, indeed, a 
sermon, must bear this form 
of fine art, yet without its appearing studied. But one would not call 
them on this account works of fine art. A poem, a musical 
composition, 
a picture — gallery, and so forth, would, however, be placed under 
this head; and so in a would — be work of fine art we may frequently 
recognize genius without taste, and in another taste without genius. 
§ 49. The faculties of the mind which constitute genius. 
Of certain products which are expected, partly at least, to stand on 
the footing of fine art, we say they are soulless; and this, although 
we find nothing to censure in them as far as taste goes. A poem may 
be 
very pretty and elegant, but is soulless. A narrative has precision and 
method, but is soulless. A speech on some festive occasion may be 
good 
in substance and ornate withal, but may be soulless. Conversation 
frequently 
is not devoid of entertainment, but yet soulless. Even of a woman we 
may 
well say, she is pretty, affable, and refined, but soulless. Now what 
do we here mean by soul? 
Soul (Geist) in an aesthetical sense, signifies the animating 
principle in the mind. But that whereby this principle animates the 
psychic 
substance (Seele) — the material which it employs for that 
purpose — is that which sets the mental powers into a swing that 
is purposive, i.e., into a play which is self-maintaining and which 
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strengthens 
those powers for such activity. 
Now my proposition is that this principle is nothing else than the 
faculty 
of presenting aesthetic ideas. But, by an aesthetic idea I mean that 
representation 
of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the 
possibility 
of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it, 
and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level 
terms with 
or render completely intelligible. It is easily seen, that an aesthetic 
idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, one which, 
conversely, 
is a concept to which no intuition (representation of the 
imagination) 
can be adequate. 
The imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is a 
powerful 
agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material 
supplied 
to it by actual nature. It affords us entertainment where experience 
proves 
too commonplace; and we even use it to remodel experience, always 
following, 
no doubt, laws that are based on analogy, but still also following 
principles 
which have a higher seat in reason (and which are every whit as 
natural 
to us as those followed by the understanding in laying hold of 
empirical 
nature). By this means we get a sense of our freedom from the law 
of association’ 
(which attaches to the empirical employment of the imagination), 
with 
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the result that the material can be borrowed by us from nature in 
accordance 
with that law, but be worked up by us into something else — namely, 
what surpasses nature. 
Such representations of the imagination may be termed ideas. 
This is 
partly because they at least strain after something lying out beyond 
the 
confines of experience, and so seek to approximate to a 
presentation of 
rational concepts (i.e., intellectual ideas), thus giving to these 
concepts 
the semblance of an objective reality. But, on the other hand, there 
is 
this most important reason, that no concept can be wholly adequate 
to 
them as internal intuitions. The poet essays the task of interpreting 
to sense the rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the 
blessed, 
hell, eternity, creation, etc. Or, again, as to things of which examples 
occur in experience, e.g., death, envy, and all vices, as also love, 
fame, 
and the like, transgressing the limits of experience he attempts with 
the aid of an imagination which emulates the display of reason in its 
attainment of a maximum, to body them forth to sense with a 
completeness. 
of which: nature affords no parallel; and it is in fact precisely 
in the art of poetry that the faculty of aesthetic ideas can show itself 
to full advantage. This faculty, however, regarded solely by itself 
alone, 
is really no more than a talent (of the imagination). 
If, now, we attach to a concept a representation of the 
imagination 
belonging to its presentation, but inducing solely on its own account 
such a wealth of thought as would never admit of comprehension in 
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a definite 
concept, and, as a consequence, giving aesthetically an unbounded 
expansion 
to the concept itself, then the imagination here displays a creative 
activity, 
and it puts the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) into motion — 
a motion, at the instance of a representation, towards an extension 
of 
thought, that, while germane, no doubt, to the concept of the 
object, 
exceeds what can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly 
expressed. 
Those forms which do not constitute the presentation of a given 
concept 
itself, but which,. as secondary representations of the imagination, 
express 
the derivatives connected with it, and its kinship with other 
concepts, 
are called (aesthetic) attributes of an object, the concept of which, 
as an idea of reason, cannot be adequately presented. In this way 
Jupiter’s 
eagle, with the lightning in its claws, is an attribute of the mighty 
king of heaven, and the peacock of its stately queen. They do not, 
like 
logical (aesthetic) attributes of an object, the concept of the 
sublimity 
and majesty of creation, but rather something else — something that 
gives the imagination an incentive to spread its flight over a whole 
host 
of kindred representations that provoke more thought than admits 
of expression 
in a concept determined by words. They furnish an aesthetic idea, 
which 
serves the above rational idea as a substitute for logical 
presentation, 
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but with the proper function, however, of animating the mind by 
opening 
out for it a prospect into a field of kindred representations 
stretching 
beyond its ken. But it is not alone in the arts of painting or sculpture, 
where the name of attribute is customarily employed, that fine art 
acts 
in this way; poetry and rhetoric also drive the soul that animates 
their 
work wholly from the aesthetic attributes of the objects — attributes 
which go hand in hand with the logical, and give the imagination an 
impetus 
to bring more thought into: play in the matter, though in an 
undeveloped 
manner, than allows of being brought within the embrace of a 
concept, 
or, therefore, of being definitely formulated in language. For the 
sake 
of brevity I must confine myself to a few examples only. When the 
great 
king expresses himself in one of his poems by saying: 
Oui, finissons sans trouble, et mourons sans regrets, 
En laissant l’Univers comble de nos bienfaits. 
Ainsi l’Astre du jour, au bout de sa carriere, 
Repand sur l’horizon une douce lumiere, 
Et les derniers rayons qu’il darde dans les airs 
Sont les derniers soupirs qu’il donne a l’Univers; 
he kindles in this way his rational idea of a cosmopolitan sentiment 
even at the close of life, with help of an attribute which the 
imagination 
(in remembering all the pleasures of a fair summer’s day that is 
over and gone — a memory of which pleasures is suggested by a 
serene 
evening) annexes to that representation, and which stirs up a crowd 
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of 
sensations and secondary representations for which no expression 
can be 
found. On the other hand, even an intellectual concept may serve, 
conversely, 
as attribute for a representation of sense, and so animate the latter 
with the idea of the supersensible; but only by the aesthetic factor 
subjectively 
attaching to the consciousness of the supersensible being employed 
for 
the purpose. So, for example, a certain poet says in his description 
of 
a beautiful morning: “The sun arose, as out of virtue rises peace.” 
The consciousness of virtue, even where we put ourselves only in 
thought 
in the position of a virtuous man, diffuses in the mind a multitude of 
sublime and tranquillizing feelings, and gives a boundless outlook 
into 
a happy future, such as no expression within the compass of a 
definite 
concept completely attains.15 
15. Perhaps there has never been a more sublime utterance, 
or a thought more sublimely expressed, than the well — 
known inscription upon the Temple of Isis (Mother 
Nature): “I am all that is, and that was, and that shall be, 
and no mortal hath raised the veil from before my face.” 
Segner made use of this idea in a suggestive vignette on 
the frontispiece of his Natural Philosophy, in order to 
inspire his pupil at the threshold of that temple into 
which he was about to lead him, with such a holy awe as 
would dispose his mind to serious attention. 
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In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the 
imagination, 
annexed to a given concept, with which, in the free employment of 
imagination, 
such a multiplicity of partial representations are bound up, that no 
expression 
indicating a definite concept can be found for it one which on that 
account 
allows a concept to be supplemented in thought by much that is 
indefinable 
in words, and the feeling of which quickens the cognitive faculties, 
and 
with language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up the spirit (soul) 
also. 
The mental powers whose union in a certain relation constitutes 
genius 
are imagination and understanding. Now, since the imagination, in 
its 
employment on behalf of cognition, is subjected to the constraint of 
the 
understanding and the restriction of having to be conformable to 
the concept 
belonging’ thereto, whereas aesthetically it is free to furnish of 
its own accord, over and above that agreement with the concept, a 
wealth 
of undeveloped material for the understanding, to which the latter 
paid 
no regard in its concept, but which it can make use of, not so much 
objectively 
for cognition, as subjectively for quickening the cognitive faculties, 
and hence also indirectly for cognitions, it may be seen that genius 
properly 
consists in the happy relation, which science cannot teach nor 
industry 
learn, enabling one to find out ideas for a given concept, and, 
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besides, 
to hit upon the expression for them — the expression by means of 
which the subjective mental condition induced by the ideas as the 
concomitant 
of a concept may be communicated to others. This latter talent is 
properly 
that which is termed soul. For to get an expression for what is 
indefinable 
in the mental state accompanying a particular representation and to 
make 
it universally communicable — be the expression in language or 
painting 
or statuary — is a thing requiring a faculty for laying hold of the 
rapid and transient play of the imagination, and for unifying it in a 
concept (which for that very reason is original, and reveals a new 
rule 
which could not have been inferred from any preceding principles 
or examples) 
that admits of communication without any constraint of rules. 
If, after this analysis, we cast a glance back upon the above 
definition 
of what is called genius, we find, first, that it is a talent for art 
— not one for science, in which clearly known rules must take the 
lead and determine the procedure. Secondly, being a talent in the 
line 
of art, it presupposes a definite concept of the product — as its 
end. Hence it presupposes understanding, but, in addition, a 
representation, 
indefinite though it be, of the material, i.e., of the intuition, required 
for the presentation of that concept, and so a relation of the 
imagination 
to the understanding. Thirdly, it displays itself, not so much in the 
working out of the projected end in the presentation of a definite 
concept, 
as rather in the portrayal, or expression of aesthetic ideas 
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containing 
a wealth of material for effecting that intention. Consequently the 
imagination 
is represented by it in its freedom from all guidance of rules, but still 
as purpose for the presentation of the given concept. Fourthly, and 
lastly, 
the unsought and undesigned subjective purposiveness in the free 
harmonizing 
of the imagination with the understanding’s conformity to law 
presupposes 
a proportion and accord between these faculties such as cannot be 
brought 
about by any observance of rules, whether of science or mechanical 
imitation, 
but can only be produced by the nature of the individual. 
Genius, according to these presuppositions, is the exemplary 
originality 
of the natural endowments of an individual in the free employment 
of his 
cognitive faculties. On this showing, the product of a genius (in 
respect 
of so much in this product as is attributable to genius, and not to 
possible 
learning or academic instruction) is an example, not for imitation 
(for 
that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very 
soul 
of the work), but to be followed by another genius — one whom it 
arouses to a sense of his own originality in putting freedom from the 
constraint of rules so into force in his art that for art itself a new 
rule is won — which is what shows a talent to be exemplary. Yet, 
since the genius is one of nature’s elect — a type that must 
be regarded as but a rare phenomenon — for other clever minds his 
example gives rise to a school, that is to say a methodical instruction 
according to rules, collected, so far as the circumstances admit, 
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from 
such products of genius and their peculiarities. And, to that extent, 
fine art is for such persons a matter of imitation, for which nature, 
through the medium of a genius gave the rule. 
But this imitation becomes aping when the pupil copies 
everything down 
to the deformities which the genius only of necessity suffered to 
remain, 
because they could hardly be removed without loss of force to the 
idea. 
This courage has merit only in the case of a genius. A certain 
boldness 
of expression and, in general, many a deviation from the common 
rule becomes 
him well, but in no sense is it a thing worthy of imitation. On the 
contrary 
it remains all through intrinsically a blemish, which one is bound to 
try to remove, but for which the genius is, as it were, allowed to 
plead 
a privilege, on the ground that a scrupulous carefulness would spoil 
what 
is inimitable in the impetuous ardour of his soul. Mannerism is 
another 
kind of aping — an aping of peculiarity (originality) in general, 
for the sake of removing oneself as far as possible from imitators, 
while 
the talent requisite to enable one to be at the same time exemplary 
is 
absent. There are, in fact, two modes (modi) in general of arranging 
one’s thoughts for utterance. The one is called a manner (modus 
aestheticus), the other a method (modus logicus). The distinction 
between them is this: the former possesses no standard other than 
the 
feeling of unity in the presentation, whereas the latter here follows 
definite principles. As a consequence, the former is alone admissible 
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for fine art. It is only, however, where the manner of carrying the 
idea 
into execution in a product of art is aimed at singularity, instead of 
being made appropriate to the idea, that mannerism is properly 
ascribed 
to such a product. The ostentatious (precieux), forced, and affected 
styles, intended to mark one out from the common herd (though 
soul is 
wanting), resemble the behaviour of a man who, as we say, hears 
himself 
talk, or who stands and moves about as if he were on a stage to be 
gaped 
at — action which invariably betrays a ignoramus. 
§ 50. The combination of taste and genius in products of fine 
art. 
To ask whether more stress should be laid in matters of fine art 
upon 
the presence of genius or upon that of taste, is equivalent to asking 
whether more turns upon imagination or upon judgment. Now, 
imagination 
rather entitles an art to be called an inspired (geistreiche) than 
a fine art. It is only in respect of judgment that the name of fine art 
is deserved. Hence it follows that judgment, being the indispensable 
condition (conditio sine qua non), is at least what one must look 
to as of capital importance in forming an estimate of art as fine art. 
So far as beauty is concerned, to be fertile and original in ideas is 
not such an imperative requirement as it is that the imagination in 
its 
freedom should be in accordance with the understanding’s 
conformity 
to law. For, in lawless freedom, imagination, with all its wealth, 
produces 
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nothing but nonsense; the power of judgment, on the other hand, is 
the 
faculty that makes it consonant with understanding. 
Taste, like judgment in general, is the discipline (or corrective) 
of genius. It severely clips its wings, and makes it orderly or 
polished; 
but at the same time it gives it guidance directing and controlling its 
flight, so that it may preserve its character of purposiveness. It 
introduces 
a clearness and order into the plenitude of thought, and in so doing 
gives 
stability to the ideas, and qualifies them at once for permanent and 
universal 
approval, for being followed by others, and for a continually 
progressive 
culture. And so, where the interests of both these qualities clash in 
a product, and there has to be a sacrifice of something, then it 
should 
rather be on the side of genius; and judgment, which in matters of 
fine 
art bases its decision on its own proper principles, will more readily 
endure an abatement of the freedom and wealth of the imagination 
than 
that the understanding should be compromised. 
The requisites for fine art are, therefore, imagination, 
understanding, 
soul, and taste.16 
16. The first three faculties are first brought into union by 
means of the fourth. Hume, in his history, informs the 
English that although they are second in their works to 
no other people in the world in respect the evidences 
they afford of the three first qualities separately 
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§ 51. The division of the fine arts. 
Beauty (whether it be of nature or of art) may in general be termed 
the expression of aesthetic ideas. But the provision must be added 
that 
with beauty of art this idea must be excited through the medium of 
a concept 
of the object, whereas with beauty of nature the bare reflection 
upon 
a given intuition, apart from any concept of what the object is 
intended 
to be, is sufficient for awakening and communicating the idea of 
which 
that object is regarded as the expression. 
Accordingly, if we wish to make a division of the fine arts, we can 
choose for that purpose, tentatively at least, no more convenient 
principle 
than the analogy which art bears to the mode of expression of which 
men 
avail themselves in speech with a view to communicating 
themselves to 
one another as completely as possible, i.e., not merely in respect of 
their concepts but in respect of their sensations also.17 Such 
expression 
consists in word, gesture, and tone (articulation, gesticulation, and 
considered, still in what unites them they must yield to 
their neighbours, the French. 
17. The reader is not to consider this scheme for a possible 
division of the fine arts as a deliberate theory. It is only 
one of the various attempts that can and ought to be 
made. 
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modulation). It is the combination of these three modes of 
expression 
which alone constitutes a complete communication of the speaker. 
For thought, 
intuition, and sensation are in this way conveyed to others 
simultaneously 
and in conjunction. 
Hence there are only three kinds of fine art: the art of speech, 
formative 
art, and the art of the play of sensations (as external sense 
impressions). 
This division might also be arranged as a dichotomy, so that fine art 
would be divided into that of the expression of thoughts or 
intuitions, 
the latter being subdivided according to the distinction between the 
form 
and the matter (sensation). It would, however, in that case appear 
too 
abstract, and less in line with popular conceptions. 
(1) The arts of speech are rhetoric and poetry. Rhetoric is the art 
of transacting a serious business of the understanding as if it were a 
free play of the imagination; poetry that of conducting a free play of 
the imagination as if it were a serious business of the understanding. 
Thus the orator announces a serious business, and for the 
purpose of 
entertaining his audience conducts it as if it were a mere play with 
ideas. 
The poet promises merely an entertaining play with ideas, and yet 
for 
the understanding there enures as much as if the promotion of its 
business 
had been his one intention. The combination and harmony of the 
two faculties 
of cognition, sensibility and understanding, which, though 
doubtless indispensable to one another, do not readily permit of 
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being united without compulsion 
and reciprocal abatement, must have the appearance of being 
undesigned 
and a spontaneous occurrence — otherwise it is not fine art. For 
this reason what is studied and laboured must be here avoided. For 
fine 
art must be free art in a double sense: i.e., not alone in a sense 
opposed 
to contract work, as not being a work the magnitude of which may 
be estimated, 
exacted, or paid for, according to a definite standard, but free also 
in the sense that, while the mind, no doubt, occupies itself, still it 
does so without ulterior regard to any other end, and yet with a 
feeling 
of satisfaction and stimulation (independent of reward). 
The orator, therefore, gives something which he does not 
promise, viz., 
an entertaining play of the imagination. On the other hand, there is 
something 
in which he fails to come up to his promise, and a thing, too, which 
is 
his avowed business, namely, the engagement of the understanding 
to some 
end. The poet’s promise, on the contrary, is a modest one, and a 
mere play with ideas is all he holds out to us, but he accomplishes 
something 
worthy of being made a serious business, namely, the using of play 
to 
provide food for the understanding, and the giving of life to its 
concepts 
by means of the imagination. Hence the orator in reality performs 
less 
than he promises, the poet more. 
(2) The formative arts, or those for the expression of ideas in 
sensuous 
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intuition (not by means of representations of mere imagination that 
are 
excited by words) are arts either of sensuous truth or of sensuous 
semblance. 
The first is called plastic art, the second painting. Both use figures 
in space for the expression of ideas: the former makes figures 
discernible 
to two senses, sight and touch (though, so far as the latter sense is 
concerned, without regard to beauty), the latter makes them so to 
the 
former sense alone. The aesthetic idea (archetype, original) is the 
fundamental 
basis of both in the imagination; but the figure which constitutes its 
expression (the ectype, the copy) is given either in its bodily 
extension 
(the way the object itself exists) or else in accordance with the 
picture 
which it forms of itself in the eye (according to its appearance when 
projected on a flat surface). Or, whatever the archetype is, either the 
reference to an actual end or only the semblance of one may be 
imposed 
upon reflection as its condition. 
To plastic art, as the first kind of formative fine art, belong 
sculpture 
and architecture. The first is that which presents concepts of things 
corporeally, as they might exist in nature (though as fine art it 
directs 
its attention to aesthetic purposiveness). The second is the art of 
presenting 
concepts of things which are possible only through art, and the 
determining 
ground of whose form is not nature but an arbitrary end — and of 
presenting them both with a view to this purpose and yet, at the 
same 
time, with aesthetic purposiveness. In architecture the chief point is 
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a certain use of the artistic object to which, as the condition, the 
aesthetic 
ideas are limited. In sculpture the mere expression of aesthetic 
ideas 
is the main intention. Thus statues of men, gods, animals, etc., 
belong 
to sculpture; but temples, splendid buildings for public concourse, 
or 
even dwelling-houses, triumphal arches, columns, mausoleums, 
etc., erected 
as monuments, belong to architecture, and in fact all household 
furniture 
(the work of cabinetmakers, and so forth — things meant to be used) 
may be added to the list, on the ground that adaptation of the 
product 
to a particular use is the essential element in a work of architecture. 
On the other hand, a mere piece of sculpture, made simply to be 
looked 
at and intended to please on its own account, is, as a corporeal 
presentation, 
a mere imitation of nature, though one in which regard is paid to 
aesthetic 
ideas, and in which, therefore, sensuous truth should not go the 
length 
of losing the appearance of being an art and a product of the elective 
will. 
Painting, as the second kind of formative art, which presents the 
sensuous 
semblance in artful combination with ideas, I would divide into that 
of 
the beautiful Portrayal of nature, and that of the beautiful 
arrangement 
of its products. The first is painting proper, the second landscape 
gardening. 
For the first gives only the semblance of bodily extension; whereas 
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the 
second, giving this, no doubt, according to its truth, gives only the 
semblance of utility and employment for ends other than the play of 
the 
imagination in the contemplation of its forms.18 The latter consists 
in no more than decking out the ground with the same manifold 
variety (grasses, 
flowers, shrubs, and trees, and even water, hills, and dales) as that 
with which nature presents it to our view, only arranged differently 
and 
in obedience to certain ideas. The beautiful arrangement of 
corporeal 
things, however, is also a thing for the eye only, just like painting 
— the sense of touch can form no intuitable representation of such 
a form, In addition I would place under the head of painting, in the 
wide 
18. It seems strange that landscape gardening may be 
regarded as a kind of painting, notwithstanding that it 
presents its forms corporeally. But, as it takes its forms 
bodily from nature (the trees, shrubs, grasses, and 
flowers taken, originally at least, from wood and field) it 
is to that extent not an art such as, let us say, plastic art. 
Further, the arrangement which it makes is not 
conditioned by any concept of the object or of its end (as 
is the case in sculpture), but by the mere free play of the 
imagination in the act of contemplation. Hence it bears a 
degree of resemblance to simple aesthetic painting that 
has no definite theme (but by means of light and shade 
makes a pleasing composition of atmosphere, land, and 
water.) 
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sense, the decoration of rooms by means of hangings, ornamental 
accessories, 
and all beautiful furniture the sole function of which is to be looked 
at; and in the same way the art of tasteful dressing (with rings, 
snuffboxes, 
etc.). For a parterre of various flowers, a room with a variety of 
ornaments 
(including even the ladies’ attire), go to make at a festal gathering 
a sort of picture which, like pictures in the true sense of the word 
(those 
which are not intended to teach history or natural science), has no 
business 
beyond appealing to the eye, in order to entertain the imagination 
in 
free play with ideas, and to engage actively the aesthetic judgment 
independently 
of any definite end. No matter how heterogeneous, on the 
mechanical side, 
may be the craft involved in all this decoration, and no matter what 
a 
variety of artists may be required, still the judgment of taste, so far 
as it is one upon what is beautiful in this art, is determined in one 
and the same way: namely, as a judgment only upon the forms 
(without 
regard to any end) as they present themselves to the eye, singly or 
in 
combination, according to their effect upon the imagination. The 
justification, 
however, of bringing formative art (by analogy) under a common 
head with 
gesture in a speech, lies in the fact that through these figures the 
soul 
of the artists furnishes a bodily expression for the substance and 
character 
of his thought, and makes the thing itself speak, as it were, in mimic 
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language — a very common play of our fancy, that attributes to 
lifeless 
things a soul suitable to their form, and that uses them as its 
mouthpiece. 
(3) The art of the beautiful play of sensations (sensations that arise 
from external stimulation), which is a play of sensations that has 
nevertheless 
to permit of universal communication, can only be concerned with 
the proportion 
of the different degrees of tension in the sense to which the 
sensation 
belongs, i.e., with its tone. In this comprehensive sense of the word, 
it may be divided into the artificial play of sensations of hearing and 
of sight, consequently into music and the art of color. It is of note 
that these two senses, over and above such susceptibility for 
impressions 
as is required to obtain concepts of external objects by means of 
these 
impressions, also admit of a peculiar associated sensation of which 
we 
cannot well determine whether it is based on sense or reflection; 
and 
that this sensibility may at times be wanting, although the sense, in 
other respects, and in what concerns its employment for the 
cognition 
of objects, is by no means deficient but particularly keen. In other 
words, 
we cannot confidently assert whether a color or a tone (sound) is 
merely 
an agreeable sensation, or whether they are-in-themselves a 
beautiful 
play of sensations, and in being estimated aesthetically, convey, as 
such, 
a delight in their form. If we consider the velocity of the vibrations 
of light, or, in the second case, of the air, which in all probability 
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far outstrips any capacity on our part for forming an immediate 
estimate 
in perception of the time interval between them, we should be led 
to believe 
that it is only the effect of those vibrating movements upon the 
elastic 
parts of our body, that can be evident to sense, but that the time-
interval 
between them is not noticed nor involved in our estimate, and that, 
consequently, 
all that enters into combination with colors and tones is 
agreeableness, 
and not beauty, of their composition. But, let us consider, on the 
other 
hand, first, the mathematical character both of the proportion of 
those 
vibrations in music, and of our judgment upon it, and, as is 
reasonable, 
form an estimate of color contrasts on the analogy of the latter. 
Secondly, 
let us consult the instances, albeit rare, of men who, with the best 
of 
sight, have failed to distinguish colors, and, with the sharpest 
hearing, 
to distinguish tones, while for men who have this ability the 
perception 
of an altered quality (not merely of the degree of the sensation) in 
the 
case of the different intensities in the scale of colors or tones is 
definite, as is also the number of those which may be intelligibly 
distinguished. 
Bearing all this in mind, we may feel compelled to look upon the 
sensations 
afforded by both, not as mere sense-impressions, but as the effect 
of 
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an estimate of form in the play of a number of sensations. The 
difference 
which the one opinion or the other occasions in the estimate of the 
basis 
of music would, however, only give rise to this much change in its 
definition, 
that either it is to be interpreted, as we have done, as the beautiful 
play of sensations (through bearing), or else as one of agreeable 
sensations. 
According to the former interpretation, alone, would music be 
represented 
out and out as a fine art, whereas according to the latter it would be 
represented as (in part at least) an agreeable art. 
§ 52. The combination of the fine arts in one and the same 
product. 
Rhetoric may in a drama be combined with a pictorial presentation 
as 
well of its subjects as of objects; as may poetry with music in a song; 
and this again with a pictorial (theatrical) presentation in an opera; 
and so may the play of sensations in a piece of music with the play 
of 
figures in a dance, and so on. Even the presentation of the sublime, 
so 
far as it belongs to fine art, may be brought into union with beauty 
in 
a tragedy in verse, a didactic poem or an oratorio, and in this 
combination 
fine art is even more artistic. Whether it is also more beautiful 
(having 
regard to the multiplicity of different kinds of delight which cross 
one 
another) may in some of these instances be doubted. Still in all fine 
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art the essential element consists in the form which is purposive for 
observation and for estimating. Here the pleasure is at the same 
time 
culture, and disposes the soul to ideas, making it thus susceptible of 
such pleasure and entertainment in greater abundance. The matter 
of sensation 
(charm or emotion) is not essential. Here the aim is merely 
enjoyment, 
which leaves nothing behind it in the idea, and renders the soul dull, 
the object in the course of time distasteful, and the mind dissatisfied 
with itself and ill-humoured, owing to a consciousness that in the 
judgment 
of reason its disposition is perverse. 
Where fine arts are not, either proximately or remotely, brought 
into 
combination with moral ideas, which alone are attended with a 
selfsufficing 
delight, the above is the fate that ultimately awaits them. They then 
only serve for a diversion, of which one continually feels an 
increasing 
need in proportion as one has availed oneself of it as a means of 
dispelling 
the discontent of one’s mind, with the result that one makes oneself 
ever more — and more unprofitable and dissatisfied with oneself. 
With a view to the purpose first named, the beauties of nature are 
in 
general the most beneficial, if one is early habituated to observe, 
estimate, 
and admire them. 
§ 53. Comparative estimate of the aesthetic worth of the fine 
arts. 
Poetry (which owes its origin almost entirely to genius and is least 
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willing to be led by precepts or example) holds the first rank among 
all 
the arts. It expands the mind by giving freedom to the imagination 
and 
by offering, from among the boundless multiplicity of possible forms 
accordant 
with a given concept, to whose bounds it is restricted, that one 
which 
couples with the presentation of the concept a wealth of thought to 
which 
no verbal expression is completely adequate, and by thus rising 
aesthetically 
to ideas. It invigorates the mind by letting it feel its faculty — 
free, spontaneous, and independent of determination by nature of 
regarding 
and estimating nature as phenomenon in the light of aspects which 
nature 
of itself does not afford us in experience, either for sense or 
understanding, 
and of employing it accordingly in behalf of, and as a sort of schema 
for, the supersensible. It plays with semblance, which it produces at 
will, but not as an instrument of deception; for its avowed pursuit is 
merely one of play, which, however, understanding may turn to 
good account 
and employ for its own purpose. Rhetoric, so far as this is taken to 
mean 
the art of persuasion, i.e., the art of deluding by means of a fair 
semblance 
(as ars oratoria), and not merely excellence of speech (eloquence 
and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from poetry only so much as 
is necessary to win over men’s minds to the side of the speaker 
before 
they have weighed the matter, and to rob their verdict of its 
freedom. 
Hence it can be recommended neither for the bar nor the pulpit. For 
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where 
civil laws, the right of individual persons, or the permanent 
instruction 
and determination of men’s minds to a correct knowledge and a 
conscientious 
observance of their duty is at stake, then it is below the dignity of 
an undertaking of such moment to exhibit even a trace of the 
exuberance 
of wit and imagination, and, still more, of the art of talking men 
round 
and prejudicing them in favor of any one. For although such art is 
capable 
of being at times directed to ends intrinsically legitimate and 
praiseworthy, 
still it becomes reprehensible on account of the subjective injury 
done 
in this way to maxims and sentiments, even where objectively the 
action 
may be lawful. For it is not enough to do what is right, but we should 
practice it solely on the ground of its being right. Further, the simple 
lucid concept of human concerns of this kind, backed up with lively 
illustrations 
of it, exerts of itself, in the absence of any offense against the rules 
of euphony of speech or of propriety in the expression of ideas of 
reason 
(all which together make up excellence of speech), a sufficient 
influence 
upon human minds to obviate the necessity of having recourse here 
to the 
machinery of persuasion, which, being equally available for the 
purpose 
of putting a fine gloss or a cloak upon vice and error, fails to rid one 
completely of the lurking suspicion that one is being artfully 
hoodwinked. 
In poetry everything is straight and above board. It shows its hand: 
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it 
desires to carry on a mere entertaining play with the imagination, 
and 
one consonant, in respect of form, with the laws of understanding, 
and 
it does not seek to steal upon and ensnare the understanding with a 
sensuous 
presentation.19 
19. I confess to the pure delight which I have ever been 
afforded by a beautiful poem; whereas the reading of the 
best speech of a Roman forensic orator, a modern 
parliamentary debater, or a preacher, has invariably been 
mingled with an unpleasant sense of disapproval of an 
insidious art that knows how, in matters of moment, to 
move men like machines to a judgment that must lose all 
its weight with them upon calm reflection. Force and 
elegance of speech (which together constitute rhetoric) 
belong to fine art; but oratory (ars oratoria), being the 
art of playing for one’s own purpose up — the 
weaknesses of men (let this purpose be ever so good in 
intention or even in fact) merits no respect whatever. 
Besides, both at Athens and at Rome, it only attained its 
greatest height at a time when the state was hastening 
to its decay, and genuine patriotic sentiment was a thing 
of the past. One who sees the issue clearly, and who has 
a command of language in its wealth and its purity, and 
who is possessed of an imagination that is fertile and 
effective in presenting his ideas, and whose heart, 
withal, turns with lively sympathy to what is truly good — 
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After poetry, if we take charm and mental stimulation into 
account, 
I would give the next place to that art which comes nearer to it than 
to any other art of speech, and admits of very natural union with it, 
namely the art of tone. For though it speaks by means of mere 
sensations 
without concepts, and so does not, like poetry, leave behind it any 
food 
for reflection, still it moves the mind more diversely, and, although 
with transient, still with intenser effect. It is certainly, however, 
more a matter of enjoyment than of culture — the play of thought 
incidentally excited by it being merely the effect of a more or less 
mechanical 
association — and it possesses less worth in the eyes of reason than 
any other of the fine arts. Hence, like all enjoyment, it calls for 
constant 
change, and does not stand frequent repetition without inducing 
weariness. 
Its charm, which admits of such universal communication, appears 
to rest 
on the following facts. Every expression in language has an 
associated 
tone suited to its sense. This tone indicates, more or less, a mode in 
which the speaker is affected, and in turn evokes it in the hearer 
also, 
in whom conversely it then also excites the idea which in language 
is 
expressed with such a tone. Further, just as modulation is, as it 
he is the vir bonus dicendi peritus, the orator without art, 
but of great impressiveness, Cicero would have him, 
though he may not himself always always remained 
faithful to this ideal. 
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were, 
a universal language of sensations intelligible to every man, so the 
art 
of tone wields the full force of this language wholly on its own 
account, 
namely, as a language of the affections, and in this way, according to 
the law of association, universally communicates the aesthetic ideas 
that 
are naturally combined therewith. But, further, inasmuch as those 
aesthetic 
ideas are not concepts or determinate thoughts, the form of the 
arrangement 
of these sensations (harmony and melody), taking the place of the 
place 
of the form of a language, only serves the purpose of giving an 
expression 
to the aesthetic idea of an integral whole of an unutterable wealth 
of 
thought that fills the measure of a certain theme forming the 
dominant 
affection in the piece. This purpose is effectuated by means of a 
proposition 
in the accord of the sensations (an accord which may be brought 
mathematically 
under certain rules, since it rests, in the case of tones, upon the 
numerical 
relation of the vibrations of the air in the same time, so far as there 
is a combination of the tones simultaneously or in succession). 
Although 
this mathematical form is not represented by means of determinate 
concepts, 
to it alone belongs the delight which the mere reflection upon such 
a 
number of concomitant or consecutive sensations couples with this 
their 
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play, as the universally valid condition of its beauty, and it is with 
reference to it alone that taste can lay claim to a right to anticipate 
the judgment of every man. 
But mathematics, certainly, does not play the smallest part in the 
charm 
and movement of the mind produced by music. Rather is it only the 
indispensable 
condition (conditio sine qua non) of that proportion of the 
combining 
as well as changing impressions which makes it possible to grasp 
them 
all in one and prevent them from destroying one another, and to let 
them, 
rather, conspire towards the production of a continuous movement 
and quickening of the mind by affections that are in unison with it, 
and thus towards 
a serene self-enjoyment. 
If, on the other hand, we estimate the worth of the fine arts by the 
culture they supply to the mind, and adopt for our standard the 
expansion 
of the faculties whose confluence, in judgment, is necessary for 
cognition, 
music, then, since it plays merely with sensations, ’has the lowest 
place among the fine arts — just as it has perhaps the highest among 
those valued at the same time for their agreeableness. Looked at in 
this 
light, it is far excelled by the formative arts. For, in putting the 
imagination 
into a play which is at once free and adapted to the understanding, 
they 
all the while carry on a serious business, since they execute a 
product 
which serves the concepts of understanding as a vehicle, permanent 
and 
appealing to us on its own account, for effectuating their union with 
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sensibility, and thus for promoting, as it were, the urbanity of the 
higher 
powers of cognition. The two kinds of art pursue completely 
different 
courses. Music advances from sensations to indefinite ideas: 
formative 
art from definite ideas to sensations. The latter gives a lasting 
impression, 
the former one that is only fleeting. The former sensations 
imagination 
can recall and agreeably entertain itself with, while the latter either 
vanish entirely, or else, if involuntarily repeated by the imagination, 
are more annoying to us than agreeable. Over and above all this, 
music 
has a certain lack of urbanity about it. For owing chiefly to the 
character 
of its instruments, it scatters its influence abroad to an uncalled — 
for extent (through the neighbourhood), and thus, as it were, 
becomes 
obtrusive and deprives others, outside the musical circle, of their 
freedom. 
This is a thing that the arts that address themselves to the eye do 
not 
do, for if one is not disposed to give admittance to their 
impressions, 
one has only to look the other way. The case is almost on a par with 
the 
practice of regaling oneself with a perfume that exhales its odours 
far 
and wide. The man who pulls his perfumed handkerchief from his 
pocket 
gives a treat to all around whether they like it or not, and compels 
them, 
Kant - from The Critique of Judgement  |  425
if they want to breathe at all, to be parties to the enjoyment, and so 
the habit has gone out of fashion.20 
Among the formative arts I would give the palm to painting: partly 
because 
it is the art of design and, as such, the groundwork of all the other 
formative arts; partly because it can penetrate much further into 
the 
region of ideas, and in conformity with them give a greater 
extension 
to the field of intuition than it is open to the others to do. 
§ 54. Remark 
As we have often shown, an essential distinction lies between what 
pleases 
simply in the estimate formed of it and what gratifies (pleases in 
sensation). 
The latter is something which, unlike the former, we cannot demand 
from 
every one. Gratification (no matter whether its cause has its seat 
even 
in ideas) appears always to consist in a feeling of the furtherance of 
the entire life of the man, and hence, also of his bodily well-being, 
i.e., his health. And so, perhaps, Epicurus was not wide of the mark 
20. Those who have recommended the singing of hymns at 
family prayers have forgotten the amount of annoyance 
which they give to the general public by such noisy (and, 
as a rule, for that very reason, pharisaical) worship, for 
they compel their neighbours either to join in the 
singing or else abandon their meditations. 
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when 
he said that at bottom all gratification is bodily sensation, and only 
misunderstood himself in ranking intellectual and even practical 
delight 
under the head of gratification. Bearing in mind the latter 
distinction, 
it is readily explicable how even the gratification a person feels is 
capable of displeasing him (as the joy of a necessitous but good-
natured 
individual on being made the heir of an affectionate but penurious 
father), 
or how deep pain may still give pleasure to the sufferer (as the 
sorrow 
of a widow over the death of her deserving husband), or how there 
may 
be pleasure over and above gratification (as in scientific pursuits), 
or how a pain (as, for example, hatred, envy, and desire for revenge) 
may in addition be a source of displeasure. Here the delight or 
aversion 
depends upon reason, and is one with approbation or 
disapprobation. Gratification and pain, on the other hand, can only 
depend upon feeling, or upon the prospect of a possible well-being 
or the reverse (irrespective of source). 
The changing free play of sensations (which do not follow any 
preconceived 
plan) is always a source of gratification, because it promotes the 
feeling 
of health; and it is immaterial whether or not we experience delight 
in 
the object of this play or even in the gratification itself when 
estimated 
in the light of reason. Also this gratification may amount to an 
affection, 
although we take no interest in the object itself, or none, at least, 
proportionate to the degree of the affection. We may divide the 
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above 
play into that of games of chance (Gluckspiel), harmony (Tonspiel), 
and wit (Gedankenspiel). The first stands in need of an interest, 
be it of vanity or selfseeking, but one which falls far short of that 
centered in the adopted mode of procurement. All that the second 
requires 
is the change of sensations, each of which has its bearing on 
affection, 
though without attaining to the degree of an affection, and excites 
aesthetic 
ideas. The third springs merely from the change of the 
representations 
in the judgment, which, while unproductive of any thought 
conveying an 
interest, yet enlivens the mind. 
What a fund of gratification must be afforded by play, without our 
having 
to fall back upon any consideration of interest, is a matter to which 
all our evening parties bear witness for without play they hardly 
ever 
escape falling flat. But the affections of hope, fear, joy, anger, and 
derision here engage in play, as every moment they change their 
parts 
and are so lively that, as by an internal motion, the whole vital 
function 
of the body seems to be furthered by the process — as is proved by 
a vivacity of the mind produced — although no one comes by 
anything 
in the way of profit or instruction. But as the play of chance is not 
one that is beautiful, we will here lay it aside. Music, on the contrary, 
and what provokes laughter are two kinds of play with aesthetic 
ideas, 
or even with representations of the understanding, by which, all said 
and done, nothing is thought. By mere force of change they yet are 
able 
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to afford lively gratification. This furnishes pretty clear evidence 
that 
the quickening effect of both is physical, despite its being excited by 
ideas of the mind, and that the feeling of health, arising from a 
movement 
of the intestines answering to that play, makes up that entire 
gratification 
of an animated gathering upon the spirit and refinement of which 
we set 
such store. Not any estimate of harmony in tones or flashes of wit, 
which, 
with its beauty, serves only as a necessary vehicle, but rather the 
stimulated 
vital functions of the body, the affection stirring the intestines and 
the diaphragm, and, in a word, the feeling of health (of which we are 
only sensible upon some such provocation) are what constitute the 
gratification 
we experience at being able to reach the body through the soul and 
use 
the latter as the physician of the former. 
In music, the course of this play is from bodily sensation to 
aesthetic 
ideas (which are the objects for the affections), and then from these 
back again, but with gathered strength, to the body. In jest (which 
just 
as much as the former deserves to be ranked rather as an agreeable 
than 
a fine art) the play sets out from thoughts which collectively, so far 
as seeking sensuous expression, engage the activity of the body. In 
this 
presentation the understanding, missing what it expected, suddenly 
lets 
go its hold, with the result that the effect of this slackening is felt 
in the body by the oscillation of the organs. This favous the 
restoration 
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of the equilibrium of the latter, and exerts a beneficial influence 
upon 
the health. 
Something absurd (something in which, therefore, the 
understanding can 
of itself find no delight) must be present in whatever is to raise a 
hearty 
convulsive laugh. Laughter is an all action arising from a strained 
expectation 
being suddenly reduced to nothing. This very reduction, at which 
certainly 
understanding cannot rejoice, is still indirectly a source of very 
lively 
enjoyment for a moment. Its cause must consequently lie in the 
influence 
of the representation upon the body and the reciprocal effect of this 
upon the mind. This, moreover, cannot depend upon the 
representation being 
objectively an object of gratification (for how can we derive 
gratification 
from a disappointment?) but must rest solely upon the fact that the 
reduction 
is a mere play of representations, and, as such, produces an 
equilibrium 
of the vital forces of the body. 
Suppose that some one tells the following story. An Indian at an 
Englishman’s 
table in Surat saw a bottle of ale opened, with all the foam flowing 
out. The Indian looked at this with great astonishment. “Well, 
what is so amazing in that?” asked the Englishman. “Oh, I’m 
not surprised that it’s coming out,” said the Indian, “It’s 
how you managed to get it all in.” At this we laugh, and it gives 
us hearty pleasure. This is not because we think ourselves, maybe, 
more 
quick-witted than this ignorant Indian, or because our 
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understanding 
here brings to our notice any other ground of delight. It is rather 
that the bubble of our expectation was extended to the full and 
suddenly 
went off into nothing. Or, again, take the case of the heir of a 
wealthy 
man who wants to put on an impressive funeral for his dead relative. 
Things aren’t working out, he explains, because “the more 
money I give the mourners, the happier they look.” At this we laugh 
outright, and the reason lies in the fact that we had an expectation 
which is suddenly reduced to nothing. We must be careful to 
observe 
that the reduction is not one into the positive contrary of an 
expected 
object — for that is always something, and may frequently pain 
us — but must be a reduction to nothing. For where a person arouses 
great expectation by recounting some tale, and at the close its 
untruth 
becomes at once apparent to us, we are displeased at it. So it is, for 
instance, with the tale of people whose hair from excess of grief is 
said to have turned white in a single night. On the other hand, if a 
wag, wishing to cap the story, tells with the utmost circumstantiality 
of a merchant’s grief, who, on his return journey from India to 
Europe with all his wealth in merchandise, was obliged by stress of 
storm to throw everything overboard, and grieved to such an extent 
that 
in the selfsame night his wig turned grey, we laugh and enjoy the 
tale. 
This is because we keep for a time playing on our own mistake about 
an object otherwise indifferent to us, or rather on the idea we 
ourselves 
were following out, and, beating it to and fro, just as if it were a 
ball eluding our grasp, when all we intend to do is just to get it into 
our hands and hold it tight. Here our gratification is not excited by 
a knave or a fool getting a rebuff: for, even on its own account, the 
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latter tale told with an air of seriousness would of itself be enough 
to set a whole table into roars of laughter; and the other matter 
would 
ordinarily not be worth a moment’s thought. 
It is observable that in all such cases the joke must have 
something 
in it capable of momentarily deceiving us. Hence, when the 
semblance vanishes 
into nothing, the mind looks back in order to try it over again, and 
thus 
by a rapidly succeeding tension and relaxation it is jerked to and fro 
and put in oscillation. As the snapping of what was, as it were, 
tightening 
up the string takes place suddenly (not by a gradual loosening), the 
oscillation 
must bring about a mental movement and a sympathetic internal 
movement 
of the body. This continues involuntarily and produces fatigue, but 
in 
so doing it also affords recreation (the effects of a motion conducive 
to health). 
For supposing we assume that some movement in the bodily 
organs is associated 
sympathetically with all our thoughts, it is readily intelligible how 
the sudden act above referred to, of shifting the mind now to one 
standpoint 
and now to the other, to enable it to contemplate its object, may 
involve 
a corresponding and reciprocal straining and slackening of the 
elastic 
parts of our intestines, which communicates itself to the diaphragm 
(and 
resembles that felt by ticklish people), in the course of which the 
lungs 
expel the air with rapidly succeeding interruptions, resulting in a 
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movement 
conducive to health. This alone, and not what goes on in the mind, 
is 
the proper cause of the gratification in a thought that at bottom 
represents 
nothing. Voltaire said that heaven has given us two things to 
compensate 
us for the many miseries of life, hope and sleep. He might have 
added 
laughter to the list — if only the means of exciting it in men of 
intelligence were as ready to hand, and the wit or originality of 
humour 
which it requires were not just as rare as the talent is common for 
inventing 
stuff that splits the head, as mystic speculators do, or that breaks 
your 
neck, as the genius does, or that harrows the heart as sentimental 
novelists 
do (aye, and moralists of the same type). 
We may, therefore as I conceive, make Epicurus a present of the 
point 
that all gratification, even when occasioned by concepts that evoke 
aesthetic ideas, is animal, i.e., bodily sensation. For from this 
admission 
the spiritual feeling of respect for moral ideas, which is not one of 
gratification, but a self-esteem (an esteem for humanity within us) 
that raises us above the need of gratification, suffers not a whit — 
nor does it impair the less noble feeling of taste. 
In naiveté we meet with a joint product of both the above. 
Naiveté is the breaking forth of the ingenuousness originally 
natural to humanity, in opposition to the art of disguising oneself 
that has become a second nature. We laugh at the simplicity that is 
as yet a stranger to dissimulation, but we rejoice the while over the 
simplicity of nature that thwarts that art. We await the 
commonplace 
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manner of artificial utterance, thoughtfully addressed to a fair show, 
and lo! nature stands before us in unsullied innocence — nature 
that we were quite unprepared to meet, and that he who laid it bare 
had also no intention of revealing. That the outward appearance, fair 
but false, that usually assumes such importance in our judgment, is 
here, at a stroke, turned to a nullity, that, as it were, the rogue 
in us is nakedly exposed, calls forth the movement of the mind, in 
two 
successive and opposite directions, agitating the body at the same 
time 
with wholesome motion. But that something infinitely better than 
any 
accepted code of manners, namely purity of mind (or at least a 
vestige 
of such purity), has not become wholly extinct in human nature, 
infuses 
seriousness and reverence into this play of judgment. But since it 
is only a manifestation that obtrudes itself for a moment, and the 
veil 
of a dissembling art is soon drawn over it again, there enters into 
the above feelings a touch of pity. This is an emotion of tenderness, 
playful in its way, that thus readily admits of combination with this 
sort of genial laughter. And, in fact, this emotion is as a rule 
associated 
with it, and, at the same time, is wont to make amends to the person 
who provides such food for our merriment for his embarrassment 
at not 
being wise after the manner of men. For that reason art of being naïf 
is a contradiction. But it is quite possible to give a representation 
of naiveté in a fictitious personage, and, rare as the art is, 
it is a fine art. With this naiveté we must not confuse homely 
simplicity, which only avoids spoiling nature by artificiality, because 
it has no notion of the conventions of good society. 
The humorous manner may also be ranked as a thing which in its 
enlivening 
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influence is clearly allied to the gratification provoked by laughter. 
It belongs to originality of mind (des Geistes), though not to 
the talent for fine art. Humour, in a good sense, means the talent for 
being able to put oneself at will into a certain frame of mind in which 
everything is estimated on lines that go quite off the beaten track 
(a topsy-turvy view of things), and yet on lines that follow certain 
principles, rational in the case of such a mental temperament. A 
person 
with whom such variations are not a matter of choice is said to have 
humours; but if a person can assume them voluntarily and of set 
purpose 
(on behalf of a lively presentation drawn from a ludicrous contrast), 
he and his way of speaking are termed humorous. This manner 
belongs, 
however, to agreeable rather than to fine art, because the object of 
the latter must always have an evident intrinsic worth about it, and 
thus demands a certain seriousness in its presentation, as taste does 
in estimating it. 
Second Section. Dialectic of 
Aesthetic Judgment. 
For a power of judgment to be dialectical it must first of all be 
rationalizing; 
that is to say, its judgments must lay claim to universality,21 and do 
21. Any judgment which sets up to be universal may be 
termed a rationalizing judgment (indicium ratiocinans); 
for so far as universal it may serve as the major premiss 
of a syllogism. On the other hand, only a judgment which 
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so a priori, for it is in the antithesis of such judgments that 
dialectic consists. Hence there is nothing dialectical in the 
irreconcilability 
of aesthetic judgments of sense (upon the agreeable and 
disagreeable). 
And in so far as each person appeals merely to his own private taste, 
even the conflict of judgments of taste does not form a dialectic of 
taste — for no one is proposing to make his own judgment into a 
universal rule. Hence the only concept left to us of a dialectic 
affecting 
taste is one of a dialectic of the critique of taste (not of taste itself) 
in respect of its principles: for, on the question of the ground of the 
possibility of judgments of taste in general, mutually conflicting 
concepts 
naturally and unavoidably make their appearance. The 
transcendental critique 
of taste will, therefore, only include a part capable of bearing the 
name 
of a dialectic of the aesthetic judgment if we find an antinomy of the 
principles of this faculty which throws doubt upon its conformity to 
law, 
and hence also upon its inner possibility. 
§ 56. Representation of the antinomy of taste 
The first commonplace of taste is contained in the proposition 
under 
cover of which every one devoid of taste thinks to shelter himself 
is thought as the conclusion of a syllogism, and, 
therefore, as having an a priori foundation, can be called 
rational (indicium ratiocinatum). 
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from 
reproach: every one has his own taste. This is only another way of 
saying 
that the determining ground of this judgment is merely subjective 
(gratification 
or pain), and that the judgment has no right to the necessary 
agreement 
of others. 
Its second commonplace, to which even those resort who 
concede the right 
of the judgment of taste to pronounce with validity for every one, is: 
there is no disputing about taste. This amounts to saying that, even 
though 
the determining ground of a judgment of taste be objective, it is not 
reducible to definite concepts, so that in respect of the judgment 
itself 
no decision can be reached by proofs, although it is quite open to us 
to contend upon the matter, and to contend with right. For though 
contention 
and dispute have this point in common, that they aim at bringing 
judgments 
into accordance out of and by means of their mutual opposition; yet 
they 
differ in the latter hoping to effect this from definite concepts, as 
grounds of proof, and, consequently, adopting objective concepts as 
grounds 
of the judgment. But where this is considered impracticable, dispute 
is regarded as alike out of the question. 
Between these two commonplaces an intermediate proposition is 
readily 
seen to be missing. It is one which has certainly not become 
proverbial, 
but yet it is at the back of every one’s mind. It is that there may 
be contention about taste (although not a dispute). This proposition, 
however, involves the contrary of the first one. For in a manner in 
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which 
contention is to be allowed, there must be a: hope of coming to 
terms. 
Hence one must be able to reckon on grounds of judgment that 
possess 
more than private Validity and are thus not merely subjective. And 
yet 
the above principle (Every one has his own taste) is directly opposed 
to this. 
The principle of taste, therefore, exhibits the following antinomy: 
1. Thesis. The judgment of taste is not based upon concepts; for, if 
it were, it would be open to dispute (decision by means of proofs). 
2. Antithesis. The judgment of taste is based on concepts; for 
otherwise, 
despite diversity of judgment, there could be no room even for 
contention 
in the matter (a claim to the necessary agreement of others with this 
judgment). 
§ 57. Solution of the antinomy of taste. 
There is no possibility of removing the conflict of the above 
principles, 
which underlie every judgment of taste (and which are only the two 
peculiarities 
of the judgment of taste previously set out in the Analytic) except by 
showing that the concept to which the object is to refer in a 
judgment 
of this kind is not taken in the same sense in both maxims of the 
aesthetic 
judgment; that this double sense, or point of view, in our estimate, 
is necessary for our power of transcendental judgment; and that 
nevertheless 
the false appearance arising from the confusion of one with the 
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other 
is a natural illusion, and so unavoidable. 
The judgment of taste must have reference to some concept or 
other, 
as otherwise it would be absolutely impossible for it to lay claim to 
necessary validity for every one. Yet it need not on that account be 
provable 
from a concept. For a concept may be either determinable, or else 
at once 
intrinsically undetermined and indeterminable. A concept of the 
understanding, 
which is determinable by means of predicates borrowed from 
sensible intuition 
and capable of corresponding to it, is of the first kind. But of the 
second 
kind is the transcendental rational concept of the supersensible, 
which 
lies at the basis of all that sensible intuition and is, therefore, 
incapable 
of being further determined theoretically. 
Now the judgment of taste applies to objects of sense, but not so 
as 
to determine a concept of them for the understanding; for it is not a 
cognitive judgment. Hence it is a singular representation of intuition 
referable to the feeling of pleasure, and, as such, only a private 
judgment. 
And to that extent it would be limited in its validity to the individual 
judging: the object is for me an object of delight, for others it may 
be otherwise; every one to his taste. 
For all that, the judgment of taste contains beyond doubt an 
enlarged 
reference on the part of the representation of the object (and at the 
same time on the part of the subject also), which lays the foundation 
of an extension of judgments of this kind to necessity for every one. 
This must of necessity be founded upon some concept or other, but 
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such 
a concept as does not admit of being determined by intuition, and 
affords 
no knowledge of anything. Hence, too, it is a concept which does 
not afford 
proof of the judgment of taste. But the mere pure rational concept 
of 
the supersensible lying at the basis of the object (and of the judging 
subject for that matter) as object of sense, and thus as phenomenon, 
is 
just such a concept. For unless such a point of view were adopted 
there 
would be no means of saving the claim of the judgment of taste to 
universal 
validity. And if the concept forming the required basis were a 
concept 
of understanding, though a mere confused one, as, let us say, of 
perfection, 
answering to which the sensible intuition of the beautiful might be 
adduced, 
then it would be at least intrinsically possible to found the judgment 
of taste upon proofs, which contradicts the thesis. 
All contradiction disappears, however, if I say: The judgment of 
taste 
does depend upon a concept (of a general ground of the subjective 
purposiveness 
of nature for the power of judgment), but one from which nothing 
can 
be cognized in respect of the object, and nothing proved, because it 
is 
in itself indeterminable and useless for knowledge. Yet, by means of 
this 
very concept, it acquires at the same time validity for every one (but 
with each individual, no doubt, as a singular judgment immediately 
accompanying 
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his intuition): because its determining ground lies, perhaps, in the 
concept 
of what may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of 
humanity. 
The solution of an antinomy turns solely on the possibility of two 
apparently 
conflicting propositions not being in fact contradictory, but rather 
being 
capable of consisting together, although the explanation of the 
possibility 
of their concept transcends our faculties of cognition. That this 
illusion 
is also natural and for human reason unavoidable, as well as why it 
is 
so, and remains so, although upon the solution of the apparent 
contradiction 
it no longer misleads us, may be made intelligible from the above 
considerations. 
For the concept, which the universal validity of a judgment must 
have 
for its basis, is taken in the same sense in both the conflicting 
judgments, 
yet two opposite predicates are asserted of it. The thesis should 
therefore 
read: The judgment of taste is not based on determinate concepts; 
but 
the antithesis: The judgment of taste does rest upon a concept, 
although 
an indeterminate one (that, namely, of the supersensible substrate 
of 
phenomena); and then there would be no conflict between them. 
Beyond removing this conflict between the claims and counter-
claims 
of taste we can do nothing. To supply a determinate objective 
principle 
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of taste in accordance with which its judgments might be derived, 
tested, 
and proved, is an absolute impossibility, for then it would not be a 
judgment 
of taste. The subjective principle — that is to say, the indeterminate 
idea of the supersensible within us — can only be indicated as the 
unique key to the riddle of this faculty, itself concealed from us in 
its sources; and there is no means of making it any more intelligible. 
The antinomy here exhibited and resolved rests upon the proper 
concept 
of taste as a merely reflective aesthetic judgment, and the two 
seemingly 
conflicting principles are reconciled on the ground that they may 
both 
be true, and this is sufficient. If, on the other hand, owing to the fact 
that the representation lying at the basis of the judgment of taste is 
singular, the determining ground of taste is taken, as by some it is, 
to be agreeableness, or, as others, looking to its universal validity, 
would have it, the principle of perfection, and if the definition of 
taste 
is framed accordingly, the result is an antinomy which is absolutely 
irresolvable 
unless we show the falsity of both propositions as contraries (not as 
simple contradictories). This would force the conclusion that the 
concept 
upon which each is founded is self-contradictory. Thus it is evident 
that 
the removal of the antinomy of the aesthetic judgment pursues a 
course 
similar to that followed by the Critique in the solution of the 
antinomies of pure theoretical reason; and that the antinomies, both 
here 
and in the Critique of Practical Reason, compel us, whether we 
like it or not, to look beyond the horizon of the sensible, and to seek 
in the supersensible the point of union of all our faculties a priori: 
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We find such frequent occasion in transcendental philosophy for 
distinguishing 
ideas from concepts of the understanding that it may be of use to 
introduce 
technical terms answering to the distinction between them. I think 
that 
no objection will be raised to my proposing some. Ideas, in the most 
comprehensive 
sense of the word, are representations referred to an object 
according 
to a certain principle (subjective or objective), in so far as they can 
still never become a cognition of it. They are either referred to an 
intuition, 
in accordance with a merely subjective principle of the harmony of 
the 
cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding), and are then 
called 
aesthetic; or else they are referred to a concept according to an 
objective 
principle and yet are incapable of ever furnishing a cognition of the 
object, and are called rational ideas. In the latter case, the concept 
is a transcendent concept, and, as such, differs from a concept of 
understanding, 
for which an adequately answering experience may always be 
supplied, and 
which, on that account, is called immanent. 
An aesthetic idea cannot become a cognition, because it is an 
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intuition 
(of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be 
found. 
A rational idea can never become a cognition, because it involves a 
concept 
(of the supersensible), for which a commensurate intuition can 
never be 
given. 
Now the aesthetic idea might, I think, be called an inexponible 
representation 
of the imagination, the rational idea, on the other hand, an 
indemonstrable 
concept of reason. The production of both is presupposed to be not 
altogether 
groundless, but rather (following the above explanation of an idea in 
general) to take place in obedience to certain principles of the 
cognitive 
faculties to which they belong (subjective principles in the case of 
the 
former and objective in that of the latter). 
Concepts of the understanding must, as such, always be 
demonstrable 
(if, as in anatomy, demonstration is understood in the sense merely 
of 
presentation). In other words, the object answering to such 
concepts must 
always be capable of being given an intuition (pure or empirical); for 
only in this way can they become cognitions. The concept of 
magnitude 
may be given a priori in the intuition of space, e.g., of the right 
line, etc.; the concept of cause in impenetrability, in the impact of 
bodies, etc. Consequently both may be verified by means of an 
empirical 
intuition, i.e., the thought of them may be indicated (demonstrated, 
exhibited) 
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in an example; and this it must be possible to do: for otherwise there 
would be no certainty of the thought not being empty, i.e., having 
no 
object. 
In logic the expressions demonstrable or indemonstrable are 
ordinarily 
employed only in respect of propositions. A better designation 
would be 
to call the former propositions only mediately, and the latter, 
propositions 
immediately, certain. For pure philosophy, too, has propositions of 
both 
these kinds — meaning thereby true propositions which are in the 
one case capable, and in the other incapable, of proof. But, in its 
character 
of philosophy, while it can, no doubt, prove on a priori grounds, 
it cannot demonstrate — unless we wish to give the complete go — 
by to the meaning of the word which makes demonstrate 
(ostendere, exhibere) 
equivalent to giving an accompanying presentation of the concept 
in intuition 
(be it in a proof or in a definition). Where the intuition is a priori 
this is called its construction, but when even the intuition is 
empirical, 
we have still got the illustration of the object, by which means 
objective 
reality is assured to the concept. Thus an anatomist is said to 
demonstrate 
the human eye when he renders the concept, of which he has 
previously 
given a discursive exposition, intuitable by means of the dissection 
of 
that organ. 
It follows from the above that the rational concept of the 
supersensible 
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substrate of all phenomena generally, or even of that which must be 
laid 
at the basis of our elective will in respect of moral laws, i.e., the 
rational concept of transcendental freedom, is at once specifically 
an 
indemonstrable — concept, and a rational idea, whereas virtue is 
so in a measure. For nothing can be given which in itself qualitatively 
answers in experience to the rational concept of the former, while 
in 
the case of virtue no empirical product of the above causality attains 
the degree that the rational idea prescribes as the rule. 
Just as the imagination, in the case of a rational idea, fails with 
its intuitions to attain to the given concept, so understanding, in the 
case of an aesthetic idea, fails with its concepts ever to attain to the 
completeness of the internal intuition which imagination conjoins 
with 
a given representation. Now since the reduction of a representation 
of 
the imagination to concepts is equivalent to giving its exponents, 
the 
aesthetic idea may be called on inexponible representation of the 
imagination 
(in its free play). I shall have an opportunity hereafter of dealing 
more 
fully with ideas of this kind. At present I confine myself to the 
remark, 
that both kinds of ideas, aesthetic ideas as well as rational, are 
bound 
to have their principles, and that the seat of these principles must in 
both cases be reason — the latter depending upon the objective, the 
former upon the subjective, principles of its employment. 
Consonantly with this, genius may also be defined 
as the faculty of aesthetic ideas. This serves at the same time to 
point 
out the reason why it is nature (the nature of the individual) and not 
446  |  Kant - from The Critique of Judgement
a set purpose, that in products of genius gives the rule to art (as the 
production of the beautiful). For the beautiful must not be estimated 
according to concepts, but by the final mode in which the 
imagination 
is attuned so as to accord with the faculty of concepts generally; and 
so rule and precept are incapable of serving as the requisite 
subjective 
standard for that aesthetic and unconditioned purposiveness in fine 
art 
which has to make a warranted claim to being bound to please every 
one. 
Rather must such a standard be sought in the element of mere 
nature in 
the subject, which cannot be comprehended under rules or 
concepts, that 
is to say, the supersensible substrate of all the subject’s faculties 
(unattainable by any concept of understanding), and consequently 
in that 
which forms the point of reference for the harmonious accord of all 
our 
faculties of cognition — the production of which accord is the 
ultimate 
end set by the intelligible basis of our nature. Thus alone is it 
possible 
for a subjective and yet universally valid principle a priori to 
lie at the basis of that purposiveness for which no objective 
principle 
can be prescribed. 
Remark 2 
The following important observation here naturally presents itself: 
There are three kinds of antinomies of pure reason, which, 
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however, all 
agree in forcing reason to abandon the otherwise very natural 
assumption 
which takes the objects of sense for things-in-themselves, and to 
regard 
them, instead, merely as phenomena, and to lay at their basis an 
intelligible 
substrate (something supersensible, the concept of which is only 
an idea 
and affords no proper knowledge). Apart from some such antinomy, 
reason 
could never bring itself to take such a step as to adopt a principle 
so 
severely restricting the field of its speculation, and to submit to 
sacrifices 
involving the complete dissipation of so many otherwise brilliant 
hopes. 
For even now that it is recompensed for this loss by the prospect of 
a 
proportionately wider scope of action from a practical point of 
view, 
it is not without a pang of regret that it appears to part company 
with 
those hopes, and to break away from the old ties.The reason for 
there being three kinds of antinomies is to be found in the fact that 
there are three faculties of cognition, understanding, 
judgment, and reason, each of which, being a higher faculty of 
cognition, 
must have its a priori principles. For, so far as reason passes 
judgment upon these principles themselves and their employment, 
it inexorably 
requires the unconditioned for the given conditioned in respect of 
them 
all. This can never be found unless the sensible, instead of being 
regarded 
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as inherently appurtenant to things-i-themselves, is treated as a 
mere 
phenomenon, and, as such, being made to rest upon something 
supersensible 
(the intelligible substrate of external and internal nature) as the 
thing-in-itself. 
There is then (1) for the cognitive faculty an antinomy of reason in 
respect 
of the theoretical employment of understanding carried to the 
point of 
the unconditioned; (2) for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure an 
antinomy of reason in respect of the aesthetic employment of 
judgment; 
(3) for the faculty Of desire an antinomy in respect of the practical 
employment of selflegislative reason. For all these faculties have 
their 
fundamental a priori principles, and, following an imperative 
demand 
of reason, must be able to judge and to determine their object 
unconditionally 
in accordance with these principles.As to two of the antinomies of 
these higher cognitive faculties, those, namely, of their theoretical 
and of their practical employment, we have 
already shown elsewhere both that they are inevitable, if no 
cognisance 
is taken in such judgments of a supersensible substrate of the given 
objects as phenomena, and, on the other hand, that they can be 
solved 
the moment this is done. Now, as to the antinomy incident to the 
employment 
of judgment in conformity with the demand of reason, and the 
solution 
of it here given, we may say that to avoid facing it there are but the 
following alternatives. It is open to us to deny that any a priori 
principle lies at the basis of the aesthetic judgment of taste, with 
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the result that all claim to the necessity of a universal consensus of 
opinion is an idle and empty delusion, and that a judgment of taste 
only 
deserves to be considered to this extent correct, that it so happens 
that 
a number share the same opinion, and even this, not, in truth, 
because 
an a priori principle is presumed to lie at the back of this 
agreement, 
but rather (as with the taste of the palate) because of the 
contingently 
resembling organization of the individuals. Or else, in the 
alternative, 
we should have to suppose that the judgment of taste is in fact a 
disguised 
judgment of reason on the perfection discovered in a thing and the 
reference 
of the manifold in it to an end, and that it is consequently only 
called 
aesthetic on account of the confusion that here besets our 
reflection, 
although fundamentally it is teleological. In this latter case the 
solution 
of the antinomy with the assistance of transcendental ideas might 
be declared 
otiose and nugatory, and the above laws of taste thus reconciled 
with 
the objects of sense, not as mere phenomena, but even as things-
in-themselves. 
How unsatisfactory both of those alternatives alike are as a means 
of 
escape has been shown in several places in our exposition of 
judgments 
of taste.If, however, our deduction is at least credited with having 
been worked 
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out on correct lines, even though it may not have been sufficiently 
clear 
in all its details, three ideas then stand out in evidence. Firstly, 
there 
is the supersensible in general, without further determination, as 
substrate 
of nature; secondly, this same supersensible as principle of the 
subjective 
purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties; thirdly, the 
same 
supersensible again, as principle of the ends of freedom, and 
principle 
of the common accord of these ends with freedom in the moral 
sphere. 
§ 58. The idealism of the purposiveness alike of nature and of 
art, 
as the unique principle of the aesthetic judgment. 
The principle of taste may, to begin with, be placed on either of two 
footings. For taste may be said invariably to judge on empirical 
grounds 
of determination and such, therefore, as are only given a posteriori 
through sense, or else it may be allowed to judge on an a priori 
ground. The former would be the empiricism of the critique of taste, 
the 
latter its rationalism. The first would obliterate the distinction that 
marks off the object of our delight from the agreeable; the second, 
supposing 
the judgment rested upon determinate concepts, would obliterate 
its distinction 
from the good. In this way beauty would have its locus standi in the 
world 
completely denied, and nothing but the dignity of a separate name, 
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betokening, 
maybe, a certain blend of both the above-named kinds of delight, 
would 
be left in its stead. But we have shown the existence of grounds of 
delight 
which are a priori, and which therefore, can consist with the 
principle 
of rationalism, and which are yet incapable of being grasped by 
definite 
concepts. 
As against the above, we may say that the rationalism of the 
principle 
of taste may take the form either of the realism of purposiveness or 
of 
its idealism. Now, as a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, 
and as beauty is not a property of the object considered in its own 
account, 
the rationalism of the principle of taste can never be placed in the 
fact 
that the purposiveness in this judgment is regarded in thought as 
objective. 
In other words, the judgment is not directed theoretically, nor, 
therefore, 
logically, either (no matter if only in a confused estimate), to the 
perfection 
of the object, but only aesthetically to the harmonizing of its 
representation 
in the imagination with the essential principles of judgment 
generally 
in the subject. For this reason the judgment of taste, and the 
distinction 
between its realism and its idealism, can only, even on the principle 
of rationalism, depend upon its subjective purposiveness 
interpreted in 
one or other of two ways. Either such subjective purposiveness is, in 
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the first case, a harmony with our judgment pursued as an actual 
(intentional) 
end of nature (or of art), or else, in the second case, it is only a 
supervening 
purposive harmony with the needs of our faculty of judgment in its 
relation 
to nature and the forms which nature produces in accordance with 
particular 
laws, and one that is independent of an end, spontaneous and 
contingent. 
The beautiful forms displayed in the organic world all plead 
eloquently 
on the side of the realism of the aesthetic purposiveness of nature 
in 
support of the plausible assumption that beneath the production of 
the 
beautiful there must lie a preconceived idea in the producing cause 
— 
that is to say, an end acting in the interest of our imagination. 
Flowers, 
blossoms, even the shapes of plants as a whole, the elegance of 
animal 
formations of all kinds, unnecessary for the discharge of any 
function 
on their part, but chosen as it were with an eye to our taste; and, 
beyond 
all else, the variety and harmony in the array of colors (in the 
pheasant, 
in crustacea, in insects, down even to the meanest flowers), so 
pleasing 
and charming to the eyes, but which, inasmuch as they touch the 
bare surf 
ace, and do not even here in any way all act the structure, of these 
creatures 
— a matter which might have a necessary bearing on their internal 
Kant - from The Critique of Judgement  |  453
ends — seem to be planned entirely with a view to outward 
appearance: 
all these lend great weight to the mode of explanation which 
assumes actual 
ends of nature in favor of our aesthetic judgment. 
On the other hand, not alone does reason, with its maxims 
enjoining 
upon us in all cases to avoid, as far as possible, any unnecessary 
multiplication 
of principles, set itself against this assumption, but we have nature 
in its free formations displaying on all sides extensive mechanical 
proclivity 
to producing forms seemingly made, as it were, for the aesthetic 
employment 
of our judgment, without affording the least support to the 
supposition 
of a need for anything over and above its mechanism, as mere 
nature, to 
enable them to be purposive for our judgment apart from their 
being grounded 
upon any idea. The above expression, “free formations” of nature, 
is, however, here used to denote such as are originally set up in a 
fluid 
at rest where the volatilization or separation of some constituent 
(sometimes 
merely of caloric) leaves the residue on solidification to assume a 
definite 
shape or structure (figure or texture) which differs with specific 
differences 
of the matter, but for the same matter is invariable. Here, however, 
it 
is taken for granted that, as the true meaning of a fluid requires, the 
matter in the fluid is completely dissolved and not a mere admixture 
of 
solid particles simply held there in suspension. 
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The formation, then, takes place by a concursion, i.e., by a sudden 
solidification — not by a gradual transition from the fluid to the 
solid state, but, as it were, by a leap. This transition is termed 
crystallization. 
Freezing water offers the most familiar instance of a formation of 
this 
kind. There the process begins by straight threads of ice forming. 
These 
unite at angles of 60″, whilst others similarly attach themselves to 
them 
at every point until the whole has turned into ice. But while this is 
going on, the water between the threads of ice does not keep 
getting gradually 
more viscous, but remains as thoroughly fluid as it would be at a 
much 
higher temperature, although it is perfectly ice-cold. The matter 
that 
frees itself that makes its sudden escape at the moment of 
solidification 
— is a considerable quantum of caloric. As this was merely required 
to preserve fluidity, its disappearance leaves the existing ice not a 
whit colder than the water which but a moment before was there as 
fluid. 
There are many salts and also stones of a crystalline figure which 
owe 
their origin in like manner to some earthly substance being 
dissolved 
in water under the influence of agencies little understood. The 
drusy 
configurations of many minerals, of the cubical sulphide of lead, of 
the 
red silver ore, etc., are presumably also similarly formed in water, 
and 
by the concursion of their particles, on their being forced by some 
cause 
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or other to relinquish this vehicle and to unite among themselves in 
definite 
external shapes. 
But, further, all substances rendered fluid by heat, which have 
become 
solid as the result of cooling, give, when broken, internal evidences 
of a definite texture, thus suggesting the inference that only for the 
interference of their own weight or the disturbance of the air, the 
exterior 
would also have exhibited their proper specific shape. This has been 
observed 
in the case of some metals where the exterior of a molten mass has 
hardened, 
but the interior remained fluid, and then. owing to the withdrawal 
of 
the still fluid portion in the interior, there has been an undisturbed 
concursion of the remaining parts on the inside. A number of such 
mineral 
crystallizations, such as spars, hematite, aragonite, frequently 
present 
extremely beautiful shapes such as it might take art all its time to 
devise; 
and the halo in the grotto of Antiparos is merely the work of water 
percolating 
through strata of gypsum. 
The fluid state is, to all appearance, on the whole older than the 
solid, 
and plants as well as animal bodies are built up out of fluid nutritive 
substance, so far as this takes form undisturbed — in the case of 
the latter, admittedly, in obedience, primarily, to a certain original 
bent of nature directed to ends (which, as will be shown in Part II, 
must 
not be judged aesthetically, but teleologically by the principle of 
realism); 
but still all the while, perhaps, also following the universal law of 
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the affinity of substances in the way they shoot together and form 
in 
freedom. In the same way, again, where an atmosphere, which is a 
composite 
of different kinds of gas, is charged with watery fluids, and these 
separate 
from it owing to a reduction of the temperature, they produce snow 
— 
figures of shapes differing with the actual composition of the 
atmosphere. 
These are frequently of very artistic appearance and of extreme 
beauty. 
So without at all derogating from the teleological principle by which 
an organization is judged, it is readily conceivable how with beauty 
of 
flowers, of the plumage of birds, of crustacea, both as to their shape 
and their color, we have only what may be ascribed to nature and its 
capacity for originating in free activity aesthetically purposive 
forms, 
independently of any particular guiding ends, according to chemical 
laws, 
by means of the chemical integration of the substance requisite for 
the 
organization. 
But what shows plainly that the principle of the ideality of the 
purposiveness 
in the beauty of nature is the one upon which we ourselves 
invariably 
take our stand in our aesthetic judgments, forbidding us to have 
recourse 
to any realism of a natural end in favor of our faculty of 
representation 
as a principle of explanation, is that in our general estimate of 
beauty 
we seek its standard a priori in ourselves, and, that the aesthetic 
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faculty is itself legislative in respect of the judgment whether 
anything 
is beautiful or not. This could not be so on the assumption of a 
realism 
of the purposiveness of nature; because in that case we should have 
to 
go to nature for instruction as to what we should deem beautiful, 
and 
the judgment of taste would be subject to empirical principles. For 
in 
such an estimate the question does not turn on what nature is, or 
even 
on what it is for us in the way of an end, but on how we receive it. 
For 
nature to have fashioned its forms for our delight would inevitably 
imply 
an objective purposiveness on the part of nature, instead of a 
subjective 
purposiveness resting on the play of imagination in its freedom, 
where 
it is we who receive nature with favor, and not nature that does us a 
favor. That nature affords us an opportunity for perceiving the inner 
purposiveness in the relation of our mental powers engaged in the 
estimate 
of certain of its products, and, indeed, such a purposiveness as 
arising 
from a supersensible basis is to be pronounced necessary and of 
universal 
validity, is a property of nature which cannot belong to it as its end, 
or rather, cannot be estimated by us to be such an end. For 
otherwise 
the judgment that would be determined by reference to such an end 
would 
found upon heteronomy, instead of founding upon autonomy and 
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being free, 
as befits a judgment of taste. 
The principle of the idealism of purposiveness is still more clearly 
apparent in fine art. For the point that sensations do not enable us 
to 
adopt an aesthetic realism of purpose (which would make art merely 
agreeable 
instead of beautiful) is one which it enjoys in common with beautiful 
nature. But the further point that the delight arising from aesthetic 
ideas must not be made dependent upon the successful attainment 
of determinate ends (as an art mechanically directed to results), and 
that, consequently, 
even in the case of the rationalism of the principle, an ideality of the 
ends and not their reality is fundamental, is brought home to us by 
the 
fact that fine art, as such, must not be regarded as a product of 
understanding 
and science, but of genius, and must, therefore, derive its rule from 
aesthetic ideas, which are essentially different from rational ideas of 
determinate ends. 
Just as the ideality of objects of sense as phenomena is the only 
way 
of explaining the possibility of their forms admitting of a priori 
determination, so, also, the idealism of the purposiveness in 
estimating 
the beautiful in nature and in art is the only hypothesis upon which 
a 
critique can explain the possibility of a judgment of taste that 
demands 
a priori validity for every one (yet without basing the purposiveness 
represented in the object upon concepts). 
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§ 59. Beauty as the symbol of morality 
Intuitions are always required to verify the reality of our concepts. 
If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called examples: if 
they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions go by 
the 
name of schemata. But to call for a verification of the objective 
reality 
of rational concepts, i.e., of ideas, and, what is more, on behalf of 
the theoretical cognition of such a reality, is to demand an 
impossibility, 
because absolutely no intuition adequate to them can be given. 
All hypotyposis (presentation, subjectio sub adspectum) as a 
rendering 
in terms of sense, is twofold. Either it is schematic, as where the 
intuition 
corresponding to a concept comprehended by the understanding is 
given 
a priori, or else it is symbolic, as where the concept is one which 
only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be 
adequate. 
In the latter case the concept is supplied with an intuition such that 
the procedure of judgment in dealing with it is merely analogous to 
that 
which it observes in schematism. In other words, what agrees with 
the 
concept is merely the rule of this procedure, and not the intuition 
itself. 
Hence the agreement is merely in the form of reflection, and not in 
the 
content. 
Notwithstanding the adoption of the word symbolic by modern 
logicians 
in a sense opposed to an intuitive mode of representation, it is a 
wrong 
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use of the word and subversive of its true meaning; for the symbolic 
is 
only a mode of any intrinsic connection with the intuition of 
sentation 
is, in fact, divisible into the schematic and the symbolic. Both are 
hypotyposes, 
i.e., presentations (exhibitiones), not mere marks. Marks are merely 
designations 
of concepts by the aid of accompanying sensible signs devoid of any 
intrinsic 
connection with the intuition of the object. Their sole function is to 
afford a means of reinvoking the concepts according to the 
imagination’s 
law of association — a purely subjective role. Such marks are either 
words or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) signs, simply as 
expressions 
for concepts.22 
All intuitions by which a priori concepts are given a foothold 
are, therefore, either schemata or symbols. Schemata contain 
direct, symbols 
indirect, presentations of the concept. Schemata effect this 
presentation 
demonstratively, symbols by the aid of an analogy (for which 
recourse 
is had even to empirical intuitions), in which analogy judgment 
performs 
a double function: first in applying the concept to the object of a 
sensible 
22. The intuitive mode of knowledge must be contrasted 
with the discursive mode (not with the symbolic). The 
former is either schematic, by mean demonstration, 
symbolic, as a representation following a mere analogy. 
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intuition, and then, secondly, in applying the mere rule of its 
reflection 
upon that intuition to quite another object, of which the former is 
but 
the symbol. In this way, a monarchical state is represented as a living 
body when it is governed by constitutional laws, but as a mere 
machine 
(like a handmill) when it is governed by an individual absolute will; 
but in both cases the representation is merely symbolic. For there is 
certainly no likeness between a despotic state and a handmill, 
whereas 
there surely is between the rules of reflection upon both and their 
causality. 
Hitherto this function has been but little analysed, worthy as it is of 
a deeper study. Still this is not the place to dwell upon it. In language 
we have many such indirect presentations modelled upon an 
analogy enabling 
the expression in question to contain, not the proper schema for the 
concept, 
but merely a symbol for reflection. Thus the words ground (support, 
basis), 
to depend (to be held up from above), to flow from (instead of to 
follow), 
substance (as Locke puts it: the support of accidents), and 
numberless 
others, are not schematic, but rather symbolic hypotyposes, and 
express 
concepts without employing a direct intuition for the purpose, but 
only 
drawing upon an analogy with one, i.e., transferring the reflection 
upon 
an object of intuition to quite a new concept, and one with which 
perhaps 
no intuition could ever directly correspond. Supposing the name of 
knowledge 
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may be given to what only amounts to a mere mode of 
representation (which 
is quite permissible where this is not a principle of the theoretical 
determination of the object in respect of what it is in itself, but of 
the practical determination of what the idea of it ought to be for us 
and for its final employment), then all our knowledge of God is 
merely 
symbolic; and one who takes it, with the properties of 
understanding, 
will, and so forth, which only evidence their objective reality in 
beings 
of this world, to be schematic, falls into anthropomorphism, just as, 
if he abandons every intuitive element, he falls into Deism which 
furnishes 
no knowledge whatsoever — not even from a practical point of view. 
Now, I say, the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and 
only 
in this light (a point of view natural to every one, and one which 
every 
one exacts from others as a duty) does it give us pleasure with an 
attendant 
claim to the agreement of every one else, whereupon the mind 
becomes conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above 
mere sensibility to pleasure from impressions of sense, and also 
appraises the worth of others on the 
score of a like maxim of their judgment. This is that intelligible to 
which taste, as noticed in the preceding paragraph, extends its view. 
It is, that is to say, what brings even our higher cognitive faculties 
into common accord, and is that apart from which sheer 
contradiction would 
arise between their nature and the claims put forward by taste. In 
this 
faculty, judgment does not find itself subjected to a heteronomy of 
laws 
of experience as it does in the empirical estimate of things — in 
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respect of the objects of such a pure delight it gives the law to itself, 
just as reason does in respect of the faculty of desire. Here, too, both 
on account of this inner possibility in the subject, and on account of 
the external possibility of a nature harmonizing therewith, it finds a 
reference in itself to something in the subject itself and outside it, 
and which is not nature, nor yet freedom, but still is connected with 
the ground of the latter, i.e., the supersensible — a something in 
which the theoretical faculty gets bound up into unity with the 
practical 
in an intimate and obscure manner. We shall bring out a few points 
of 
this analogy, while taking care, at the same time, not to let the points 
of difference escape us. 
(1) The beautiful pleases immediately (but only in reflective 
intuition, 
not, like morality, in its concept). (2) It pleases apart from all interest 
(pleasure in the morally good is no doubt necessarily bound up with 
an 
interest, but not with one of the kind that are antecedent to the 
judgment 
upon the delight, but with one that judgment itself for the first time 
calls into existence). (3) The freedom of the imagination 
(consequently 
of our faculty in respect of its sensibility) is, in estimating the 
beautiful, 
represented as in accord with the understanding’s conformity to law 
(in moral judgments the freedom of the will is thought as the 
harmony 
of the latter with itself according to universal laws of Reason). (4) 
The subjective principles of the estimate of the beautiful is 
represented 
as universal, i.e., valid for every man, but as incognizable by means 
of any universal concept (the objective principle of morality is set 
forth 
as also universal, i.e., for all individuals, and, at the same time, for 
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all actions of the same individual, and, besides, as cognizable by 
means 
of a universal concept). For this reason the moral judgment not 
alone 
admits of definite constitutive principles, but is only possible by 
adopting 
these principles and their universality as the ground of its maxims. 
Even common understanding is wont to pay regard to this 
analogy; and 
we frequently apply to beautiful objects of nature or of art names 
that 
seem to rely upon the basis of a moral estimate. We call buildings or 
trees majestic and stately, or plains laughing and gay; even colors 
are 
called innocent, modest, soft, because they excite sensations 
containing 
something analogous to the consciousness of the state of mind 
produced 
by moral judgments. Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the 
charm of sense to habitual moral interest possible without too 
violent 
a leap, for it represents the imagination, even in its freedom, as 
amenable 
to a final determination for understanding, and teaches us to find, 
even 
in sensuous objects, a free delight apart from any charm of sense. 
§ 60 Appendix. The methodology of taste 
The division of a critique into elementology and methodology — 
a division which is introductory to science — is one inapplicable 
to the critique of taste. For there neither is, nor can be, a science 
of the beautiful, and the judgment of taste is not determinable by 
principles. 
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For, as to the element of science in every art — a matter which turns 
upon truth in the presentation of the object of the art — while this 
is, no doubt, the indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non) 
of fine art, it is not itself fine art. Fine art, therefore, has only 
got a manner (modus), and not a method of teaching (methodus). 
The master must illustrate what the pupil is to achieve and how 
achievement 
is to be attained, and the proper function of the universal rules to 
which 
he ultimately reduces his treatment is rather that of supplying a 
convenient 
text for recalling its chief moments to the pupil’s mind, than of 
prescribing them to him. Yet, in all this, due regard must be paid to 
a certain ideal which art must keep in view, even though complete 
success 
ever eludes its happiest efforts. Only by exciting the pupil’s 
imagination 
to conformity with a given concept, by pointing out how the 
expression 
falls short of the idea to which, as aesthetic, the concept itself fails 
to attain, and by means of severe criticism, is it possible to prevent 
his promptly looking upon the examples set before him as the 
prototypes 
of excellence, and as models for him to imitate, without submission 
to 
any higher standard or to his own critical judgment. This would 
result 
in genius being stifled, and, with it, also the freedom of the 
imagination 
in its very conformity to law — a freedom without which a fine art 
is not possible, nor even as much as a correct taste of one’s own 
for estimating it. 
The propaedeutic to all fine art, so far as the highest degree of its 
perfection is what is in view, appears to lie, not in precepts, but in 
the culture of the mental powers produced by a sound preparatory 
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education 
in what are called the humaniora — so-called, presumably, 
because humanity signifies, on the one hand, the universal feeling of 
sympathy, and, on the other, the faculty of being able to 
communicate 
universally one’s inmost self-properties constituting in conjunction 
the befitting social spirit of mankind, in contradistinction to the 
narrow 
life of the lower animals. There was an age and there were nations 
in 
which the active impulse towards a social life regulated by laws — 
what converts a people into a permanent community — grappled 
with 
the huge difficulties presented by the trying problem of bringing 
freedom 
(and therefore equality also) into union with constraining force 
(more 
that of respect and dutiful submission than of fear). And such must 
have 
been the age, and such the nation, that first discovered the art of 
reciprocal 
communication of ideas between the more cultured and ruder 
sections of 
the community, and how to bridge the difference between the 
amplitude 
and refinement of the former and the natural simplicity and 
originality 
of the latter — in this way hitting upon that mean between higher 
culture and the modest worth of nature, that forms for taste also, as 
a sense common to all mankind, that true standard which no 
universal rules 
can supply. 
Hardly will a later age dispense with those models. For nature will 
ever recede farther into the background, so that eventually, with no 
permanent 
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example retained from the past, a future age would scarce be in a 
position 
to form a concept of the happy union, in one and the same people, 
of the 
law-directed constraint belonging to the highest culture, with the 
force 
and truth of a free nature sensible of its proper worth. 
However, taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that 
judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense (through 
the 
intervention of a certain analogy in our reflection on both); and it 
is this rendering also, and the increased sensibility, founded upon 
it, for the feeling which these ideas evoke (termed moral sense), that 
are the origin of that pleasure which taste declares valid for 
mankind 
in general and not merely for the private feeling of each individual. 
This makes it clear that the true propaedeutic for laying the 
foundations 
of taste is the development of moral ideas and the culture of the 
moral feeling. For only when sensibility is brought 
into harmony with moral feeling can genuine taste assume a definite 
unchangeable form. 
*** 
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12. J. C. Friedrich Von Schiller 
- Letters Upon The Aesthetic 
Education of Man 
Part I 
Letter I. 
By your permission I lay before you, in a series of letters, the results 
of my researches upon beauty and art. I am keenly sensible of the 
importance as well as of the charm and dignity of this undertaking. 
I shall treat a subject which is closely connected with the better 
portion of our happiness and not far removed from the moral 
nobility of human nature. I shall plead this cause of the Beautiful 
before a heart by which her whole power is felt and exercised, and 
which will take upon itself the most difficult part of my task in 
an investigation where one is compelled to appeal as frequently to 
feelings as to principles. 
That which I would beg of you as a favour, you generously impose 
upon me as a duty; and, when I solely consult my inclination, you 
impute to me a service. The liberty of action you prescribe is rather 
a necessity for me than a constraint. Little exercised in formal rules, 
I shall scarcely incur the risk of sinning against good taste by any 
undue use of them; my ideas, drawn rather from within than from 
reading or from an intimate experience with the world, will not 
disown their origin; they would rather incur any reproach than 
that of a sectarian bias, and would prefer to succumb by their 
Schiller - Letters Upon the Aesthetic
Education of Man  |  469
innate feebleness than sustain themselves by borrowed authority 
and foreign support. 
In truth, I will not keep back from you that the assertions which 
follow rest chiefly upon Kantian principles; but if in the course 
of these researches you should be reminded of any special school 
of philosophy, ascribe it to my incapacity, not to those principles. 
No; your liberty of mind shall be sacred to me; and the facts upon 
which I build will be furnished by your own sentiments; your own 
unfettered thought will dictate the laws according to which we have 
to proceed. 
With regard to the ideas which predominate in the practical part 
of Kant’s system, philosophers only disagree, whilst mankind, I am 
confident of proving, have never done so. If stripped of their 
technical shape, they will appear as the verdict of reason 
pronounced from time immemorial by common consent, and as 
facts of the moral instinct which nature, in her wisdom, has given 
to man in order to serve as guide and teacher until his enlightened 
intelligence gives him maturity. But this very technical shape which 
renders truth visible to the understanding conceals it from the 
feelings; for, unhappily, understanding begins by destroying the 
object of the inner sense before it can appropriate the object. Like 
the chemist, the philosopher finds synthesis only by analysis, or 
the spontaneous work of nature only through the torture of art. 
Thus, in order to detain the fleeting apparition, he must enchain 
it in the fetters of rule, dissect its fair proportions into abstract 
notions, and preserve its living spirit in a fleshless skeleton of words. 
Is it surprising that natural feeling should not recognise itself in 
such a copy, and if in the report of the analyst the truth appears as 
paradox? 
Permit me therefore to crave your indulgence if the following 
researches should remove their object from the sphere of sense 
while endeavouring to draw it towards the understanding. That 
which I before said of moral experience can be applied with greater 
truth to the manifestation of “the beautiful.” It is the mystery which 
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enchants, and its being extinguished with the extinction of the 
necessary combination of its elements. 
 
Letter II. 
But I might perhaps make a better use of the opening you afford 
me if I were to direct your mind to a loftier theme than that of art. 
It would appear to be unseasonable to go in search of a code for 
the aesthetic world, when the moral world offers matter of so much 
higher interest, and when the spirit of philosophical inquiry is so 
stringently challenged by the circumstances of our times to occupy 
itself with the most perfect of all works of art – the establishment 
and structure of a true political freedom. 
It is unsatisfactory to live out of your own age and to work for 
other times. It is equally incumbent on us to be good members of 
our own age as of our own state or country. If it is conceived to be 
unseemly and even unlawful for a man to segregate himself from 
the customs and manners of the circle in which he lives, it would be 
inconsistent not to see that it is equally his duty to grant a proper 
share of influence to the voice of his own epoch, to its taste and its 
requirements, in the operations in which he engages. 
But the voice of our age seems by no means favorable to art, at 
all events to that kind of art to which my inquiry is directed. The 
course of events has given a direction to the genius of the time 
that threatens to remove it continually further from the ideal of 
art. For art has to leave reality, it has to raise itself bodily above 
necessity and neediness; for art is the daughter of freedom, and it 
requires its prescriptions and rules to be furnished by the necessity 
of spirits and not by that of matter. But in our day it is necessity, 
neediness, that prevails, and bends a degraded humanity under its 
iron yoke. Utility is the great idol of the time, to which all powers 
do homage and all subjects are subservient. In this great balance of 
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utility, the spiritual service of art has no weight, and, deprived of all 
encouragement, it vanishes from the noisy Vanity Fair of our time. 
The very spirit of philosophical inquiry itself robs the imagination of 
one promise after another, and the frontiers of art are narrowed, in 
proportion as the limits of science are enlarged. 
The eyes of the philosopher as well as of the man of the world 
are anxiously turned to the theatre of political events, where it is 
presumed the great destiny of man is to be played out. It would 
almost seem to betray a culpable indifference to the welfare of 
society if we did not share this general interest. For this great 
commerce in social and moral principles is of necessity a matter 
of the greatest concern to every human being, on the ground both 
of its subject and of its results. It must accordingly be of deepest 
moment to every man to think for himself. It would seem that 
now at length a question that formerly was only settled by the 
law of the stronger is to be determined by the calm judgment of 
the reason, and every man who is capable of placing himself in a 
central position, and raising his individuality into that of his species, 
can look upon himself as in possession of this judicial faculty of 
reason; being moreover, as man and member of the human family, 
a party in the case under trial and involved more or less in its 
decisions. It would thus appear that this great political process is 
not only engaged with his individual case, it has also to pronounce 
enactments, which he as a rational spirit is capable of enunciating 
and entitled to pronounce. 
It is evident that it would have been most attractive to me to 
inquire into an object such as this, to decide such a question in 
conjunction with a thinker of powerful mind, a man of liberal 
sympathies, and a heart imbued with a noble enthusiasm for the 
weal of humanity. Though so widely separated by worldly position, 
it would have been a delightful surprise to have found your 
unprejudiced mind arriving at the same result as my own in the 
field of ideas. Nevertheless, I think I can not only excuse, but even 
justify by solid grounds, my step in resisting this attractive purpose 
and in preferring beauty to freedom. I hope that I shall succeed in 
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convincing you that this matter of art is less foreign to the needs 
than to the tastes of our age; nay, that, to arrive at a solution even 
in the political problem, the road of aesthetics must be pursued, 
because it is through beauty that we arrive at freedom. But I cannot 
carry out this proof without my bringing to your remembrance the 
principles by which the reason is guided in political legislation. 
Letter III. 
Man is not better treated by nature in his first start than her other 
works are; so long as he is unable to act for himself as an 
independent intelligence, she acts for him. But the very fact that 
constitutes him a man is, that he does not remain stationary, where 
nature has placed him, that he can pass with his reason, retracing 
the steps nature had made him anticipate, that he can convert the 
work of necessity into one of free solution, and elevate physical 
necessity into a moral law. 
When man is raised from his slumber in the senses, he feels 
that he is a man, he surveys his surroundings, and finds that he 
is in a state. He was introduced into this state, by the power of 
circumstances, before he could freely select his own position. But 
as a moral being he cannot possibly rest satisfied with a political 
condition forced upon him by necessity, and only calculated for 
that condition; and it would be unfortunate if this did satisfy him. 
In many cases man shakes off this blind law of necessity, by his 
free spontaneous action, of which among many others we have 
an instance, in his ennobling by beauty and suppressing by moral 
influence the powerful impulse implanted in him by nature in the 
passion of love. Thus, when arrived at maturity, he recovers his 
childhood by an artificial process, he founds a state of nature in 
his ideas, not given him by any experience, but established by the 
necessary laws and conditions of his reason, and he attributes to 
this ideal condition an object, an aim, of which he was not cognisant 
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in the actual reality of nature. He gives himself a choice of which he 
was not capable before, and sets to work just as if he were beginning 
anew, and were exchanging his original state of bondage for one 
of complete independence, doing this with complete insight and of 
his free decision. He is justified in regarding this work of political 
thraldom as non-existing, though a wild and arbitrary caprice may 
have founded its work very artfully; though it may strive to maintain 
it with great arrogance and encompass it with a halo of veneration. 
For the work of blind powers possesses no authority, before which 
freedom need bow, and all must be made to adapt itself to the 
highest end which reason has set up in his personality. It is in this 
wise that a people in a state of manhood is justified in exchanging a 
condition of thraldom for one of moral freedom. 
Now the term natural condition can be applied to every political 
body which owes its establishment originally to forces and not to 
laws, and such a state contradicts the moral nature of man, because 
lawfulness can alone have authority over this. At the same time 
this natural condition is quite sufficient for the physical man, who 
only gives himself laws in order to get rid of brute force. Moreover, 
the physical man is a reality, and the moral man problematical. 
Therefore when the reason suppresses the natural condition, as 
she must if she wishes to substitute her own, she weighs the real 
physical man against the problematical moral man, she weighs the 
existence of society against a possible, though morally necessary, 
ideal of society. She takes from man something which he really 
possesses, and without which he possesses nothing, and refers him 
as a substitute to something that he ought to posses and might 
possess; and if reason had relied too exclusively on him, she might, 
in order to secure him a state of humanity in which he is wanting 
and can want without injury to his life, have robbed him even of the 
means of animal existence which is the first necessary condition of 
his being a man. Before he had opportunity to hold firm to the law 
with his will, reason would have withdrawn from his feet the ladder 
of nature. 
The great point is therefore to reconcile these two 
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considerations: to prevent physical society from ceasing for a 
moment in time, while the moral society is being formed in the 
idea; in other words, to prevent its existence from being placed 
in jeopardy, for the sake of the moral dignity of man. When the 
mechanic has to mend a watch, he lets the wheels run out, but the 
living watchworks of the state have to be repaired while they act, 
and a wheel has to be exchanged for another during its revolutions. 
Accordingly props must be sought for to support society and keep 
it going while it is made independent of the natural condition from 
which it is sought to emancipate it. 
This prop is not found in the natural character of man, who, being 
selfish and violent, directs his energies rather to the destruction 
than to the preservation of society. Nor is it found in his moral 
character, which has to be formed, which can never be worked 
upon or calculated on by the lawgiver, because it is free and never 
appears. It would seem therefore that another measure must be 
adopted. It would seem that the physical character of the arbitrary 
must be separated from moral freedom; that it is incumbent to 
make the former harmonise with the laws and the latter dependent 
on impressions; it would be expedient to remove the former still 
farther from matter and to bring the latter somewhat more near to 
it; in short to produce a third character related to both the others 
– the physical and the moral – paving the way to a transition from 
the sway of mere force to that of law, without preventing the proper 
development of the moral character, but serving rather as a pledge 
in the sensuous sphere of a morality in the unseen. 
Letter IV. 
Thus much is certain. It is only when a third character, as previously 
suggested, has preponderance that a revolution in a state according 
to moral principles can be free from injurious consequences; nor 
can anything else secure its endurance. In proposing or setting up 
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a moral state, the moral law is relied upon as a real power, and 
free will is drawn into the realm of causes, where all hangs together 
mutually with stringent necessity and rigidity. But we know that the 
condition of the human will always remains contingent, and that 
only in the Absolute Being physical coexists with moral necessity. 
Accordingly if it is wished to depend on the moral conduct of man as 
on natural results, this conduct must become nature, and he must 
be led by natural impulse to such a course of action as can only and 
invariably have moral results. But the will of man is perfectly free 
between inclination and duty, and no physical necessity ought to 
enter as a sharer in this magisterial personality. If therefore he is to 
retain this power of solution, and yet become a reliable link in the 
causal concatenation of forces, this can only be effected when the 
operations of both these impulses are presented quite equally in the 
world of appearances. It is only possible when, with every difference 
of form, the matter of man’s volition remains the same, when all his 
impulses agreeing with his reason are sufficient to have the value of 
a universal legislation. 
It may be urged that every individual man carries, within himself, 
at least in his adaptation and destination, a purely ideal man. The 
great problem of his existence is to bring all the incessant changes 
of his outer life into conformity with the unchanging unity of this 
ideal. This pure ideal man, which makes itself known more or less 
clearly in every subject, is represented by the state, which is the 
objective and, so to speak, canonical form in which the manifold 
differences of the subjects strive to unite. Now two ways present 
themselves to the thought, in which the man of time can agree with 
the man of idea, and there are also two ways in which the state can 
maintain itself in individuals. One of these ways is when the pure 
ideal man subdues the empirical man, and the state suppresses the 
individual, or again when the individual becomes the state, and the 
man of time is ennobled to the man of idea. 
I admit that in a one-sided estimate from the point of view of 
morality this difference vanishes, for the reason is satisfied if her 
law prevails unconditionally. But when the survey taken is complete 
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and embraces the whole man (anthropology), where the form is 
considered together with the substance, and a living feeling has a 
voice, the difference will become far more evident. No doubt the 
reason demands unity, and nature variety, and both legislations take 
man in hand. The law of the former is stamped upon him by an 
incorruptible consciousness, that of the latter by an ineradicable 
feeling. Consequently education will always appear deficient when 
the moral feeling can only be maintained with the sacrifice of what 
is natural; and a political administration will always be very 
imperfect when it is only able to bring about unity by suppressing 
variety. The state ought not only to respect the objective and 
generic but also the subjective and specific in individuals; and while 
diffusing the unseen world of morals, it must not depopulate the 
kingdom of appearance, the external world of matter. 
When the mechanical artist places his hand on the formless block, 
to give it a form according to his intention, he has not any scruples 
in doing violence to it. For the nature on which he works does not 
deserve any respect in itself, and he does not value the whole for 
its parts, but the parts on account of the whole. When the child of 
the fine arts sets his hand to the same block, he has no scruples 
either in doing violence to it, he only avoids showing this violence. 
He does not respect the matter in which he works, and more than 
the mechanical artist; but he seeks by an apparent consideration for 
it to deceive the eye which takes this matter under its protection. 
The political and educating artist follows a very different course, 
while making man at once his material and his end. In this case the 
aim or end meets in the material, and it is only because the whole 
serves the parts that the parts adapt themselves to the end. The 
political artist has to treat his material man with a very different 
kind of respect from that shown by the artist of fine art to his work. 
He must spare man’s peculiarity and personality, not to produce 
a deceptive effect on the senses, but objectively and out of 
consideration for his inner being. 
But the state is an organisation which fashions itself through itself 
and for itself, and for this reason it can only be realised when the 
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parts have been accorded to the idea of the whole. The state serves 
the purpose of a representative, both to pure ideal and to objective 
humanity, in the breast of its citizens, accordingly it will have to 
observe the same relation to its citizens in which they are placed 
to it, and it will only respect their subjective humanity in the same 
degree that it is ennobled to an objective existence. If the internal 
man is one with himself, he will be able to rescue his peculiarity, 
even in the greatest generalisation of his conduct, and the state will 
only become the exponent of his fine instinct, the clearer formula of 
his internal legislation. But if the subjective man is in conflict with 
the objective and contradicts him in the character of the people, so 
that only the oppression of the former can give the victory to the 
latter, then the state will take up the severe aspect of the law against 
the citizen, and in order not to fall a sacrifice, it will have to crush 
under foot such a hostile individuality, without any compromise. 
Now man can be opposed to himself in a twofold manner: either 
as a savage, when his feelings rule over his principles; or as a 
barbarian, when his principles destroy his feelings. The savage 
despises art, and acknowledges nature as his despotic ruler; the 
barbarian laughs at nature, and dishonours it, but he often proceeds 
in a more contemptible way than the savage, to be the slave of his 
senses. The cultivated man makes of nature his friend, and honours 
its friendship, while only bridling its caprice. 
Consequently, when reason brings her moral unity into physical 
society, she must not injure the manifold in nature. When nature 
strives to maintain her manifold character in the moral structure 
of society, this must not create any breach in moral unity; the 
victorious form is equally remote from uniformity and confusion. 
Therefore, totality of character must be found in the people which 
is capable and worthy to exchange the state of necessity for that of 
freedom. 
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Letter V. 
Does the present age, do passing events, present this character? I 
direct my attention at once to the most prominent object in this vast 
structure. 
It is true that the consideration of opinion is fallen, caprice is 
unnerved, and, although still armed with power, receives no longer 
any respect. Man has awaked from his long lethargy and self-
deception, and he demands with impressive unanimity to be 
restored to his imperishable rights. But he does not only demand 
them; he rises on all sides to seize by force what, in his opinion, 
has been unjustly wrested from him. The edifice of the natural state 
is tottering, its foundations shake, and a physical possibility seems 
at length granted to place law on the throne, to honour man at 
length as an end, and to make true freedom the basis of political 
union. Vain hope! The moral possibility is wanting, and the generous 
occasion finds an unsusceptible rule. 
Man paints himself in his actions, and what is the form depicted in 
the drama of the present time? On the one hand, he is seen running 
wild, on the other in a state of lethargy; the two extremest stages of 
human degeneracy, and both seen in one and the same period. 
In the lower larger masses, coarse, lawless impulses come to view, 
breaking loose when the bonds of civil order are burst asunder, 
and hastening with unbridled fury to satisfy their savage instinct. 
Objective humanity may have had cause to complain of the state; yet 
subjective man must honour its institutions. Ought he to be blamed 
because he lost sight of the dignity of human nature, so long as 
he was concerned in preserving his existence? Can we blame him 
that he proceeded to separate by the force of gravity, to fasten by 
the force of cohesion, at a time when there could be no thought 
of building or raising up? The extinction of the state contains its 
justification. Society set free, instead of hastening upward into 
organic life, collapses into its elements. 
On the other hand, the civilized classes give us the still more 
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repulsive sight of lethargy, and of a depravity of character which 
is the more revolting because it roots in culture. I forget who of 
the older or more recent philosophers makes the remark, that what 
is more noble is the more revolting in its destruction. The remark 
applies with truth to the world of morals. The child of nature, when 
he breaks loose, becomes a madman; but the art scholar, when 
he breaks loose, becomes a debased character. The enlightenment 
of the understanding, on which the more refined classes pride 
themselves with some ground, shows on the whole so little of an 
ennobling influence on the mind that it seems rather to confirm 
corruption by its maxims. We deny nature in her legitimate field 
and feel her tyranny in the moral sphere, and while resisting her 
impressions, we receive our principles from her. While the affected 
decency of our manners does not even grant to nature a pardonable 
influence in the initial stage, our materialistic system of morals 
allows her the casting vote in the last and essential stage. Egotism 
has founded its system in the very bosom of a refined society, 
and without developing even a sociable character, we feel all the 
contagions and miseries of society. We subject our free judgment 
to its despotic opinions, our feelings to its bizarre customs, and 
our will to its seductions. We only maintain our caprice against 
her holy rights. The man of the world has his heart contracted by 
a proud self-complacency, while that of the man of nature often 
beats in sympathy; and every man seeks for nothing more than 
to save his wretched property from the general destruction, as 
it were from some great conflagration. It is conceived that the 
only way to find a shelter against the aberrations of sentiment 
is by completely foregoing its indulgence, and mockery, which is 
often a useful chastener of mysticism, slanders in the same breath 
the noblest aspirations. Culture, far from giving us freedom, only 
develops, as it advances, new necessities; the fetters of the physical 
close more tightly around us, so that the fear of loss quenches even 
the ardent impulse toward improvement, and the maxims of passive 
obedience are held to be the highest wisdom of life. Thus the spirit 
of the time is seen to waver between perversions and savagism, 
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between what is unnatural and mere nature, between superstition 
and moral unbelief, and it is often nothing but the equilibrium of 
evils that sets bounds to it. 
Letter VI. 
Have I gone too far in this portraiture of our times? I do not 
anticipate this stricture, but rather another – that I have proved 
too much by it. You will tell me that the picture I have presented 
resembles the humanity of our day, but it also bodies forth all 
nations engaged in the same degree of culture, because all, without 
exception, have fallen off from nature by the abuse of reason, before 
they can return to it through reason. 
But if we bestow some serious attention to the character of our 
times, we shall be astonished at the contrast between the present 
and the previous form of humanity, especially that of Greece. We 
are justified in claiming the reputation of culture and refinement, 
when contrasted with a purely natural state of society, but not so 
comparing ourselves with the Grecian nature. For the latter was 
combined with all the charms of art and with all the dignity of 
wisdom, without, however, as with us, becoming a victim to these 
influences. The Greeks put us to shame not only by their simplicity, 
which is foreign to our age; they are at the same time our rivals, 
nay, frequently our models, in those very points of superiority from 
which we seek comfort when regretting the unnatural character of 
our manners. We see that remarkable people uniting at once fulness 
of form and fulness of substance, both philosophising and creating, 
both tender and energetic, uniting a youthful fancy to the virility of 
reason in a glorious humanity. 
At the period of Greek culture, which was an awakening of the 
powers of the mind, the senses and the spiria had no distinctly 
separated property; no division had yet torn them asunder, leading 
them to partition in a hostile attitude, and to mark off their limits 
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with precision. Poetry had not yet become the adversary of wit, nor 
had speculation abused itself by passing into quibbling. In cases of 
necessity both poetry and wit could exchange parts, because they 
both honoured truth only in their special way. However high might 
be the flight of reason, it drew matter in a loving spirit after it, and, 
while sharply and stiffly defining it, never mutilated what it touched. 
It is true the Greek mind displaced humanity, and recast it on a 
magnified scale in the glorious circle of its gods; but it did this not 
by dissecting human nature, but by giving it fresh combinations, 
for the whole of human nature was represented in each of the 
gods. How different is the course followed by us moderns! We also 
displace and magnify individuals to form the image of the species, 
but we do this in a fragmentary way, not by altered combinations, 
so that it is necessary to gather up from different individuals the 
elements that form the species in its totality. It would almost appear 
as if the powers of mind express themselves with us in real life 
or empirically as separately as the psychologist distinguishes them 
in the representation. For we see not only individual subjects, but 
whole classes of men, uphold their capacities only in part, while the 
rest of their faculties scarcely show a germ of activity, as in the case 
of the stunted growth of plants. 
I do not overlook the advantages to which the present race, 
regarded as a unity and in the balance of the understanding, may 
lay claim over what is best in the ancient world; but it is obliged to 
engage in the contest as a compact mass, and measure itself as a 
whole against a whole. Who among the moderns could step forth, 
man against man, and strive with an Athenian for the prize of higher 
humanity? 
Whence comes this disadvantageous relation of individuals 
coupled with great advantages of the race? Why could the individual 
Greek be qualified as the type of his time? and why can no modern 
dare to offer himself as such? Because all-uniting nature imparted 
its forms to the Greek, and an all-dividing understanding gives our 
forms to us. 
It was culture itself that gave these wounds to modern humanity. 
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The inner union of human nature was broken, and a destructive 
contest divided its harmonious forces directly; on the one hand, 
an enlarged experience and a more distinct thinking necessitated 
a sharper separation of the sciences, while on the other hand, the 
more complicated machinery of states necessitated a stricter 
sundering of ranks and occupations. Intuitive and speculative 
understanding took up a hostile attitude in opposite fields, whose 
borders were guarded with jealousy and distrust; and by limiting 
its operation to a narrow sphere, men have made unto themselves 
a master who is wont not unfrequently to end by subduing and 
oppressing all the other faculties. Whilst on the one hand a luxuriant 
imagination creates ravages in the plantations that have cost the 
intelligence so much labour, on the other hand a spirit of 
abstraction suffocates the fire that might have warmed the heart 
and inflamed the imagination. 
This subversion, commenced by art and learning in the inner man, 
was carried out to fullness and finished by the spirit of innovation 
in government. It was, no doubt, reasonable to expect that the 
simple organisation of the primitive republics should survive the 
quaintness of primitive manners and of the relations of antiquity. 
But, instead of rising to a higher and nobler degree of animal life, 
this organisation degenerated into a common and coarse 
mechanism. The zoophyte condition of the Grecian states, where 
each individual enjoyed an independent life, and could, in cases 
of necessity, become a separate whole and unit in himself, gave 
way to an ingenious mechanism, whence, from the splitting up 
into numberless parts, there results a mechanical life in the 
combination. Then there was a rupture between the state and the 
church, between laws and customs; enjoyment was separated from 
labour, the means from the end, the effort from the reward. Man 
himself eternally chained down to a little fragment of the whole, 
only forms a kind of fragment; having nothing in his ears but the 
monotonous sound of the perpetually revolving wheel, he never 
develops the harmony of his being; and instead of imprinting the 
seal of humanity on his being, he ends by being nothing more than 
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the living impress of the craft to which he devotes himself, of the 
science that he cultivates. This very partial and paltry relation, 
linking the isolated members to the whole, does not depend on 
forms that are given spontaneously; for how could a complicated 
machine, which shuns the light, conaide itself to the free will of 
man? This relation is rather dictated, with a rigorous strictness, by 
a formulary in which the free intelligence of man is chained down. 
The dead letter takes the place of a living meaning, and a practised 
memory becomes a safer guide than genius and feeling. 
If the community or state measures man by his function, only 
asking of its citizens memory, or the intelligence of a craftsman, 
or mechanical skill, we cannot be surprised that the other faculties 
of the mind are neglected, for the exclusive culture of the one 
that brings in honour and profit. Such is the necessary result of 
an organisation that is indifferent about character, only looking 
to acquirements, whilst in other cases it tolerates the thickest 
darkness, to favour a spirit of law and order; it must result if it 
wishes that individuals in the exercise of special aptitudes should 
gain in depth what they are permitted to lose in extension. We are 
aware, no doubt, that a powerful genius does not shut up its activity 
within the limits of its functions; but mediocre talents consume 
in the craft fallen to their lot the whole of their feeble energy; 
and if some of their energy is reserved for matters of preference, 
without prejudice to its functions, such a state of things at once 
bespeaks a spirit soaring above the vulgar. Moreover, it is rarely a 
recommendation in the eye of a state to have a capacity superior 
to your employment, or one of those noble intellectual cravings of 
a man of talent which contend in rivalry with the duties of office. 
The state is so jealous of the exclusive possession of its servants that 
it would prefer – nor can it be blamed in this – for functionaries 
to show their powers with the Venus of Cytherea rather than the 
Uranian Venus. 
It is thus that concrete individual life is extinguished, in order 
that the abstract whole may continue its miserable life, and the 
state remains for ever a stranger to its citizens, because feeling does 
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not discover it anywhere. The governing authorities find themselves 
compelled to classify, and thereby simplify, the multiplicity of 
citizens, and only to know humanity in a representative form and 
at second hand. Accordingly they end by entirely losing sight of 
humanity, and by confounding it with a simple artificial creation of 
the understanding, whilst on their part the subject classes cannot 
help receiving coldly laws that address themselves so little to their 
personality. At length society, weary of having a burden that the 
state takes so little trouble to lighten, falls to pieces and is broken up 
– a destiny that has long since attended most European states. They 
are dissolved in what may be called a state of moral nature, in which 
public authority is only one function more, hated and deceived by 
those who think it necessary, respected only by those who can do 
without it. 
Thus compressed between two forces, within and without, could 
humanity follow any other course than that which it has taken? 
The speculative mind, pursuing imprescriptible goods and rights 
in the sphere of ideas, must needs have become a stranger to the 
world of sense, and lose sight of matter for the sake of form. On its 
part, the world of public affairs, shut up in a monotonous circle of 
objects, and even there restricted by formulas, was led to lose sight 
of the life and liberty of the whole, while becoming impoverished 
at the same time in its own sphere. Just as the speculative mind 
was tempted to model the real after the intelligible, and to raise 
the subjective laws of its imagination into laws constituting the 
existence of things, so the state spirit rushed into the opposite 
extreme, wished to make a particular and fragmentary experience 
the measure of all observation, and to apply without exception to 
all affairs the rules of its own particular craft. The speculative mind 
had necessarily to become the prey of a vain subtlety, the state 
spirit of a narrow pedantry; for the former was placed too high 
to see the individual, and the latter too low to survey the whole. 
But the disadvantage of this direction of mind was not confined to 
knowledge and mental production; it extended to action and feeling. 
We know that the sensibility of the mind depends, as to degree, 
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on the liveliness, and for extent on the richness of the imagination. 
Now the predominance of the faculty of analysis must necessarily 
deprive the imagination of its warmth and energy, and a restricted 
sphere of objects must diminish its wealth. It is for this reason that 
the abstract thinker has very often a cold heart, because he analyses 
impressions, which only move the mind by their combination or 
totality; on the other hand, the man of business, the statesman, has 
very often a narrow heart, because shut up in the narrow circle of 
his employment his imagination can neither expand nor adapt itself 
to another manner of viewing things. 
My subject has led me naturally to place in relief the distressing 
tendency of the character of our own times to show the sources 
of the evil, without its being my province to point out the 
compensations offered by nature. I will readily admit to you that, 
although this splitting up of their being was unfavourable for 
individuals, it was the only road open for the progress of the race. 
The point at which we see humanity arrived among the Greeks was 
undoubtedly a maximum; it could neither stop there nor rise higher. 
It could not stop there, for the sum of notions acquired forced 
infallibly the intelligence to break with feeling and intuition, and to 
lead to clearness of knowledge. Nor could it rise any higher; for it 
is only in a determinate measure that clearness can be reconciled 
with a certain degree of abundance and of warmth. The Greeks had 
attained this measure, and to continue their progress in culture, 
they, as we, were obliged to renounce the totality of their being, and 
to follow different and separate roads in order to seek after truth. 
There was no other way to develop the manifold aptitudes of man 
than to bring them in opposition with one another. This antagonism 
of forces is the great instrument of culture, but it is only an 
instrument; for as long as this antagonism lasts, man is only on the 
road to culture. It is only because these special forces are isolated 
in man, and because they take on themselves to impose an exclusive 
legislation, that they enter into strife with the truth of things, and 
oblige common sense, which generally adheres imperturbably to 
external phaenomena, to dive into the essence of things. While 
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pure understanding usurps authority in the world of sense, and 
empiricism attempts to subject this intellect to the conditions of 
experience, these two rival directions arrive at the highest possible 
development, and exhaust the whole extent of their sphere. While 
on the one hand imagination, by its tyranny, ventures to destroy 
the order of the world, it forces reason, on the other side, to rise 
up to the supreme sources of knowledge, and to invoke against this 
predominance of fancy the help of the law of necessity. 
By an exclusive spirit in the case of his faculties, the individual 
is fatally led to error; but the species is led to truth. It is only 
by gathering up all the energy of our mind in a single focus, and 
concentrating a single force in our being, that we give in some sort 
wings to this isolated force, and that we draw it on artificially far 
beyond the limits that nature seems to have imposed upon it. If it be 
certain that all human individuals taken together would never have 
arrived, with the visual power given them by nature, to see a satellite 
of Jupiter, discovered by the telescope of the astronomer, it is just 
as well established that never would the human understanding have 
produced the analysis of the infinite, or the critique of pure reason, 
if in particular branches, destined for this mission, reason had not 
applied itself to special researches, and if, after having, as it were, 
freed itself from all matter, it had not by the most powerful 
abstraction given to the spiritual eye of man the force necessary, in 
order to look into the absolute. But the question is, if a spirit thus 
absorbed in pure reason and intuition will be able to emancipate 
itself from the rigorous fetters of logic, to take the free action 
of poetry, and seize the individuality of things with a faithful and 
chaste sense? Here nature imposes even on the most universal 
genius a limit it cannot pass, and truth will make martyrs as long 
as philosophy will be reduced to make its principal occupation the 
search for arms against errors. 
But whatever may be the final profit for the totality of the world, 
of this distinct and special perfecting of the human faculties, it 
cannot be denied that this final aim of the universe, which devotes 
them to this kind of culture, is a cause of suffering, and a kind 
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of malediction for individuals. I admit that the exercises of the 
gymnasium form athletic bodies; but beauty is only developed by 
the free and equal play of the limbs. In the same way the tension 
of the isolated spiritual forces may make extraordinary men; but 
it is only the well-tempered equilibrium of these forces that can 
produce happy and accomplished men. And in what relation should 
we be placed with past and future ages if the perfecting of human 
nature made such a sacrifice indispensable? In that case we should 
have been the slaves of humanity, we should have consumed our 
forces in servile work for it during some thousands of years, and 
we should have stamped on our humiliated, mutilated nature the 
shameful brand of this slavery – all this in order that future 
generations, in a happy leisure, might consecrate themselves to the 
cure of their moral health, and develop the whole of human nature 
by their free culture. 
But can it be true that man has to neglect himself for any end 
whatever? Can nature snatch from us, for any end whatever, the 
perfection which is prescribed to us by the aim of reason? It must be 
false that the perfecting of particular faculties renders the sacrifice 
of their totality necessary; and even if the law of nature had 
imperiously this tendency, we must have the power to reform by a 
superior art this totality of our being, which art has destroyed. 
Part II. 
Letter VII. 
Can this effect of harmony be attained by the state? That is not 
possible, for the state, as at present constituted, has given occasion 
to evil, and the state as conceived in the idea, instead of being 
able to establish this more perfect humanity, ought to be based 
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upon it. Thus the researches in which I have indulged would have 
brought me back to the same point from which they had called me 
off for a time. The present age, far from offering us this form of 
humanity, which we have acknowledged as a necessary condition 
of an improvement of the state, shows us rather the diametrically 
opposite form. If therefore the principles I have laid down are 
correct, and if experience confirms the picture I have traced of 
the present time, it would be necessary to qualify as unseasonable 
every attempt to effect a similar change in the state, and all hope 
as chimerical that would be based on such an attempt, until the 
division of the inner man ceases, and nature has been sufficiently 
developed to become herself the instrument of this great change 
and secure the reality of the political creation of reason. 
In the physical creation, nature shows us the road that we have to 
follow in the moral creation. Only when the struggle of elementary 
forces has ceased in inferior organisations, nature rises to the noble 
form of the physical man. In like manner, the conflict of the 
elements of the moral man and that of blind instincts must have 
ceased, and a coarse antagonism in himself, before the attempt 
can be hazarded. On the other hand, the independence of man’s 
character must be secured, and his submission to despotic forms 
must have given place to a suitable liberty, before the variety in 
his constitution can be made subordinate to the unity of the ideal. 
When the man of nature still makes such an anarchical abuse of 
his will, his liberty ought hardly to be disclosed to him. And when 
the man fashioned by culture makes so little use of his freedom, his 
free will ought not to be taken from him. The concession of liberal 
principles becomes a treason to social order when it is associated 
with a force still in fermentation, and increases the already 
exuberant energy of its nature. Again, the law of conformity under 
one level becomes tyranny to the individual when it is allied to a 
weakness already holding sway and to natural obstacles, and when it 
comes to extinguish the last spark of spontaneity and of originality. 
The tone of the age must therefore rise from its profound moral 
degradation; on the one hand it must emancipate itself from the 
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blind service of nature, and on the other it must revert to its 
simplicity, its truth, and its fruitful sap; a sufficient task for more 
than a century. However, I admit readily, more than one special 
effort may meet with success, but no improvement of the whole 
will result from it, and contradictions in action will be a continual 
protest against the unity of maxims. It will be quite possible, then, 
that in remote corners of the world humanity may be honoured 
in the person of the negro, while in Europe it may be degraded 
in the person of the thinker. The old principles will remain, but 
they will adopt the dress of the age, and philosophy will lend its 
name to an oppression that was formerly authorised by the Church. 
In one place, alarmed at the liberty which in its opening efforts 
always shows itself an enemy, it will cast itself into the arms of 
a convenient servitude. In another place, reduced to despair by a 
pedantic tutelage, it will be driven into the savage license of the 
state of nature. Usurpation will invoke the weakness of human 
nature, and insurrection will invoke its dignity, till at length the 
great sovereign of all human things, blind force, shall come in and 
decide, like a vulgar pugilist, this pretended contest of principles. 
Letter VIII. 
Must philosophy therefore retire from this field, disappointed in 
its hopes? Whilst in all other directions the dominion of forms is 
extended, must this the most precious of all gifts be abandoned to 
a formless chance? Must the contest of blind forces last eternally in 
the political world, and is social law never to triumph over a hating 
egotism? 
Not in the least. It is true that reason herself will never attempt 
directly a struggle with this brutal force which resists her arms, and 
she will be as far as the son of Saturn in the ‘Iliad’ from descending 
into the dismal field of battle, to fight them in person. But she 
chooses the most deserving among the combatants, clothes him 
490  |  Schiller - Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man
with divine arms as Jupiter gave them to his son-in-law, and by her 
triumphing force she finally decides the victory. 
Reason has done all that she could in finding the law and 
promulgating it; it is for the energy of the will and the ardour of 
feeling to carry it out. To issue victoriously from her contest with 
force, truth herself must first become a force, and turn one of the 
instincts of man into her champion in the empire of phaenomena. 
For instincts are the only motive forces in the material world. If 
hitherto truth has so little manifested her victorious power, this has 
not depended on the understanding, which could not have unveiled 
it, but on the heart which remained closed to it, and on instinct 
which did not act with it. 
Whence, in fact, proceeds this general sway of prejudices, this 
might of the understanding in the midst of the light disseminated 
by philosophy and experience? The age is enlightened, that is to 
say, that knowledge, obtained and vulgarised, suffices to set right 
at least our practical principles. The spirit of free inquiry has 
dissipated the erroneous opinions which long barred the access to 
truth, and has undermined the ground on which fanaticism and 
deception had erected their throne. Reason has purified itself from 
the illusions of the senses and from a mendacious sophistry, and 
philosophy herself raises her voice and exhorts us to return to the 
bosom of nature, to which she had first made us unfaithful. Whence 
then is it that we remain still barbarians? 
There must be something in the spirit of man – as it is not in the 
objects themselves – which prevents us from receiving the truth, 
notwithstanding the brilliant light she diffuses, and from accepting 
her, whatever may be her strength for producing conviction. This 
something was perceived and expressed by an ancient sage in this 
very significant maxim: sapere aude. 
Dare to be wise! A spirited courage is required to triumph over the 
impediments that the indolence of nature as well as the cowardice 
of the heart oppose to our instruction. It was not without reason 
that the ancient Mythos made Minerva issue fully armed from the 
head of Jupiter, for it is with warfare that this instruction 
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commences. From its very outset it has to sustain a hard fight 
against the senses, which do not like to be roused from their easy 
slumber. The greater part of men are much too exhausted and 
enervated by their struggle with want to be able to engage in a 
new and severe contest with error. Satisfied if they themselves can 
escape from the hard labour of thought, they willingly abandon to 
others the guardianship of their thoughts. And if it happens that 
nobler necessities agitate their soul, they cling with a greedy faith 
to the formulas that the state and the church hold in reserve for 
such cases. If these unhappy men deserve our compassion, those 
others deserve our just contempt, who, though set free from those 
necessities by more fortunate circumstances, yet willingly bend to 
their yoke. These latter persons prefer this twilight of obscure ideas, 
where the feelings have more intensity, and the imagination can at 
will create convenient chimeras, to the rays of truth which put to 
flight the pleasant illusions of their dreams. They have founded the 
whole structure of their happiness on these very illusions, which 
ought to be combated and dissipated by the light of knowledge, 
and they would think they were paying too dearly for a truth which 
begins by robbing them of all that has value in their sight. It would 
be necessary that they should be already sages to love wisdom: a 
truth that was felt at once by him to whom philosophy owes its 
name.1 
It is therefore not going far enough to say that the light of the 
understanding only deserves respect when it reacts on the 
character; to a certain extent it is from the character that this 
light proceeds; for the road that terminates in the head must pass 
through the heart. Accordingly, the most pressing need of the 
present time is to educate the sensibility, because it is the means, 
1. Schiller is referring to the meaning of the word 
"philosophy" in Greek: philo means "love" and sophia 
means "wisdom." (md) 
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not only to render efficacious in practice the improvement of ideas, 
but to call this improvement into existence. 
Letter IX. 
But perhaps there is a vicious circle in our previous reasoning? 
Theoretical culture must it seems bring along with it practical 
culture, and yet the latter must be the condition of the former. 
All improvement in the political sphere must proceed from the 
ennobling of the character. But, subject to the influence of a social 
constitution still barbarous, how can character become ennobled? 
It would then be necessary to seek for this end an instrument that 
the state does not furnish, and to open sources that would have 
preserved themselves pure in the midst of political corruption. 
I have now reached the point to which all the considerations 
tended that have engaged me up to the present time. This 
instrument is the art of the beautiful; these sources are open to us 
in its immortal models. 
Art, like science, is emancipated from all that is positive, and all 
that is humanly conventional; both are completely independent of 
the arbitrary will of men. The political legislator may place their 
empire under an interdict, but he cannot reign there. He can 
proscribe the friend of truth, but truth subsists; he can degrade the 
artist, but he cannot change art. No doubt, nothing is more common 
than to see science and art bend before the spirit of the age, and 
creative taste receive its law from critical taste. When the character 
becomes stiff and hardens itself, we see science severely keeping 
her limits, and art subject to the harsh restraint of rules; when the 
character is relaxed and softened, science endeavours to please and 
art to rejoice. For whole ages philosophers as well as artists show 
themselves occupied in letting down truth and beauty to the depths 
of vulgar humanity. They themselves are swallowed up in it; but, 
thanks to their essential vigour and indestructible life, the true and 
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the beautiful make a victorious fight, and issue triumphant from the 
abyss. 
No doubt the artist is the child of his time, but unhappy for him if 
he is its disciple or even its favourite. Let a beneficent deity carry off 
in good time the suckling from the breast of its mother, let it nourish 
him on the milk of a better age, and suffer him to grow up and arrive 
at virility under the distant sky of Greece. When he has attained 
manhood, let him come back, presenting a face strange to his own 
age; let him come, not to delight it with his apparition, but rather to 
purify it, terrible as the son of Agamemnon. He will, indeed, receive 
his matter from the present time, but he will borrow the form from 
a nobler time and even beyond all time, from the essential, absolute, 
immutable unity. There, issuing from the pure ether of its heavenly 
nature, flows the source of all beauty, which was never tainted 
by the corruption of generations or of ages, which roll along far 
beneath it in dark eddies. Its matter may be dishonoured as well 
as ennobled by fancy, but the ever chaste form escapes from the 
caprices of imagination. The Roman had already bent his knee for 
long years to the divinity of the emperors, and yet the statues of 
the gods stood erect; the temples retained their sanctity for the 
eye long after the gods had become a theme for mockery, and the 
noble architecture of the palaces that shielded the infamies of Nero 
and of Commodus were a protest against them. Humanity has lost 
its dignity, but art has saved it, and preserves it in marbles full 
of meaning; truth continues to live in illusion, and the copy will 
serve to reestablish the model. If the nobility of art has survived 
the nobility of nature, it also goes before it like an inspiring genius, 
forming and awakening minds. Before truth causes her triumphant 
light to penetrate into the depth of the heart, poetry intercepts her 
rays, and the summits of humanity shine in a bright light, while a 
dark and humid night still hangs over the vatleys. 
But how will the artist avoid the corruption of his time which 
encloses him on all hands? Let him raise his eyes to his own dignity, 
and to law; let him not lower them to necessity and fortune. Equally 
exempt from a vain activity which would imprint its trace on the 
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fugitive moment, and from the dreams of an impatient enthusiasm 
which applies the measure of the absolute to the paltry productions 
of time, let the artist abandon the real to the understanding, for 
that is its proper field. But let the artist endeavour to give birth to 
the ideal by the union of the possible and of the necessary. Let him 
stamp illusion and truth with the effigy of this ideal; let him apply it 
to the play of his imagination and his most serious actions, in short, 
to all sensuous and spiritual forms; then let him quietly launch his 
work into infinite time. 
But the minds set on fire by this ideal have not all received an 
equal share of calm from the creative genius – that great and patient 
temper which is required to impress the ideal on the dumb marble, 
or to spread it over a page of cold, sober letters, and then entrust 
it to the faithful hands of time. This divined instinct, and creative 
force, much too ardent to follow this peaceful walk, often throws 
itself immediately on the present, on active life, and strives to 
transform the shapeless matter of the moral world. The misfortune 
of his brothers, of the whole species, appeals loudly to the heart of 
the man of feeling; their abasement appeals still louder; enthusiasm 
is inflamed, and in souls endowed with energy the burning desire 
aspires impatiently to action and facts. But has this innovator 
examined himself to see if these disorders of the moral world wound 
his reason, or if they do not rather wound his self-love? If he does 
not determine this point at once, he will find it from the 
impulsiveness with which he pursues a prompt and definite end. 
A pure, moral motive has for its end the absolute; time does not 
exist for it, and the future becomes the present to it directly, by a 
necessary development, it has to issue from the present. To a reason 
having no limits the direction towards an end becomes confounded 
with the accomplishment of this end, and to enter on a course is to 
have finished it. 
If, then, a young friend of the true and of the beautiful were to ask 
me how, notwithstanding the resistance of the times, he can satisfy 
the noble longing of his heart, I should reply: Direct the world on 
which you act towards that which is good, and the measured and 
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peaceful course of time will bring about the results. You have given 
it this direction if by your teaching you raise its thoughts towards 
the necessary and the eternal; if, by your acts or your creations, 
you make the necessary and the eternal the object of your leanings. 
The structure of error and of all that is arbitrary must fall, and it 
has already fallen, as soon as you are sure that it is tottering. But 
it is important that it should not only totter in the external but 
also in the internal man. Cherish triumphant truth in the modest 
sanctuary of your heart; give it an incarnate form through beauty, 
that it may not only be the understanding that does homage to it, 
but that feeling may lovingly grasp its appearance. And that you 
may not by any chance take from external reality the model which 
you yourself ought to furnish, do not venture into its dangerous 
society before you are assured in your own heart that you have a 
good escort furnished by ideal nature. Live with your age, but be 
not its creation; labour for your contemporaries, but do for them 
what they need, and not what they praise. Without having shared 
their faults, share their punishment with a noble resignation, and 
bend under the yoke which they find is as painful to dispense with 
as to bear. By the constancy with which you will despise their good 
fortune, you will prove to them that it is not through cowardice 
that you submit to their sufferings. See them in thought such as 
they ought to be when you must act upon them; but see them 
as they are when you are tempted to act for them. Seek to owe 
their suffrage to their dignity; but to make them happy keep an 
account of their unworthiness; thus, on the one hand, the nobleness 
of your heart will kindle theirs, and, on the other, your end will 
not be reduced to nothingness by their unworthiness. The gravity 
of your principles will keep them off from you, but in play they 
will still endure them. Their taste is purer than their heart, and 
it is by their taste you must lay hold of this suspicious fugitive. 
In vain will you combat their maxims, in vain will you condemn 
their actions; but you can try your moulding hand on their leisure. 
Drive away caprice, frivolity, and coarseness, from their pleasures, 
and you will banish them imperceptibly from their acts, and length 
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from their feelings. Everywhere that you meet them, surround them 
with great, noble, and ingenious forms; multiply around them the 
symbols of perfection, till appearance triumphs over reality, and art 
over nature. 
Letter X. 
Convinced by my preceding letters, you agree with me on this point, 
that man can depart from his destination by two opposite roads, 
that our epoch is actually moving on these two false roads, and that 
it has become the prey, in one case, of coarseness, and elsewhere of 
exhaustion and depravity. It is the beautiful that must bring it back 
from this twofold departure. But how can the cultivation of the fine 
arts remedy, at the same time, these opposite defects, and unite in 
itself two contradictory qualities? Can it bind nature in the savage, 
and set it free in the barbarian? Can it at once tighten a spring and 
loose it, and if it cannot produce this double effect, how will it be 
reasonable to expect from it so important a result as the education 
of man? 
Now, although an infinite being, a divinity could not become (or be 
subject to time), still a tendency ought to be named divine which has 
for its infinite end the most characteristic attribute of the divinity; 
the absolute manifestation of power – the reality of all the possible 
– and the absolute unity of the manifestation (the necessity of all 
reality). It cannot be disputed that man bears within himself, in his 
personality, a predisposition for divinity. The way to divinity – if the 
word “way” can be applied to what never leads to its end – is open 
to him in every direction. 
Considered in itself and independently of all sensuous matter, his 
personality is nothing but the pure virtuality of a possible infinite 
manifestation, and so long as there is neither intuition nor feeling, 
it is nothing more than a form, an empty power. Considered in 
itself, and independently of all spontaneous activity of the mind, 
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sensuousness can only make a material man; without it, it is a pure 
form; but it cannot in any way establish a union between matter 
and it. So long as he only feels, wishes, and acts under the influence 
of desire, he is nothing more than the world, if by this word we 
point out only the formless contents of time. Without doubt, it is 
only his sensuousness that makes his strength pass into efficacious 
acts, but it is his personality alone that makes this activity his own. 
Thus, that he may not only be a world, he must give form to matter, 
and in order not to be a mere form, he must give reality to the 
virtuality that he bears in him. He gives matter to form by creating 
time, and by opposing the immutable to change, the diversity of the 
world to the eternal unity of the Ego. He gives a form to matter by 
again suppressing time, by maintaining permanence in change, and 
by placing the diversity of the world under the unity of the Ego. 
Now from this source issue for man two opposite exigencies, the 
two fundamental laws of sensuous-rational nature. The first has for 
its object absolute reality; it must make a world of what is only form, 
manifest all that in it is only a force. The second law has for its object 
absolute formality; it must destroy in him all that is only world, and 
carry out harmony in all changes. In other terms, he must manifest 
all that is internal, and give form to all that is external. Considered 
in its most lofty accomplishment, this twofold labour brings us back 
to the idea of humanity which was my starting point. 
Part III. 
Letter XII. 
This twofold labour or task, which consists in making the necessary 
pass into reality in us and in making out of us reality subject to 
the law of necessity, is urged upon us as a duty by two opposing 
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forces, which are justly styled impulsions or instincts, because they 
impel us to realise their object. The first of these impulsions, which 
I shall call the sensuous instinct, issues from the physical existence 
of man, or from sensuous nature; and it is this instinct which tends 
to enclose him in the limits of time and to make of him a material 
being; I do not say to give him matter, for to dot that a certain 
free activity of the personality would be necessary, which, receiving 
matter, distinguishes it from the Ego, or what is permanent. By 
matter I only understand in this place the change or reality that 
fills time. Consequently the instinct requires that there should be 
change, and that time should contain something. This simply filled 
state of time is named sensation, and it is only in this state that 
physical existence manifests itself. 
As all that is in time is successive, it follows by that fact alone 
that something is: all the remainder is excluded. When one note on 
an instrument is touched, among all those that it virtually offers, 
this note alone is real. When man is actually modified, the infinite 
possibility of all his modifications is limited to this single mode of 
existence. Thus, then, the exclusive action of sensuous impulsion 
has for its necessary consequence the narrowest limitation. In this 
state man is only a unity of magnitude, a complete moment in 
time; or, to speak more correctly, he is not, for his personality is 
suppressed as long as sensation holds sway over him and carries 
time along with it. 
This instinct extends its domains over the entire sphere of the 
finite in man, and as form is only revealed in matter, and the 
absolute by means of its limits, the total manifestation of human 
nature is connected on a close analysis with the sensuous instinct. 
But though it is only this instinct that awakens and develops what 
exists virtually in man, it is nevertheless this very instinct which 
renders his perfection impossible. It binds down to the world of 
sense by indestructible ties the spirit that tends higher and it calls 
back to the limits of the present, abstraction which had its free 
development in the sphere of the infinite. No doubt, thought can 
escape it for a moment, and a firm will victoriously resists its 
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exigencies; but soon compressed nature resumes her rights to give 
an imperious reality to our existence, to give it contents, substance, 
knowledge, and an aim for our activity. 
The second impulsion, which may be named the formal instinct, 
issues from the absolute existence of man, or from his rational 
nature, and tends to set free, and bring harmony into the diversity 
of its manifestations, and to maintain personality notwithstanding 
all the changes of state. As this personality, being an absolute and 
indivisible unity, can never be in contradiction with itself, as we 
are ourselves for ever, this impulsion, which tends to maintain 
personality, can never exact in one time anything but what it exacts 
and requires for ever. It therefore decides for always what it decides 
now, and orders now what it orders for ever. Hence it embraces 
the whole series of times, or what comes to the same thing, it 
suppresses time and change. It wishes the real to be necessary and 
eternal, and it wishes the eternal and the necessary to be real; in 
other terms, it tends to truth and justice. 
If the sensuous instinct only produces accidents, the formal 
instinct gives laws, laws for every judgment when it is a question 
of knowledge, laws for every will when it is a question of action. 
Whether, therefore, we recognise an object or conceive an objective 
value to a state of the subject, whether we act in virtue of knowledge 
or make of the objective the determining principle of our state; in 
both cases we withdraw this state from the jurisdiction of time, 
and we attribute to it reality for all men and for all time, that 
this, universality and necessity. Feeling can only say: “That is true 
for this subject and at this moment,” and there may come another 
moment, another subject, which withdraws the affirmation from 
the actual feeling. But when once thought pronounces and says: 
“That is,” it decides for ever and ever, and the validity of its decision 
is guaranteed by the personality itself, which defies all change. 
Inclination can only say: “That is good for your individuality and 
present necessity;” but the changing current of affairs will sweep 
them away, and what you ardently desire today will form the object 
of your aversion tomorrow. But when the moral feeling says: “That 
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ought to be,” it decides for ever. If you confess the truth because it 
is the truth, and if you practice justice because it is justice, you have 
made of a particular case the law of all possible cases, and treated 
one moment of your life as eternity. 
Accordingly, when the formal impulse holds sway and the pure 
object acts in us, the being attains its highest expansion, all barriers 
disappear, and from the unity of magnitude in which man was 
enclosed by a narrow sensuousness, he rises to the unity of idea, 
which embraces and keeps subject the entire sphere of 
phaenomena. During this operation we are no longer in time, but 
time is in us with its infinite succession. We are no longer 
individuals but a species; the judgment of all spirits is expressed by 
our own, and the choice of all hearts is represented by our own act. 
Letter XIII. 
On a first survey, nothing appears more opposed than these two 
impulsions; one having for its object change, the other immutability, 
and yet it is these two notions that exhaust the notion of humanity, 
and a third fundamental impulsion, holding a medium between 
them, is quite inconceivable. How then shall we re-establish the 
unity of human nature, a unity that appears completely destroyed 
by this primitive and radical opposition? 
I admit these two tendencies are contradictory, but it should be 
noticed that they are not so in the same objects. But things that 
do not meet cannot come into collision. No doubt the sensuous 
impulsion desires change; but it does not wish that it should extend 
to personality and its field, nor that there should be a change of 
principles. The formal impulsion seeks unity and permanence, but 
it does not wish the condition to remain fixed with the person, that 
there should be identity of feeling. Therefore these two impulsions 
are not divided by nature, and if, nevertheless, they appear so, it is 
because they have become divided by transgressing nature freely, by 
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ignoring themselves, and by confounding their spheres. The office 
of culture is to watch over them and to secure to each one its proper 
limits; therefore culture has to give equal justice to both, and to 
defend not only the rational impulsion against the sensuous, but 
also the latter against the former. Hence she has to act a twofold 
part: first, to protect sense against the attacks of freedom; secondly, 
to secure personality against the power of sensations. One of these 
ends is attained by the cultivation of the sensuous, the other by that 
of the reason. 
Since the world is developed in time, or change, the perfection 
of the faculty that places men in relation with the world will 
necessarily be the greatest possible mutability and extensiveness. 
Since personality is permanence in change, the perfection of this 
faculty, which must be opposed to change, will be the greatest 
possible freedom of action (autonomy) and intensity. The more the 
receptivity is developed under manifold aspects, the more it is 
movable and offers surfaces to phaenomena, the larger is the part of 
the world seized upon by man, and the more virtualities he develops 
in himself. Again, in proportion as man gains strength and depth, 
and depth and reason gain in freedom, in that proportion man takes 
in a larger share of the world, and throws out forms outside himself. 
Therefore his culture will consist, first, in placing his receptivity on 
contact with the world in the greatest number of points possible, 
and in raising passivity to the highest exponent on the side of 
feeling; secondly, in procuring for the determining faculty the 
greatest possible amount of independence, in relation to the 
receptive power, and in raising activity to the highest degree on the 
side of reason. By the union of these two qualities man will associate 
the highest degree of self-spontaneity (autonomy) and of freedom 
with the fullest plenitude of existence and instead of abandoning 
himself to the world so as to get lost in it, he will rather absorb it in 
himself, with all the infinitude of its phaenomena, and subject it to 
the unity of his reason. 
But man can invert this relation, and thus fail in attaining his 
destination in two ways. He can hand over to the passive force the 
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intensity demanded by the active force; he can encroach by material 
impulsion on the formal impulsion, and convert the receptive into 
the determining power. He can attribute to the active force the 
extensiveness belonging to the passive force, he can encroach by 
the formal impulsion on the material impulsion, and substitute the 
determining for the receptive power. In the former case, he will 
never be an Ego, a personality; in the second case, he will never be 
a Non-Ego, and hence in both cases he will be neither the one nor 
the other, consequently he will be nothing. 
In fact, if the sensuous impulsion becomes determining, if the 
senses become law-givers, and if the world stifles personality, he 
loses as object what he gains in force. It may be said of man that 
when he is only the contents of time, he is not and consequently he 
has no other contents. His condition is destroyed at the same time 
as his personality, because these are two correlative ideas, because 
change presupposes permanence, and a limited reality implies an 
infinite reality. If the formal impulsion becomes receptive, that is, 
if thought anticipates sensation, and the person substitutes itself 
in the place of the world, it loses as a subject and autonomous 
force what it gains as object, because immutability implies change, 
and that to manifest itself also absolute reality requires limits. As 
soon as man is only form, he has no form, and the personality 
vanishes with the condition. In a word, it is only inasmuch as he is 
spontaneous, autonomous, that there is reality out of him, that he is 
also receptive; and it is only inasmuch as he is receptive that there 
is reality in him that he is a thinking force. 
Consequently these two impulsions require limits, and looked 
upon as forces, they need tempering; the former that it may not 
encroach on the field of legislation, the latter that it may not invade 
the ground of feeling. But this tempering and moderating the 
sensuous impulsion ought not to be the effect of physical impotence 
or of a blunting of sensations, which is always a matter for 
contempt. It must be a free act, an activity of the person, which 
by its moral intensity moderates the sensuous intensity, and by 
the sway of impressions takes from them in depth what it gives 
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them in surface or breadth. The character must place limits to 
temperament, for the senses have only the right to lose elements 
if it be to the advantage of the mind. In its turn, the tempering of 
the formal impulsion must not result from moral impotence, from a 
relaxation of thought and will, which would degrade humanity. It is 
necessary that the glorious source of this second tempering should 
be the fullness of sensations; it is necessary that sensuousness itself 
should defend its field with a victorious arm and resist the violence 
that the invading activity of the mind would do to it. In a word, 
it is necessary that the material impulsion should be contained in 
the limits of propriety by personality, and the formal impulsion by 
receptivity or nature. 
Letter XIV. 
We have been brought to the idea of such a correlation between the 
two impulsions that the action of the one establishes and limits at 
the same time the action of the other, and that each of them, taken 
in isolation, does arrive at its highest manifestation just because the 
other is active. 
No doubt this correlation of the two impulsions is simply a 
problem advanced by reason, and which man will only be able to 
solve in the perfection of his being. It is in the strictest signification 
of the term: the idea of his humanity; accordingly, it is an infinite to 
which he can approach nearer and nearer in the course of time, but 
without ever reaching it. “He ought not to aim at form to the injury 
of reality, nor to reality to the detriment of the form. He must rather 
seek the absolute being by means of a determinate being, and the 
determinate being by means of an infinite being. He must set the 
world before him because he is a person, and he must be a person 
because he has the world before him. He must feel because he has 
a consciousness of himself, and he must have a consciousness of 
himself because he feels.” It is only in conformity with this idea that 
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he is a man in the full sense of the word; but he cannot be convinced 
of this so long as he gives himself up exclusively to one of these 
two impulsions, or only satisfies them one after the other. For as 
long as he only feels, his absolute personality and existence remain 
a mystery to him, and as long as he only thinks, his condition or 
existence in time escapes him. But if there were cases in which he 
could have at once this twofold experience in which he would have 
the consciousness of his freedom and the feeling of his existence 
together, in which he would simultaneously feel as matter and know 
himself as spirit, in such cases, and in such only, would he have 
a complete intuition of his humanity, and the object that would 
procure him this intuition would be a symbol of his accomplished 
destiny, and consequently serve to express the infinite to him – 
since this destination can only be fulfilled in the fullness of time. 
Presuming that cases of this kind could present themselves in 
experience, they would awake in him a new impulsion, which, 
precisely because the two other impulsions would co-operate in it, 
would be opposed to each of them taken in isolation, and might, 
with good grounds, be taken for a new impulsion. The sensuous 
impulsion requires that there should be change, that time should 
have contents; the formal impulsion requires that time should be 
suppressed, that there should be no change. Consequently, the 
impulsion in which both of the others act in concert – allow me to 
call it the instinct of play, till I explain the term – the instinct of play 
would have as its object to suppress time in time to conciliate the 
state of transition or becoming with the absolute being, change with 
identity. 
The sensuous instinct wishes to be determined, it wishes to 
receive an object; the formal instinct wishes to determine itself, 
it wishes to produce an object. Therefore the instinct of play will 
endeavor to receive as it would itself have produced, and to produce 
as it aspires to receive. 
The sensuous impulsion excludes from its subject all autonomy 
and freedom; the formal impulsion excludes all dependence and 
passivity. But the exclusion of freedom is physical necessity; the 
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exclusion of passivity is moral necessity. Thus the two impulsions 
subdue the mind: the former to the laws of nature, the latter to the 
laws of reason. It results from this that the instinct of play, which 
unites the double action of the two other instincts, will content the 
mind at once morally and physically. Hence, as it suppresses all that 
is contingent, it will also suppress all coercion, and will set man 
free physically and morally. When we welcome with effusion some 
one who deserves our contempt, we feel painfully that nature is 
constrained. When we have a hostile feeling against a person who 
commands our esteem, we feel painfully the constraint of reason. 
But if this person inspires us with interest, and also wins our 
esteem, the constraint of feeling vanishes together with the 
constraint of reason, and we begin to love him, that is to say, to play, 
to take recreation, at once with our inclination and our esteem. 
Moreover, as the sensuous impulsion controls us physically, and 
the formal impulsion morally, the former makes our formal 
constitution contingent, and the latter makes our material 
constitution contingent, that is to say, there is contingence in the 
agreement of our happiness with our perfection, and reciprocally. 
The instinct of play, in which both act in concert, will render both 
our formal and our material constitution contingent; accordingly, 
our perfection and our happiness in like manner. And on the other 
hand, exactly because it makes both of them contingent, and 
because the contingent disappears with necessity, it will suppress 
this contingence in both, and will thus give form to matter and 
reality to form. In proportion that it will lessen the dynamic 
influence of feeling and passion, it will place them in harmony with 
rational ideas, and by taking from the laws of reason their moral 
constraint, it will reconcile them with the interest of the senses. 
Letter XV. 
I approach continually nearer to the end to which I lead you, by a 
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path offering few attractions. Be pleased to follow me a few steps 
further, and a large horizon will open up to you and a delightful 
prospect will reward you for the labour of the way. 
The object of the sensuous instinct, expressed in a universal 
conception, is named Life in the widest acceptation: a conception 
that expresses all material existence and all that is immediately 
present in the senses. The object of the formal instinct, expressed 
in a universal conception, is called shape or form, as well in an exact 
as in an inexact acceptation; a conception that embraces all formal 
qualities of things and all relations of the same to the thinking 
powers. The object of the play instinct, represented in a general 
statement, may therefore bear the name of living form; a term that 
serves to describe all aesthetic qualities of phaenomena, and what 
people style, in the widest sense, beauty. 
Beauty is neither extended to the whole field of all living things 
nor merely enclosed in this field. A marble block, though it is and 
remains lifeless, can nevertheless become a living form by the 
architect and sculptor; a man, though he lives and has a form, is far 
from being a living form on that account. For this to be the case, 
it is necessary that his form should be life, and that his life should 
be a form. As long as we only think of his form, it is lifeless, a mere 
abstraction; as long as we only feel his life, it is without form, a mere 
impression. It is only when his form lives in our feeling, and his life 
in our understanding, he is the living form, and this will everywhere 
be the case where we judge him to be beautiful. 
But the genesis of beauty is by no means declared because we 
know how to point out the component parts, which in their 
combination produce beauty. For to this end it would be necessary 
to comprehend that combination itself, which continues to defy 
our exploration, as well as all mutual operation between the finite 
and the infinite. The reason, on transcendental grounds, makes the 
following demand: There shall be a communion between the formal 
impulse and the material impulse – that is, there shall be a play 
instinct – because it is only the unity of reality with the form, of 
the accidental with the necessary, of the passive state with freedom, 
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that the conception of humanity is completed. Reason is obliged to 
make this demand, because her nature impels her to completeness 
and to the removal of all bounds; while every exclusive activity 
of one or the other impulse leaves human nature incomplete and 
places a limit in it. Accordingly, as soon as reason issues the 
mandate, “a humanity shall exist,” it proclaims at the same time the 
law, “there shall be a beauty.” Experience can answer us if there is 
a beauty, and we shall know it as soon as she has taught us if a 
humanity can exist. But neither reason nor experience can tell us 
how beauty can be, and how a humanity is possible. 
We know that man is neither exclusively matter nor exclusively 
spirit. Accordingly, beauty, as the consummation of humanity, can 
neither be exclusively mere life, as has been asserted by sharp-
sighted observers, who kept too close to the testimony of 
experience, and to which the taste of the time would gladly degrade 
it; Nor can beauty be merely form, as has been judged by speculative 
sophists, who departed too far from experience, and by philosophic 
artists, who were led too much by the necessity of art in explaining 
beauty; it is rather the common object of both impulses, that is, 
of the play instinct. The use of language completely justifies this 
name, as it is wont to qualify with the word play what is neither 
subjectively nor objectively accidental, and yet does not impose 
necessity either externally or internally. As the mind in the intuition 
of the beautiful finds itself in a happy medium between law and 
necessity, it is, because it divides itself between both, emancipated 
from the pressure of both. The formal impulse and the material 
impulse are equally earnest in their demands, because one relates 
in its cognition to things in their reality and the other to their 
necessity; because in action the first is directed to the preservation 
of life, the second to the preservation of dignity, and therefore 
both to truth and perfection. But life becomes more indifferent 
when dignity is mixed up with it, and duty on longer coerces when 
inclination attracts. In like manner the mind takes in the reality 
of things, material truth, more freely and tranquilly as soon as it 
encounters formal truth, the law of necessity; nor does the mind 
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find itself strung by abstraction as soon as immediate intuition can 
accompany it. In one word, when the mind comes into communion 
with ideas, all reality loses its serious value because it becomes 
small; and as it comes in contact with feeling, necessity parts also 
with its serious value because it is easy. 
But perhaps the objection has for some time occurred to you, Is 
not the beautiful degraded by this, that it is made a mere play? and 
is it not reduced to the level of frivolous objects which have for ages 
passed under that name? Does it not contradict the conception of 
the reason and the dignity of beauty, which is nevertheless regarded 
as an instrument of culture, to confine it to the work of being a mere 
play? and does it not contradict the empirical conception of play, 
which can coexist with the exclusion of all taste, to confine it merely 
to beauty? 
But what is meant by a mere play, when we know that in all 
conditions of humanity that very thing is play, and only that is 
play which makes man complete and develops simultaneously his 
twofold nature? What you style limitation, according to your 
representation of the matter, according to my views, which I have 
justified by proofs, I name enlargement. Consequently, I should have 
said exactly the reverse: man is serious only with the agreeable, with 
the good, and with the perfect, but he plays with beauty. In saying 
this we must not indeed think of the plays that are in vogue in real 
life, and which commonly refer only to his material state. But in real 
life we should also seek in vain for the beauty of which we are here 
speaking. The actually present beauty is worthy of the really, of the 
actually, present playimpulse; but by the ideal of beauty, which is 
set up by the reason, an ideal of the play-instinct is also presented, 
which man ought to have before his eyes in all his plays. 
Therefore, no error will ever be incurred if we seek the ideal of 
beauty on the same road on which we satisfy our play-impulse. We 
can immediately understand why the ideal form of a Venus, of a 
Juno, and of an Apollo, is to be sought not at Rome, but in Greece, 
if we contrast the Greek population, delighting in the bloodless 
athletic contests of boxing, racing, and intellectual rivalry at 
Schiller - Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man  |  509
Olympia, with the Roman people gloating over the agony of a 
gladiator. Now the reason pronounces that the beautiful must not 
only be life and form, but a living form, that is, beauty, inasmuch as 
it dictates to man the twofold law of absolute formality and absolute 
reality. Reason also utters the decision that man shall only play with 
beauty, and he shall only play with beauty. 
For, to speak out once for all, man only plays when in the full 
meaning of the word he is a man, and he is only completely a man 
when he plays. This proposition, which at this moment perhaps 
appears paradoxical, will receive a great and deep meaning if we 
have advanced far enough to apply it to the twofold seriousness of 
duty and of destiny. I promise you that the whole edifice of aesthetic 
art and the still more difficult art of life will be supported by this 
principle. But this proposition is only unexpected in science; long 
ago it lived and worked in art and in the feeling of the Greeks, 
her most accomplished masters; only they removed to Olympus 
what ought to have been preserved on earth. Influenced by the 
truth of this principle, they effaced from the brow of their gods the 
earnestness and labour which furrow the cheeks of mortals, and 
also the hollow lust that smoothes the empty face. They set free 
the ever serene from the chains of every purpose, of every duty, of 
every care, and they made indolence and indifference the envied 
condition of the godlike race; merely human appellations for the 
freest and highest mind. As well the material pressure of natural 
laws as the spiritual pressure of moral laws lost itself in its higher 
idea of necessity, which embraced at the same time both worlds, 
and out of the union of these two necessities issued true freedom. 
Inspired by this spirit, the Greeks also effaced from the features of 
their ideal, together with desire or inclination, all traces of volition, 
or, better still, they made both unrecognisable, because they knew 
how to wed them both in the closest alliance. It is neither charm 
nor is it dignity which speaks from the glorious face of the Juno 
Ludovici; it is neither of these, for it is both at once. While the 
female god challenges our veneration, the godlike woman at the 
same times kindles our love. But while in ecstasy we give ourselves 
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up to the heavenly beauty, the heavenly self-repose awes us back. 
The whole form rests and dwells in itself – a fully complete creation 
in itself – and as if she were out of space, without advance or 
resistance; it shows no force contending with force, no opening 
through which time could break in. Irresistibly carried away and 
attracted by her womanly charm, kept off at a distance by her godly 
dignity, we also find ourselves at length in the state of the greatest 
repose, and the result is a wonderful impression, for which the 
understanding has no idea and language no name. 
Letter XVI. 
From the antagonism of the two impulsions, and from the 
association of two opposite principles, we have seen beauty to 
result, of which the highest ideal must therefore be sought in the 
most perfect union and equilibrium possible of the reality and of 
the form. But this equilibrium remains always an idea that reality 
can never completely reach. In reality, there will always remain a 
preponderance of one of these elements over the other, and the 
highest point to which experience can reach will consist in an 
oscillation between two principles, when sometimes reality and at 
others form will have the advantage. Ideal beauty is therefore 
eternally one and indivisible, because there can only be one single 
equilibrium; on the contrary, experimental beauty will be eternally 
double, because in the oscillation the equilibrium may be destroyed 
in two ways – this side and that. 
I have called attention in the foregoing letters to a fact that can 
also be rigorously deduced from the considerations that have 
engaged our attention to the present point; this fact is that an 
exciting and also a moderating action may be expected from the 
beautiful. The tempering action is directed to keep within proper 
limits the sensuous and the formal impulsions; the exciting, to 
maintain both of them in their full force. But these two modes 
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of action of beauty ought to be completely identified in the idea. 
The beautiful ought to temper while uniformly exciting the two 
natures, and it ought also to excite while uniformly moderating 
them. This result flows at once from the idea of a correlation, in 
virtue of which the two terms mutually imply each other, and are 
the reciprocal condition one of the other, a correlation of which 
the purest product is beauty. But experience does not offer an 
example of so perfect a correlation. In the field of experience it 
will always happen more or less that excess on the one side will 
give rise to deficiency on the other, and deficiency will give birth 
to excess. It results from this that what in the beau-ideal is only 
distinct in the idea, is different in reality in empirical beauty. The 
beau-ideal, though simple and indivisible, discloses, when viewed in 
two different aspects, on the one hand a property of gentleness and 
grace, and on the other an energetic property; in experience there 
is a gentle and graceful beauty, and there is an energetic beauty. It 
is so, and it will be always so, so long as the absolute is enclosed 
in the limits of time, and the ideas of reason have to be realised in 
humanity. For example, the intellectual man has the idea of virtue, 
of truth, and of happiness; but the active man will only practise 
virtues, will only grasp truths, and enjoy happy days. The business 
of physical and moral education is to bring back this multiplicity to 
unity, to put morality in the place of manners, science in the place 
of knowledge; the business of aesthetic education is to make out of 
beauties the beautiful. 
Energetic beauty can no more preserve a man from a certain 
residue of savage violence and harshness than graceful beauty can 
secure him against a certain degree of effeminacy and weakness. 
As it is the effect of the energetic beauty to elevate the mind in a 
physical and moral point of view and to augment its momentum, it 
only too often happens that the resistance of the temperament and 
of the character diminishes the aptitude to receive impressions, that 
the delicate part of humanity suffers an oppression which ought 
only to affect its grosser part, and that this course nature 
participates in an increase of force that ought only to turn to the 
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account of free personality. It is for this reason that at the periods 
when we find much strength and abundant sap in humanity, true 
greatness of thought is seen associated with what is gigantic and 
extravagant, and the sublimest feeling is found coupled with the 
most horrible excess of passion. It is also the reason why, in the 
periods distinguished for regularity and form, nature is as often 
oppressed as it is governed, as often outraged as it is surpassed. And 
as the action of gentle and graceful beauty is to relax the mind in the 
moral sphere as well as the physical, it happens quite as easily that 
the energy of feelings is extinguished with the violence of desires, 
and that character shares in the loss of strength which ought only 
to affect the passions. This is the reason why, in ages assumed 
to be refined, it is not a rare thing to see gentleness degenerate 
into effeminacy, politeness into platitude, correctness into empty 
sterility, liberal ways into arbitrary caprice, ease into frivolity, calm 
into apathy, and, lastly, a most miserable caricature treads on the 
heels of the noblest, the most beautiful type of humanity. Gentle 
and graceful beauty is therefore a want to the man who suffers the 
constraint of matter and of forms, for he is moved by grandeur and 
strength long before he becomes sensible to harmony and grace. 
Energetic beauty is a necessity to the man who is under the 
indulgent sway of taste, for in his state of refinement he is only too 
much disposed to make light of the strength that he retained in his 
state of rude savagism. 
I think I have now answered and also cleared up the contradiction 
commonly met in the judgments of men respecting the influence 
of the beautiful, and the appreciation of aesthetic culture. This 
contradiction is explained directly we remember that there are two 
sorts of experimental beauty, and that on both hands an affirmation 
is extended to the entire race, when it can only be proved of one 
of the species. This contradiction disappears the moment we 
distinguish a twofold want in humanity to which two kinds of beauty 
correspond. It is therefore probable that both sides would make 
good their claims if they come to an understanding respecting the 
kind of beauty and the form of humanity that they have in view. 
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Consequently in the sequel of my researches I shall adopt the 
course that nature herself follows with man considered from the 
point of view of aesthetics, and setting out from the two kinds of 
beauty, I shall rise to the idea of the genus. I shall examine the 
effects produced on man by the gentle and graceful beauty when 
its springs of action are in full play, and also those produced by 
energetic beauty when they are relaxed. I shall do this to confound 
these two sorts of beauty in the unity of the beau-ideal, in the same 
way that the two opposite forms and modes of being of humanity 
are absorbed in the unity of the ideal man. 
Part IV. 
Letter XVII. 
While we were only engaged in deducing the universal idea of 
beauty from the conception of human nature in general, we had 
only to consider in the latter the limits established essentially in 
itself, and inseparable from the notion of the finite. Without 
attending to the contingent restrictions that human nature may 
undergo in the real world of phaenomena, we have drawn the 
conception of this nature directly from reason, as a source of every 
necessity, and the ideal of beauty has been given us at the same time 
with the ideal of humanity. 
But now we are coming down from the region of ideas to the 
scene of reality, to find man in a determinate state, and 
consequently in limits which are not derived from the pure 
conception of humanity, but from external circumstances and from 
an accidental use of his freedom. But although the limitation of 
the idea of humanity may be very manifold in the individual, the 
contents of this idea suffice to teach us that we can only depart 
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from it by two opposite roads. For if the perfection of man consist 
in the harmonious energy of his sensuous and spiritual forces, he 
can only lack this perfection through the want of harmony and the 
want of energy. Thus then, before having received on this point the 
testimony of experience, reason suffices to assure us that we shall 
find the real and consequently limited man in a state of tension 
or relaxation, according as the exclusive activity of isolated forces 
troubles the harmony of his being, or as the unity of his nature is 
based on the uniform relaxation of his physical and spiritual forces. 
These opposite limits are, as we have now to prove, suppressed by 
the beautiful, which reestablishes harmony in man when excited, 
and energy in man when relaxed; and which, in this way, in 
conformity with the nature of the beautiful, restores the state of 
limitation to an absolute state, and makes of man a whole, complete 
in himself. 
Thus the beautiful by no means belies in reality the idea which 
we have made of it in speculation; only its action is much less free 
in it than in the field of theory, where we were able to apply it to 
the pure conception of humanity. In man, as experience shows him 
to us, the beautiful finds a matter, already damaged and resisting, 
which robs him in ideal perfection of what it communicates to him 
of its individual mode of being. Accordingly in reality the beautiful 
will always appear a peculiar and limited species, and not as the 
pure genus; in excited minds in the state of tension, it will lose 
its freedom and variety; in relaxed minds, it will lose its vivifying 
force; but we, who have become familiar with the true character 
of this contradictory phaenomenon, cannot be led astray by it. We 
shall not follow the great crowd of critics, in determining their 
conception by separate experiences, and to make them answerable 
for the deficiencies which man shows under their influence. We 
know rather that it is man who transfers the imperfections of his 
individuality over to them, who stands perpetually in the way of 
their perfection by his subjective limitation, and lowers their 
absolute ideal to two limited forms of phaenomena. 
It was advanced that soft beauty is for an unstrung mind, and the 
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energetic beauty for the tightly strung mind. But I apply the term 
unstrung to a man when he is rather under the pressure of feelings 
than under the pressure of conceptions. Every exclusive sway of one 
of his two fundamental impulses is for man a state of compulsion 
and violence, and freedom only exists in the cooperation of his two 
natures. Accordingly, the man governed preponderately by feelings, 
or sensuously unstrung, is emancipated and set free by matter. 
The soft and graceful beauty, to satisfy this twofold problem, must 
therefore show herself under two aspects – in two distinct forms. 
First as a form in repose, she will tone down savage life, and pave 
the way from feeling to thought. She will, secondly, as a living image 
equip the abstract form with sensuous power, and lead back the 
conception to intuition and law to feeling. The former service she 
does to the man of nature, the second to the man of art. But because 
she does not in both cases hold complete sway over her matter, 
but depends on that which is furnished either by formless nature 
or unnatural art, she will in both cases bear traces of her origin, 
and lose herself in one place in material life and in another in mere 
abstract form. 
To be able to arrive at a conception how beauty can become a 
means to remove this twofold relaxation, we must explore its source 
in the human mind. Accordingly, make up your mind to dwell a little 
longer in the region of speculation, in order then to leave it for ever, 
and to advance with securer footing on the ground of experience. 
Letter XVIII. 
By beauty the sensuous man is led to form and to thought; by 
beauty the spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to 
the world of sense. 
From this statement it would appear to follow that between 
matter and form, between passivity and activity, there must be a 
middle state, and that beauty plants us in this state. It actually 
happens that the greater part of mankind really form this 
conception of beauty as soon as they begin to reflect on its 
operations, and all experience seems to point to this conclusion. 
But, on the other hand, nothing is more unwarrantable and 
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contradictory than such a conception, because the aversion of 
matter and form, the passive and the active, feeling and thought, is 
eternal and cannot be mediated in any way. How can we remove this 
contradiction? Beauty weds the two opposed conditions of feeling 
and thinking, and yet there is absolutely no medium between them. 
The former is immediately certain through experience, the other 
through the reason. 
This is the point to which the whole question of beauty leads, and 
if we succeed in settling this point in a satisfactory way, we have 
at length found the clue that will conduct us through the whole 
labyrinth of aesthetics. 
But this requires two very different operations, which must 
necessarily support each other in this inquiry. Beauty it is said, 
weds two conditions with one another which are opposite to each 
other, and can never be one. We must start from this opposition; we 
must grasp and recognise them in their entire purity and strictness, 
so that both conditions are separated in the most definite matter; 
otherwise we mix, but we do not unite them. Secondly, it is usual 
to say, beauty unites those two opposed conditions, and therefore 
removes the opposition. But because both conditions remain 
eternally opposed to one another, they cannot be united in any 
other way than by being suppressed. Our second business is 
therefore to make this connection perfect, to carry them out with 
such purity and perfection that both conditions disappear entirely 
in a third one, and no trace of separation remains in the whole, 
otherwise we segregate, but do not unite. All the disputes that have 
ever prevailed and still prevail in the philosophical world respecting 
the conception of beauty have no other origin than their 
commencing without a sufficiently strict distinction, or that is not 
carried out fully to a pure union. Those philosophers who blindly 
follow their feeling in reflecting on this topic can obtain no other 
conception of beauty, because they distinguish nothing separate in 
the totality of the sensuous impression. Other philosophers, who 
take the understanding as their exclusive guide, can never obtain 
a conception of beauty, because they never see anything else in 
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the whole than the parts, and spirit and matter remain eternally 
separate, even in their most perfect unity. The first fear to suppress 
beauty dynamically, that is, as a working power, if they must 
separate what is united in the feeling. The others fear to suppress 
beauty logically, that is, as a conception, when they have to hold 
together what in the understanding is separate. The former wish to 
think of beauty as it works; the latter wish it to work as it is thought. 
Both therefore must miss the truth; the former because they try to 
follow infinite nature with their limited thinking power; the others, 
because they wish to limit unlimited nature according to their laws 
of thought. The first fear to rob beauty of its freedom by a too 
strict dissection, the others fear to destroy the distinctness of the 
conception by a too violent union. But the former do not reflect that 
the freedom in which they very properly place the essence of beauty 
is not lawlessness, but harmony of laws; not caprice, but the highest 
internal necessity. The others do not remember that distinctness, 
which they with equal right demand from beauty, does not consist 
in the exclusion of certain realities, but the absolute including of 
all; that is not therefore limitation, but infinitude. We shall avoid 
the quicksands on which both have made shipwreck if we begin 
from the two elements in which beauty divides itself before the 
understanding, but then afterwards rise to a pure aesthetic unity 
by which it works on feeling, and in which both those conditions 
completely disappear. 
Letter XIX. 
Two principal and different states of passive and active capacity of 
being determined2 can be distinguished in man; in like manner two 
2. Bestimmbarkeit 
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states of passive and active determination.3 The explanation of this 
proposition leads us most readily to our end. 
The condition of the state of man before destination or direction 
is given him by the impressions of the senses is an unlimited 
capacity of being determined. The infinite of time and space is given 
to his imagination for its free use; and, because nothing is settled in 
this kingdom of the possible, and therefore nothing is excluded from 
it, this state of absence of determination can be named an empty 
infiniteness, which must not by any means be confounded with an 
infinite void. 
Now it is necessary that his sensuous nature should be modified, 
and that in the indefinite series of possible determinations one 
alone should become real. One perception must spring up in it. 
That which, in the previous state of determinableness, was only an 
empty potency becomes now an active force, and receives contents; 
but at the same time, as an active force it receives a limit, after 
having been, as a simple power, unlimited. Reality exists now, but 
the infinite has disappeared. To describe a figure in space, we are 
obliged to limit infinite space; to represent to ourselves a change 
in time, we are obliged to divide the totality of time. Thus we only 
arrive at reality by limitation, at the positive, at a real position, by 
negation or exclusion; to determination, by the suppression of our 
free determinableness. 
But mere exclusion would never beget a reality, nor would a mere 
sensuous impression ever give birth to a perception, if there were 
not something from which it was excluded, if by an absolute act of 
the mind the negation were not referred to something positive, and 
if opposition did not issue out of nonposition. This act of the mind 
is styled judging or thinking, and the result is named thought. 
Before we determine a place in space, there is no space for us; 
but without absolute space we could never determine a place. The 
same is the case with time. Before we have an instant, there is no 
3. Bestimmung 
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time to us; but without infinite time – eternity – we should never 
have a representation of the instant. Thus, therefore, we can only 
arrive at the whole by the part, to the unlimited through limitation; 
but reciprocally we only arrive at the part through the whole, at 
limitation through the unlimited. 
It follows from this, that when it is affirmed of beauty that it 
mediates for man, the transition from feeling to thought, this must 
not be understood to mean that beauty can fill up the gap that 
separates feeling from thought, the passive from the active. This gap 
is infinite; and, without the interposition of a new and independent 
faculty, it is impossible for the general to issue from the individual, 
the necessary from the contingent. Thought is the immediate act 
of this absolute power, which, I admit, can only be manifested in 
connection with sensuous impressions, but which in this 
manifestation depends so little on the sensuous that it reveals itself 
specially in an opposition to it. The spontaneity or autonomy with 
which it acts excludes every foreign influence; and it is not in as far 
as it helps thought – which comprehends a manifest contradiction 
– but only in as far as it procures for the intellectual faculties the 
freedom to manifest themselves in conformity with their proper 
laws. It does not only because the beautiful can become a means 
of leading man from matter to form, from feeling to laws, from a 
limited existence to an absolute existence. 
But this assumes that the freedom of the intellectual faculties 
can be balked, which appears contradictory to the conception of an 
autonomous power. For a power which only receives the matter of 
its activity from without can only be hindered in its action by the 
privation of this matter, and consequently by way of negation; it is 
therefore a misconception of the nature of the mind, to attribute 
to the sensuous passions the power of oppressing positively the 
freedom of the mind. Experience does indeed present numerous 
examples where the rational forces appear compressed in 
proportion to the violence of the sensuous forces. But instead of 
deducing this spiritual weakness from the energy of passion, this 
passionate energy must rather be explained by the weakness of 
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the human mind. For the sense can only have a sway such as this 
over man when the mind has spontaneously neglected to assert its 
power. 
Yet in trying by these explanations to remove one objection, I 
appear to have exposed myself to another, and I have only saved the 
autonomy of the mind at the cost of its unity. For how can the mind 
derive at the same time from itself the principles of inactivity and of 
activity, if it is not itself divided, and if it is not in opposition with 
itself? 
Here we must remember that we have before us, not the infinite 
mind, but the finite. The finite mind is that which only becomes 
active through the passive, only arrives at the absolute through 
limitation, and only acts and fashions in as far as it receives matter. 
Accordingly, a mind of this nature must associate with the impulse 
towards form or the absolute, an impulse towards matter or 
limitation, conditions without which it could not have the former 
impulse nor satisfy it. How can two such opposite tendencies exist 
together in the same being? This is a problem that can no doubt 
embarrass the metaphysician, but not the transcendental 
philosopher. The latter does not presume to explain the possibility 
of things, but he is satisfied with giving a solid basis to the 
knowledge that makes us understand the possibility of experience. 
And as experience would be equally impossible without this 
autonomy in the mind, and without the absolute unity of the mind, 
it lays down these two conceptions as two conditions of experience 
equally necessary without troubling itself any more to reconcile 
them. Moreover, this immanence of two fundamental impulses does 
not in any degree contradict the absolute unity of the mind, as soon 
as the mind itself, – its selfhood – is distinguished from these two 
motors. No doubt, these two impulses exist and act in it, but itself 
is neither matter nor form, nor the sensuous nor reason, and this is 
a point that does not seem always to have occurred to those who 
only look upon the mind as itself acting when its acts are in harmony 
with reason, and who declare it passive when its acts contradict 
reason. 
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Arrived at its development, each of these two fundamental 
impulsions tends of necessity and by its nature to satisfy itself; but 
precisely because each of them has a necessary tendency, and both 
nevertheless have an opposite tendency, this twofold constraint 
mutually destroys itself, and the will preserves an entire freedom 
between them both. It is therefore the will that conducts itself like a 
power – as the basis of reality – with respect to both these impulses; 
but neither of them can by itself act as a power with respect to the 
other. A violent man, by his positive tendency to justice, which never 
fails in him, is turned away from injustice; nor can a temptation 
of pleasure, however strong, make a strong character violate its 
principles. There is in man no other power than his will; and death 
alone, which destroys man, or some privation of self-consciousness, 
is the only thing that can rob man of his internal freedom. 
An external necessity determines our condition, our existence 
in time, by means of the sensuous. The latter is quite involuntary, 
and directly it is produced in us, we are necessarily passive. In 
the same manner an internal necessity awakens our personality in 
connection with sensations, and by its antagonism with them; for 
consciousness cannot depend on the will, which presupposes it. 
This primitive manifestation of personality is no more a merit to 
us than its privation is a defect in us. Reason can only be required 
in a being who is self-conscious, for reason is an absolute 
consecutiveness and universality of consciousness; before this is 
the case, he is not a man, nor can any act of humanity be expected 
from him. The metaphysician can no more explain the limitation 
imposed by sensation on a free and autonomous mind than the 
natural philosopher can understand the infinite, which is revealed in 
consciousness in connection with these limits. Neither abstraction 
nor experience can bring us back to the source whence issue our 
ideas of necessity and of universality; this source is concealed in 
its origin in time from the observer, and its super-sensuous origin 
from the researches of the metaphysician. But, to sum up in a few 
words, consciousness is there, and, together, with its immutable 
unity, the law of all that is for man is established, as well as of all 
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that is to be by man, for his understanding and his activity. The ideas 
of truth and of right present themselves inevitable, incorruptible, 
immeasurable, even in the age of sensuousness; and without our 
being able to say why or how, we see eternity in time, the necessary 
following the contingent. It is thus that, without any share on the 
part of the subject, the sensation and self-consciousness arise, and 
the origin of both is beyond our volition, as it is out of the sphere of 
our knowledge. 
But as soon as these two faculties have passed into action, and 
man has verified by experience, through the medium of sensation, a 
determinate existence, and through the medium of consciousness, 
its absolute existence, the two fundamental impulses exert their 
influence directly their object is given. The sensuous impulse is 
awakened with the experience of life – with the beginning of the 
individual; the rational impulsion with the experience of law – with 
the beginning of his personality; and it is only when these two 
inclinations have come into existence that the human type is 
realised. Up to that time, everything takes place in man according 
to the law of necessity; but now the hand of nature lets him go, 
and it is for him to keep upright humanity which nature places as 
a germ in his heart. And thus we see that directly the two opposite 
and fundamental impulses exercise their influence in him, both lose 
their constraint, and the autonomy of two necessities gives birth to 
freedom. 
Letter XX. 
That freedom is an active and not a passive principle results from its 
very conception; but that liberty itself should be an effect of nature 
(taking this word in its widest sense), and not the work of man, and 
therefore that it can be favoured or thwarted by natural means, is 
the necessary consequence of that which precedes. It begins only 
when man is complete, and when these two fundamental impulsions 
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have been developed. It will then be wanting whilst he is incomplete, 
and while one of these impulsions is excluded, and it will be re-
established by all that gives back to man his integrity. 
Thus it is possible, both with regard to the entire species as to the 
individual, to remark the moment when man is yet incomplete, and 
when one of the two exclusions acts solely in him. We know that 
man commences by life simply, to end by form; that he is more of an 
individual than a person, and that he starts from the limited or finite 
to approach the infinite. The sensuous impulsion comes into play 
therefore before the rational impulsion, because sensation precedes 
consciousness; and in this priority of sensuous impulsion we find 
the key of the history of the whole of human liberty. 
There is a moment, in fact, when the instinct of life, not yet 
opposed to the instinct of form, acts as nature and as necessity; 
when the sensuous is a power because man has not begun; for even 
in man there can be no other power than his will. But when man 
shall have attained to the power of thought, reason, on the contrary, 
will be a power, and moral or logical necessity will take the place 
of physical necessity. Sensuous power must then be annihilated 
before the law which must govern it can be established. It is not 
enough that something shall begin which as yet was not; previously 
something must end which had begun. Man cannot pass 
immediately from sensuousness to thought. He must step 
backwards, for it is only when one determination is suppressed that 
the contrary determination can take place. Consequently, in order 
to exchange passive against active liberty, a passive determination 
against an active, he must be momentarily free from all 
determination, and must traverse a state of pure determinability. He 
has then to return in some degree to that state of pure negative 
indetermination in which he was before his senses were affected 
by anything. But this state was absolutely empty of all contents, 
and now the question is to reconcile an equal determination and 
a determinability equally without limit, with the greatest possible 
fullness, because from this situation something positive must 
immediately follow. The determination which man received by 
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sensation must be preserved, because he should not lose the reality; 
but at the same time, in so far as finite, it should be suppressed, 
because a determinability without limit would take place. The 
problem consists then in annihilating the determination of the 
mode of existence, and yet at the same time in preserving it, which 
is only possible in one way: in opposing to it another. The two 
sides of a balance are in equilibrium when empty; they are also in 
equilibrium when their contents are of equal weight. 
Thus, to pass from sensation to thought, the soul traverses a 
medium position, in which sensibility and reason are at the same 
time active, and thus they mutually destroy their determinant 
power, and by their antagonism produce a negation. This medium 
situation in which the soul is neither physically nor morally 
constrained, and yet is in both ways active, merits essentially the 
name of a free situation; and if we call the state of sensuous 
determination physical, and the state of rational determination 
logical or moral, that state of real and active determination should 
be called the aesthetic. 
Letter XXI. 
I have remarked in the beginning of the foregoing letter that there 
is a twofold condition of determinableness and a twofold condition 
of determination. And now I can clear up this proposition. 
The mind can be determined – is determinable – only in as far 
as it is not determined; it is, however, determinable also, in as far 
as it is not exclusively determined; that is, if it is not confined 
in its determination. The former is only a want of determination 
– it is without limits, because it is without reality; but the latter, 
the aesthetic determinableness, has no limits, because it unites all 
reality. 
The mind is determined, inasmuch as it is only limited; but it is 
also determined because it limits itself of its own absolute capacity. 
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It is situated in the former position when it feels, in the second 
when it thinks. Accordingly the aesthetic constitution is in relation 
to determinableness what thought is in relation to determination. 
The latter is a negative from internal infinite completeness, the 
former a limitation from internal infinite power. Feeling and thought 
come into contact in one single point, the mind is determined in 
both conditions, the man becomes something and exists – either 
as individual or person – by exclusion; in other cases these two 
faculties stand infinitely apart. Just in the same manner, the 
aesthetic determinableness comes in contact with the mere want 
of determination in a single point, by both excluding every distinct 
determined existence, by thus being in all other points nothing and 
all, and hence by being infinitely different. Therefore, if the latter, in 
the absence of determination from deficiency, is represented as an 
empty infiniteness, the aesthetic freedom of determination, which 
forms the proper counterpart to the former, can be considered, as a 
completed infiniteness; a representation which exactly agrees with 
the teachings of the previous investigations. 
Man is therefore nothing in the aesthetic state, if attention is 
given to the single result, and not to the whole faculty, and if we 
regard only the absence or want of every special determination. We 
must therefore do justice to those who pronounce the beautiful, and 
the disposition in which it places the mind, as entirely indifferent 
and unprofitable, in relation to knowledge and feeling. They are 
perfectly right; for it is certain that beauty gives no separate, single 
result, either for the understanding or for the will; it does not carry 
out a single intellectual or moral object; it discovers no truth, does 
not help us to fulfil a single duty, and, in one word, is equally unfit to 
found the character or to clear the head. Accordingly, the personal 
worth of a man, or his dignity, as far as this can only depend on 
himself, remains entirely undetermined by aesthetic culture, and 
nothing further is attained than that, on the part of nature, it is 
made profitable for him to make of himself what he will; that the 
freedom to be what he ought to be is restored perfectly to him. 
But by this, something infinite is attained. But as soon as we 
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remember that freedom is taken from man by the one-sided 
compulsion of nature in feeling, and by the exclusive legislation 
of the reason in thinking, we must consider the capacity restored 
to him by the aesthetical disposition, as the highest of all gifts, as 
the gift of humanity. I admit that he possesses this capacity for 
humanity, before every definite determination in which he may be 
placed. But as a matter of fact, he loses it with every determined 
condition, into which he may come, and if he is to pass over to an 
opposite condition, humanity must be in every case restored to him 
by the aesthetic life. 
It is therefore not only a poetical license, but also philosophically 
correct, when beauty is named our second creator. Nor is this 
inconsistent with the fact the she only makes it possible for us to 
attain and realise humanity, leaving this to our free will. For in this 
she acts in common with our original creator, nature, which has 
imparted to us nothing further than this capacity for humanity, but 
leaves the use of it to our own determination of will. 
Letter XXII. 
Accordingly, if the aesthetic disposition of the mind must be looked 
upon in one respect as nothing – that is, when we confine our view 
to separate and determined operations – it must be looked upon 
in another respect as a state of the highest reality, in as far as we 
attend to the absence of all limits and the sum of powers which 
are commonly active in it. Accordingly we cannot pronounce them, 
again, to be wrong who describe the aesthetic state to be the most 
productive in relation to knowledge and morality. They are perfectly 
right, for a state of mind which comprises the whole of humanity 
in itself must of necessity include in itself also – necessarily and 
potentially – every separate expression of it. Again, a disposition of 
mind that removes all limitation from the totality of human nature 
must also remove it from every social expression of the same. 
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Exactly because its “aesthetic disposition” does not exclusively 
shelter any separate function of humanity, it is favourable to all 
without distinction; nor does it favour any particular functions, 
precisely because it is the foundation of the possibility of all. All 
other exercises give to the mind some special aptitude, but for 
that very reason give it some definite limits; only the aesthetical 
leads him to the unlimited. Every other condition, in which we can 
live, refers us to a previous condition, and requires for its solution 
a following condition; only the aesthetic is a complete whole in 
itself, for it unites in itself all conditions of its source and of its 
duration. Here alone we feel ourselves swept out of time, and our 
humanity expresses itself with purity and integrity as if it had not 
yet received any impression or interruption from the operation of 
external powers. 
That which flatters our senses in immediate sensation opens our 
weak and volatile spirit to every impression, but makes us in the 
same degree less apt for exertion. That which stretches our thinking 
power and invites to abstract conceptions strengthens our mind for 
every kind of resistance, but hardens it also in the same proportion, 
and deprives us of susceptibility in the same ratio that it helps us 
to greater mental activity. For this very reason, one as well as the 
other brings us at length to exhaustion, because matter cannot long 
do without the shaping, constructive force, and the force cannot do 
without the constructible material. But on the other hand, if we have 
resigned ourselves to the enjoyment of genuine beauty, we are at 
such a moment of our passive and active powers in the same degree 
master, and we shall turn with ease from grave to gay, from rest to 
movement, from submission to resistance, to abstract thinking and 
intuition. 
This high indifference and freedom of mind, united with power 
and elasticity, is the disposition in which a true work of art ought to 
dismiss us, and there is no better test of true aesthetic excellence. If 
after an enjoyment of this kind we find ourselves specially impelled 
to a particular mode of feeling or action, and unfit for other modes, 
this serves as an infallible proof that we have not experienced any 
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pure aesthetic effect, whether this is owing to the object, to our own 
mode of feeling – as generally happens – or to both together. 
As in reality no purely aesthetical effect can be met with – for man 
can never leave his dependance on material forces – the excellence 
of a work of art can only consist in its greater approximation to 
its ideal of aesthetic purity, and however high we may raise the 
freedom of this effect, we shall always leave it with a particular 
disposition and a particular bias. Any class of productions or 
separate work in the world of art is noble and excellent in 
proportion to the universality of the disposition and the unlimited 
character of the bias thereby presented to our mind. This truth can 
be applied to works in various branches of art, and also to different 
works in the same branch. We leave a grand musical performance 
with our feelings excited, the reading of a noble poem with a 
quickened imagination, a beautiful statue or building with an 
awakened understanding; but a man would not choose an 
opportune moment who attempted to invite us to abstract thinking 
after a high musical enjoyment, or to attend to a prosaic affair 
of common life after a high poetical enjoyment, or to kindle our 
imagination and astonish our feelings directly after inspecting a fine 
statue or edifice. The reason of this is that music, by its matter, 
even when most spiritual, presents a greater affinity with the senses 
than is permitted by aesthetic liberty; it is because even the most 
happy poetry, having for its medium the arbitrary and contingent 
play of the imagination, always shares in it more than the intimate 
necessity of the really beautiful allows; it is because the best 
sculpture touches on severe science by what is determinate in its 
conception. However, these particular affinities are lost in 
proportion as the works of these three kinds of art rise to a greater 
elevation, and it is a natural and necessary consequence of their 
perfection, that, without confounding their objective limits, the 
different arts come to resemble each other more and more, in the 
action which they exercise on the mind. At its highest degree of 
ennobling, music ought to become a form, and act on us with the 
calm power of an antique statue; in its most elevated perfection, the 
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plastic art ought to become music and move us by the immediate 
action exercised on the mind by the senses; in its most complete 
development, poetry ought both to stir us powerfully like music and 
like plastic art to surround us with a peaceful light. In each art, the 
perfect style consists exactly in knowing how to remove specific 
limits, while sacrificing at the same time the particular advantages 
of the art, and to give it by a wise use of what belongs to it specially 
a more general character. 
Nor is it only the limits inherent in the specific character of each 
kind of art that the artist ought to overstep in putting his hand 
to the work; he must also triumph over those which are inherent 
in the particular subject of which he treats. In a really beautiful 
work of art, the substance ought to be inoperative, the form should 
do everything; for by the form, the whole man is acted on; the 
substance acts on nothing but isolated forces. Thus, however vast 
and sublime it may be, the substance always exercises a restrictive 
action on the mind, and true aesthetic liberty can only be expected 
from the form. Consequently the true search of the master consists 
in destroying matter by the form; and the triumph of art is great 
in proportion as it overcomes matter and maintains its sway over 
those who enjoy its work. It is great particularly in destroying 
matter when most imposing, ambitious, and attractive, when 
therefore matter has most power to produce the effect proper to it, 
or, again, when it leads those who consider it more closely to enter 
directly into relation with it. The mind of the spectator and of the 
hearer must remain perfectly free and intact; it must issue pure and 
entire from the magic circle of the artist, as from the hands of the 
Creator. The most frivolous subject ought to be treated in such a 
way that we preserve the faculty to exchange it immediately for the 
most serious work. The arts which have passion for their object, as 
a tragedy for example, do not present a difficulty here; for, in the 
first place these arts are not entirely free, because they are in the 
service of a particular end (the pathetic), and then no connoisseur 
will deny that even in this class a work is perfect in proportion as 
amidst the most violent storms of passion it respects the liberty of 
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the soul. There is a fine art of passion, but an impassioned fine art 
is a contradiction in terms, for the infallible effect of the beautiful 
is emancipation from the passions. The idea of an instructive fine 
art (didactic art) or improving (moral) art is no less contradictory, 
for nothing agrees less with the idea of the beautiful than to give a 
determinate tendency to the mind. 
However, from the fact that a work produces effects only by its 
substance, it must not always be inferred that there is a want of 
form in this work; this conclusion may quite as well testify to a want 
of form in the observer. If his mind is too stretched or too relaxed, 
if it is only accustomed to receive things either by the senses or the 
intelligence, even in the ost perfect combination, it will only stop to 
look at the parts, and it will only see matter in the most beautiful 
form. Only sensible of the coarse elements, he must first destroy 
the aesthetic organisation of a work to find enjoyment in it, and 
carefully disinter the details which genius has caused to vanish, with 
infinite art, in the harmony of the whole. The interest he takes in 
the work is either solely moral or exclusively physical; the only thing 
wanting to it is to be exactly what it ought to be – aesthetical. The 
readers of this class enjoy a serious and pathetic poem as they do 
a sermon; a simple and playful work, as an inebriating draught; and 
if on the one hand they have so little taste as to demand edification 
from a tragedy or from an epos, even such as the “Messias,” on the 
other hand they will be infallibly scandalised by a piece after the 
fashion of Anacreon and Catullus. 
Part V. 
Letter XXIII. 
I take up the thread of my researches, which I broke off only to apply 
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the principles I laid down to practical art and the appreciation of its 
works. 
The transition from the passivity of sensuousness to the activity 
of thought and of will can be effected only by the intermediary 
state of aesthetic liberty; and though in itself this state decides 
nothing respecting our opinions and our sentiments, and therefore 
leaves our intellectual and moral value entirely problematical, it is, 
however, the necessary condition without which we should never 
attain to an opinion or a sentiment. In a word, there is no other way 
to make a reasonable being out of a sensuous man than by making 
him first aesthetic. 
But, you might object: Is this mediation absolutely indispensable? 
Could not truth and duty, one or the other, in themselves and by 
themselves, find access to the sensuous man? To this I reply: Not 
only is it possible, but it is absolutely necessary that they owe 
solely to themselves their determining force, and nothing would be 
more contradictory to our preceding affirmations than to appear 
to defend the contrary opinion. It has been expressly proved that 
the beautiful furnishes no result, either for the comprehension or 
for the will; that it mingles with no operations, either of thought 
or of resolution; and that it confers this double power without 
determining anything with regard to the real exercise of this power. 
Here all foreign help disappears, and the pure logical form, the 
idea, would speak immediately to the intelligence, as the pure moral 
form, the law, immediately to the will. 
But that the pure form should be capable of it, and that there is 
in general a pure form for sensuous man, is that, I maintain, which 
should be rendered possible by the aesthetic disposition of the soul. 
Truth is not a thing which can be received from without like reality 
or the visible existence of objects. It is the thinking force, in his 
own liberty and activity, which produces it, and it is just this liberty 
proper to it, this liberty which we seek in vain in sensuous man. The 
sensuous man is already determined physically, and thenceforth 
he has no longer his free determinability; he must necessarily first 
enter into possession of this lost determinability before he can 
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exchange the passive against an active determination. Therefore, in 
order to recover it, he must either lose the passive determination 
that he had, or he should enclose already in himself the active 
determination to which he should pass. If he confined himself to 
lose passive determination, he would at the same time lose with 
it the possibility of an active determination, because thought need 
a body, and form can only be realised through matter. He must 
therefore contain already in himself the active determination that 
he may be at once both actively and passively determined, that is to 
say, he becomes necessarily aesthetic. 
Consequently, by the aesthetic disposition of the soul the proper 
activity of reason is already revealed in the sphere of sensuousness, 
the power of sense is already broken within its own boundaries, 
and the ennobling of physical man carried far enough, for spiritual 
man has only to develop himself according to the laws of liberty. 
The transition from an aesthetic state to a logical and moral state 
(from the beautiful to truth and duty) is then infinitely more easy 
than the transition from the physical state to the aesthetic state 
(from life pure and blind to form). This transition man can effectuate 
alone by his liberty, whilst he has only to enter into possession 
of himself not to give it himself; but to separate the elements of 
his nature, and not to enlarge it. Having attained to the aesthetic 
disposition, man will give to his judgments and to his actions a 
universal value as soon as he desires it. This passage from brute 
nature to beauty, is which an entirely new faculty would awaken in 
him, nature would render easier, and his will has no power over a 
disposition which, we know, itself gives birth to the will. To bring 
the aesthetic man to profound views, to elevated sentiments, he 
requires nothing more than important occasions; to obtain the same 
thing from the sensuous man, his nature must at first be changed. 
To make of the former a hero, a sage, it is often only necessary to 
meet with a sublime situation, which exercises upon the faculty of 
the will the more immediate action; for the second, it must first be 
transplanted under another sky. 
One of the most important tasks of culture, then, is to submit man 
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to form, even in a purely physical life, and to render it aesthetic as 
far as the domain of the beautiful can be extended, for it is alone 
in the aesthetic state, and not in the physical state, that the moral 
state can be developed. If in each particular case man ought to 
possess the power to make his judgment and his will the judgment 
of the entire species; if he ought to find in each limited existence 
the transition to an infinite existence; if, lastly, he ought from every 
dependent situation to take his flight to rise to autonomy and to 
liberty, it must be observed that at no moment is he only individual 
and solely obeys the law of nature. To be apt and ready to raise 
himself from the narrow circle of the ends of nature, to rational 
ends, in the sphere of the former he must already have exercised 
himself in the second; he must already have realised his physical 
destiny with a certain liberty that belongs only to spiritual nature, 
that is to say, according to the laws of the beautiful. 
And that he can effect without thwarting in the least degree his 
physical aim. The exigencies of nature with regard to him turn only 
upon what he does upon the substance of his acts; but the ends 
of nature in no degree determine the way in which he acts, the 
form of his actions. On the contrary, the exigencies of reason have 
rigorously the form of his activity for its object. Thus, so much as 
it is necessary for the moral destination of man, that he be purely 
moral, that he shows an absolute personal activity, so much is he 
indifferent that his physical destination be entirely physical, that he 
acts in a manner entirely passive. Henceforth with regard to this 
last destination, it entirely depends on him to fulfil it solely as a 
sensuous being and natural force (as a force which acts only as it 
diminishes) or, at the same time, as absolute force, as a rational 
being. To which of these does his dignity best respond? Of this, 
there can be no question. It is as disgraceful and contemptible 
for him to do under sensuous impulsion that which he ought to 
have determined merely by the motive of duty, as it is noble and 
honourable for him to incline towards conformity with laws, 
harmony, independence; there even where the vulgar man only 
satisfies a legitimate want. In a word, in the domain of truth and 
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morality, sensuousness must have nothing to determine; but in the 
sphere of happiness, form may find a place, and the instinct of play 
prevail. 
Thus then, in the indifferent sphere of physical life, man ought 
to already commence his moral life; his own proper activity ought 
already to make way in passivity, and his rational liberty beyond the 
limits of sense; he ought already to impose the law of his will upon 
his inclinations; he ought if you will permit me the expression – to 
carry into the domain of matter the war against matter, in order 
to be dispensed from combatting this redoubtable enemy upon the 
sacred field of liberty; he ought to learn to have nobler desires, not 
to be forced to have sublime volitions. This is the fruit of aesthetic 
culture, which submits to the laws of the beautiful, in which neither 
the laws of nature nor those of reason suffer, which does not force 
the will of man, and which by the form it gives to exterior life already 
opens internal life. 
Letter XXIV. 
Accordingly three different moments or stages of development can 
be distinguished, which the individual man, as well as the whole 
race, must of necessity traverse in a determinate order if they are 
to fulfil the circle of their determination. No doubt, the separate 
periods can be lengthened or shortened, through accidental causes 
which are inherent either in the influence of external things or 
under the free caprice of men; but neither of them can be 
overstepped, and the order of their sequence cannot be inverted 
either by nature or by the will. Man, in his physical condition, suffers 
only the power of nature; he gets rid of this power in the aesthetical 
condition, and he rules them in the moral state. 
What is man before beauty liberates him from free pleasure, and 
the serenity of form tames down the savageness of life? Eternally 
uniform in his aims, eternally changing in his judgments, self-
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seeking without being himself, unfettered without being free, a slave 
without serving any rule. At this period, the world is to him only 
destiny, not yet an object; all has existence for him only in as far 
as it procures existence to him; a thing that neither seeks from nor 
gives to him is non-existent. Every phaenomenon stands out before 
him, separate and cut off, as he finds himself in the series of beings. 
All that is, is to him through the bias of the moment; every change 
is to him an entirely fresh creation, because with the necessary in 
him, the necessary out of him is wanting, which binds together all 
the changing forms in the universe, and which holds fast the law 
on the theatre of his action, while the individual departs. It is in 
vain that nature lets the rich variety of her forms pass before him; 
he sees in her glorious fullness nothing but his prey, in her power 
and greatness nothing but his enemy. Either he encounters objects, 
and wishes to draw them to himself in desire, or the objects press 
in a destructive manner upon him, and he thrusts them away in 
dismay and terror. In both cases his relation to the world of sense 
is immediate contact; and perpetually anxious through its pressure, 
restless and plagued by imperious wants, he nowhere finds rest 
except in enervation, and nowhere limits save in exhausted desire. 
“True, his is the powerful breast and the mighty hand of the 
Titans. . . . A certain inheritance; yet the god welded Round his 
forehead a brazen band; Advice, moderation, wisdom, and patience, 
Hid it from his shy, sinister look. Every desire is with him a rage, And 
his rage prowls around limitless.” – Iphigenia in Tauris. 
Ignorant of his own human dignity, he is far removed from 
honouring it in others, and conscious of his own savage greed, he 
fears it in every creature that he sees like himself. He never sees 
others in himself, only himself in others, and human society, instead 
of enlarging him to the race, only shuts him up continually closer 
in his individuality. Thus limited, he wanders through his sunless 
life, till favouring nature rolls away the load of matter from his 
darkened senses, reflection separates him from things, and objects 
show themselves at length in the after-glow of the consciousness. 
It is true we cannot point out this state of rude nature as we 
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have here portrayed it in any definite people and age. It is only 
an idea, but an idea with which experience agrees most closely in 
special features. It may be said that man was never in this animal 
condition, but he has not, on the other hand, ever entirely escaped 
from it. Even in the rudest subjects, unmistakable traces of rational 
freedom can be found, and even in the most cultivated, features are 
not wanting that remind us of that dismal natural condition. It is 
possible for man, at one and the same time, to unite the highest 
and the lowest in his nature; and if his dignity depends on a strict 
separation of one from the other, his happiness depends on a skilful 
removal of this separation. The culture which is to bring his dignity 
into agreement with his happiness will therefore have to provide for 
the greatest purity of these two principles in their most intimate 
combination. 
Consequently the first appearance of reason in man is not the 
beginning of humanity. This is first decided by his freedom, and 
reason begins first by making his sensuous dependence boundless; 
a phaenomenon that does not appear to me to have been 
sufficiently elucidated, considering its importance and universality. 
We know that the reason makes itself known to man by the demand 
for the absolute – the self – dependent and necessary. But as this 
want of the reason cannot be satisfied in any separate or single state 
of his physical life, he is obliged to leave the physical entirely and to 
rise from a limited reality to ideas. But although the true meaning of 
that demand of the reason is to withdraw him from the limits of time 
and to lead him up from the world of sense to an ideal world, yet this 
same demand of reason, by a misapplication – scarcely to be avoided 
in this age, prone to sensuousness can direct him to physical life, 
and, instead of making man free, plunge him in the most terrible 
slavery. 
Facts verify this supposition. Man raised on the wings of 
imagination leaves the narrow limits of the present, in which mere 
animality is enclosed, in order to strive on to an unlimited future. 
But while the limitless is unfolded to his dazed imagination, his 
heart has not ceased to live in the separate, and to serve the 
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moment. The impulse towards the absolute seizes him suddenly in 
the midst of his animality, and as in this cloddish condition all his 
efforts aim only at the material and temporal, and are limited by his 
individuality, he is only led by that demand of the reason to extend 
his individuality into the infinite, instead of to abstract from it. He 
will be led to seek instead of form an inexhaustible matter, instead 
of the unchangeable an everlasting change and an absolute securing 
of his temporal existence. The same impulse which, directed to 
his thought and action, ought to lead to truth and morality, now 
directed to his passion and emotional state, produces nothing but 
an unlimited desire and an absolute want. The first fruits, therefore, 
that he reaps in the world of spirits, are cares and fear – both 
operations of the reason; not of sensuousness, but of a reason that 
mistakes its object and applies its categorical imperative to matter. 
All unconditional systems of happiness are fruits of this tree, 
whether they have for their object the present day or the whole of 
life, or what does not make them any more respectable, the whole of 
eternity, for their object. An unlimited duration of existence and of 
well-being is only an ideal of the desires; hence a demand which can 
only be put forth by an animality striving up to the absolute. Man, 
therefore, without gaining anything for his humanity by a rational 
expression of this sort, loses the happy limitation of the animal over 
which he now only possesses the unenviable superiority of losing 
the present for an endeavour after what is remote, yet without 
seeking in the limitless future anything but the present. 
But even if the reason does not go astray in its object, or err in the 
question, sensuousness will continue to falsify the answer for a long 
time. As soon as man has begun to use his understanding and to knit 
together phaenomena in cause and effect, the reason, according to 
its conception, presses on to an absolute knitting together and to an 
unconditional basis. In order merely to be able to put forward this 
demand man must already have stepped beyond the sensuous, but 
the sensuous uses this very demand to bring back the fugitive. 
In fact it is now that he ought to abandon entirely the world 
of sense in order to take his flight into the realm of ideas; for 
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the intelligence remains eternally shut up in the finite and in the 
contingent, and does not cease putting questions without reaching 
the last link of the chain. But as the man with whom we are engaged 
is not yet capable of such an abstraction, and does not find it in 
the sphere of sensuous knowledge, and because he does not look 
for it in pure reason, he will seek for it below in the region of 
sentiment, and will appear to find it. No doubt the sensuous shows 
him nothing that has its foundation in itself, and that legislates for 
itself, but it shows him something that does not care for foundation 
or law; therefore thus not being able to quiet the intelligence by 
showing it a final cause, he reduces it to silence by the conception 
which desires no cause; and being incapable of understanding the 
sublime necessity of reason, he keeps to the blind constraint of 
matter. As sensuousness knows no other end than its interest, and 
is determined by nothing except blind chance, it makes the former 
the motive of its actions, and the latter the master of the world. 
Even the divine part in man, the moral law, in its first 
manifestation in the sensuous cannot avoid this perversion. As this 
moral law is only prohibited and combats in man the interest of 
sensuous egotism, it must appear to him as something strange until 
he has come to consider this self-love as the stranger, and the 
voice of reason as his true self. Therefore he confines himself to 
feeling the fetters which the latter impose on him, without having 
the consciousness of the infinite emancipation which it procures 
for him. Without suspecting in himself the dignity of lawgiver, he 
only experiences the constraint and the impotent revolt of a subject 
fretting under the yoke, because in this experience the sensuous 
impulsion precedes the moral impulsion, he gives to the law of 
necessity a beginning in him, a positive origin, and by the most 
unfortunate of all mistakes he converts the immutable and the 
eternal in himself into a transitory accident. He makes up his mind 
to consider the notions of the just and the unjust as statutes which 
have been introduced by a will, and not as having in themselves 
an eternal value. Just as in the explanation of certain natural 
phaenomena he goes beyond nature and seeks out of her what can 
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only be found in her, in her own laws; so also in the explanation 
of moral phaenomena he goes beyond reason and makes light of 
his humanity, seeking a god in this way. It is not wonderful that a 
religion which he has purchased at the cost of his humanity shows 
itself worthy of this origin, and that he only considers as absolute 
and eternally binding laws that have never been binding from all 
eternity. He has placed himself in relation with, not a holy being, but 
a powerful. Therefore the spirit of his religion, of the homage that 
he gives to God, is a fear that abases him, and not a veneration that 
elevates him in his own esteem. 
Though these different aberrations by which man departs from 
the ideal of his destination cannot all take place at the same time, 
because several degrees have to be passed over in the transition 
from the obscure of though to error, and from the obscure of will to 
the corruption of the will; these degrees are all, without exception, 
the consequence of his physical state, because in all the vital 
impulsion sways the formal impulsion. Now, two cases may happen: 
either reason may not yet have spoken in man, and the physical 
may reign over him with a blind necessity, or reason may not be 
sufficiently purified from sensuous impressions, and the moral may 
still be subject to the physical; in both cases the only principle that 
has a real power over him is a material principle, and man, at least 
as regards his ultimate tendency, is a sensuous being. The only 
difference is, that in the former case he is an animal without reason, 
and in the second case a rational animal. But he ought to be neither 
one nor the other: he ought to be a man. Nature ought not to rule 
him exclusively; nor reason conditionally. The two legislations ought 
to be completely independent and yet mutually complementary. 
Letter XXV. 
Whilst man, in his first physical condition, is only passively affected 
by the world of sense, he is still entirely identified with it; and for 
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this reason the external world, as yet, has no objective existence for 
him. When he begins in his aesthetic state of mind to regard the 
world objectively, then only is his personality severed from it, and 
the world appears to him an objective reality, for the simple reason 
that he has ceased to form an identical portion of it. 
That which first connects man with the surrounding universe is 
the power of reflective contemplation. Whereas desire seizes at 
once its object, reflection removes it to a distance and renders it 
inalienably her own by saving it from the greed of passion. The 
necessity of sense which he obeyed during the period of mere 
sensations, lessens during the period of reflection; the senses are 
for the time in abeyance; even ever-fleeting time stands still whilst 
the scattered rays of consciousness are gathering and shape 
themselves; an image of the infinite is reflected upon the perishable 
ground. As soon as light dawns in man, there is no longer night 
outside of him; as soon as there is peace within him the storm lulls 
throughout the universe, and the contending forces of nature find 
rest within prescribed limits. Hence we cannot wonder if ancient 
traditions allude to these great changes in the inner man as to 
a revolution in surrounding nature, and symbolise thought 
triumphing over the laws of time, by the figure of Zeus, which 
terminates the reign of Saturn. 
As long as man derives sensations from a contact with nature, he 
is her slave; but as soon as he begins to reflect upon her objects 
and laws he becomes her lawgiver. Nature, which previously ruled 
him as a power, now expands before him as an object. What is 
objective to him can have no power over him, for in order to become 
objective it has to experience his own power. As far and as long 
as he impresses a form upon matter, he cannot be injured by its 
effect; for a spirit can only be injured by that which deprives it of its 
freedom. Whereas he proves his own freedom by giving a form to 
the formless; where the mass rules heavily and without shape, and 
its undefined outlines are for ever fluctuating between uncertain 
boundaries, fear takes up its abode; but man rises above any natural 
terror as soon as he knows how to mould it, and transform it into 
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an object of his art. As soon as he upholds his independence toward 
phaenomenal nature, he maintains his dignity toward her as a thing 
of power and with a noble freedom he rises against his gods. They 
throw aside the mask with which they had kept him in awe during 
his infancy, and to his surprise his mind perceives the reflection of 
his own image. The divine monster of the Oriental, which roams 
about changing the world with the blind force of a beast of prey, 
dwindles to the charming outline of humanity in Greek fable; the 
empire of the Titans is crushed, and boundless force is tamed by 
infinite form. 
But whilst I have been merely searching for an issue from the 
material world and a passage into the world of mind, the bold flight 
on my imagination has already taken me into the very midst of the 
latter world. The beauty of which we are in search we have left 
behind by passing from the life of mere sensations to the pure form 
and to the pure object. Such a leap exceeds the condition of human 
nature; in order to keep pace with the latter we must return to the 
world of sense. 
Beauty is indeed the sphere of unfettered contemplation and 
reflection; beauty conducts us into the world of ideas, without 
however taking us from the world of sense, as occurs when a truth is 
perceived and acknowledged. This is the pure product of a process 
of abstraction from everything material and accidental, a pure 
object free from every subjective barrier, a pure state of self-activity 
without any admixture of passive sensations. There is indeed a way 
back to sensation from the highest abstraction; for thought teaches 
the inner sensation, and the idea of logical and moral unity passes 
into a sensation of sensual accord. But if we delight in knowledge we 
separate very accurately our own conceptions from our sensations; 
we look upon the latter as something accidental, which might have 
been omitted without the knowledge being impaired thereby, 
without truth being less true. It would, however, be a vain attempt 
to suppress this connection of the faculty of feeling with the idea 
of beauty, consequently, we shall not succeed in representing to 
ourselves one as the effect of the other, but we must look upon them 
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both together and reciprocally as cause and effect. In the pleasure 
which we derive from knowledge we readily distinguish the passage 
from the active to the passive state, and we clearly perceive that 
the first ends when the second begins. On the contrary, from the 
pleasure which we take in beauty, this transition from the active 
to the passive is not perceivable, and reflection is so intimately 
blended with feeling that we believe we feel the form immediately. 
Beauty is then an object to us, it is true, because reflection is the 
condition of the feeling which we have of it; but it is also a state 
of our personality (our Ego), because the feeling is the condition 
of the idea we conceive of it: beauty is therefore doubtless form, 
because we contemplate it, but it is equally life because we feel it. In 
a word, it is at once our state and our act. And precisely because it 
is at the same time both a state and an act, it triumphantly proves 
to us that the passive does not exclude the active, neither matter 
nor form, neither the finite nor the infinite; and that consequently 
the physical dependence to which man is necessarily devoted does 
not in any way destroy his moral liberty. This is the proof of beauty, 
and I ought to add that this alone can prove it. In fact, as in the 
possession of truth or of logical unity, feeling is not necessarily one 
with the thought, but follows it accidentally; it is a fact which only 
proves that a sensitive nature can succeed a rational nature, and 
vice versa; not that they co-exist, that they exercise a reciprocal 
action one over the other, and lastly that they ought to be united 
in an absolute and necessary manner. From this exclusion of feeling 
as long as there is thought, and of thought so long as there is 
feeling, we should on the contrary conclude that the two natures 
are incompatible, so that in order to demonstrate the pure reason 
is to be realised in humanity, the best proof given by the analysis is 
that this realisation is demanded. But, as in the realisation of beauty 
or of aesthetic unity, there is a real union, mutual substitution of 
matter and of form, of passive and of active, by this alone in proved 
the compatibility of the two natures, the possible realisation of the 
infinite in the finite, and consequently also the possibility of the 
most sublime humanity. 
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Henceforth we need no longer be embarrassed to find a transition 
from dependent feeling to moral liberty, because beauty reveals to 
us the fact that they can perfectly co-exist, and that to show himself 
a spirit, man need not escape from matter. But if on one side he is 
free, even in his relation with a visible world, as the fact of beauty 
teaches, and if on the other side freedom is something absolute 
and supersensuous, as its idea necessarily implies, the question 
is no longer how man succeeds in raising himself from the finite 
to the absolute, and opposing himself in his thought and will to 
sensuality, as this has already been produced in the fact of beauty. 
In a word, we have no longer to ask how he passes from virtue to 
truth, which is already included in the former, but how he opens a 
way for himself from vulgar reality to aesthetic reality, and from the 
ordinary feelings of life to the perception of the beautiful. 
Letter XXVI. 
I have shown in the previous letters that it is only the aesthetic 
disposition of the soul that gives birth to liberty, it cannot therefore 
be derived from liberty nor have a moral origin. It must be a gift 
of nature, the favour of chance alone can break the bonds of the 
physical state and bring the savage to duty. The germ of the 
beautiful will find an equal difficulty in developing itself in countries 
where a severe nature forbids man to enjoy himself, and in those 
where a prodigal nature dispenses him from all effort; where the 
blunted senses experience no want, and where violent desire can 
never be satisfied. The delightful flower of the beautiful will never 
unfold itself in the case of the Troglodyte hid in his cavern always 
alone, and never finding humanity outside himself; nor among 
nomads, who, travelling in great troops, only consist of a multitude, 
and have no individual humanity. It will only flourish in places where 
man converses peacefully with himself in his cottage, and with the 
whole race when he issues from it. In those climates where a limpid 
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ether opens the senses to the lightest impression, whilst a life-
giving warmth developes a luxuriant nature, where even in the 
inanimate creation the sway of inert matter is overthrown, and the 
victorious form ennobles even the most abject natures; in this joyful 
state and fortunate zone, where activity alone leads to enjoyment, 
and enjoyment to activity, from life itself issues a holy harmony, 
and the laws of order develope life, a different result takes place. 
When imagination incessantly escapes from reality, and does not 
abandon the simplicity of nature in its wanderings; then and there 
only the mind and the senses, the receptive force and the plastic 
force, are developed in that happy equilibrium which is the soul of 
the beautiful and the condition of humanity. 
What phaenomenon accompanies the initiation of the savage into 
humanity? However far we look back into history the phaenomenon 
is identical among all people who have shaken off the slavery of the 
animal state, the love of appearance, the inclination for dress and 
for games. 
Extreme stupidity and extreme intelligence have a certain affinity 
in only seeking the real and being completely insensible to mere 
appearance. The former is only drawn forth by the immediate 
presence of an object in the senses, and the second is reduced 
to a quiescent state only by referring conceptions to the facts of 
experience. In short, stupidity cannot rise above reality, nor the 
intelligence descend below truth. Thus, in as far as the want of 
reality and attachment to the real are only the consequence of a 
want and a defect, indifference to the real and an interest taken 
in appearances are a real enlargement of humanity and a decisive 
step towards culture. In the first place it is the proof of an exterior 
liberty, for as long as necessity commands and want solicits, the 
fancy is strictly chained down to the real; it is only when want 
is satisfied that it developes without hindrance. But it is also the 
proof of an internal liberty, because it reveals to us a force which, 
independent of an external substratum, sets itself in motion, and 
has sufficient energy to remove from itself the solicitations of 
nature. The reality of things is effected by things, the appearance 
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of things is the work of man, and a soul that takes pleasure in 
appearance does not take pleasure in what it receives but in what it 
makes. 
It is self-evident that I am speaking of aesthetical evidence 
different from reality and truth, and not of logical appearance 
identical with them. Therefore if it is liked it is because it is an 
appearance, and not because it is held to be something better than it 
is: the first principle alone is a play whilst the second is a deception. 
To give a value to the appearance of the first kind can never injure 
truth, because it is never to be feared that it will supplant it – the 
only way in which truth can be injured. To despise this appearance 
is to despise in general all the fine arts of which it is the essence. 
Nevertheless, it happens sometimes that the understanding carries 
its zeal for reality as far as this intolerance, and strikes with a 
sentence of ostracism all the arts relating to beauty in appearance, 
because it is only an appearance. However, the intelligence only 
shows this vigorous spirit when it calls to mind the affinity pointed 
out further back. I shall find some day the occasion to treat specially 
of the limits of beauty in its appearance. 
It is nature herself which raises man from reality to appearance 
by endowing him with two senses which only lead him to the 
knowledge of the real through appearance. In the eye and the ear 
the organs of the senses are already freed from the persecutions 
of nature, and the object with which we are immediately in contact 
through the animal senses is remoter from us. What we see by 
the eye differs from what we feel; for the understanding to reach 
objects overleaps the light which separates us from them. In truth, 
we are passive to an object; in sight and hearing the object is a 
form we create. While still a savage, man only enjoys through touch 
merely aided by sight and sound. He either does not rise to 
perception through sight, or does not rest there. As soon as he 
begins to enjoy through a sight, vision has an independent value, he 
is aesthetically free, and the instinct of play is developed. 
The instinct of play likes appearance, and directly it is awakened it 
is followed by the formal imitative instinct which treats appearance 
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as an independent thing. Directly man has come to distinguish the 
appearance from the reality, the form from the body, he can 
separate, in fact he has already done so. Thus the faculty of the 
art of imitation is given with the faculty of form in general. The 
inclination that draws us to it reposes on another tendency I have 
not to notice here. The exact period when the aesthetic instinct, or 
that of art, developes, depends entirely on the attraction that mere 
appearance has for men. 
As every real existence proceeds from nature as a foreign power, 
whilst every appearance comes in the first place from man as a 
percipient subject, he only uses his absolute sight in separating 
semblance from essence, and arranging according to subjective law. 
With an unbridled liberty he can unite what nature has severed, 
provided he can imagine his union, and he can separate what nature 
has united, provided this separation can take place in his 
intelligence. Here nothing can be sacred to him but his own law: the 
only condition imposed upon him is to respect the border which 
separates his own sphere from the existence of things or from the 
realm of nature. 
This human right of ruling is exercised by man in the art of 
appearance; and his success in extending the empire of the 
beautiful, and guarding the frontiers of truth, will be in proportion 
with the strictness with which he separates form from substance: 
for if he frees appearance from reality he must also do the converse. 
But man possesses sovereign power only in the world of 
appearance, in the unsubstantial realm of imagination, only by 
abstaining from giving being to appearance in theory, and by giving 
it being in practice. It follows that the poet transgresses his proper 
limits when he attributes being to his ideal, and when he gives this 
ideal aim as a determined existence. For he can only reach this 
result by exceeding his right as a poet, that of encroaching by the 
ideal on the field of experience, and by pretending to determine real 
existence in virtue of a simple possibility, or else he renounces his 
right as poet by letting experience encroach on the sphere of the 
ideal, and by restricting possibility to the conditions of reality. 
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It is only by being frank or disclaiming all reality, and by being 
independent or doing without reality, that the appearance is 
aesthetical. Directly it apes reality or needs reality for effect it is 
nothing more than a vile instrument for material ends, and can 
prove nothing for the freedom of the mind. Moreover, the object in 
which we find beauty need not be unreal if our judgment disregards 
this reality; for if it regards this the judgment is no longer 
aesthetical. A beautiful woman if living would no doubt please us 
as much and rather more than an equally beautiful woman seen in 
painting; but what makes the former please men is not her being an 
independent appearance; she no longer pleases the pure aesthetic 
feeling. In the painting, life must only attract as an appearance, and 
reality as an idea. But it is certain that to feel in a living object only 
the pure appearance, requires a greatly higher aesthetic culture 
than to do without life in the appearance. 
When the frank and independent appearance is found in man 
separately, or in a whole people, it may be inferred they have mind, 
taste, and all prerogatives connected with them. In this case, the 
ideal will be seen to govern real life, honour triumphing over 
fortune, thought over enjoyment, the dream of immortality over a 
transitory existence. 
In this case public opinion will no longer be feared and an olive 
crown will be more valued than a purple mantle. Impotence and 
perversity alone have recourse to false and paltry semblance, and 
individuals as well as nations who lend to reality the support of 
appearance, or to the aesthetical appearance the support of reality, 
show their moral unworthiness and their aesthetical impotence. 
Therefore, a short and conclusive answer can be given to this 
question – How far will appearance be permitted in the moral 
world? It will run thus in proportion as this appearance will be 
aesthetical, that is, an appearance that does not try to make up 
for reality, nor requires to be made up for by it. The aesthetical 
appearance can never endanger the truth of morals: wherever it 
seems to do so the appearance is not aesthetical. Only a stranger 
to the fashionable world can take the polite assurances, which are 
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only a form, for proofs of affection, and say he has been deceived; 
but only a clumsy fellow in good society calls in the aid of duplicity 
and flatters to become amiable. The former lacks the pure sense 
for independent appearance; therefore he can only give a value 
to appearance by truth. The second lacks reality, and wishes to 
replace it by appearance. Nothing is more common than to hear 
depreciators of the times utter these paltry complaints – that all 
solidity has disappeared from the world, and that essence is 
neglected for semblance. Though I feel by no means called upon 
to defend this age against these reproaches, I must say that the 
wide application of these criticisms shows that they attach blame 
to the age, not only on the score of the false, but also of the frank 
appearance. And even the exceptions they admit in favour of the 
beautiful have for their object less the independent appearance 
than the needy appearance. Not only do they attack the artificial 
colouring that hides truth and replaces reality, but also the 
beneficent appearance that fills a vacuum and clothes poverty; and 
they even attack the ideal appearance that ennobles a vulgar reality. 
Their strict sense of truth is rightly offended by the falsity of 
manners; unfortunately, they class politeness in this category. It 
displeases them that the noisy and showy so often eclipse true 
merit, but they are no less shocked that appearance is also 
demanded from merit, and that a real substance does not dispense 
with an agreeable form. They regret the cordiality, the energy, and 
solidity of ancient times; they would restore with them ancient 
coarseness, heaviness, and the old Gothic profusion. By judgments 
of this kind they show an esteem for the matter itself unworthy 
of humanity, which ought only to value the matter inasmuch as it 
can receive a form and enlarge the empire of ideas. Accordingly, 
the taste of the age need not much fear these criticisms, if it can 
clear itself before better judges. Our defect is not to grant a value 
to aesthetic appearance (we do not do this enough): a severe judge 
of the beautiful might rather reproach us with not having arrived 
at pure appearance, with not having separated clearly enough 
existence from the phaenomenon, and thus established their limits. 
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We shall deserve this reproach so long as we cannot enjoy the 
beautiful in living nature without desiring it; as long as we cannot 
admire the beautiful in the imitative arts without having an end 
in view; as long as we do not grant to imagination an absolute 
legislation of its own; and as long as we do not inspire it with care 
for its dignity by the esteem we testify for its works. 
Part VI. 
Letter XXVII. 
Do not fear for reality and truth. Even if the elevated idea of 
aesthetic appearance became general, it would not become so, as 
long as man remains so little cultivated as to abuse it; and if it 
became general, this would result from a culture that would prevent 
all abuse of it. The pursuit of independent appearance requires 
more power of abstraction, freedom of heart, and energy of will 
than man requires to shut himself up in reality; and he must have 
left the latter behind him if he wishes to attain to aesthetic 
appearance. Therefore a man would calculate very badly who took 
the road of the ideal to save himself that of reality. Thus reality 
would not have much to fear from appearance, as we understand it; 
but, on the other hand, appearance would have more to fear from 
reality. Chained to matter, man uses appearance for his purposes 
before he allows it a proper personality in the art of the ideal: to 
come to that point a complete revolution must take place in his 
mode of feeling, otherwise he would not be even on the way to the 
ideal. Consequently, when we find in man the signs of a pure and 
disinterested esteem, we can infer that this revolution has taken 
place in his nature, and that humanity has really begun in him. Signs 
of this kind are found even in the first and rude attempts that he 
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makes to embellish his existence, even at the risk of making it worse 
in its material conditions. As soon as he begins to prefer form to 
substance and to risk reality for appearance (known by him to be 
such), the barriers of animal life fall, and he finds himself on a track 
that has no end. 
Not satisfied with the needs of nature, he demands the 
superfluous. First, only the superfluous of matter, to secure his 
enjoyment beyond the present necessity; but afterwards he wishes 
a superabundance in matter, an aesthetical supplement to satisfy 
the impulse for the formal, to extend enjoyment beyond necessity. 
By piling up provisions simply for a future use, and anticipating their 
enjoyment in the imagination, he outsteps the limits of the present 
moment, but not those of time in general. He enjoys more; he does 
not enjoy differently. But as soon as he makes form enter into his 
enjoyment, and he keeps in view the forms of the objects which 
satisfy his desires, he has not only increased his pleasure in extent 
and intensity, but he has also ennobled it in mode and species. 
No doubt nature has given more than is necessary to unreasoning 
beings; she has caused a gleam of freedom to shine even in the 
darkness of animal life. When the lion is not tormented by hunger, 
and when no wild beast challenges him to fight, his unemployed 
energy creates an object for himself; full of ardour, he fills the 
re-echoing desert with his terrible roars, and his exuberant force 
rejoices in itself, showing itself without an object. The insect flits 
about rejoicing in life in the sunlight, and it is certainly not the cry 
of want that makes itself heard in the melodious song of the bird; 
there is undeniably freedom in these movements, though it is not 
emancipation from want in general, but from a determinate external 
necessity. 
The animal works, when a privation is the motor of its activity, 
and it plays when the plenitude of force is this motor, when an 
exuberant life is excited to action. Even in inanimate nature a luxury 
of strength and a latitude of determination are shown, which in this 
material sense might be styled play. The tree produces numberless 
germs that are abortive without developing, and it sends forth more 
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roots, branches and leaves, organs of nutrition, than are used for 
the preservation of the species. Whatever this tree restores to the 
elements of its exuberant life, without using it, or enjoying it, may be 
expended by life in free and joyful movements. It is thus that nature 
offers in her material sphere a sort of prelude to the limitless, and 
that even there she suppresses partially the chains from which she 
will be completely emancipated in the realm of form. The constraint 
of superabundance or physical play, answers as a transition from 
the constraint of necessity, or of physical seriousness, to aesthetical 
play; and before shaking off, in the supreme freedom of the 
beautiful, the yoke of any special aim, nature already approaches, at 
least remotely, this independence, by the free movement which is 
itself its own end and means. 
The imagination, like the bodily organs, has in man its free 
movement and its material play, a play in which, without any 
reference to form, it simply takes pleasure in its arbitrary power 
and in the absence of all hindrance. These plays of fancy, inasmuch 
as form is not mixed up with them, and because a free succession 
of images makes all their charm, though confined to man, belong 
exclusively to animal life, and only prove one thing – that he is 
delivered from all external sensuous constraint – without our being 
entitled to infer that there is in it an independent plastic force. 
From this play of free association of ideas, which is still quite 
material in nature and is explained by simple natural laws, the 
imagination, by making the attempt of creating a free form, passes 
at length at a jump to the aesthetic play: I say at one leap, for quite 
a new force enters into action here; for here, for the first time, the 
legislative mind is mixed with the acts of a blind instinct, subjects 
the arbitrary march of the imagination to its eternal and immutable 
unity, causes its independent permanence to enter in that which is 
transitory, and its infinity in the sensuous. Nevertheless, as long as 
rude nature, which knows of no other law than running incessantly 
from change to change, will yet retain too much strength, it will 
oppose itself by its different caprices to this necessity; by its 
agitation to this permanence; by its manifold needs to this 
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independence, and by its insatiability to this sublime simplicity. It 
will be also troublesome to recognise the instinct of play in its 
first trials, seeing that the sensuous impulsion, with its capricious 
humour and its violent appetites, constantly crosses. It is on that 
account that we see the taste, still coarse, seize that which is new 
and startling, the disordered, the adventurous and the strange, the 
violent and the savage, and fly from nothing so much as from calm 
and simplicity. It invents grotesque figures, it likes rapid transitions, 
luxurious forms, sharply marked changes, acute tones, a pathetic 
song. That which man calls beautiful at this time, is that which 
excites him, that which gives him matter; but that which excites 
him to give his personality to the object, that which gives matter 
to a possible plastic operation, for otherwise it would not be the 
beautiful for him. A remarkable change has therefore taken place in 
form of his judgments; he searches for these objects, not because 
they affect him, but because they furnish him with the occasion of 
acting; they please him, not because they answer to a want, but 
because they satisfy a law, which speaks in his breast, although quite 
low as yet. 
Soon it will not be sufficient for things to please him; he will wish 
to please: in the first place, it is true, only by that which belongs to 
him; afterwards by that which he is. That which he possesses, that 
which he produces, ought not merely to bear any more the traces 
of servitude, nor to mark out the end, simply and scrupulously, by 
the form. Independently of the use to which it is destined, the object 
ought also to reflect the enlightened intelligence which imagines it, 
the hand which shaped it with affection, the mind free and serene 
which chose it and exposed it to view. Now, the ancient German 
searches for more magnificent furs, for more splendid antlers of the 
stag, for more elegant drinking horns; and the Caledonian chooses 
the prettiest shells for his festivals. The arms themselves ought 
to be no longer only objects of terror, but also of pleasure; and 
the skilfully worked scabbard will not attract less attention than 
the homicidal edge of the sword. The instinct of play, not satisfied 
with bringing into the sphere of the necessary an aesthetic 
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superabundance for the future more free, is at last completely 
emancipated from the bonds of duty, and the beautiful becomes 
of itself an object of man’s exertions. He adorns himself. The free 
pleasure comes to take a place among his wants, and the useless 
soon becomes the best part of his joys. Form, which from the 
outside gradually approaches him, in his dwellings, his furniture, his 
clothing, begins at last to take possession of the man himself, to 
transform him, at first exteriorly, and afterwards in the interior. The 
disordered leaps of joy become the dance, the formless gesture is 
changed into an amiable and harmonious pantomime, the confused 
accents of feeling are developed, and begin to obey measure and 
adapt themselves to song. When, like the flight of cranes, the Trojan 
army rushes on to the field of battle with thrilling cries, the Greek 
army approaches in silence and with a noble and measured step. On 
the one side we see but the exuberance of a blind force, on the other 
the triumph of form and the simple majesty of law. 
Now, a nobler necessity binds the two sexes mutually, and the 
interests of the heart contribute in rendering durable an alliance 
which was at first capricious and changing like the desire that knits 
it. Delivered from the heavy fetters of desire, the eye, now calmer, 
attends to the form, the soul contemplates the soul, and the 
interested exchange of pleasure becomes a generous exchange of 
mutual inclination. Desire enlarges and rises to love, in proportion 
as it sees humanity dawn in its object; and, despising the vile 
triumphs gained by the senses, man tries to win a nobler victory 
over the will. The necessity of pleasing subjects the powerful nature 
to the gentle laws of taste; pleasure may be stolen, but love must 
be a gift. To obtain this higher recompense, it is only through the 
form and not through matter that it can carry on the contest. It 
must cease to act on feeling as a force, to appear in the intelligence 
as a simple phaenomenon; it must respect liberty, as it is liberty it 
wishes to please. The beautiful reconciles the contrast of different 
natures in its simplest and purest expression. It also reconciles the 
eternal contrast of the two sexes, in the whole complex framework 
of society, or at all events it seeks to do so; and, taking as its model 
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the free alliance it has knit between manly strength and womanly 
gentleness, it strives to place in harmony, in the moral world, all the 
elements of gentleness and of violence. Now, at length, weakness 
becomes sacred, and an unbridled strength disgraces; the injustice 
of nature is corrected by the generosity of chivalrous manners. 
The being whom no power can make tremble, is disarmed by the 
amiable blush of modesty, and tears extinguish a vengeance that 
blood could not have quenched. Hatred itself hears the delicate 
voice of honour, the conqueror’s sword spares the disarmed enemy, 
and a hospitable hearth smokes for the stranger on the dreaded hill-
side where murder alone awaited him before. 
In the midst of the formidable realm of forces, and of the sacred 
empire of laws, the aesthetic impulse of form creates by degrees a 
third and a joyous realm, that of play and of the appearance, where 
she emancipates man from fetters, in all his relations, an from all 
that is named constraint, whether physical or moral. 
If in the dynamic state of rights men mutually move and come into 
collision as forces, in the moral (ethical) state of duties, man opposes 
to man the majesty of the laws, and chains down his will. In this 
realm of the beautiful or the aesthetic state, man ought to appear 
to man only as a form, and an object of free play. To give freedom 
through freedom is the fundamental law of this realm. 
The dynamic state can only make society simply possible by 
subduing nature through nature; the moral (ethical) state can only 
make it morally necessary by submitting the will of the individual to 
the general will. The aesthetic state alone can make it real, because 
it carries out the will of all through the nature of the individual. If 
necessity alone forces man to enter into society, and if this reason 
engraves on his soul social principles, it is beauty only that can 
give him a social character; taste alone brings harmony into society, 
because it creates harmony in the individual. All other forms of 
perception divide the man, because they are based exclusively 
either in the sensuous or in the spiritual part of his being. It is only 
the perception of beauty that makes of him an entirety, because 
it demands the co-operation of his two natures. All other forms 
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of communication divide society, because they apply exclusively 
either to the receptivity or to the private activity of its members, 
and therefore to what distinguishes men one from the other. The 
aesthetic communication alone unites society, because it applies to 
what is common to all its members. We only enjoy the pleasures of 
sense as individuals, without the nature of the race in us sharing 
in it; accordingly, we cannot generalise our individual pleasures, 
because we cannot generalise our individuality. We enjoy the 
pleasures of knowledge as a race, dropping the individual in our 
judgment; but we cannot generalise the pleasures of the 
understanding, because we cannot eliminate individuality from the 
judgments of others as we do from our own. Beauty alone can we 
enjoy both as individuals and as a race, that is, as representing a 
race. Good appertaining to sense can only make one person happy, 
because it is founded on inclination, which is always exclusive; and 
it can only make a man partially happy, because his real personality 
does not share in it. Absolute good can only render a man happy 
conditionally, for truth is only the reward of abnegation, and a pure 
heart alone has faith in a pure will. Beauty alone confers happiness 
on all, and under its influence every being forgets that he is limited. 
Taste does not suffer any superior or absolute authority, and 
the sway of beauty is extended over appearance. It extends up 
to the seat of reason’s supremacy, suppressing all that is material. 
It extends down to where sensuous impulse rules with blind 
compulsion, and form is undeveloped. Taste ever maintains its 
power on these remote borders, where legislation is taken from it. 
Particular desires must renounce their egotism, and the agreeable, 
otherwise tempting the senses, must in matters of taste adorn the 
mind with the attractions of grace. 
Duty and stern necessity must change their forbidding tone, only 
excused by resistance, and do homage to nature by a nobler trust 
in her. Taste leads our knowledge from the mysteries of science 
into the open expanse of common sense, and changes a narrow 
scholasticism into the common property of the human race. Here 
the highest genius must leave its particular elevation, and make 
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itself familiar to the comprehension even of a child. Strength must 
let the Graces bind it, and the arbitrary lion must yield to the reins 
of love. For this purpose taste throws a veil over physical necessity, 
offending a free mind by its coarse nudity, and dissimulating our 
degrading parentage with matter by a delightful illusion of freedom. 
Mercenary art itself rises from the dust; and the bondage of the 
bodily, in its magic touch, falls off from the inanimate and animate. 
In the aesthetic state the most slavish tool is a free citizen, having 
the same rights as the noblest; and the intellect which shapes the 
mass to its intent must consult it concerning its destination. 
Consequently in the realm of aesthetic appearance, the idea of 
equality is realised, which the political zealot would gladly see 
carried out socially. It has often been said that perfect politeness is 
only found near a throne. If thus restricted in the material, man has, 
as elsewhere appears, to find compensation in the ideal world. 
Does such a state of beauty in appearance exist, and where? It 
must be in every finely harmonised soul; but as a fact, only in select 
circles, like the pure ideal of the church and state – in circles where 
manners are not formed by the empty imitations of the foreign, but 
by the very beauty of nature; where man passes through all sorts 
of complications in all simplicity and innocence, neither forced to 
trench on another’s freedom to preserve his own, nor to show grace 
at the cost of dignity. 
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13. G. W. F. Hegel - The 




The present inquiry2 has for its subject-matter Aesthetic. It is a 
subject co-extensive with the entire realm of the beautiful; more 
specifically described, its province is that of Art, or rather, we 
should say, of Fine Art. 
For a subject-matter such as this the term “Aesthetic” is no doubt 
not entirely appropriate, for “Aesthetic” denotes more accurately 
the science of the senses or emotion. It came by its origins as a 
science, or rather as something that to start with purported to be 
a branch of philosophy, during the period of the school of Wolff, in 
1. All footnotes are by the translator, F. P. B. Osmaston, 
except where noted. Clarifications in square brackets 
are added by me. (md) 
2. The introduction begins as an introduction of lectures. 
But as the work is merely based to a large extent on 
notes for lectures, or on a manuscript which did not 
preserve the lectures as they were delivered, it will be 
found most convenient to ignore this fact, and in 
references to regard it simply as a written treatise. 
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other words when works of art were generally regarded in Germany 
with reference to the feelings they were calculated to evoke, as, 
for example, the feelings of pleasure, admiration, fear, pity, and so 
forth. It is owing to the unsuitability or, more strictly speaking, 
the superficiality of this term that the attempt has been made by 
some to apply the name “Callistic“3 to this science. Yet this also is 
clearly insufficient inasmuch as the science here referred to does 
not investigate beauty4 in its general signification, but the beauty 
of art pure and simple. For this reason we shall accommodate 
ourselves to the term Aesthetic, all the more so as the mere 
question of nomenclature is for ourselves a matter of indifference. 
It has as such been provisionally accepted in ordinary speech, and 
we cannot do better than retain it. The term, however, which fully 
expresses our science is “Philosophy of Art,” and, with still more 
precision, “Philosophy of Fine Art.” 
(a) In virtue of this expression we at once exclude the beauty of 
Nature from the scientific exposition of Fine Art. Such a limitation 
of our subject may very well appear from a certain point of view 
3. In Greek Aesthetic Theory: A Study of Callistic and 
Aesthetic Concepts in the Works of Plato and Aristotle, 
John Gibson Warry summarizes what Hegel is saying 
here: "the term 'aesthetic' had already come — however 
unjustifiably — to apply to the study of fine arts whereas 
'callistics' is a more suitable name for the study of beauty 
in general (2).(md) 
4. To Hegel, "beauty" is the "'sensuous appearing of the 
idea' (117), which entails that the higher form of the idea 
is non-sensuous and takes the form of philosophy, in the 
broad sense of that which integrates particular forms of 
knowledge and norms of action into a system" (Peters 3). 
(Madeline Campbell) 
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as an arbitrary boundary line, similar to that which every science 
is entitled to fix in the demarcation of its subject-matter. We must 
not, however, understand the limitation of “Aesthetic” to the beauty 
of art in this sense. We are accustomed, no doubt, in ordinary 
life to speak of a beautiful color, a beautiful heaven, a beautiful 
stream, to say nothing of beautiful flowers, animals, and, above all, 
of beautiful human beings. Without entering now into the disputed 
question how far the quality of beauty can justly be predicated 
of such objects, and consequently the beauty of Nature comes 
generally into competition with that of art, we are justified in 
maintaining categorically that the beauty of art stands higher than 
Nature. For the beauty of art is a beauty begotten, a new birth of 
mind;5 and to the extent that Spirit and its creations stand higher 
than Nature and its phenomena, to that extent the beauty of art 
is more exalted than the beauty of Nature. Indeed, if we regard 
the matter in its formal aspect, that is to say, according to the 
way it is there, any chance fancy that passes through any one’s 
head,6 is of higher rank than any product of Nature. For in every 
case intellectual conception and freedom are inseparable from such 
a conceit. In respect to content the sun appears to us an absolutely 
necessary constituent of actual fact, while the perverse fancy passes 
away as something accidental and evanescent. None the less in 
its own independent being a natural existence such as the sun 
possesses no power of self-differentiation; it is neither essentially 
free nor self-aware; and, if we regard it in its necessary cohesion 
with other things, we do not regard it independently for its own 
sake, and consequently not as beautiful. 
Merely to maintain, in a general way, that mind and the beauty 
5. Hegel, alluding no doubt to the words of the Gospel, 
puts it "born and born again from mind (spirit)." 
6. It is assumed that such a fancy is seized and defined as 
such in separation from other experience. 
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of art which originates therefrom stand higher than the beauty of 
Nature is no doubt to establish next to nothing. The expression 
higher is obviously entirely indefinite; it still indicates the beauty of 
Nature and art as standing juxtaposed in the field of conception, 
and emphasizes the difference as a quantitative and accordingly 
external difference. But in predicating of mind and its artistic beauty 
a higher place in contrast to Nature, we do not denote a distinction 
which is merely relative. Mind, and mind alone, is pervious to truth, 
comprehending all in itself, so that all which is beautiful can only 
be veritably beautiful as partaking in this higher sphere and as 
begotten of the same. Regarded under this point of view it is only 
a reflection of the beauty appertinent to mind, that is, we have 
it under an imperfect and incomplete mode, and one whose 
substantive being is already contained in the mind itself. 
And apart from this we shall find the restriction to the beauty of 
art only natural, for in so far as the beauties of Nature may have 
come under discussion — a rarer occurrence among ancient writers 
than among ourselves — yet at least it has occurred to no one to 
insist emphatically on the beauty of natural objects to the extent 
of proposing a science, or systematic exposition of such beauties. 
It is true that the point of view of utility has been selected for 
such exclusive treatment. We have, for example, the conception of a 
science of natural objects in so far as they are useful in the conflict 
with diseases, in other words a description of minerals, chemical 
products, plants, animals, which subserve the art of healing. We do 
not find any analogous exploitation and consideration of the realm 
of Nature in its aspect of beauty. In the case of natural beauty we are 
too keenly conscious that we are dealing with an indefinite subject-
matter destitute of any real criterion. It is for this reason that such 
an effort of comparison would carry with it too little interest to 
justify the attempt. 
These preliminary observations over beauty in Nature and art, 
over the relation of both, and the exclusion of the first-mentioned 
from the province of our real subject-matter are intended to 
disabuse us of the notion that the limitation of our science is simply 
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a question of capricious selection. We have, however, not reached 
the point where a demonstration of this fact is feasible for the reason 
that such an investigation falls within the limits of our science itself, 
and it is therefore only at a later stage that we can either discuss or 
prove the same. 
Assuming, however, that we have, by way of prelude, limited our 
inquiry to the beauty of art, we are merely by this first step involved 
in fresh difficulties. 
(b) What must first of all occur to us is the question whether Fine 
Art in itself is truly susceptible to a scientific treatment. It is a simple 
fact that beauty and art pervade all the affairs of life like some 
friendly genius, and embellish with their cheer all our surroundings, 
mental no less than material. They alleviate the strenuousness of 
such relations, the varied changes of actual life; they banish the 
tedium of our existence with their entertainment; and where 
nothing really worth having is actually achieved, it is at least an 
advantage that they occupy the place of actual vice. Yet while art 
prevails on all sides with its pleasing shapes, from the crude 
decorations of savage tribes up to the splendours of the sacred 
shrine adorned with every conceivable beauty of design, none the 
less such shapes themselves appear to fall outside the real purposes 
of life, and even where the imaginative work of art is not impervious 
to such serious objects, nay, rather at times even appear to assist 
them, to the extent at least of removing what is evil to a distance, yet 
for all that art essentially belongs to the relaxation and recreation 
of spiritual life, whereas its substantive interests rather make a call 
upon its strained energy. On such grounds an attempt to treat 
that which on its own account is not of a serious character with 
all the gravity of scientific exposition may very possibly appear to 
be unsuitable and pedantic. In any case from such a point of view 
art appears a superfluity if contrasted with the essential needs and 
interests of life, even assuming that the softening of the soul which 
a preoccupation with the beauty of objects is capable of producing, 
does not actually prove injurious in its effeminate influence upon 
the serious quality of those practical interests. Owing to this 
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fundamental assumption that they are a luxury it has often 
appeared necessary to undertake the defence of the fine arts 
relatively to the necessities of practical life, and in particular 
relatively to morality and piety; and inasmuch as this harmlessness 
is incapable of demonstration, the idea has been at least to make it 
appear credible, that this luxury of human experience contributes a 
larger proportion of advantages than disadvantages. In this respect 
serious aims have been attributed to art, and in many quarters it 
has been commended as a mediator between reason and sensuous 
associations, between private inclinations and duty, personified in 
short as a reconciler of these forces in the strenuous conflict and 
opposition which this antagonism generates. But it is just 
conceivable7 that, even assuming the presence of such aims with 
all their indubitably greater seriousness, neither reason nor duty 
come by much profit from such mediation, for the simple reason 
that they are incapable by their very nature of any such interfusion 
or compromise, demanding throughout the same purity which they 
intrinsically possess. And we might add that art does not become in 
any respect more worthy thereby of scientific discussion, inasmuch 
as it remains still on two sides a menial, that is, subservient to 
idleness and frivolity, if also to objects of more elevated character. 
In such service, moreover, it can at most merely appear as a means 
instead of being an object for its own sake. And, in conclusion, 
assuming that art is a means, it still invariably labours under the 
formal defect, that so far as it in fact is subservient to more serious 
objects, and produces results of like nature, the means which 
actually brings this about is deception. For beauty is made vital in the 
appearance.8 Now it can hardly be denied that aims which are true 
and serious ought not to be achieved by deception; and though such 
an effect is here and there secured by this means, such ought only 
to be the case in a restricted degree; and even in the exceptional 
7. The sentence is slightly ironical. 
8. Dem Scheine. 
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case we are not justified in regarding deception as the right means. 
For the means ought to correspond with the dignity of the aim. 
Neither semblance nor deception, but only what is itself real and 
true, possesses a title to create what is real and true. Just in the 
same way science has to investigate the true interests of the mind 
in accordance with the actual process of the real world and the 
manner of conceiving it as we actually find it. 
We may possibly conclude from the above grounds that the art 
of beauty is unworthy of philosophical examination. It is after all, 
it may be said, only a pleasant pastime, and, though we may admit 
more serious aims are also in its purview, nevertheless it is 
essentially opposed to such aims in their seriousness. It is at the 
most merely the servant of specific amusements no less than the 
exceptional serious objects, and for the medium of its existence 
as also for the means of its operations can merely avail itself of 
deception and show. 
But yet further in the second place, it is a still more plausible 
contention that even supposing fine art to be compatible generally 
with philosophical disquisition, none the less it would form no really 
adequate subject-matter for scientific enquiry in the strict sense. 
For the beauty of art is presented to sense, feeling, perception, and 
imagination: its field is not that of thought, and the comprehension 
of its activity and its creations demands another faculty than that 
of the scientific intelligence. Furthermore, what we enjoy in artistic 
beauty is just the freedom of its creative and plastic activity. In the 
production and contemplation of these we appear to escape the 
principle of rule and system. In the creations of art we seek for an 
atmosphere of repose and animation as some counterpoise to the 
austerity of the realm of law and the sombre self-concentration of 
thought; we seek for blithe and powerful reality in exchange for 
the shadow-world of the Idea. And, last of all, the free activity of 
the imagination is the source of the fair works of art, which in this 
world of the mind are even more free than Nature is herself. Not 
only has art at its service the entire wealth of natural form in all 
their superabundant variety, but the creative imagination is able 
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inexhaustibly to extend the realm of form by its own productions 
and modifications. In the presence of such an immeasurable depth 
of inspired creation and its free products, it may not unreasonably 
be supposed that thought will lose the courage to apprehend such 
in their apparent range, to pronounce its verdict thereon, and to 
appropriate such beneath its universal formulae. 
Science,9 on the other hand, everyone must admit, is 
formally bound to occupy itself with thinking which abstracts from 
the mass of particulars: and for this very reason, from one point 
of view, the imagination and its contingency and caprice, in other 
words the organ of artistic activity and enjoyment, is excluded from 
it. On the other hand, when art gives joyous animation to just this 
gloomy and arid dryness of the notion, bringing its abstractions 
and divisions into reconciliation with concrete fact, supplementing 
with its detail what is wanting to the notion in this respect, even 
in that case a purely contemplative reflection simply removes once 
more all that has been added, does away with it, conducting the 
notion once again to that simplicity denuded of positive reality 
which belongs to it and its shadowland of abstraction. It is also a 
possible contention that science in respect to content is concerned 
with what is essentially necessary. If our science of Aesthetic places 
on one side natural beauty, not merely have we apparently made 
no advance, but rather separated ourselves yet further from what 
9. Hegel breaks down science and nature into three 
categories with which we are still familiar today: 
mathematics, physics, and physiology. Beyond the 
aesthetics of nature and art, Hegel recognizes that the 
sciences have their own form and function. While nature 
is bound to the earth like the sciences, it is also bound to 
the ethereal and divine, a concept which Hegel explores 
deeply in his musings (see Zakaria 31). 
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is necessary. The expression Nature implies from the first the ideas 
of necessity and uniformity, that is to say a constitution which gives 
every expectation of its proximity and adaptability to scientific 
inquiry. In mental operations generally, and most of all in the 
imagination, if contrasted in this respect with Nature, caprice and 
superiority to every kind of formal restriction, caprice, it is here 
assumed, is uniquely in its right place, and these at once put out of 
court the basis of a scientific inquiry. 
From each and all these points of view consequently, in its origin, 
that is to say, in its effect and in its range, fine art, so far from 
proving itself fitted for scientific effort, rather appears 
fundamentally to resist the regulative principle of thought, and to 
be ill-adapted for exact scientific discussion. 
Difficulties of this kind, and others like them, which have been 
raised in respect to a thoroughly scientific treatment of fine art have 
been borrowed from current ideas, points of view, and reflection, 
the more systematic expansion of which we may read ad nauseam in 
previous literature, in particular French literature, upon the subject 
of beauty and the fine arts. Such contain to some extent facts 
which have their justification; in fact, elaborate arguments10 are 
deduced therefrom, which also are not without their tincture of 
apparent plausibility. In this way, for instance, there is the fact that 
the configuration of beauty is as multifold as the phenomenon of 
beauty is of universal extension; from which we may conclude, if we 
care to do so, that a universal impulse towards beauty is enclosed 
in our common nature, and may yet further conceivably infer, that 
because the conceptions of beauty are so countless in their variety 
and withal are obviously something particular, it is impossible to 
secure laws of universalvalidity either relatively to beauty or our 
taste for it. 
Before turning away from such theories to the subject, as we 
10. Raisonnements: a disparaging expression. 
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ourselves conceive it, it will be a necessary and preliminary task to 
discuss the questions and objections raised above. 
First, as to the worthiness of art to form the object of scientific 
inquiry, it is no doubt the case that art can be utilized as a mere 
pastime in the service of pleasure and entertainment, either in the 
embellishment of our surroundings, the imprinting of a delight-
giving surface to the external conditions of life, or the emphasis 
placed by decoration on other objects. In these respects it is 
unquestionably no independent or free art, but an art subservient 
to certain objects. The kind of art, however, which we ourselves 
propose to examine is one which is free in its aim and its means. 
That art in general can serve other objects, and even be merely a 
pastime, is a relation which it possesses in common with thought 
itself. From one point of view thought likewise, as science 
subservient to other ends, can be used in just the same way for 
finite purposes and means as they chance to crop up, and as such 
serviceable faculty of science is not self-determined, but 
determined by something alien to it. But, further, as distinct from 
such subservience to particular objects, science is raised of its own 
essential resources in free independence to truth, and exclusively 
united with its own aims in discovering the true fulfillment in that 
truth. 
Fine art is not art in the true sense of the term until it is also 
thus free, and its highest function is only then satisfied when it 
has established itself in a sphere which it shares with religion, and 
philosophy, becoming thereby merely one mode and form through 
which the Divine, the profoundest interests of mankind, and 
spiritual truths of widest range, art brought home to consciousness 
and expressed. It is in works of art that nations have deposited the 
richest intuitions and ideas they possess; and not infrequently fine 
art supplies a key of interpretation to the wisdom and religion of 
peoples; in the case of many it is the only one. This is an attribute 
which art shares in common with religion and philosophy, the 
peculiar distinction in the case of art being that its presentation 
of the most exalted subject-matter is in sensuous form, thereby 
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bringing them nearer to Nature and her mode of envisagement, that 
is closer to our sensitive and emotional life. The world, into the 
profundity of which thought penetrates, is a supersensuous one, 
a world which to start with is posited as a Beyond in contrast to 
the immediacy of ordinary conscious life and present sensation. It 
is the freedom of reflecting consciousness which disengages itself 
from this immersion in the “this side,” or immediacy, in other words 
sensuous reality and finitude. But the mind is able, too, to heal the 
fracture which is thus created in its progression. From the wealth 
of its own resources it brings into being the works of fine art as 
the primary bond of mediation between that which is exclusively 
external, sensuous and transitory, and the medium of pure thought, 
between Nature and its finite reality, and the infinite freedom of 
a reason which comprehends. Now it was objected that the 
element11 of art was, if we view it as a whole, of an unworthy 
character, inasmuch as it consisted of appearance and deceptions 
inseparable from such. Such a contention would of course be 
justifiable, if we were entitled to assume that appearance had no 
locus standi12 at all. An appearance or show is, however, essential 
to actuality. There could be no such thing as truth if it did not 
appear, or, rather, let itself appear,13 were it not further true for 
some one thing or person, for itself as also for spirit. Consequently 
it cannot be appearance in general against which such an objection 
can be raised, but the particular mode of its manifestation under 
which art makes actual what is essentially real and true. If, then, the 
appearance, in the medium of which art gives determinate existence 
to its creations, be defined as deception, such an objection is in the 
11. Hegel here means the formal character, not the material 
on which it is imposed in the several arts. 
12. Hegel says, "as that which has no right to be," das 
Nichtseyn sollende. 
13. Erscheine as contrasted with scheine. 
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first instance intelligible if we compare it with the external world 
of a phenomena, and its immediate relation to ourselves as material 
substance, or view it relatively to our own world of emotions, that 
is our inward sensuous life. Both these are worlds to which in our 
everyday life, the life, that is, of visible experience, we are 
accustomed to attach the worth and name of reality, actuality and 
truth as contrasted with that of art, which fails to possess such 
reality as we suppose. Now it is just this entire sphere of the 
empirical world, whether on its personal side or its objective side, 
which we ought rather to call in a stricter sense than when we 
apply the term to the world of art, merely a show or appearance, 
and an even more unyielding form of deception. It is only beyond 
the immediacy of emotional life and that world of external objects 
that we shall discover reality in any true sense of the term. Nothing 
is actually real but that which is actual in its own independent 
right and substance,14 that which is at once of the substance of 
Nature and of mind, which, while it is actually here in present and 
determinate existence, yet retains under such limitation an 
essential and self-concentred being, and only in virtue of such is 
truly real. The predominance of these universal powers is precisely 
that which art accentuates and manifests. In the external and soul-
world of ordinary experience we have also no doubt this essence 
of actuality, but in the chaotic congeries of particular detail, 
encumbered by the immediacy of sensuous envisagement, and 
every kind of caprice of condition, event, character, and so forth. 
Now it is just the show and deception of this false and evanescent 
world which art disengages from the veritable significance of 
phenomena to which we have referred, implanting in the same a 
reality of more exalted rank born of mind. The phenomena of art 
14. Das An-und-Fürsichseyende. That which is explicitly to 
itself self-determinate being, no less than essentially 
such in its substantive right. 
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therefore are not merely not appearance and nothing more; we are 
justified in ascribing to them, as contrasted with the realities of our 
ordinary life, an actually higher reality and more veritable existence. 
To as little extent are the representations of art a deceptive 
appearance as compared with the assumed truer delineations of 
historical writing. For immediate existence also does not belong to 
historical writing. It only possesses the intellectual appearance of 
the same as the medium of its delineations, and its content remains 
charged with the entire contingent materia of ordinary reality and 
its events, developments and personalities, whereas the work of art 
brings us face to face with the eternal powers paramount in history 
with this incidental association of the immediate sensuous present 
and its unstable appearance expunged. 
If, however, it is in contrast with philosophic thought and 
religious and ethical principles, that the mode of appearance of the 
shapes of art, is described as a deception, there is certainly this 
in support of the view that the mode of revelation attained by a 
content in the realm of thought is the truest reality. In comparison, 
nevertheless, with the appearance of immediate sensuous existence 
and that of historical narration, the show of art possesses the 
advantage that, in its own virtue, it points beyond itself, directing us 
to a somewhat spiritual, which it seeks to envisage to the conceptive 
mind. Immediate appearance, on the contrary, does not give itself 
out to be thus illusive, but rather to be the true and real, though 
as a matter of fact such truth is contaminated and obstructed by 
the immediately sensuous medium. The hard rind of Nature and 
the everyday world offer more difficulty to the mind in breaking 
through to the Idea than do the products of art. 
But if from this particular point of view we place art thus highly, 
we must not, on the other hand, fail to remember that neither 
in respect to content or form is art either the highest or most 
absolute mode of bringing the true interests of our spiritual life to 
consciousness. The very form of art itself is sufficient to limit it to 
a definite content. It is only a particular sphere and grade of truth 
which is capable of being reproduced in the form of a work of art. 
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Such truth must have the power in its own determinate character 
to go out freely into sensuous shape and remain adequate to itself 
therein, if it is to be the genuine content of art, as is the case, 
for example, with the gods of Greece. On the other hand there 
is a profounder grasp of truth, in which the form is no longer on 
such easy and friendly terms with the sensuous material as to be 
adequately accepted and expressed by that medium. Of such a type 
is the Christian conception of truth; and above all it is the prevailing 
spirit of our modern world, or, more strictly, of our religion and our 
intellectual culture, which have passed beyond the point at which 
art is the highest mode under which the absolute is brought home 
to human consciousness. The type peculiar to art-production and 
its products fails any longer to satisfy man’s highest need. We are 
beyond the stage of reverence for works of art as divine and objects 
deserving our worship. The impression they produce is one of a 
more reflective15 kind, and the emotions which they arouse require 
a higher test and a further verification. Thought and reflection 
have taken their flight above fine art. To those who are fond of 
complaint and grumbling such a condition of things may be held 
as a form of decadence; it may be ascribed to the obsession of 
passion and selfish interests, which scare away the seriousness of 
art no less than its blithesomeness. Or we may find the fault to 
lie in the exigencies of the present day, the complex conditions of 
social and political life, which prevent the soul, entangled as it is 
in microscopic interests, from securing its freedom in the nobler 
objects of art, a condition, too, in which the intelligence itself 
becomes a menial to such trifling wants and the interests they 
excite in sciences, which subserve objects of a like nature, and are 
seduced into the voluntary exile of such a wilderness. 
But however we may explain the fact it certainly is the case that 
Art is no longer able to discover that satisfaction of spiritual wants, 
15. Besonnener Art. Possibly Hegel means "one more 
compatible with common sense." 
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which previous epochs and nations have sought for in it and 
exclusively found in it, a satisfaction which, at least on the religious 
side, was associated with art in the most intimate way. The fair 
days of Greek art, as also the golden time of the later middle ages, 
are over. The reflective culture of our life of today makes it 
inevitable, both relatively to our volitional power and our judgment, 
that we adhere strictly to general points of view, and regulate 
particular matters in consonance with them, so that universal 
forms, laws, duties, rights, and maxims hold valid as the determining 
basis of our life and the force within of main importance. What 
is demanded for artistic interest as also for artistic creation is, 
speaking in general terms, a vital energy, in which the universal 
is not present as law and maxim, but is operative in union with 
the soul and emotions, just as also, in the imagination, what is 
universal and rational is enclosed only as brought into unity with a 
concrete sensuous phenomenon. For this reason the present time 
is not, if we review its conditions in their widest range, favorable 
to art. And with regard to the executive artist himself it is not 
merely that reflection on every side, which will insist on utterance, 
owing to the universal habit of critical opinion and judgment, leads 
him astray from his art and infects his mind with a like desire 
to accumulate abstract thought in his creations; rather the entire 
spiritual culture of the times is of such a nature that he himself 
stands within a world thus disposed to reflection and the conditions 
it presupposes, and, do what he may, he cannot release himself 
either by his wish or his power of decision from their influence, 
neither can he by means of exceptional education, or a removal from 
the ordinary conditions of life, conjure up for himself and secure a 
solitude capable of replacing all that is lost. 
In all these respects art is and remains for us, on the side, of its 
highest possibilities, a thing of the past. Herein it has further lost 
its genuine truth and life, and is rather transported to our world of 
ideas than is able to maintain its former necessity and its superior 
place in reality. What is now stimulated in us by works of art is, 
in addition to the fact of immediate enjoyment, our judgment. In 
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other words we subject the content, and the means of presentation 
of the work of art, and the suitability and unsuitability of both, to 
the contemplation of our thought. A science of art is therefore a 
far more urgent necessity in our own days than in times in which 
art as art sufficed by itself alone to give complete satisfaction. We 
are invited by art to contemplate it reflectively, not, that is to say, 
with the object of recreating such art,16 but in order to ascertain 
scientifically its nature. 
In doing our best to accept such an invitation we are confronted 
with the objection already adverted to, that even assuming that art 
is a subject adapted for philosophical investigation in a general way, 
yet it unquestionably is not so adapted to the systematic procedure 
of science. Such an objection, however, implies to start with the 
false notion that we can have a philosophical inquiry which is at the 
same time unscientific. In reply to such a point I can only here state 
summarily my opinion, that whatever ideas other people may have 
of philosophy and philosophizing, I myself conceive philosophical 
inquiry of any sort or kind to be inseparable from the methods of 
science. The function of philosophy is to examine subject-matter 
in the light of the principle of necessity, not, it is true, merely 
in accordance with its subjective17 necessity or external co-
16. I think by the words kunst wieder hervorzurufen Hegel 
rather means to call up art as it was previously cultivated 
than merely to "stimulate art production." The latter is, 
however, Professor [Bernard] Bosanquet's translation 
[The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art, 1886]. 
17. Subjective apparently in the sense of being wholly 
personal to the writer or philosopher in so far as the 
form of his treatise deals in classification and 
arrangement peculiar to himself and so external, if not 
entirely arbitrary. 
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ordination, classification, and so forth; it has rather to unfold and 
demonstrate the object under review out of the necessity of its own 
intimate nature. Until this essential process is made explicit the 
scientific quality of such an inquiry is absent. In so far, however, as 
the objective necessity of an object subsists essentially in its logical 
and metaphysical nature the isolated examination of art may in such 
a case, at any rate, or rather inevitably, must be carried forward 
with a certain relaxation of scientific stringency. For art is based 
upon many assumptions, part of which relate to its content, part to 
its material or conceptive18 medium, in virtue of which art is never 
far from the borders of contingency and caprice. Consequently it is 
only relatively to the essential and ideal progression of its content 
and its means of expression that we are able to recall with 
advantage the formative principle of its necessity.19 
The objection that works of fine art defy the examination of 
scientific thought, because they originate in the unregulated world 
of imagination and temperament, and assert their effect exclusively 
on the emotions and the fancy with a complexity and variety which 
defies exact analysis, raises a difficulty which still carries genuine 
weight behind it.20 As a matter of fact the beauty of art does appear 
in a form which is expressly to be contrasted with abstract thought, 
18. I agree with the note of Professor Bosanquet (Trans., p. 
21) that the word element refers here to the mental 
constituents of art, as contrasted with the sensuous 
medium. 
19. That is to say, the essential formative process involved in 
its necessity. 
20. There must be a misprint or oversight in Professor 
Bosanquet's rendering of this passage (p. 21). As the 
sentence now stands it does not appear to me to make 
sense. 
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a form which it is compelled to disturb in order to exercise its own 
activity in its own way. Such a result is simply a corollary of the 
thesis that reality anywhere and everywhere, whether the life of 
Nature or mind, is defaced and slain by its comprehension; that so 
far from being brought more close to us by the comprehension of 
thinking, it is only by this means that it is in the complete sense 
removed apart from us, so that in his attempt to grasp through 
thought as a means the nature of life, man rather renders nugatory 
this very aim. An exhaustive discussion of the subject is here 
impossible; we propose merely to indicate the point of view from 
which the removal of this difficulty or impossibility and 
incompatibility might be effected. It will at least be readily admitted 
that mind is capable of self-contemplation, and of possessing a 
consciousness, and indeed one that implies a power of thought co-
extensive with itself and everything which originates from itself. 
It is, in fact, precisely thought, the process of thinking, which 
constitutes the most intimate and essential nature of mind. It is 
in this thinking-consciousness over itself and its products, despite 
all the freedom and caprice such may otherwise and indeed must 
invariably possess — assuming only mind or spirit to be veritably 
pregnant therein — that mind exhibits the activity congenial to its 
essential nature. Art and the creations of art, being works which 
originate in and are begotten of the spirit, are themselves stamped 
with the hall-mark of spirit, even though the mode of its 
presentation accept for its own the phenomenal guise of sensuous 
reality, permeating as it does the sensuous substance with 
intelligence. Viewed in this light art is placed from the first nearer 
to spirit and its thought than the purely external and unintelligent 
Nature. In the products of art mind is exclusively dealing with that 
which is its own. And although works of art are not thought and 
notion simply as such, but an evolution of the notion out of itself, 
an alienation of the same in the direction of sensuous being, yet for 
all that the might of the thinking spirit is discovered not merely in 
its ability to grasp itself in its most native form as pure thinking, 
but also, and as completely, to recognize itself in its self-divestment 
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in the medium of emotion and the sensuous, to retain the grasp of 
itself in that “other” which it transforms but is not, transmuting the 
alien factor into thought-expression, and by so doing recovering it 
to itself. And moreover in this active and frequent relation to that 
“other” than itself the reflective mind is not in any way untrue to 
itself. We have here no oblivion or surrender of itself; neither is it so 
impotent as to be unable to comprehend what is differentiated from 
that other;21 what it actually does is to grasp in the notion both itself 
and its opposite. For the notion is the universal, which maintains 
itself in its particularizations, which covers in its grasp both itself 
and its “other,” and consequently contains the power and energy to 
cancel the very alienation into which it passes. For this reason the 
work of art, in which thought divests itself of itself,22 belongs to the 
realm of comprehending thought; and mind, by subjecting it23 to 
scientific contemplation, thereby simply satisfies its most essential 
nature. For inasmuch as thought is its essence and notion, it can 
only ultimately find such a satisfaction after passing all the products 
of its activity through the alembic of rational thought, and in this 
way making them for the first time in very truth part of its own 
substance. But though art, as we shall eventually see with yet more 
distinctness, is far indeed from being the highest form of mind, it is 
only in the philosophy of art that it comes into all that it may justly 
claim. 
In the same way art is not debarred from a philosophical inquiry 
by reason of its unregulated caprice. As already intimated, it is its 
true function to bring to consciousness the highest interests of 
mind. An immediate consequence of this is that, so far as the content 
21. Von ihm. The pronoun, I take it, must refer here to das 
Andere rather than the subject of the verb. 
22. "Makes itself an alien to itself" perhaps expresses the 
German better. 
23. That is, the work of art. 
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of fine art is concerned, it cannot range about in all the wildness 
of an unbridled fancy; these interests of spirit posit categorically 
for the content that embodies them definite points of 
attachment,24 however multifold and inexhaustible may be the 
forms and shapes they assume. The same may be said of the forms 
themselves. They too do not remain unaffected by constraining 
principles. It is not every chance form which is capable of 
expressing and presenting these interests, capable of assimilating 
them and reproducing them. It is only through one determinate 
content that the form adequate to its embodiment is defined. 
It is upon grounds such as these that we are also able to discover 
a track adapted to critical reflection through the apparently endless 
vistas of artistic creations and shapes. 
We have now, I trust, by way of prelude, succeeded in restricting 
the content of our science on the lines of definition proposed. We 
have made it clear that neither is fine art unworthy of philosophical 
study, nor is such a philosophical study incapable of accepting as an 
object of its cognition the essence of fine art. 
II 
If we now investigate the required mode of such scientific 
investigation, we are here again face to face with two contradictory 
modes of handling the subject, each of which appears to exclude the 
other and to permit us to arrive at no satisfactory result. 
On the one hand we observe the science of art, merely so to speak, 
from an external point of view busying itself with actual works 
of art, cataloguing them in a history of art, drawing up a sort of 
24. Haltpunkte. Points of arrest in essential ideas necessary 
which restrain this tendency to purely arbitrary caprice. 
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commentary upon extant works, or propounding theories which are 
intended to supply the general points of view for artistic criticism 
no less than artistic production. 
On the other hand we find science wholly giving itself up in 
its independence and self-assured to the contemplation of the 
beautiful, offering generalizations which do not concern the specific 
characteristics of a work of art, producing in short an abstract 
philosophy of the beautiful. 
1. With regard to the first mentioned method of study, the 
starting-point of which is the empirical study of definite facts, such 
is the path everyone must tread who means to study art at all. 
And just as everyone nowadays, even though he does not actually 
concern himself with physical science, yet deems it indispensable 
to his intellectual equipment to have some kind of knowledge of 
the principles of that science,25 so too it is generally considered 
more or less essential to any man of real cultivation, that he should 
possess some general knowledge of art; and indeed the pretension 
to be ranked as dilletante, or even as genuine connoisseur, meets 
with comparatively few exceptions. 
*** 
2. The method or point of view to be contrasted with this, in other 
25. I do not think the first part of this sentence ironical. 
Hegel admits that a general knowledge is a legitimate 
feature of modern culture. But he points out that people 
are only too ready to confuse such a general knowledge 
with real art scholarship. To bring out this I have 
translated rather freely. 
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words an entirely theoretical reflection, which is concerned to 
cognize the beautiful as such from its own intrinsic wealth, and 
to penetrate to the idea of it, is essentially distinct from the first 
method. As is well known, Plato was the first to demand of 
philosophical inquiry in a profounder sense, that objects should not 
be cognized in their particularity, but in their universality, in their 
generic type, their essential being and its explicit manifestation. He 
maintained that this true essence26 did not consist in particular 
actions which were good, in particular true opinions, handsome 
men or beautiful works of art, but in goodness, beauty, and truth in 
their universality. Now if in fact the beautiful ought to be cognized 
according to its essence and notion, this can only be effected by 
means of the thinking notion27 by means of which the logical and 
metaphysical nature of the Idea as such, as also of that of the 
particular Idea of the beautiful enters into the thinking 
consciousness. But the consideration of the beautiful in its self-
independence and its idea may readily once more become an 
abstract metaphysic; and even though Plato is accepted as founder 
and pioneer, the Platonic abstraction no longer supplies all we 
require, not even for the logical Idea of the beautiful. We are bound 
to grasp this idea more profoundly and more in the concrete. The 
emptiness of content which clings to the Platonic Idea, no longer 
26. Das Wahre. 
27. Den denkenden Begriff. It is possible that the "notion of 
thought" would express Hegel's meaning, as it would be 
a less strange expression. But I have retained the more 
literal translation as the reference may be to the self-
evolution of Thought in its own dialectical process, 
thought or the Idea thinking out itself in the Hegelian 
sense. Professor Bosanquet seems to assume this, as he 
translates "the thinking Idea." 
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satisfies the richer philosophical requirements of the mind to-day. 
It is no doubt the case that we also in the philosophy of art must 
make the Idea of the beautiful our starting point; but it is by no 
means inevitable that we should adhere to the Platonic ideas in their 
abstraction, ideas from which the philosophy of the beautiful merely 
dates its origins. 
3. The philosophical idea of the beautiful to indicate at any rate 
its true nature provisionally, must contain both extremes which 
we have described mediated in itself. It must combine, that is to 
say, metaphysical universality with the determinate content of real 
particularity. It is only by this means that it is grasped in its essential 
no less than explicit truth. For on the one hand it is then, as 
contrasted with the sterility of one-sided reflection, fruit-bearing 
out of its own wealth. It is its function, in consonance with its 
own notion, to develop into a totality of definite qualities, and this 
essential conception itself, no less than its detailed explication, 
comprises the necessary coherence of its particular features as also 
of the progress and transition of one phase thereof into another. On 
the other hand, these particulars into which the passage is made 
essentially carry the universality and essentiality of the fundamental 
notion, as the particulars of which they appear. The modes of 
inquiry hitherto discussed lack both these aspects, and for this 
reason it is only the notion, as above formulated, in its 
completeness, which conducts us to definitive principles which are 
substantive, necessary, and self-contained in their completeness. 




What in the first instance is known to us under current conceptions 
of a work of art may be subsumed under the three following 
determinations: 
(1) A work of art is no product of Nature. It is brought into being 
through the agency of man. 
(2) It is created essentially for man; and, what, is more, it is to 
a greater-or less degree delivered from a sensuous medium, and 
addressed to his senses.28 
(3) It contains an end bound up with it. 
1. With regard to the first point, that a work of art is a product of 
human activity, an inference has been drawn from this (a) that such 
an activity, being the conscious production of an external object 
can also be known and divulged, and learned and reproduced by 
others. For that which one is able to effect, another — such is the 
notion — is able to effect or to imitate,29 when he has once simply 
mastered the way of doing it. In short we have merely to assume 
an acquaintance with the rules of art-production universally shared, 
and anybody may then, if he cares to do so, give effect to executive 
28. By man's sensitive [sensory] life in its widest sense is, I 
think, intended. 
29. The German words are machen and nachmachen. We 
have no exact equivalents. 
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ability of the same type, and produce works of art. It is out of 
reasoning of this kind that the above-mentioned theories, with their 
provision of rules, and their prescriptions formulated for practical 
acceptance, have arisen. Unfortunately that which is capable of 
being brought into effect in accordance with suggestions of this 
description can only be something formally regular and mechanical. 
For only that which is mechanical is of so exterior a type that only 
an entirely empty effort of will and dexterity is required to accept 
it among our working conceptions, and forthwith to carry it out; an 
effort, in fact, which is not under the necessity to contribute out 
of its own resources anything concrete such as is quite outside the 
prescriptive power of such general rules. 
This is apparent with most vividness when precepts of this kind 
are not limited to what is purely external and mechanical, but 
extend their pretensions to the activity of the artist in the sense 
that implies wealth of significance and intelligence. In this field 
our rules pass off to purely indefinite generalities, such as “the 
theme ought to be interesting, and each individual person must 
speak as is appropriate to his status, age, sex and situation.” But if 
rules are really to suffice for such a purpose their directions ought 
to be formulated with such directness of detail that, without any 
further co-operation of mind, they could be executed precisely in 
the manner they are prescribed. Such rules being, in respect to this 
content, abstract, clearly and entirely fall short of their pretension 
of being able to complete30 artistic consciousness. Artistic 
production is not a formal activity in accordance with a series of 
definitions; it is, as an activity of soul, constrained to work out 
of its own wealth, and to bring before the mind’s eye a wholly 
other and far richer content, and a more embracing and 
unique31 creation than ever can be thus prescribed. In particular 
cases such rules may prove, of assistance, in so far, that is, as they 
30. Lit., "to fill out (ausfüllen) in complete equipment." 
31. Individuelle 
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contain something really definite and consequently useful for 
practice. But even here their guidance will only apply to conditions 
wholly external. 
(b) This above indicated tendency has consequently been wholly 
given up; but writers in doing so have only fallen as unreservedly 
into the opposite extreme. A work of art came to be looked upon, 
and so far rightly, as no longer the product of an activity shared by 
all men, but rather as a creation of a mind gifted in an extraordinary 
degree. A mind of this type has in this view merely to give free vent 
to its peculiar endowment, regarded as a specific natural power. 
It has to free itself absolutely from a pursuit of rules of universal 
application, as also from any admixture of conscious reflection with 
its creative and, as thus viewed, wholly instinctive powers, or rather 
it should be on its guard therefrom, the assumption being that such 
an exercise of conscious thought can only act on its creations as an 
infection and a taint. Agreeably to such a view the work of art has 
been heralded as the product of talent and genius; and it is mainly 
the aspect of natural gift inseparable from the ordinary conception 
of talent and genius, which has been emphasized. There is to some 
extent real truth in this. Talent is specific, genius universal capacity. 
With neither32 of these can a man endow himself simply by the 
exercise of his self-conscious activity. We shall consider this at 
greater length in a subsequent chapter.33 
In the present context we would merely draw attention to the 
false assumption in this view that in artistic production every kind 
of self-reflection upon the artist’s own activity was regarded as 
not merely superfluous, but actually injurious. In such a view the 
32. The German will admit of the interpretation that the 
reference is merely to genius, but I think Hegel clearly 
means that neither one nor the other can be thus 
conjured up. 
33. At the end of the first main division of the work. 
G. W. F. Hegel - The Philosophy of Fine Art  |  583
process of creation by talent or genius simply is taken to be a 
general state; or we may define it more precisely as a condition 
of inspiration. To such a condition, it is said, genius is in some 
measure exalted by the subject-matter itself; it is also to some 
extent voluntarily able to place itself under such a condition, a 
process of self-inhibition in which the genial service of the 
champagne bottle is not forgotten.34An idea of this kind was in 
vogue during the so-called “Epoch of Genius,” which originated with 
the early poetical work of Goethe, receiving subsequent illustration 
in those of Schiller. These poets by their rejection of all rules 
hitherto fabricated made as it were an entirely new start; with 
deliberate intention they ran counter to such rules, and while doing 
so distanced all competitors by many lengths. I do not, however, 
propose to discuss with more detail the confusions which have 
prevailed over the conception of inspiration and genius, and the 
notion, which even at the present day finds advocates, that 
inspiration simply by itself can effect anything and everything. The 
real and indeed sole point to maintain as essential is the thesis that 
34. One of [George] Meredith's correspondents has put the 
question with all gravity whether he considered 
inspiration could be assisted by wine drinking. With 
equal gravity our humorist replied that though wine 
might be something of a restorative after mental effort it 
was not his experience that it contributed to first-rate 
artistic work. He actually mentions the case of 
[Friedrich] Schiller. Though I have read somewhere that 
this poet used to be inspired by the smell of rotten 
apples I do not recollect reading that he favored the 
champagne bottle. Meredith also mentions the case of 
[E. T. A.] Hoffmann, and adds that the type of his work 
does not increase our respect for the precedent. 
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although artistic talent and genius essentially implies an element 
of natural power, yet it is equally indispensable that it should be 
thoughtfully cultivated, that reflection should be brought to bear on 
the particular way it is exercised, and that it should be also kept alive 
with use and practice in actual work. The fact is that an important 
aspect of the creating process is merely facility in the use of a 
medium;35 that is to say, a work of art possesses a purely technical 
side, which extends to the borders of mere handicraft. This is most 
obviously the case in architecture and sculpture, less so in painting 
and music, least of all in poetry. A facility here is not assisted at 
all by inspiration; what solely indispensable is reflection, industry, 
and practice. Such technical skill an artist simply must possess in 
order that he may be master over the external material, and not be 
thwarted by its obstinacy. 
Add to this that the more exalted the rank of an artist the more 
profoundly ought he to portray depths of soul and mind; and these 
are not to be known by flashlight, but are exclusively to be sounded, 
if at all, by the direction of the man’s own intelligence on the world 
of souls and the objective world. In this respect, therefore, once 
more study is the means whereby the artist brings to consciousness 
such a content, and appropriates the material and structure of his 
conceptions. At the same time no doubt one art will require such 
a conscious reception and cognitive mastery of the content in 
question more than another. Music, for example, which has 
exclusively to deal with the entirely undefined motion of the soul 
within, with the musical tones of that which is, relatively, feeling 
denuded of positive thought, has little or no need to bring home to 
35. Eine äusserliche Arbeit. A craftsmanship which has to 
deal with the outside surface. We may translate "external 
craftsmanship"; but the translation in the text gives the 
meaning best, I think. 
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consciousness the substance of intellectual conception.36For this 
very reason musical talent declares itself as a rule in very early 
youth, when the head is still empty and the emotions have barely 
had a flutter; it has, in fact, attained real distinction at a time in the 
artist’s life when both intelligence and life are practically without 
experience. And for the matter of that we often enough see very 
great accomplishment in musical composition and execution hung 
together with considerable indigence of mind and character. It is 
quite another matter in the case of poetry. What is of main 
importance here is a presentation of our humanity rich in subject-
matter and reflective power, of its profounder interests, and of 
the forces which move it. Here at least mind and heart must 
themselves be richly and profoundly disciplined by life, experience, 
and thought before genius itself can bring into being the fruit that is 
ripe, the content that has substance, and is essentially consummate. 
36. Keinen geistigen Stoff. Professor Bosanquet translates 
"spiritual content." I imagine the emphasis to be mainly 
on the absence of positive ideas available to knowledge. 
In any case Hegel appears to press his point of contrast 
too far. Men of genius such as Mozart (who was probably 
[a genius] in his [Hegel's] mind) and Schubert may bear 
him out. But on the other hand we have a Keats, Shelley, 
and Raphael. Genius matures rapidly, but the greatest 
works of musical art no less than any other imply a real 
maturity of mind at least, and more than is here assumed 
of, I should say, a rich experience. Mozart, of course, 
upsets any theory, and it is questionable even whether 
Mozart is really an exception. It depends on the point of 
view from which we are estimating the intelligible 
content of music as an expression of soul-life. 
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The early productions of [Johann Wolfgang Von] Goethe and 
[Friedrich] Schiller are characterized by an immaturity, we may even 
call it a rawness and barbarity, which really are appalling. This 
phenomenon, that in the majority of those experiments we find a 
preponderating mass of features which are absolutely prosaic, or 
at least uninspired and commonplace, is a main objection to the 
ordinary notion that inspiration is inseparable from youth and its 
sirocco season. These two men of genius were the first beyond 
question to give our nation true works of poetry, are, in fact, our 
national poets; but for all that it was only their mature manhood, 
which made it a present of creations profound, sterling of their kind, 
creations of genuine inspiration, and no less technically complete 
in their artistic form.37 We naturally recall the case of the veteran 
Homer, who only composed and uttered his immortal songs in his 
old age. 
(c) A third view, held relatively to the idea of a work of art as a 
product of human activity, concerns the position of such towards 
the phenomena of Nature. The natural tendency of ordinary 
thinking in this respect is to assume that the product of human 
art is of subordinate rank to the works of Nature. The work of art 
possesses no feeling of its own; it is not through and through a 
living thing, but, regarded as an external object, is a dead thing. 
It is usual to regard that which is alive of higher worth than what 
is dead. We may admit, of course, that the work of art is not in 
itself capable of movement and alive. The living, natural thing is, 
whether looked at within or without, an organization with the life-
purpose of such worked out into the minutest detail. The work of 
37. The "Iphigenie" was completed in Goethe's thirty-eighth 
year, fourteen years later than "Götz." The bulk of his 
more important works are of the same date or later. 
Schiller's "Wallenstein" was completed after his thirty-
fifth year. 
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art merely attains to the show of animation on its surface. Below 
this it is ordinary stone, wood, or canvas38 or in the case of poetry 
idea, the medium of such being speech and letters. But this element 
of external existence is not that which makes a work a creation of 
fine art. A work of art is only truly such in so far as originating in 
the human spirit, it continues to belong to the soil from which it 
sprang, has received, in short, the baptism of the mind and soul of 
man, and only presents that which is fashioned in consonance with 
such a sacrament. An interest vital to man, the spiritual values which 
the single event, one individual character, one action possesses 
in its devolution and final issue, is seized in the work of art and 
emphasized with greater purity39 and clarity than is possible on 
the ground of ordinary reality where human art is not. And for 
this reason the work of art is of higher rank than any product of 
Nature whatever, which has not submitted to this passage through 
the mind. In virtue of the emotion and insight, for example, in 
the atmosphere of which a landscape is portrayed by the art of 
painting, this creation of the human spirit assumes a higher rank 
than the purely natural landscape. Everything which partakes of 
spirit is better than anything begotten of mere Nature. However this 
may be, the fact remains that no purely natural existence is able, as 
art is, to represent divine ideals. 
And further, all that the mind borrows from its own ideal content 
it is able, even in the direction of external existence, to endow 
with permanence. The individual living thing on the contrary is 
transitory; it vanishes and is unstable in its external aspect. The 
38. This is surely not quite accurate. The medium of painting 
in the sense that speech or writing is the medium of 
poetry is not canvas or panel but oil or other color. 
Canvas would correspond with the blank pages of a 
book. 
39. Free, that is, from accidental and irrelevant matter. 
588  |  G. W. F. Hegel - The Philosophy of Fine Art
work of art persists. At the same time it is not mere continuation, 
but rather the form and pressure thereon of the mintage of soul-life 
which constitutes its true pre-eminence as contrasted with Nature’s 
reality. 
But this higher position we have thus assigned to the work of art is 
yet further contested by another prevalent conception of ordinary 
ideas. It is contended that Nature and all that proceeds from her 
are a work of God, created by His goodness and wisdom. The work 
of art is on the contrary merely a human product fashioned by 
human hands according to human design. The fallacy implied in 
this contrast between the products of Nature viewed as a divine 
creation and human activity as of wholly finite energy consists in 
the apparent assumption that God is not operative in and through 
man, but limits the sphere of His activity to Nature alone. We must 
place this false conception entirely on one side if we are desirous 
of penetrating to the true idea of art; or rather, as opposed to such 
a conception we ought to accept the extreme opposite thereto, 
namely, that God is more honoured by that which mind makes and 
creates than by everything brought into being and fashioned in 
the natural process. For not only is there a divinity in man, but 
it is actually effective in him in a form which is adequate to the 
essential nature of God in a far higher degree than in the work 
of Nature. God is a Spirit, and it is only in man that the medium, 
through which the Divine passes, possesses the form of spirit fully 
conscious of the activity in which it manifests its ideal presence. 
In Nature the medium correspondent to this is the unconscious 
sensuous40 and external materia, which is by many degrees inferior 
40. Professor Bosanquet translates sinnliche here as 
"sensitive." I am inclined to think that Hegel here rather 
leaves out of sight the fact that in the process of Nature 
we have sensitive organic life no less than unconscious 
inorganic. His contrast is rather between the conscious 
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to consciousness in its worth. In the products of art God works 
precisely as He works through the phenomena of Nature. The divine 
substance, however, as it is asserted in the work of art has secured, 
being begotten of spirit life itself, a highway commensurable to its 
existence; determinate existence in the unconscious sensuousness 
of Nature is not a mode of appearance adequate to the Divine Being. 
(d) Assuming, then, that the work of art is a creation of man in 
the sense that it is the offspring of mind or spirit we have still a 
further question in conclusion, which will help us to draw a more 
profound inference still from our previous discussion. That question 
is, “What is the human need which stimulates art-production?” On 
the one hand the artistic activity may be regarded as the mere 
play of accident, or human conceits, which might just as well be 
left alone as attempted. For, it may be urged, there are other and 
better means for carrying into effect the aims of art, and man bears 
within himself higher and more weighty interests, than art is 
capable of satisfying. In contrast to such a view art appears to 
originate in a higher impulse, and to satisfy more elevated needs, 
nay, at certain times the highest and most absolute of all, being, as it 
has been, united to the most embracing views of entire epochs and 
nations upon the constitution of the world and the nature of their 
religion. 
This inquiry, however, concerning a necessity for art which shall 
not be merely contingent, but absolute, we are not as yet able to 
answer with completeness; it demands, in fact, a concreter mode 
of exposition than is compatible with the form of this introduction. 
life of man and unconscious nature, the conscious life 
that is not self-conscious being for the object of the 
contrast treated as equivalent to unconscious. He would 
also apparently ignore the fact that man himself and the 
higher beauty which attaches to him is also from one 
point of view a part of the natural process. 
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We must accordingly deem it sufficient for the present merely to 
establish the following points. 
The universal and absolute want from which art on its side of 
essential form41 arises originates in the fact that man is a thinking 
consciousness, in other words that he renders explicit to himself 
and from his own substance,42 what he is and all in fact that exists. 
The objects of Nature exist exclusively in immediacy and once for 
all. 43Man, on the contrary, as mind reduplicates himself. He is, to 
start with, an object of Nature as other objects; but in addition to 
this, and no less truly, he exists for himself; he observes himself, 
makes himself present to his imagination and thought, and only in 
virtue of this active power of self-realization is he actually mind or 
spirit. This consciousness of himself man acquires in a twofold way; 
in the first instance theoretically. This is so in so far as he is under 
a constraint to bring himself in his own inner life to consciousness 
— all which moves in the human heart, all that surges up and strives 
therein — and generally, so far as he is impelled to make himself an 
object of perception and conception, to fix for himself definitively 
that which thought discovers as essential being, and in all that he 
summons out of himself, no less than in that which is received from 
without, to recognize only himself. And secondly, this realization is 
effected through a practical activity. In other words man possesses 
an impulse to assert himself in that which is presented him in 
immediacy, in that which is at hand as an external something to 
himself, and by doing so at the same time once more to recognize 
himself therein. This purpose he achieved by the alteration he 
effects in such external objects, upon which he imprints the seal 
41. That is, apart from purely personal ends in its pursuit, 
which are accidental to its essential notion. 
42. That is, in the medium of conscious life. 
43.  Einmal. They are there, but they do not know they are 
there. 
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of his inner life, rediscovering in them thereby the features of his 
own determinate nature. And man does all this, in order that he may 
as a free agent divest the external world of its stubborn alienation 
from himself — and in order that he may enjoy in the configuration 
of objective fact an external reality simply of himself. The very first 
impulse of the child implies in essentials this practical process of 
deliberate change in external fact. A boy throws stones into the 
stream, and then looks with wonder at the circles which follow in 
the water, regarding them as a result in which he sees something 
of his own doing. This human need runs through the most varied 
phenomena up to that particular form of self-reproduction in the 
external fact which is presented us in human art. And it is not 
merely in relation to external objects that man acts thus. He treats 
himself, that is, his natural form, in a similar manner: he will not 
permit it to remain as he finds it; he alters it deliberately. This is the 
rational ground of all ornament and decoration, though it may be 
as barbarous, tasteless, entirely disfiguring, nay, as injurious as the 
crushing of the feet of Chinese ladies,44 or the slitting of ears and 
lips. For it is among the really cultured alone that a change of figure, 
behaviour, and every mode and manner of self-expression will issue 
in harmony with the dictates of mental elevation.45 
44. Hegel is referencing the ancient Tang Chinese practice 
of foot binding called 'lotus feet' which was a method of 
breaking the bones of young girl's feet and wrapping the 
bones so that the feet would grow malformed and fit 
into minuscule shoes in the name of beauty. 
https://www.ancient.eu/Foot-Binding/ [Madeline 
Campbell] 
45. Aus geistiger Bildung, i.e., a high level of mental culture is 
necessary before the advent of civilized manners and 
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This universal demand for artistic expression46 is based on the 
rational impulse in man’s nature to exalt both the world of his 
soul experience and that of Nature for himself into the conscious 
embrace of mind as an object in which he rediscovers himself. He 
satisfies the demand of this spiritual freedom by making explicit to, 
his inner life all that exists, no less than from the further point of 
view giving a realized external embodiment to the self made thus 
explicit. And by this reduplication of what is his own he places 
before the vision and within the cognition of himself and others 
what is within him. This is the free rationality of man, in which art 
as also all action and knowledge originates. We shall investigate at a 
later stage the specific need for art as compared with that for other 
political and ethical action, or that for religious ideas and scientific 
knowledge. 
*** 
customs in which spiritual life is reflected with real 
refinement and directness. 
46. Bedürfniss zur Kunst. 
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556.] As [the] consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape, its 
immediacy produces the factor of finitude in Art. On one hand 
that is, it breaks up into a work of external common existence, 
into the subject which produces that work, and the subject which 
contemplates and worships it. But, on the other hand, it is the 
concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute 
spirit as the Ideal. In this ideal, or the concrete shape born of the 
subjective spirit, its natural immediacy, which is only a sign of the 
Idea, is so transfigured by the informing spirit in order to express 
the Idea, that the figure shows it and it alone :—the shape or form of 
Beauty. 
557.] The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful,—the 
form of immediacy as such,— at the same time qualifies what it 
embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same 
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time the stamp upon him of a natural medium or natural phase of 
existence — He contains the so-called unity of nature and spirit 
— i.e. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form — hence 
not the spiritual unity, in which the natural would be put only as 
“ideal,” as superseded in spirit, and the spiritual content would be 
only in self-relation. It is not the absolute spirit which enters this 
consciousness. On the subjective side the community has of course 
an ethical life, aware, as it is, of the spirituality of its essence: and 
its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to substantial 
liberty. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it, the subject’s 
liberty is only a manner of life, without the infinite self-reflection 
and the subjective inwardness of conscience. These considerations 
govern in their further developments the devotion and the worship 
in the religion of fine art. 
558.] For the objects of contemplation it has to produce, Art 
requires not only an external given material — (under which are 
also included subjective images and ideas), but—for the expression 
of spiritual truth — must use the given forms of nature with a 
significance which art must divine and possess (cf. §4II). Of all such 
forms the human is the highest and the true, because only in it can 
the spirit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. 
This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a 
point on which it is impossible to come to an understanding while 
a distinction is left thus abstract, — in other words, so long as the 
natural is only taken in its externality, not as the ‘characteristic’ 
meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. 
559.] In such single shapes the “absolute” mind cannot be made 
explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit 
whose implicit universality, when steps are taken to specify its 
fullness in detail, breaks up into an indeterminate polytheism. With 
the essential restrictedness of its content, Beauty in general goes 
no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spiritual 
principle, — something formal, so that the thought embodied, or 
the idea, can, like the material which it uses to work in, be of the 
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most diverse and unessential kind, and still the work be something 
beautiful and a work of art. 
560.] The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal 
involves the opposite one-sidedness (§ 556) that it is something
made by the artist. The subject or agent is the mere technical 
activity: and the work of art is only then an expression of the God, 
when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it, and the net 
power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world, 
without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. But as 
liberty only goes as far as there is thought, the action inspired with 
the fullness of this indwelling power, the artist’s enthusiasm, is like 
a foreign force under which he is bound and passive; the artistic
production has on its part the form of natural immediacy, it belongs 
to the genius or particular endowment of the artist,— and is at 
the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and 
mechanical externalities. The work of art therefore is just as much a 
work due to free option, and the artist is the master of the God. 
561.] In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious 
in its initial stage that it is without more ado accomplished in the 
subjective self-consciousness, which is thus self-confident and of 
good cheer, without the depth and without the sense of its 
antithesis to the absolute essence. On the further side of the 
perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation, in the beauty of
classical art) lies the art of sublimity, — symbolic art, in which the 
figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found, and the thought as 
going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative 
attitude to ,it, and yet all the while toiling to work itself into it. The 
meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reached the infinite 
form, is not yet known, not yet conscious of itself, as free spirit. 
The artist’s theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought, or an 
effort towards him, — a restless and unappeased effort which throws 
itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. 
562.] In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears 
in are incompatible; and that is where the infinite form, subjectivity, 
is not as in the first extreme a mere superficial personality, but its 
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inmost depth, and God is known not as only seeking his form or 
satisfying himself in an external form, but as only finding himself in 
himself, and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual 
world alone. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such 
in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only 
condescending to appearance, and the divine as the heart of hearts 
in an externality from which it always disengages itself. Thus the 
external can here appear as contingent towards its significance. 
The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in 
the progress by which the Being, known as the Absolute, assumes 
fuller and firmer features; it has to note to what particular feature 
the kind of cultus corresponds — and then to see how the secular 
self-consciousness, the consciousness of what is the supreme 
vocation of man, — in short how the nature of a nation’s moral life, 
the principle of its law, of its actual liberty, and of its constitution, 
as well as of its art and science, corresponds to the principle which 
constitutes the substance of a religion. That all these elements of a 
nation’s actuality constitute one systematic totality, that one spirit 
creates and informs them, is a truth on which follows the further 
truth that the history of religions coincides with the world-history. 
As regards the close connexion of art with the various religions it 
may be specially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those 
religions in which the spiritual principle, though concrete and 
intrinsically free, is not yet absolute. In religions where the Idea has 
not yet been revealed and known in its free character, though the 
craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visibility to 
consciousness the idea of the supreme being, and though art is the 
sole organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content, — a 
mixture from natural and spiritual sources, — can try to bring itself 
to consciousness; — still this art is defective; its form is defective 
because its subject-matter and theme is so,— for the defect in 
subject-matter comes from the form not being immanent in it. The 
representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness 
and stolidity — for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and 
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dull, and hence has not the power freely to transmute the external 
to significance and shape. Beautiful art, on the contrary, has for 
its condition the self-consciousness of the free spirit, — the 
consciousness that compared with it the natural and sensuous has 
no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere 
expression of spirit, which is thus the inner form that gives 
utterance to itself alone. 
But with a further and deeper study, we see that the advent of 
art, in a religion still in the bonds of sensuous externality, shows 
that such religion is on the decline. At the very time it seems to 
give religion the supreme glorification, expression and brilliancy, 
it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. In the sublime 
divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the 
artistic genius and the spectator find themselves at home, with 
their personal sense and feeling, satisfied and liberated: to them the 
vision and the consciousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and 
attained. Beautiful art, from its side, has thus performed the same 
service as philosophy: it has purified the spirit from its thraldom. 
The older religion in which the need of fine art, and just for that 
reason, is first generated, looks up in its principle to an other-
world which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its 
devotees are hideous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans, 
which point to the unspiritual objectivity of that other world, — and 
bones perform a similar or even a better service than such images. 
But even fine art is only a grade of liberation, not the supreme 
liberation itself. — The genuine objectivity, which is only in the 
medium of thought, — the medium in which alone the pure spirit 
is for the spirit, and where the liberation is accompanied with 
reverence, — is still absent in the sensuous beauty of the work of art, 
still more in that external, unbeautiful sensuousness. 
563.] Beautiful Art, like the religion peculiar to it, has its future 
in true religion. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and 
naturally into the universality identical with the infinite form; — 
the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses 
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passes into a self-mediating knowledge, into an existence which is 
itself knowledge, — into revelation. Thus the principle which gives 
the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence, and as 
“absolute” spirit it is for the spirit. 
SUB-SECTION B 
REVEALED RELIGION. 
564.] It lies essentially in the notion of religion,—the religion i.e. 
whose content is absolute mind — that it be revealed, and, what 
is more, revealed by God. Knowledge (the principle by which the 
substance is mind) is a self-determining principle, as infinite self-
realizing form, — it therefore is manifestation out and out. The spirit 
is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit, and in the absolute 
religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract 
elements of its being but itself. 
*** 
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Independence and Dependence of 
Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage
1 
178. Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by 
the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, 
1. (Translator's Note: The selves conscious of self in 
another self are, of course, distinct and separate from 
each other. The difference is, in the first instance, a 
question of degree of self-assertion and 
self-maintenance: one is stronger, higher, more 
independent than another, and capable of asserting this 
at the expense of the other. Still, even this distinction of 
primary and secondary rests ultimately on their identity 
of constitution; and the course of the analysis here 
gradually brings out this essential identity as the true 
fact. The equality of the selves is the truth, or completer 
realisation, of self in another self; the affinity is higher 
and more ultimate than the disparity. Still, the struggle 
and conflict of selves must be gone through in order to 
bring out this result. Hence the present section. The 
background of Hegel's thought is the remarkable human 
phenomenon of the subordination of one self to another 
which we have in all forms of servitude — whether 
slavery, serfdom, or voluntary service. Servitude is not 
only a phase of human history, it is in principle a 
condition of the development and maintenance of the 
consciousness of self as a fact of experience.) 
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it is only by being acknowledged or “recognised.” The conception of 
this its unity in its duplication, of infinitude realising itself in self-
consciousness, has many sides to it and encloses within it elements 
of varied significance. Thus its moments must on the one hand be 
strictly kept apart in detailed distinctiveness, and, on the other, 
in this distinction must, at the same time, also be taken as not 
distinguished, or must always be accepted and understood in their 
opposite sense. This double meaning of what is distinguished lies in 
the nature of self-consciousness: — of its being infinite, or directly 
the opposite of the determinateness in which it is fixed. The detailed 
exposition of the notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will 
bring before us the process of Recognition. 
179. Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; 
it has come outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has 
lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it 
has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as 
essentially real, but sees its own self in the other. 
180. It must cancel this its other.2 To do so is the sublation of that 
first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. 
First, it must set itself to sublate the other independent being, in 
order thereby to become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it 
thereupon proceeds to sublate its own self, for this other is itself. 
181. This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double 
sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into its self. 
For, firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes 
one with itself again through the cancelling of its otherness; but 
secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other self-
consciousness, for it was aware of being in the other, it cancels this 
its own being in the other and thus lets the other again go free. 
182. This process of self-consciousness in relation to another self-
consciousness has in this manner been represented as the action of 
2. A. V. Miller translates this as "It must supersede the 
otherness of itself." (md) 
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one alone. But this action Independence of Self-Consciousness on 
the part of the one has itself the double significance of being at once 
its own action and the action of that other as well. For the other is 
likewise independent, shut up within itself, and there is nothing in it 
which is not there through itself. The first does not have the object 
before it in the way that object primarily exists for desire, but as an 
object existing independently for itself, over which therefore it has 
no power to do anything for its own behoof, if that object does not 
per sedo what the first does to it. The process then is absolutely the 
double process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other 
do the same as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part 
of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only so far as the 
other does the same. Action from one side only would be useless, 
because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of 
both.3 
183. The action has then a double entente not only in the sense 
that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also 
inasmuch as it is in its undivided entirety the act of the one as well 
as of the other. 
184. In this movement we see the process repeated which came 
before us as the play of forces; in the present case, however, it is 
found in consciousness. What in the former had effect only for us 
[contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. 
The middle term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into 
the extremes; and each extreme is this interchange of its own 
determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite. While 
3. In sublation, one self or idea must cancel out the other 
and be "resolved" ("sublate, n3") in the "emergence of a 
new idea" (sublation, n5") of one self being an 
independent and certain self. If the self also sublates 
itself, the ideas would be preserved, as the OED defines. 
(Chloe Groom) 
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qua consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being 
outside itself it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists 
for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness. 
185. Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not another 
consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it 
cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the 
self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, 
through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each 
is to itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, 
at the same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. 
They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another. 
186. This pure conception of recognition, of duplication of self-
consciousness within its unity, we must now consider in the way 
its process appears for self-consciousness. It will, in the first place, 
present the aspect of the disparity of the two, or the break-up of the 
middle term into the extremes, which, qua extremes, are opposed to 
one another, and of which one is merely recognized, while the other 
only recognizes. Self-consciousness is primarily simple existence 
for self, self-identity by exclusion of every other from itself. It takes 
its essential nature and absolute object to be Ego; and in this 
immediacy, in this bare fact of its self-existence, it is individual. 
That which for it is other stands as unessential object, as object 
with the impress and character of negation. But the other is also a 
self-consciousness; an individual makes its appearance in antithesis 
to an individual. Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are for 
each other in the manner of ordinary objects. They are independent 
individual forms, modes of consciousness that have not risen above 
the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been 
determined as life). They are, moreover, forms of consciousness 
which have not yet accomplished for one another the process of 
absolute abstraction, of uprooting all immediate existence, and of 
being merely the bare, negative fact of self-identical consciousness; 
or, in other words, have not yet revealed themselves to each other 
as existing purely for them-selves, i.e. as self-consciousness. Each 
is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its 
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own certainty of itself is still without truth. For its truth would be 
merely that its own individual existence for itself would be shown 
to it to be an independent object, or, which is the same thing, that 
the object would be exhibited as this pure certainty of itself. By the 
notion of recognition, however, this is not possible, except in the 
form that as the other is for it, so it is for the other; each in its self 
through its own action and again through the action of the other 
achieves this pure abstraction of existence for self. 
187. The presentation of itself, however, as pure abstraction of 
self-consciousness consists in showing itself as a pure negation of 
its objective form, or in showing that it is fettered to no determinate 
existence, that it is not bound at all by the particularity everywhere 
characteristic of existence as such, and is not tied up with life. The 
process of bringing all this out involves a twofold action — action 
on the part of the other, and action on the part of itself. In so far 
as it is the other’s action, each aims at the destruction and death 
of the other. But in this there is implicated also the second kind of 
action, self-activity; for each implies that it risks its own life. The 
relation of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted 
that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death 
struggle. They must enter into this struggle, for they must bring 
their certainty of themselves, the certainty of being for themselves, 
to the level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the 
case of the other and in their own case as well. And it is solely by 
risking life, that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved 
that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence, 
is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its 
appearance, is not its mere absorption in the expanse of life. Rather 
it is thereby guaranteed that there is nothing present but what 
might be taken as a vanishing moment — that self-consciousness is 
merely pure self-existence, being-for-self. The individual, who has 
not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognised as a Person; but 
he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent 
self-consciousness. In the same way each must aim at the death 
of the other, as it risks its own life thereby; for that other is to 
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it of no more worth than itself; the other’s reality is presented to 
the former as an external other, as outside itself; it must cancel 
that externality. The other is a purely existent consciousness and 
entangled in manifold ways; it must regard its otherness as pure 
existence for itself or as absolute negation. 
188. This trying and testing, however, by a struggle to the death, 
cancels both the truth which was to result from it, and therewith the 
certainty of self altogether. For just as life is the natural “position” of 
consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death 
is the natural “negation” of consciousness, negation without 
independence, which thus remains without the requisite 
significance of actual recognition. Through death, doubtless, there 
has arisen certainty that both did stake their life, and held it lightly 
both in their own case and in the case of the other; but that is 
not for those who underwent this struggle. They cancel their 
consciousness which had its place in this alien element of natural 
existence; in other words, they cancel themselves and are sublated, 
as terms or extremes seeking to have existence on their own 
account. But along with this there vanishes from the play of change, 
the essential moment, viz. that of breaking up into extremes with 
opposite characteristics; and the middle term collapses into a 
lifeless unity which is broken up into lifeless extremes, merely 
existent and not opposed. And the two do not mutually give and 
receive one another back from each other through consciousness; 
they let one another go quite indifferently, like things. Their act is 
abstract negation, not the negation characteristic of consciousness, 
which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is 
sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated. 
189. In this experience self-consciousness becomes aware that 
life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. In immediate 
self-consciousness the simple ego is absolute object, which, 
however, is for us or in itself absolute mediation, and has as its 
essential moment substantial and solid independence. The 
dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience; 
through this there is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a 
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consciousness which is not purely for itself, but for another, i.e. as 
an existent consciousness, consciousness in the form and shape of 
thinghood. Both moments are essential, since, in the first instance, 
they are unlike and opposed, and their reflexion into unity has not 
yet come to light, they stand as two opposed forms or modes of 
consciousness. The one is independent whose essential nature is 
to be for itself, the other is dependent whose essence is life or 
existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter 
the Bondsman. 
190. The master is the consciousness that exists for itself; but 
no longer merely the general notion of existence for self. Rather, 
it is consciousness which, while existing on its own account, is 
mediated with itself through an other consciousness, viz. bound up 
with an independent being or with thinghood in general. The master 
brings himself into relation to both these moments, to a thing as 
such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness whose essential 
character is thinghood, and since the master, qua notion of self-
consciousness, is (a) an immediate relation of self-existence, but is 
now moreover at the same time (b) mediation, or a being-for-self 
which is for itself only through an other — he [the master] stands 
in relation (a) immediately to both (b) mediately to each through 
the other. The master relates himself to the bondsman mediately 
through independent existence, for that is precisely what keeps the 
bondsman in thrall; it is his chain, from which he could not in the 
struggle get away, and for that reason he proves himself dependent, 
shows that his independence consists in being a thing. The master, 
however, is the power controlling this state of existence, for he 
has shown in the struggle that he holds existence to be merely 
something negative. Since he is the power dominating the negative 
nature of existence, while this existence again is the power 
controlling the other [the bondsman], the master holds, 
parconsequence, his other in subordination. In the same way the 
master relates himself to the thing mediately through the 
bondsman. The bondsman being a self-consciousness in the broad 
sense, also takes up a negative attitude to things and cancels them; 
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but the thing is, at the same time, independent for him, and, in 
consequence, he cannot, with all his negating, get so far as to 
annihilate it outright and be done with it; that is to say, he merely 
works on it. To the master, on the other hand, by means of this 
mediating process, belongs the immediate relation, in the sense of 
the pure negation of it, in other words he gets the enjoyment. What 
mere desire did not attain, he now succeeds in attaining, viz. to 
have done with the thing, and find satisfaction in enjoyment. Desire 
alone did not get the length of this, because of the independence of 
the thing. The master, however, who has interposed the bondsman 
between it and himself, thereby relates himself merely to the 
dependence of the thing, and enjoys it without qualification and 
without reserve. The aspect of its independence he leaves to the 
bondsman, who labours upon it. 
191. In these two moments, the master gets his recognition 
through an other consciousness, for in them the latter affirms itself 
as unessential, both by working upon the thing, and, on the other 
hand, by the fact of being dependent on a determinate existence; 
in neither case can this other get the mastery over existence, and 
succeed in absolutely negating it. We have thus here this moment 
of recognition, viz. that the other consciousness cancels itself as 
self-existent, and, ipso facto, itself does what the first does to it. In 
the same way we have the other moment, that this action on the 
part of the second is the action proper of the first; for what is done 
by the bondsman is properly an action on the part of the master. 
The latter exists only for himself, that is his essential nature; he 
is the negative power without qualification, a power to which the 
thing is naught, and his is thus the absolutely essential action in 
this situation, while the bondsman’s is not so, his is an unessential 
activity. But for recognition proper there is needed the moment that 
what the master does to the other he should also do to himself, and 
what the bondsman does to himself, he should do to the other also. 
On that account a form of recognition has arisen that is one-sided 
and unequal. 
192. In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, 
608  |  G. W. F. Hegel - from The Phenomenology of Mind (Geist)
the object which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But 
it is evident that this object does not correspond to its notion; for, 
just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really 
finds that something has come about quite different from an 
independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather 
a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. He is thus not 
assured of self-existence as his truth; he finds that his truth is rather 
the un-essential consciousness, and the fortuitous unessential 
action of that consciousness. 
193. The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly 
the consciousness of the bondsman. This doubtless appears in the 
first instance outside it, and not as the truth of self-consciousness. 
But just as lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse 
of what it wants to be, so, too, bondage will, when completed, pass 
into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness 
repressed within itself, it will enter into itself, and change round into 
real and true independence. 
194. We have seen what bondage is only in relation to lordship. 
But it is a self-consciousness, and we have now to consider what it 
is, in this regard, in and for itself. In the first instance, the master 
is taken to be the essential reality for the state of bondage; hence, 
for it, the truth is the independent consciousness existing for itself, 
although this truth is not yet taken as inherent in bondage itself. 
Still, it does in fact contain within itself this truth of pure negativity 
and self-existence, because it has experienced this reality within it. 
For this self-consciousness was not in peril and fear for this element 
or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its 
entire being; it felt the fear of death, it was in mortal terror of its 
sovereign master. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost 
soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, the stable foundations 
of its whole being have quaked within it. This complete perturbation 
of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its stability 
into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple, ultimate nature of 
self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure self-referrent [sic] 
existence, which consequently is involved in this type of 
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consciousness. This moment of pure self-existence is moreover a 
fact for it; for in the master this moment is consciously his object. 
Further, this bondsman’s consciousness is not only this total 
dissolution in a general way; in serving and toiling, the bondsman 
actually carries this out. By serving he cancels in every particular 
moment his dependence on and attachment to natural existence, 
and by his work removes this existence away. 
195. The feeling of absolute power, however, realized both in 
general and in the particular form of service, is only dissolution 
implicitly, and albeit the fear of his lord is the beginning of wisdom, 
consciousness is not therein aware of being self-existent. Through 
work and labour, however, this consciousness of the bondsman 
comes to itself. In the moment which corresponds to desire in the 
case of the master’s consciousness, the aspect of the non-essential 
relation to the thing seemed to fall to the lot of the servant, since 
the thing there retained its independence. Desire has reserved to 
itself the pure negating of the object and thereby unalloyed feeling 
of self. This satisfaction, however, just for that reason is itself only a 
state of evanescence, for it lacks objectivity or subsistence. Labour, 
on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked, evanescence 
delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions 
the thing. The negative relation to the object passes into the form of 
the object, into something that is permanent and remains; because 
it is just for the labourer that the object has independence. This 
negative mediating agency, this activity giving shape and form, is at 
the same time the individual existence, the pure self-existence of 
that consciousness, which now in the work it does is externalised 
and passes into the condition of permanence. The consciousness 
that toils and serves accordingly comes by this means to view that 
independent being as its self. 
196. But again, shaping or forming the object has not only the 
positive significance that the bondsman becomes thereby aware 
of himself as factually and objectively self-existent; this type of 
consciousness has also a negative import, in contrast with its first 
moment, the element of fear. For in shaping the thing it only 
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becomes aware of its own proper negativity, its existence on its 
own account, as an object, through the fact that it cancels the 
actual form confronting it. But this objective negative element is 
precisely the alien, external reality, before which it trembled. Now, 
however, it destroys this extraneous alien negative, affirms and sets 
itself up as a negative in the element of permanence, and thereby 
becomes aware of being objectively for itself. In the master, this 
self-existence is felt to be an other, is only external; in fear, the 
self-existence is present implicitly, in fashioning the thing, self-
existence comes to be felt explicitly as its own proper being, and 
it attains the consciousness that itself exists in its own right and 
on its own account (an und für sich).4 By the fact that the form 
is objectified, it does not become something other than the 
consciousness moulding the thing through work; for just that form 
is his pure self- existence, which therein becomes truly realized. 
Thus precisely in labour where there seemed to be merely some 
outsider’s mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware, 
through this re-discovery of himself by himself, of having and being 
a “mind of his own.” For this reflexion of self into self the two 
moments, fear and service in general, as also that of formative 
activity are necessary: and at the same time both must exist in a 
universal manner. Without the discipline of service and obedience, 
fear remains formal and does not spread over the whole known 
reality of existence. Without the formative activity shaping the 
thing, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not 
become objective for itself. Should consciousness shape and form 
the thing without the initial state of absolute fear, then it has merely 
a vain and futile “mind of its own”; for its form or negativity is not 
negativity per se, and hence its formative activity cannot furnish 
the consciousness of itself as essentially real. If it has endured not 
absolute fear, but merely some slight anxiety, the negative reality 
4. Miller translates this as "being-for-self"; this is a more 
commonly accepted translation. (md) 
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has remained external to it, its substance has not been through and 
through infected thereby. Since the entire content of its natural 
consciousness has not tottered and shaken, it is still inherently a 
determinate mode of being; having a ” mind of its own” (der eigen 
Sinn) is simply stubbornness (Eigensinn), a type of freedom which 
does not get beyond the attitude of bondage. The less the pure 
form can become its essential nature, the less is that form, as 
overspreading and controlling particulars, a universal formative 
activity, an absolute notion; it is rather a piece of cleverness which 
has mastery within a certain range, but does not wield universal 
power and dominate the entire objective reality. 
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16. Matthew Arnold - The 
Function of Criticism at the 
Present Time 
The Function of Criticism at the Present 
Time
1 
Many objections have been made to a proposition which, in some 
remarks of mine2 on translating Homer, I ventured to put forth; a 
proposition about criticism, and its importance at the present day. 
I said: “Of the literature of France and Germany, as of the intellect 
of Europe in general, the main effort, for now many years, has 
been a critical effort; the endeavor, in all branches of knowledge, 
theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to see the object as in 
itself it really is.” I added, that owing to the operation in English 
literature of certain causes, “almost the last thing for which one 
would come to English literature is just that very thing which now 
Europe most desires,—criticism”; and that the power and value of 
English literature was thereby impaired. More than one rejoinder 
declared that the importance I here assigned to criticism was 
excessive, and asserted the inherent superiority of the creative 
1. Reprinted from The National Review, November, 1864, in 
the Essays in Criticism, Macmillan & Co., 1865. (All notes 
are by the editor, William Savage Johnson, unless 
otherwise noted.) 
2. In On Translating Homer, ed. 1903, pp. 216-17 
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effort of the human spirit over its critical effort. And the other day, 
having been led by a Mr. Shairp’s3 excellent notice of Wordsworth4 
to turn again to his biography, I found, in the words of this great 
man, whom I, for one, must always listen to with the profoundest 
respect, a sentence passed on the critic’s business, which seems to 
justify every possible disparagement of it. Wordsworth says in one 
of his letters5:— 
“The writers in these publications” (the Reviews), “while they 
3. An essay called Wordsworth: The Man and the Poet, 
published in The North British Review for August, 1864, 
vol. 41. John Campbell Shairp (1819-85), Scottish critic 
and man of letters, was professor of poetry at Oxford 
from 1877 to 1884. The best of his lectures from this chair 
were published in 1881 as Aspects of Poetry. 
4. Arnold's note: I cannot help thinking that a practice, 
common in England during the last century, and still 
followed in France, of printing a notice of this kind, — a 
notice by a competent critic, — to serve as an 
introduction to an eminent author's works, might be 
revived among us with advantage. To introduce all 
succeeding editions of Wordsworth, Mr. Shairp's notice 
might, it seems to me, excellently serve; it is written 
from the point of view of an admirer, nay, of a disciple, 
and that is right; but then the disciple must be also, as in 
this case he is, a critic, a man of letters, not, as too often 
happens, some relation or friend with no qualification 
for his task except affection for his author. 
5. See Memoirs of William Wordsworth, ed. 1851, II, 151, 
letter to Bernard Barton. 
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prosecute their inglorious employment, cannot be supposed to be 
in a state of mind very favorable for being affected by the finer 
influences of a thing so pure as genuine poetry.” 
And a trustworthy reporter6 of his conversation quotes a more 
elaborate judgment to the same effect:— 
“Wordsworth holds the critical power very low, infinitely lower 
than the inventive; and he said to-day that if the quantity of time 
consumed in writing critiques on the works of others were given to 
original composition, of whatever kind it might be, it would be much 
better employed; it would make a man find out sooner his own level, 
and it would do infinitely less mischief. A false or malicious criticism 
may do much injury to the minds of others, a stupid invention, 
either in prose or verse, is quite harmless.” 
It is almost too much to expect of poor human nature, that a man 
capable of producing some effect in one line of literature, should, for 
the greater good of society, voluntarily doom himself to impotence 
and obscurity in another. Still less is this to be expected from men 
addicted to the composition of the “false or malicious criticism” of 
which Wordsworth speaks. However, everybody would admit that 
a false or malicious criticism had better never have been written. 
Everybody, too, would be willing to admit, as a general proposition, 
that the critical faculty is lower than the inventive. But is it true 
that criticism is really, in itself, a baneful and injurious employment; 
is it true that all time given to writing critiques on the works of 
others would be much better employed if it were given to original 
composition, of whatever kind this may be? Is it true that Johnson 
had better have gone on producing more Irenes7 instead of writing 
his Lives of the Poets; nay, is it certain that Wordsworth himself was 
better employed in making his Ecclesiastical Sonnets than when he 
6. Christopher Wordsworth, in Memoirs of William 
Wordsworth (md) 
7. An unsuccessful play of Dr. [Samuel] Johnson's. 
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made his celebrated Preface8so full of criticism, and criticism of the 
works of others? Wordsworth was himself a great critic, and it is to 
be sincerely regretted that he has not left us more criticism; Goethe 
was one of the greatest of critics, and we may sincerely congratulate 
ourselves that he has left us so much criticism. Without wasting 
time over the exaggeration which Wordsworth’s judgment on 
criticism clearly contains, or over an attempt to trace the causes, — 
not difficult, I think, to be traced, — which may have led Wordsworth 
to this exaggeration, a critic may with advantage seize an occasion 
for trying his own conscience, and for asking himself of what real 
service at any given moment the practice of criticism either is or 
may be made to his own mind and spirit, and to the minds and 
spirits of others. 
The critical power is of lower rank than the creative. True; but 
in assenting to this proposition, one or two things are to be kept 
in mind. It is undeniable that the exercise of a creative power, 
that a free creative activity, is the highest function of man; it is 
proved to be so by man’s finding in it his true happiness. But it is 
undeniable, also, that men may have the sense of exercising this 
free creative activity in other ways than in producing great works 
of literature or art; if it were not so, all but a very few men would 
be shut out from the true happiness of all men. They may have 
it in well-doing, they may have it in learning, they may have it 
even in criticizing. This is one thing to be kept in mind. Another 
is, that the exercise of the creative power in the production of 
great works of literature or art, however high this exercise of it may 
rank, is not at all epochs and under all conditions possible; and that 
therefore labor may be vainly spent in attempting it, which might 
with more fruit be used in preparing for it, in rendering it possible. 
This creative power works with elements, with materials; what if it 
has not those materials, those elements, ready for its use? In that 
8. Prefixed to the second edition (1800) of the Lyrical 
Ballads. 
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case it must surely wait till they are ready. Now, in literature,— I will 
limit myself to literature, for it is about literature that the question 
arises,—the elements with which the creative power works are ideas; 
the best ideas on every matter which literature touches, current at 
the time. At any rate we may lay it down as certain that in modern 
literature no manifestation of the creative power not working with 
these can be very important or fruitful. And I say current at the 
time, not merely accessible at the time; for creative literary genius 
does not principally show itself in discovering new ideas: that is 
rather the business of the philosopher. The grand work of literary 
genius is a work of synthesis and exposition, not of analysis and 
discovery; its gift lies in the faculty of being happily inspired by a 
certain intellectual and spiritual atmosphere, by a certain order of 
ideas, when it finds itself in them; of dealing divinely with these 
ideas, presenting them in the most effective and attractive 
combinations,—making beautiful works with them, in short. But it 
must have the atmosphere, it must find itself amidst the order 
of ideas, in order to work freely; and these it is not so easy to 
command. This is why great creative epochs in literature are so 
rare, this is why there is so much that is unsatisfactory in the 
productions of many men of real genius; because, for the creation of 
a master-work of literature two powers must concur, the power of 
the man and the power of the moment, and the man is not enough 
without the moment; the creative power has, for its happy exercise, 
appointed elements, and those elements are not in its own control. 
Nay, they are more within the control of the critical power. It is 
the business of the critical power, as I said in the words already 
quoted, “in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, 
art, science, to see the object as in itself it really is.” Thus it tends, 
at last, to make an intellectual situation of which the creative power 
can profitably avail itself. It tends to establish an order of ideas, 
if not absolutely true, yet true by comparison with that which it 
displaces; to make the best ideas prevail. Presently these new ideas 
reach society, the touch of truth is the touch of life, and there is a 
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stir and growth everywhere; out of this stir and growth come the 
creative epochs of literature. 
Or, to narrow our range, and quit these considerations of the 
general march of genius and of society,—considerations which are 
apt to become too abstract and impalpable, — every one can see 
that a poet, for instance, ought to know life and the world before 
dealing with them in poetry; and life and the world being in modern 
times very complex things, the creation of a modern poet, to be 
worth much, implies a great critical effort behind it; else it must 
be a comparatively poor, barren, and short-lived affair. This is why 
Byron’s poetry had so little endurance in it, and Goethe’s so much; 
both Byron and Goethe had a great productive power, but Goethe’s 
was nourished by a great critical effort providing the true materials 
for it, and Byron’s was not; Goethe knew life and the world, the 
poet’s necessary subjects, much more comprehensively and 
thoroughly than Byron. He knew a great deal more of them, and he 
knew them much more as they really are. 
It has long seemed to me that the burst of creative activity in our 
literature, through the first quarter of this century, had about it in 
fact something premature; and that from this cause its productions 
are doomed, most of them, in spite of the sanguine hopes which 
accompanied and do still accompany them, to prove hardly more 
lasting than the productions of far less splendid epochs. And this 
prematureness comes from its having proceeded without having 
its proper data, without sufficient materials to work with. In other 
words, the English poetry of the first quarter of this century, with 
plenty of energy, plenty of creative force, did not know enough. 
This makes Byron so empty of matter, Shelley so incoherent, 
Wordsworth even, profound as he is, yet so wanting in 
completeness and variety. Wordsworth cared little for books, and 
disparaged Goethe. I admire Wordsworth, as he is, so much that I 
cannot wish him different; and it is vain, no doubt, to imagine such 
a man different from what he is, to suppose that he could have been 
different. But surely the one thing wanting to make Wordsworth an 
even greater poet than he is,—his thought richer, and his influence 
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of wider application, — was that he should have read more books, 
among them, no doubt, those of that Goethe whom he disparaged 
without reading him. 
But to speak of books and reading may easily lead to a 
misunderstanding here. It was not really books and reading that 
lacked to our poetry at this epoch: Shelley had plenty of reading, 
Coleridge had immense reading. Pindar and Sophocles — as we all 
say so glibly, and often with so little discernment of the real import 
of what we are saying—had not many books; Shakespeare was no 
deep reader. True; but in the Greece of Pindar and Sophocles, in 
the England of Shakespeare, the poet lived in a current of ideas in 
the highest degree animating and nourishing to the creative power; 
society was, in the fullest measure, permeated by fresh thought, 
intelligent and alive. And this state of things is the true basis for 
the creative power’s exercise, in this it finds its data, its materials, 
truly ready for its hand; all the books and reading in the world are 
only valuable as they are helps to this. Even when this does not 
actually exist, books and reading may enable a man to construct a 
kind of semblance of it in his own mind, a world of knowledge and 
intelligence in which he may live and work. This is by no means an 
equivalent to the artist for the nationally diffused life and thought 
of the epochs of Sophocles or Shakespeare; but, besides that it may 
be a means of preparation for such epochs, it does really constitute, 
if many share in it, a quickening and sustaining atmosphere of great 
value. Such an atmosphere the many-sided learning and the long 
and widely combined critical effort of Germany formed for Goethe, 
when he lived and worked. There was no national glow of life and 
thought there as in the Athens of Pericles or the England of 
Elizabeth. That was the poet’s weakness. But there was a sort of 
equivalent for it in the complete culture and unfettered thinking of 
a large body of Germans. That was his strength. In the England of 
the first quarter of this century there was neither a national glow 
of life and thought, such as we had in the age of Elizabeth, nor yet 
a culture and a force of learning and criticism such as were to be 
found in Germany. Therefore the creative power of poetry wanted, 
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for success in the highest sense, materials and a basis; a thorough 
interpretation of the world was necessarily denied to it. 
At first sight it seems strange that out of the immense stir of 
the French Revolution and its age should not have come a crop of 
works of genius equal to that which came out of the stir of the 
great productive time of Greece, or out of that of the Renascence, 
with its powerful episode the Reformation. But the truth is that 
the stir of the French Revolution took a character which essentially 
distinguished it from such movements as these. These were, in 
the main, disinterestedly intellectual and spiritual movements; 
movements in which the human spirit looked for its satisfaction 
in itself and in the increased play of its own activity. The French 
Revolution took a political, practical character. The movement, 
which went on in France under the old régime, from 1700 to 1789, 
was far more really akin than that of the Revolution itself to the 
movement of the Renascence; the France of Voltaire and Rousseau 
told far more powerfully upon the mind of Europe than the France 
of the Revolution. Goethe reproached this last expressly with having 
“thrown quiet culture back.” Nay, and the true key to how much in 
our Byron, even in our Wordsworth, is this! — that they had their 
source in a great movement of feeling, not in a great movement of 
mind. The French Revolution, however, — that object of so much 
blind love and so much blind hatred, — found undoubtedly its 
motive-power in the intelligence of men, and not in their practical 
sense; this is what distinguishes it from the English Revolution of 
Charles the First’s time. This is what makes it a more spiritual event 
than our Revolution, an event of much more powerful and world-
wide interest, though practically less successful; it appeals to an 
order of ideas which are universal, certain, permanent. 1789 asked 
of a thing, Is it rational? 1642 asked of a thing, Is it legal? or, when 
it went furthest, Is it according to conscience? This is the English 
fashion, a fashion to be treated, within its own sphere, with the 
highest respect; for its success, within its own sphere, has been 
prodigious. But what is law in one place is not law in another; 
what is law here to-day is not law even here to-morrow; and as for 
620  |  Matthew Arnold - The Function of Criticism at the Present Time
conscience, what is binding on one man’s conscience is not binding 
on another’s. The old woman9 who threw her stool at the head of 
the surpliced minister in St. Giles’s Church at Edinburgh obeyed 
an impulse to which millions of the human race may be permitted 
to remain strangers. But the prescriptions of reason are absolute, 
unchanging, of universal validity; to count by tens is the easiest way 
of counting — that is a proposition of which every one, from here 
to the Antipodes, feels the force; at least I should say so if we did 
not live in a country where it is not impossible that any morning we 
may find a letter in the Times declaring that a decimal coinage is an 
absurdity. That a whole nation should have been penetrated with an 
enthusiasm for pure reason, and with an ardent zeal for making its 
prescriptions triumph, is a very remarkable thing, when we consider 
how little of mind, or anything so worthy and quickening as mind, 
comes into the motives which alone, in general, impel great masses 
of men. In spite of the extravagant direction given to this 
enthusiasm, in spite of the crimes and follies in which it lost itself, 
the French Revolution derives from the force, truth, and universality 
of the ideas which it took for its law, and from the passion with 
which it could inspire a multitude for these ideas, a unique and still 
living power; it is, — it will probably long remain, — the greatest, 
the most animating event in history. And as no sincere passion for 
the things of the mind, even though it turn out in many respects 
an unfortunate passion, is ever quite thrown away and quite barren 
of good, France has reaped from hers one fruit — the natural and 
9. At the first attempt to read the newly prescribed liturgy 
in St. Giles's Church, Edinburgh, on July 23, 1637, a riot 
took place, in which the "fauld-stools," or folding stools, 
of the congregation were hurled as missiles. An 
untrustworthy tradition attributes the flinging of the 
first stool to a certain Jenny or Janet Geddes. 
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legitimate fruit though not precisely the grand fruit she expected: 
she is the country in Europe where the people is most alive. 
But the mania for giving an immediate political and practical 
application to all these fine ideas of the reason was fatal. Here an 
Englishman is in his element: on this theme we can all go on for 
hours. And all we are in the habit of saying on it has undoubtedly 
a great deal of truth. Ideas cannot be too much prized in and for 
themselves, cannot be too much lived with; but to transport them 
abruptly into the world of politics and practice, violently to 
revolutionize this world to their bidding, — that is quite another 
thing. There is the world of ideas and there is the world of practice; 
the French are often for suppressing the one and the English the 
other; but neither is to be suppressed. A member of the House of 
Commons said to me the other day: “That a thing is an anomaly, I 
consider to be no objection to it whatever.” I venture to think he 
was wrong; that a thing is an anomaly is an objection to it, but 
absolutely and in the sphere of ideas: it is not necessarily, under 
such and such circumstances, or at such and such a moment, an 
objection to it in the sphere of politics and practice. Joubert has 
said beautifully: “C’est la force et le droit qui règlent toutes choses 
dans le monde; la force en attendant le droit.”10 (Force and right 
are the governors of this world; force till right is ready.) Force till 
right is ready; and till right is ready, force, the existing order of 
things, is justified, is the legitimate ruler. But right is something 
moral, and implies inward recognition, free assent of the will; we 
are not ready for right,—right, so far as we are concerned, is not 
ready,—until we have attained this sense of seeing it and willing it. 
The way in which for us it may change and transform force, the 
existing order of things, and become, in its turn, the legitimate ruler 
of the world, should depend on the way in which, when our time 
comes, we see it and will it. Therefore for other people enamored of 
their own newly discerned right, to attempt to impose it upon us as 
10. Pensées de J. Joubert, ed. 1850, I, 355, titre 15, 2. 
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ours, and violently to substitute their right for our force, is an act of 
tyranny, and to be resisted. It sets at naught the second great half 
of our maxim, force till right is ready. This was the grand error of 
the French Revolution; and its movement of ideas, by quitting the 
intellectual sphere and rushing furiously into the political sphere, 
ran, indeed, a prodigious and memorable course, but produced no 
such intellectual fruit as the movement of ideas of the Renascence, 
and created, in opposition to itself, what I may call an epoch of 
concentration. The great force of that epoch of concentration was 
England; and the great voice of that epoch of concentration was 
Burke. It is the fashion to treat Burke‘s writings on the French 
Revolution11as superannuated and conquered by the event; as the 
eloquent but unphilosophical tirades of bigotry and prejudice. I 
will not deny that they are often disfigured by the violence and 
passion of the moment, and that in some directions Burke’s view 
was bounded, and his observation therefore at fault. But on the 
whole, and for those who can make the needful corrections, what 
distinguishes these writings is their profound, permanent, fruitful, 
philosophical truth. They contain the true philosophy of an epoch 
of concentration, dissipate the heavy atmosphere which its own 
nature is apt to engender round it, and make its resistance rational 
instead of mechanical. 
But Burke is so great because, almost alone in England, he brings 
thought to bear upon politics, he saturates politics with thought. 
It is his accident that his ideas were at the service of an epoch of 
concentration, not of an epoch of expansion; it is his characteristic 
that he so lived by ideas, and had such a source of them welling 
11. The latter part of Burke's life was largely devoted to a 
conflict with the upholders of the French Revolution. 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790, and Letters 
on a Regicide Peace, 1796, are his most famous writings in 
this cause. 
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up within him, that he could float even an epoch of concentration 
and English Tory politics with them. It does not hurt him that Dr. 
Price12 and the Liberals were enraged with him; it does not even 
hurt him that George the Third and the Tories were enchanted 
with him. His greatness is that he lived in a world which neither 
English Liberalism nor English Toryism is apt to enter;—the world 
of ideas, not the world of catchwords and party habits. So far is it 
from being really true of him that he “to party gave up what was 
meant for mankind,”13 that at the very end of his fierce struggle 
with the French Revolution, after all his invectives against its false 
pretensions, hollowness, and madness, with his sincere convictions 
of its mischievousness, he can close a memorandum on the best 
means of combating it, some of the last pages he ever wrote, — the 
Thoughts on French Affairs, in December 1791, — with these striking 
words: — 
“The evil is stated, in my opinion, as it exists. The remedy must 
be where power, wisdom, and information, I hope, are more united 
with good intentions than they can be with me. I have done with this 
subject, I believe, forever. It has given me many anxious moments 
for the last two years. If a great change is to be made in human 
affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it; the general opinions and 
feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope will forward it: 
and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current in human 
affairs, will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself, 
than the mere designs of men. They will not be resolute and firm, but 
perverse and obstinate.“ 
That return of Burke upon himself has always seemed to me one 
12. Richard Price, D. D. (1723-91), was strongly opposed to 
the war with America and in sympathy with the French 
revolutionists. 
13. From [Oliver] Goldsmith's epitaph on Burke in the 
Retaliation. 
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of the finest things in English literature, or indeed in any literature. 
That is what I call living by ideas: when one side of a question has 
long had your earnest support, when all your feelings are engaged, 
when you hear all round you no language but one, when your party 
talks this language like a steam-engine and can imagine no 
other,—still to be able to think, still to be irresistibly carried, if so it 
be, by the current of thought to the opposite side of the question, 
and, like Balaam,14 to be unable to speak anything but what the Lord 
has put in your mouth. I know nothing more striking, and I must add 
that I know nothing more un-English. 
For the Englishman in general is like my friend the Member of 
Parliament, and believes, point-blank, that for a thing to be an 
anomaly is absolutely no objection to it whatever. He is like the 
Lord Auckland15 of Burke’s day, who, in a memorandum on the 
French Revolution, talks of “certain miscreants, assuming the name 
of philosophers, who have presumed themselves capable of 
establishing a new system of society.” The Englishman has been 
called a political animal, and he values what is political and practical 
so much that ideas easily become objects of dislike in his eyes, 
and thinkers “miscreants,” because ideas and thinkers have rashly 
meddled with politics and practice. This would be all very well if 
the dislike and neglect confined themselves to ideas transported 
out of their own sphere, and meddling rashly with practice; but 
they are inevitably extended to ideas as such, and to the whole life 
of intelligence; practice is everything, a free play of the mind is 
nothing. The notion of the free play of the mind upon all subjects 
being a pleasure in itself, being an object of desire, being an 
essential provider of elements without which a nation’s spirit, 
14. [The Bible], Num[bers] XXII, 35. 
15. William Eden, First Baron Auckland (1745-1814), English 
statesman. Among other services he represented English 
interests in Holland during the critical years 1790-93. 
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whatever compensations it may have for them, must, in the long 
run, die of inanition, hardly enters into an Englishman’s thoughts. 
It is noticeable that the word curiosity, which in other languages is 
used in a good sense, to mean, as a high and fine quality of man’s 
nature, just this disinterested love of a free play of the mind on all 
subjects, for its own sake, — it is noticeable, I say, that this word 
has in our language no sense of the kind, no sense but a rather 
bad and disparaging one. But criticism, real criticism, is essentially 
the exercise of this very quality. It obeys an instinct prompting it 
to try to know the best that is known and thought in the world, 
irrespectively of practice, politics, and everything of the kind; and 
to value knowledge and thought as they approach this best, without 
the intrusion of any other considerations whatever. This is an 
instinct for which there is, I think, little original sympathy in the 
practical English nature, and what there was of it has undergone a 
long benumbing period of blight and suppression in the epoch of 
concentration which followed the French Revolution. 
But epochs of concentration cannot well endure forever; epochs 
of expansion, in the due course of things, follow them. Such an 
epoch of expansion seems to be opening in this country. In the first 
place all danger of a hostile forcible pressure of foreign ideas upon 
our practice has long disappeared; like the traveller in the fable, 
therefore, we begin to wear our cloak a little more loosely. Then, 
with a long peace, the ideas of Europe steal gradually and amicably 
in, and mingle, though in infinitesimally small quantities at a time, 
with our own notions. Then, too, in spite of all that is said about 
the absorbing and brutalizing influence of our passionate material 
progress, it seems to me indisputable that this progress is likely, 
though not certain, to lead in the end to an apparition of intellectual 
life; and that man, after he has made himself perfectly comfortable 
and has now to determine what to do with himself next, may begin 
to remember that he has a mind, and that the mind may be made 
the source of great pleasure. I grant it is mainly the privilege of faith, 
at present, to discern this end to our railways, our business, and 
our fortune-making; but we shall see if, here as elsewhere, faith is 
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not in the end the true prophet. Our ease, our travelling, and our 
unbounded liberty to hold just as hard and securely as we please 
to the practice to which our notions have given birth, all tend to 
beget an inclination to deal a little more freely with these notions 
themselves, to canvass them a little, to penetrate a little into their 
real nature. Flutterings of curiosity, in the foreign sense of the word, 
appear amongst us, and it is in these that criticism must look to find 
its account. Criticism first; a time of true creative activity, perhaps, 
— which, as I have said, must inevitably be preceded amongst us by 
a time of criticism, — hereafter, when criticism has done its work. 
It is of the last importance that English criticism should clearly 
discern what rule for its course, in order to avail itself of the field 
now opening to it, and to produce fruit for the future, it ought to 
take. The rule may be summed up in one word, — disinterestedness. 
And how is criticism to show disinterestedness? By keeping aloof 
from what is called “the practical view of things”; by resolutely 
following the law of its own nature, which is to be a free play of 
the mind on all subjects which it touches. By steadily refusing to 
lend itself to any of those ulterior, political, practical considerations 
about ideas, which plenty of people will be sure to attach to them, 
which perhaps ought often to be attached to them, which in this 
country at any rate are certain to be attached to them quite 
sufficiently, but which criticism has really nothing to do with. Its 
business is, as I have said, simply to know the best that is known 
and thought in the world, and by in its turn making this known, to 
create a current of true and fresh ideas. Its business is to do this 
with inflexible honesty, with due ability; but its business is to do no 
more, and to leave alone all questions of practical consequences and 
applications, questions which will never fail to have due prominence 
given to them. Else criticism, besides being really false to its own 
nature, merely continues in the old rut which it has hitherto 
followed in this country, and will certainly miss the chance now 
given to it. For what is at present the bane of criticism in this 
country? It is that practical considerations cling to it and stifle it. It 
subserves interests not its own. Our organs of criticism are organs 
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of men and parties having practical ends to serve, and with them 
those practical ends are the first thing and the play of mind the 
second; so much play of mind as is compatible with the prosecution 
of those practical ends is all that is wanted. An organ like the Revue 
des Deux Mondes,16 having for its main function to understand and 
utter the best that is known and thought in the world, existing, 
it may be said, as just an organ for a free play of the mind, we 
have not. But we have the Edinburgh Review, existing as an organ 
of the old Whigs, and for as much play of the mind as may suit its 
being that; we have the Quarterly Review, existing as an organ of 
the Tories, and for as much play of mind as may suit its being that; 
we have the British Quarterly Review, existing as an organ of the 
political Dissenters, and for as much play of mind as may suit its 
being that; we have the Times, existing as an organ of the common, 
satisfied, well-to-do Englishman, and for as much play of mind as 
may suit its being that. And so on through all the various fractions, 
political and religious, of our society; every fraction has, as such, 
its organ of criticism, but the notion of combining all fractions in 
the common pleasure of a free disinterested play of mind meets 
with no favor. Directly this play of mind wants to have more scope, 
and to forget the pressure of practical considerations a little, it is 
checked, it is made to feel the chain. We saw this the other day in 
the extinction, so much to be regretted, of the Home and Foreign 
Review.17 Perhaps in no organ of criticism in this country was there 
so much knowledge, so much play of mind; but these could not 
save it. The Dublin Review subordinates play of mind to the practical 
business of English and Irish Catholicism, and lives. It must needs 
be that men should act in sects and parties, that each of these 
16. The best-known of the French magazines devoted to 
literature, art, and general criticism, founded in Paris in 
1831 by Francois Buloz. 
17. Published in London 1862-64. 
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sects and parties should have its organ, and should make this organ 
subserve the interests of its action; but it would be well, too, that 
there should be a criticism, not the minister of these interests, not 
their enemy, but absolutely and entirely independent of them. No 
other criticism will ever attain any real authority or make any real 
way towards its end, — the creating a current of true and fresh ideas. 
It is because criticism has so little kept in the pure intellectual 
sphere, has so little detached itself from practice, has been so 
directly polemical and controversial, that it has so ill accomplished, 
in this country, its best spiritual work; which is to keep man from 
a self-satisfaction which is retarding and vulgarizing, to lead him 
towards perfection, by making his mind dwell upon what is excellent 
in itself, and the absolute beauty and fitness of things. A polemical 
practical criticism makes men blind even to the ideal imperfection 
of their practice, makes them willingly assert its ideal perfection, 
in order the better to secure it against attack: and clearly this is 
narrowing and baneful for them. If they were reassured on the 
practical side, speculative considerations of ideal perfection they 
might be brought to entertain, and their spiritual horizon would 
thus gradually widen. Sir Charles Adderley18 says to the 
Warwickshire farmers: — 
“Talk of the improvement of breed! Why, the race we ourselves 
represent, the men and women, the old Anglo-Saxon race, are the 
best breed in the whole world. . . . The absence of a too enervating 
climate, too unclouded skies, and a too luxurious nature, has 
produced so vigorous a race of people, and has rendered us so 
superior to all the world.” 
18. Charles Bowyer Adderley, First Baron Norton (1814-1905), 
English politician, inherited valuable estates in 
Warwickshire. He was a strong churchman and 
especially interested in education and the colonies. 
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Mr. Roebuck19 says to the Sheffield cutlers:— 
“I look around me and ask what is the state of England? Is not 
property safe? Is not every man able to say what he likes? Can you 
not walk from one end of England to the other in perfect security? I 
ask you whether, the world over or in past history, there is anything 
like it? Nothing. I pray that our unrivalled happiness may last.” 
Now obviously there is a peril for poor human nature in words and 
thoughts of such exuberant self-satisfaction, until we find ourselves 
safe in the streets of the Celestial City. 
“Das wenige verschwindet leicht dem Blicke 
Der vorwärts sieht, wie viel noch übrig bleibt—”20 
says Goethe; “the little that is done seems nothing when we look 
forward and see how much we have yet to do.” Clearly this is a better 
line of reflection for weak humanity, so long as it remains on this 
earthly field of labor and trial. 
But neither Sir Charles Adderley nor Mr. Roebuck is by nature 
inaccessible to considerations of this sort. They only lose sight of 
them owing to the controversial life we all lead, and the practical 
form which all speculation takes with us. They have in view 
opponents whose aim is not ideal, but practical; and in their zeal to 
uphold their own practice against these innovators, they go so far 
as even to attribute to this practice an ideal perfection. Somebody 
has been wanting to introduce a six-pound franchise, or to abolish 
church-rates, or to collect agricultural statistics by force, or to 
diminish local self-government. How natural, in reply to such 
proposals, very likely improper or ill-timed, to go a little beyond 
19. John Arthur Roebuck (1801-79), a leading radical and 
utilitarian reformer, conspicuous for his eloquence, 
honesty, and strong hostility to the government of his 
day. He held a seat for Sheffield from 1849 until his 
death. 
20. From Goethe's Iphigenie auf Tauris, I, ii, 91-92. 
630  |  Matthew Arnold - The Function of Criticism at the Present Time
the mark and to say stoutly, “Such a race of people as we stand, so 
superior to all the world! The old Anglo-Saxon race, the best breed 
in the whole world! I pray that our unrivalled happiness may last! I 
ask you whether, the world over or in past history, there is anything 
like it?” And so long as criticism answers this dithyramb by insisting 
that the old Anglo-Saxon race would be still more superior to all 
others if it had no church-rates, or that our unrivalled happiness 
would last yet longer with a six-pound franchise, so long will the 
strain, “The best breed in the whole world!” swell louder and louder, 
everything ideal and refining will be lost out of sight, and both 
the assailed and their critics will remain in a sphere, to say the 
truth, perfectly unvital, a sphere in which spiritual progression is 
impossible. But let criticism leave church-rates and the franchise 
alone, and in the most candid spirit, without a single lurking thought 
of practical innovation, confront with our dithyramb this paragraph 
on which I stumbled in a newspaper immediately after reading Mr. 
Roebuck:— 
“A shocking child murder has just been committed at Nottingham. 
A girl named Wragg left the workhouse there on Saturday morning 
with her young illegitimate child. The child was soon afterwards 
found dead on Mapperly Hills, having been strangled. Wragg is in 
custody.” 
Nothing but that; but, in juxtaposition with the absolute eulogies 
of Sir Charles Adderley and Mr. Roebuck, how eloquent, how 
suggestive are those few lines! “Our old Anglo-Saxon breed, the 
best in the whole world!” — how much that is harsh and ill-favored 
there is in this best! Wragg! If we are to talk of ideal perfection, 
of “the best in the whole world,” has any one reflected what a 
touch of grossness in our race, what an original short-coming in the 
more delicate spiritual perceptions, is shown by the natural growth 
amongst us of such hideous names, — Higginbottom, Stiggins, Bugg! 
In Ionia and Attica they were luckier in this respect than “the best 
race in the world”; by the Ilissus there was no Wragg, poor thing! 
And “our unrivalled happiness”;  — what an element of grimness, 
bareness, and hideousness mixes with it and blurs it; the workhouse, 
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the dismal Mapperly Hills, — how dismal those who have seen them 
will remember; — the gloom, the smoke, the cold, the strangled 
illegitimate child! “I ask you whether, the world over or in past 
history, there is anything like it?” Perhaps not, one is inclined to 
answer; but at any rate, in that case, the world is very much to be 
pitied. And the final touch, — short, bleak and inhuman: Wragg is in 
custody. The sex lost in the confusion of our unrivalled happiness; 
or (shall I say?) the superfluous Christian name lopped off by the 
straightforward vigor of our old Anglo-Saxon breed! There is profit 
for the spirit in such contrasts as this; criticism serves the cause 
of perfection by establishing them. By eluding sterile conflict, by 
refusing to remain in the sphere where alone narrow and relative 
conceptions have any worth and validity, criticism may diminish 
its momentary importance, but only in this way has it a chance of 
gaining admittance for those wider and more perfect conceptions 
to which all its duty is really owed. Mr. Roebuck will have a poor 
opinion of an adversary who replies to his defiant songs of triumph 
only by murmuring under his breath, Wragg is in custody; but in 
no other way will these songs of triumph be induced gradually to 
moderate themselves, to get rid of what in them is excessive and 
offensive, and to fall into a softer and truer key. 
It will be said that it is a very subtle and indirect action which I am 
thus prescribing for criticism, and that, by embracing in this manner 
the Indian virtue of detachment21 and abandoning the sphere of 
practical life, it condemns itself to a slow and obscure work. Slow 
and obscure it may be, but it is the only proper work of criticism. 
The mass of mankind will never have any ardent zeal for seeing 
things as they are; very inadequate ideas will always satisfy them. 
On these inadequate ideas reposes, and must repose, the general 
21. In the Buddhistic religion salvation is found through an 
emancipation from the craving for the gratification of 
the senses, for a future life, and for prosperity. 
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practice of the world. That is as much as saying that whoever sets 
himself to see things as they are will find himself one of a very 
small circle; but it is only by this small circle resolutely doing its 
own work that adequate ideas will ever get current at all. The rush 
and roar of practical life will always have a dizzying and attracting 
effect upon the most collected spectator, and tend to draw him 
into its vortex; most of all will this be the case where that life is so 
powerful as it is in England. But it is only by remaining collected, 
and refusing to lend himself to the point of view of the practical 
man, that the critic can do the practical man any service; and it is 
only by the greatest sincerity in pursuing his own course, and by at 
last convincing even the practical man of his sincerity, that he can 
escape misunderstandings which perpetually threaten him. 
For the practical man is not apt for fine distinctions, and yet in 
these distinctions truth and the highest culture greatly find their 
account. But it is not easy to lead a practical man, — unless you 
reassure him as to your practical intentions, you have no chance 
of leading him,—to see that a thing which he has always been used 
to look at from one side only, which he greatly values, and which, 
looked at from that side, quite deserves, perhaps, all the prizing 
and admiring which he bestows upon it, — that this thing, looked at 
from another side, may appear much less beneficent and beautiful, 
and yet retain all its claims to our practical allegiance. Where shall 
we find language innocent enough, how shall we make the spotless 
purity of our intentions evident enough, to enable us to say to the 
political Englishmen that the British Constitution itself, which, seen 
from the practical side, looks such a magnificent organ of progress 
and virtue, seen from the speculative side, — with its compromises, 
its love of facts, its horror of theory, its studied avoidance of clear 
thoughts,—that, seen from this side, our august Constitution 
sometimes looks, — forgive me, shade of Lord Somers!22—a colossal 
22. John Somers, Baron Somers (1651-1716), was the most 
trusted minister of William III, and a stanch supporter of 
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machine for the manufacture of Philistines? How is 
Cobbett23 [/footnote] to say this and not be misunderstood, 
blackened as he is with the smoke of a lifelong conflict in the field of 
political practice? how is Mr. [Thomas] Carlyle to say it and not be 
misunderstood, after his furious raid into this field with his Latter-
day Pamphlets?24 how is Mr. [John] Ruskin,25 after his pugnacious 
political economy? I say, the critic must keep out of the region of 
immediate practice in the political, social, humanitarian sphere, if he 
wants to make a beginning for that more free speculative treatment 
of things, which may perhaps one day make its benefits felt even in 
this sphere, but in a natural and thence irresistible manner. 
Do what he will, however, the critic will still remain exposed 
to frequent misunderstandings, and nowhere so much as in this 
country. For here people are particularly indisposed even to 
comprehend that without this free disinterested treatment of 
things, truth and the highest culture are out of the question. So 
immersed are they in practical life, so accustomed to take all their 
notions from this life and its processes, that they are apt to think 
that truth and culture themselves can be reached by the processes 
the English Constitution. See Addison, The Freeholder, 
May 14, 1716, and Macauley's History, iv, 53. 
23. William Cobbett~ (1762-1835). English politician and 
writer. As a pamphleteer his reputation was injured by 
his pugnacity, self-esteem, and virulence of language. 
See Heine, Selections, p. 120 and The Contribution of the 
Celts, Selections, p. 179. 
24. Carlyle's Latter-Day Pamphlets (1850) contain much 
violent denunciation of the society of his day. 
25. Ruskin turned to political economy about 1860. In 1862, 
he published Unto this Last, followed by other works of 
similar nature. 
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of this life, and that it is an impertinent singularity to think of 
reaching them in any other. “We are all terræ filii,”26 cries their 
eloquent advocate; “all Philistines27 together. Away with the notion 
of proceeding by any other course than the course dear to the 
Philistines; let us have a social movement, let us organize and 
combine a party to pursue truth and new thought, let us call it 
the liberal party, and let us all stick to each other, and back each 
other up. Let us have no nonsense about independent criticism, and 
intellectual delicacy, and the few and the many. Don’t let us trouble 
ourselves about foreign thought; we shall invent the whole thing for 
ourselves as we go along. If one of us speaks well, applaud him; if one 
of us speaks ill, applaud him too; we are all in the same movement, 
we are all liberals, we are all in pursuit of truth.” In this way the 
pursuit of truth becomes really a social, practical, pleasurable affair, 
almost requiring a chairman, a secretary, and advertisements; with 
the excitement of an occasional scandal, with a little resistance to 
give the happy sense of difficulty overcome; but, in general, plenty 
of bustle and very little thought. To act is so easy, as Goethe says; 
to think is so hard!28 It is true that the critic has many temptations 
to go with the stream, to make one of the party movement, one of 
these terræ filii; it seems ungracious to refuse to be a terræ filius, 
when so many excellent people are; but the critic’s duty is to refuse, 
or, if resistance is vain, at least to cry with Obermann: Périssons en 
résistant.29 
26. Sons of Mother Earth; hence, obscure, mean persons. 
27. See Heine, Selections, Note 2, p. 117 
28. Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, Book VII, 
chap. IX. 
29. See Sénancour's Obermann, letter 90. Arnold was much 
influenced by this remarkable book. For an account of 
the author (1770-1846) and the book see Arnold's Stanzas 
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How serious a matter it is to try and resist, I had ample 
opportunity of experiencing when I ventured some time ago to 
criticize the celebrated first volume of Bishop Colenso.3031 The 
in Memory of the Author of "Obermann," with note on the 
poem, and the essay on Obermann in Essays in Criticism, 
third series. 
30. Arnold's note: So sincere is my dislike to all personal 
attack and controversy, that I abstain from reprinting, at 
this distance of time from the occasion which called 
them forth, the essays in which I criticized Dr. Colenso's 
book; I feel bound, however, after all that has passed, to 
make here a final declaration of my sincere impenitence 
for having published them. Nay, I cannot forbear 
repeating yet once more, for his benefit and that of his 
readers, this sentence from my original remarks upon 
him; There is truth of science and truth of religion; truth 
of science does not become truth of religion till it is made 
religious. And I will add: Let us have all the science there 
is from the men of science; from the men of religion let 
us have religion. 
31. John William Colenso (1814-83), Bishop of Natal, 
published a series of treatises on the Pentateuch, 
extending from 1862-1879, opposing the traditional views 
about the literal inspiration of the Scriptures and the 
actual historical character of the Mosaic story. Arnold's 
censorious criticism of the first volume of this work is 
entitled The Bishop and the Philosopher (Macmillan's 
Magazine, January, 1863). As an example of the Bishop's 
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echoes of the storm which was then raised I still, from time to 
time, hear grumbling round me. That storm arose out of a 
misunderstanding almost inevitable. It is a result of no little culture 
to attain to a clear perception that science and religion are two 
wholly different things. The multitude will forever confuse them; 
but happily that is of no great real importance, for while the 
multitude imagines itself to live by its false science, it does really live 
by its true religion. Dr. Colenso, however, in his first volume did all 
he could to strengthen the confusion,32 and to make it dangerous. 
He did this with the best intentions, I freely admit, and with the 
most candid ignorance that this was the natural effect of what he 
was doing; but, says Joubert, “Ignorance, which in matters of morals 
extenuates the crime, is itself, in intellectual matters, a crime of 
the first order.” I criticized Bishop Colenso’s speculative confusion. 
Immediately there was a cry raised: “What is this? here is a liberal 
attacking a liberal. Do not you belong to the movement? are not 
cheap "arithmetical demonstrations" he describes him as 
presenting the case of Leviticus as follows: "'If three 
priests have to eat 264 pigeons a day, how many must 
each priest eat?' That disposes of Leviticus." The essay is 
devoted chiefly to contrasting Bishop Colenso's 
unedifying methods with those of the philosopher 
Spinoza. In passing, Arnold refers also to Dr. [Arthur 
Penrhyn] Stanley's Sinai and Palestine (1856), quotations 
from which are characterized as "the refreshing spots" in 
the Bishop's volume. 
32. Arnold's note: It has been said I make it "a crime against 
literary criticism and the higher culture to attempt to 
inform the ignorant." Need I point out that the ignorant 
are not informed by being confirmed in a confusion? 
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you a friend of truth? Is not Bishop Colenso in pursuit of truth? 
then speak with proper respect of his book. Dr. Stanley33 is another 
friend of truth, and you speak with proper respect of his book; 
why make these invidious differences? both books are excellent, 
admirable, liberal; Bishop Colenso’s perhaps the most so, because it 
is the boldest, and will have the best practical consequences for the 
liberal cause. Do you want to encourage to the attack of a brother 
liberal his, and your, and our implacable enemies, the Church and 
State Review or the Record,— the High Church rhinoceros and the 
Evangelical hyena? Be silent, therefore; or rather speak, speak as 
loud as ever you can! and go into ecstasies over the eighty and odd 
pigeons.” 
But criticism cannot follow this coarse and indiscriminate 
method. It is unfortunately possible for a man in pursuit of truth 
to write a book which reposes upon a false conception. Even the 
practical consequences of a book are to genuine criticism no 
recommendation of it, if the book is, in the highest sense, 
blundering. I see that a lady34 who herself, too, is in pursuit of truth, 
and who writes with great ability, but a little too much, perhaps, 
under the influence of the practical spirit of the English liberal 
33. Arthur Penrhyn Stanley (1815-81), Dean of Westminster. 
He was the author of a Life of (Thomas) Arnold, 1844. In 
university politics and in religious discussions he was a 
Liberal and the advocate of toleration and 
comprehension. 
34. Frances Power Cobbe (1822-1904), a prominent English 
philanthropist and woman of letters. The quotation 
below is from Broken Lights (1864), p. 134. Her Religious 
Duty (1857), referred to [elsewhere in this essay], is a 
book of religious and ethical instruction written from 
the Unitarian point of view. 
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movement, classes Bishop Colenso’s book and M. Renan’s35 
together, in her survey of the religious state of Europe, as facts of 
the same order, works, both of them, of “great importance”; “great 
ability, power, and skill”; Bishop Colenso’s, perhaps, the most 
powerful; at least, Miss Cobbe gives special expression to her 
gratitude that to Bishop Colenso “has been given the strength to 
grasp, and the courage to teach, truths of such deep import.” In 
the same way, more than one popular writer has compared him to 
Luther. Now it is just this kind of false estimate which the critical 
spirit is, it seems to me, bound to resist. It is really the strongest 
possible proof of the low ebb at which, in England, the critical spirit 
is, that while the critical hit in the religious literature of Germany 
is Dr. Strauss’s36 book, in that of France M. Renan’s book, the book 
of Bishop Colenso is the critical hit in the religious literature of 
England. Bishop Colenso’s book reposes on a total misconception 
of the essential elements of the religious problem, as that problem 
is now presented for solution. To criticism, therefore, which seeks 
to have the best that is known and thought on this problem, it 
is, however well meant, of no importance whatever. M. Renan’s 
book attempts a new synthesis of the elements furnished to us by 
the Four Gospels. It attempts, in my opinion, a synthesis, perhaps 
premature, perhaps impossible, certainly not successful. Up to the 
present time, at any rate, we must acquiesce in Fleury’s sentence on 
35. Ernest Renan (1823-92), French philosopher and 
Orientalist. The Vie de Jésus (1863), here referred to, was 
begun in Syria and is filled with the atmosphere of the 
East, but is a work of literary rather than of scholarly 
importance. 
36. David Friedrich Strauss (1808-74), German theologian 
and man of letters. The work referred to is the Leben 
Jesu 1835. A popular edition was published in 1864. 
Matthew Arnold - The Function of Criticism at the Present Time  |  639
such recastings of the Gospel story: Quiconque s’imagine la pouvoir 
mieux écrire, ne l’entend pas.37 M. Renan had himself passed by 
anticipation a like sentence on his own work, when he said: “If a 
new presentation of the character of Jesus were offered to me, I 
would not have it; its very clearness would be, in my opinion, the 
best proof of its insufficiency.” His friends may with perfect justice 
rejoin that at the sight of the Holy Land, and of the actual scene 
of the Gospel story, all the current of M. Renan’s thoughts may 
have naturally changed, and a new casting of that story irresistibly 
suggested itself to him; and that this is just a case for applying 
Cicero’s maxim: Change of mind is not inconsistency—nemo doctus 
unquam mutationem consilii inconstantiam dixit esse.38 
Nevertheless, for criticism, M. Renan’s first thought must still be the 
truer one, as long as his new casting so fails more fully to commend 
itself, more fully (to use Coleridge’s happy phrase39 about the Bible) 
to find us. Still M. Renan’s attempt is, for criticism, of the most 
real interest and importance, since, with all its difficulty, a fresh 
synthesis of the New Testament data—not a making war on them, 
in Voltaire’s fashion, not a leaving them out of mind, in the world’s 
fashion, but the putting a new construction upon them, the taking 
them from under the old, traditional, conventional point of view and 
placing them under a new one — is the very essence of the religious 
problem, as now presented; and only by efforts in this direction can 
it receive a solution. 
Again, in the same spirit in which she judges Bishop Colenso, 
Miss Cobbe, like so many earnest liberals of our practical race, 
both here and in America, herself sets vigorously about a positive 
reconstruction of religion, about making a religion of the future out 
37. From "Fleury (Preface) on the Gospel."—Arnold's Note 
Book. 
38. Cicero's Att. 16. 7. 3. 
39. Coleridge's Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, letter 2. 
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of hand, or at least setting about making it. We must not rest, she 
and they are always thinking and saying, in negative criticism, we 
must be creative and constructive; hence we have such works as her 
recent Religious Duty, and works still more considerable, perhaps, 
by others, which will be in every one’s mind. These works often 
have much ability; they often spring out of sincere convictions, and 
a sincere wish to do good; and they sometimes, perhaps, do good. 
Their fault is (if I may be permitted to say so) one which they have 
in common with the British College of Health, in the New Road. 
Every one knows the British College of Health; it is that building 
with the lion and the statue of the Goddess Hygeia before it; at 
least I am sure about the lion, though I am not absolutely certain 
about the Goddess Hygeia. This building does credit, perhaps, to the 
resources of Dr. Morrison and his disciples; but it falls a good deal 
short of one’s idea of what a British College of Health ought to be. 
In England, where we hate public interference and love individual 
enterprise, we have a whole crop of places like the British College 
of Health; the grand name without the grand thing. Unluckily, 
creditable to individual enterprise as they are, they tend to impair 
our taste by making us forget what more grandiose, noble, or 
beautiful character properly belongs to a public institution. The 
same may be said of the religions of the future of Miss Cobbe 
and others. Creditable, like the British College of Health, to the 
resources of their authors, they yet tend to make us forget what 
more grandiose, noble, or beautiful character properly belongs to 
religious constructions. The historic religions, with all their faults, 
have had this; it certainly belongs to the religious sentiment, when 
it truly flowers, to have this; and we impoverish our spirit if we 
allow a religion of the future without it. What then is the duty 
of criticism here? To take the practical point of view, to applaud 
the liberal movement and all its works, — its New Road religions 
of the future into the bargain, — for their general utility’s sake? 
By no means; but to be perpetually dissatisfied with these works, 
while they perpetually fall short of a high and perfect ideal. For 
criticism, these are elementary laws; but they never can be popular, 
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and in this country they have been very little followed, and one 
meets with immense obstacles in following them. That is a reason 
for asserting them again and again. Criticism must maintain its 
independence of the practical spirit and its aims. Even with well-
meant efforts of the practical spirit it must express dissatisfaction, 
if in the sphere of the ideal they seem impoverishing and limiting. It 
must not hurry on to the goal because of its practical importance. 
It must be patient, and know how to wait; and flexible, and know 
how to attach itself to things and how to withdraw from them. It 
must be apt to study and praise elements that for the fulness of 
spiritual perfection are wanted, even though they belong to a power 
which in the practical sphere may be maleficent. It must be apt to 
discern the spiritual shortcomings or illusions of powers that in the 
practical sphere may be beneficent. And this without any notion of 
favoring or injuring, in the practical sphere, one power or the other; 
without any notion of playing off, in this sphere, one power against 
the other. When one looks, for instance, at the English Divorce 
Court—an institution which perhaps has its practical conveniences, 
but which in the ideal sphere is so hideous; an institution which 
neither makes divorce impossible nor makes it decent, which allows 
a man to get rid of his wife, or a wife of her husband, but makes 
them drag one another first, for the public edification, through a 
mire of unutterable infamy, — when one looks at this charming 
institution, I say, with its crowded trials, its newspaper reports, 
and its money compensations, this institution in which the gross 
unregenerate British Philistine has indeed stamped an image of 
himself, — one may be permitted to find the marriage theory of 
Catholicism refreshing and elevating. Or when Protestantism, in 
virtue of its supposed rational and intellectual origin, gives the law 
to criticism too magisterially, criticism may and must remind it that 
its pretensions, in this respect, are illusive and do it harm; that 
the Reformation was a moral rather than an intellectual event; that 
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Luther’s theory of grace40 no more exactly reflects the mind of 
the spirit than Bossuet’s philosophy of history41 reflects it; and that 
there is no more antecedent probability of the Bishop of Durham’s 
stock of ideas being agreeable to perfect reason than of Pope Pius 
the Ninth’s. But criticism will not on that account forget the 
achievements of Protestantism in the practical and moral sphere; 
nor that, even in the intellectual sphere, Protestantism, though in a 
blind and stumbling manner, carried forward the Renascence, while 
Catholicism threw itself violently across its path. 
I lately heard a man of thought and energy contrasting the want 
of ardor and movement which he now found amongst young men 
in this country with what he remembered in his own youth, twenty 
years ago. “What reformers we were then!” he exclaimed; “What 
a zeal we had! how we canvassed every institution in Church and 
State, and were prepared to remodel them all on first principles!” 
He was inclined to regret, as a spiritual flagging, the lull which 
he saw. I am disposed rather to regard it as a pause in which the 
turn to a new mode of spiritual progress is being accomplished. 
Everything was long seen, by the young and ardent amongst us, 
40. The question concerning the "means of grace," i.e. 
whether the efficacy of the sacraments as channels of 
the divine grace is ex opere operato, or dependent on 
the faith of the recipient, was the chief subject of 
controversy between Catholics and Protestants during 
the period of the Reformation. 
41. Jacques Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704), French divine, 
orator, and writer. His Discours sur l'histoire universelle 
(1681) was an attempt to provide ecclesiastical authority 
with a rational basis. It is dominated by the conviction 
that "the establishment of Christianity was the one point 
of real importance in the whole history of the world." 
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in inseparable connection with politics and practical life. We have 
pretty well exhausted the benefits of seeing things in this 
connection, we have got all that can be got by so seeing them. Let 
us try a more disinterested mode of seeing them; let us betake 
ourselves more to the serener life of the mind and spirit. This life, 
too, may have its excesses and dangers; but they are not for us at 
present. Let us think of quietly enlarging our stock of true and fresh 
ideas, and not, as soon as we get an idea or half an idea, be running 
out with it into the street, and trying to make it rule there. Our ideas 
will, in the end, shape the world all the better for maturing a little. 
Perhaps in fifty years’ time it will in the English House of Commons 
be an objection to an institution that it is an anomaly, and my friend 
the Member of Parliament will shudder in his grave. But let us in 
the meanwhile rather endeavor that in twenty years’ time it may, in 
English literature, be an objection to a proposition that it is absurd. 
That will be a change so vast, that the imagination almost fails to 
grasp it. Ab Integro soeclorum nascitur ordo.42 
If I have insisted so much on the course which criticism must 
take where politics and religion are concerned, it is because, where 
these burning matters are in question, it is most likely to go astray. 
I have wished, above all, to insist on the attitude which criticism 
should adopt towards things in general; on its right tone and temper 
of mind. But then comes another question as to the subject-matter 
which literary criticism should most seek. Here, in general, its 
course is determined for it by the idea which is the law of its being: 
the idea of a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the 
best that is known and thought in the world, and thus to establish 
a current of fresh and true ideas. By the very nature of things, 
as England is not all the world, much of the best that is known 
and thought in the world cannot be of English growth, must be 
foreign; by the nature of things, again, it is just this that we are 
42. From Virgil's Eclogues, iv, 5. Translated in Shelley's 
Hellas: "The world's great age begins anew." 
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least likely to know, while English thought is streaming in upon 
us from all sides, and takes excellent care that we shall not be 
ignorant of its existence. The English critic of literature, therefore, 
must dwell much on foreign thought, and with particular heed on 
any part of it, which, while significant and fruitful in itself, is for 
any reason specially likely to escape him. Again, judging is often 
spoken of as the critic’s one business, and so in some sense it is; 
but the judgment which almost insensibly forms itself in a fair and 
clear mind, along with fresh knowledge, is the valuable one; and 
thus knowledge, and ever fresh knowledge, must be the critic’s great 
concern for himself. And it is by communicating fresh knowledge, 
and letting his own judgment pass along with it, — but insensibly, 
and in the second place, not the first, as a sort of companion and 
clue, not as an abstract lawgiver, — that the critic will generally 
do most good to his readers. Sometimes, no doubt, for the sake 
of establishing an author’s place in literature, and his relation to a 
central standard (and if this is not done, how are we to get at our 
best in the world?) criticism may have to deal with a subject-matter 
so familiar that fresh knowledge is out of the question, and then 
it must be all judgment; an enunciation and detailed application of 
principles. Here the great safeguard is never to let oneself become 
abstract, always to retain an intimate and lively consciousness of the 
truth of what one is saying, and, the moment this fails us, to be sure 
that something is wrong. Still under all circumstances, this mere 
judgment and application of principles is, in itself, not the most 
satisfactory work to the critic; like mathematics, it is tautological, 
and cannot well give us, like fresh learning, the sense of creative 
activity. 
But stop, some one will say; all this talk is of no practical use to us 
whatever; this criticism of yours is not what we have in our minds 
when we speak of criticism; when we speak of critics and criticism, 
we mean critics and criticism of the current English literature of 
the day: when you offer to tell criticism its function, it is to this 
criticism that we expect you to address yourself. I am sorry for it, 
for I am afraid I must disappoint these expectations. I am bound 
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by my own definition of criticism; a disinterested endeavor to learn 
and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world.. How 
much of current English literature comes into this “best that is 
known and thought in the world”? Not very much I fear; certainly 
less, at this moment, than of the current literature of France or 
Germany. Well, then, am I to alter my definition of criticism, in order 
to meet the requirements of a number of practising English critics, 
who, after all, are free in their choice of a business? That would 
be making criticism lend itself just to one of those alien practical 
considerations, which, I have said, are so fatal to it. One may say, 
indeed, to those who have to deal with the mass—so much better 
disregarded — of current English literature, that they may at all 
events endeavor, in dealing with this, to try it, so far as they can, 
by the standard of the best that is known and thought in the world; 
one may say, that to get anywhere near this standard, every critic 
should try and possess one great literature, at least, besides his own; 
and the more unlike his own, the better. But, after all, the criticism 
I am really concerned with,—the criticism which alone can much 
help us for the future, the criticism which, throughout Europe, 
is at the present day meant, when so much stress is laid on the 
importance of criticism and the critical spirit, — is a criticism which 
regards Europe as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, 
one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working to a 
common result; and whose members have, for their proper outfit, 
a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one 
another. Special, local, and temporary advantages being put out of 
account, that modern nation will in the intellectual and spiritual 
sphere make most progress, which most thoroughly carries out 
this program. And what is that but saying that we too, all of us, 
as individuals, the more thoroughly we carry it out, shall make the 
more progress? 
There is so much inviting us! — what are we to take? what will 
nourish us in growth towards perfection? That is the question 
which, with the immense field of life and of literature lying before 
him, the critic has to answer; for himself first, and afterwards for 
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others. In this idea of the critic’s business the essays brought 
together in the following pages have had their origin; in this idea, 
widely different as are their subjects, they have, perhaps, their unity. 
I conclude with what I said at the beginning: to have the sense 
of creative activity is the great happiness and the great proof of 
being alive, and it is not denied to criticism to have it; but then 
criticism must be sincere, simple, flexible, ardent, ever widening 
its knowledge. Then it may have, in no contemptible measure, a 
joyful sense of creative activity; a sense which a man of insight and 
conscience will prefer to what he might derive from a poor, starved, 
fragmentary, inadequate creation. And at some epochs no other 
creation is possible. 
Still, in full measure, the sense of creative activity belongs only to 
genuine creation; in literature we must never forget that. But what 
true man of letters ever can forget it? It is no such common matter 
for a gifted nature to come into possession of a current of true and 
living ideas, and to produce amidst the inspiration of them, that we 
are likely to underrate it. The epochs of Æschylus and Shakespeare 
make us feel their preëminence. In an epoch like those is, no doubt, 
the true life of literature; there is the promised land, towards which 
criticism can only beckon. That promised land it will not be ours 
to enter, and we shall die in the wilderness: but to have desired to 
enter it, to have saluted it from afar, is already, perhaps, the best 
distinction among contemporaries; it will certainly be the best title 
to esteem with posterity. 
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PART III 
PART THREE: MARXISM 
Whereas literary theorists in the first two units pose questions 
about how to determine aesthetic value, some Marxist literary 
critics question if the study of aesthetics has value at all. They ask: 
if aesthetics has value, what kind of value does it have? What is 
literature for? What does it do? What can it do? Can it be justified, in 
itself or as a specialization of the aesthetic as a praxis — as an action, 
a doing? Or, is suggesting this an easy way out of engaging with the 
“real world?” In our current political and economic climate, these 
questions are pressing — not just theoretically or “superstructually,” 
but economically, in determining who gets paid what. How many 
state and university resources are allocated to the humanities? Why 
does an assistant professor of business get paid double what an 
assistant professor of English gets paid? Why does the university 
rely more on the precarious labor of adjuncts while increasing the 
number of administrators and cutting tenure-track faculty 
positions? Moreover, why are entire departments — Comparative 
Literature, Spanish, African American Studies, Gender Studies etc. 
— being cut while others — business and engineering — are being 
funded? What does this suggest about the use-value of literature? 
What can it tell us about the production of literature as a mode of 
production? 
The progress of history, for Marx, is dependent on the emergence 
and maintenance of social and economic classes and the ideologies 
that perpetuate them. Because literature and art are superstructural 
products, some believe Marx and Engels view studying the 
humanities as a distraction from the “real” work of society. In 
Engels’s letters and Marx’s response to Prussian censorship, you will 
see that this claim is not entirely correct. 
This does not mean that Marx and Engels approach literature and 
art from an idealist perspective. It is true that there is an intimate 
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relationship between Marxist philosophy and Hegelian idealism. 
However, as Marx will explain in The German Ideology, his 
perspective is the opposite of Hegel’s. Both Marx and Hegel agree 
that literature and art change as history changes, and both agree 
that history proceeds dialectically. But, where Hegel sees history as 
beginning with Spirit and the Idea, Marx sees history beginning with 
the material conditions of the world and uses the dialectical method 
to expose how ideas (even Hegel’s “Idea”) are produced in the first 
place. 
–Molly Desjardins 
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17. Friedrich Engels, Letters 
“Letter to Minna Kautsky”
1 
London, 26 November 1885 
I have now also read Die Alten und die Neuen,2, for which I 
sincerely thank you. The life of the salt-mine workers is described 
with as masterly a pen as were the portraits of the peasants in 
Stefan. The descriptions of the life of Vienna society are for the 
most part likewise very fine. Vienna is indeed the only German 
city which has a society; Berlin possesses merely “certain circles,” 
and still more uncertain ones, that is why its soil produces only 
novels about men of letters, officials or actors. You are in a 
better position to judge whether the plot in this part of your work 
develops sometimes too rapidly. Many things that may give us this 
impression, perhaps look quite natural in Vienna considering the 
city’s peculiar international character and its intermixture with 
Southern and East-European elements. In both spheres the 
characters exhibit the sharp individualisation so customary in 
your work. Each of them is a type but at the same time also a 
definite individual, a “Dieser,” as old Hegel would say, and that is 
how it should be. And now, to be impartial, I have to find fault 
with something, which brings me to Arnold. He is really much too 
1. From Marx-Engels Correspondence 1885, Transcribed by 
Andy Blunden for Marxists.org. Material in square 
brackets added by Blunden. 
2. Kautsky's novel, which she had sent to Engels for 
critique. 
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worthy a man and when he is finally killed in a landslide one can 
reconcile this with poetic justice only by assuming that he was too 
good for this world. But it is always bad if an author adores his own 
hero and this is the error which to some extent you seem to me to 
have fallen into here. In Elsa there is still a certain individualisation, 
though she is also idealised, but in Arnold the personality merges 
still more in the principle. 
The novel itself reveals the origins of this shortcoming. You 
obviously felt a desire to take a public stand in your book, to testify 
to your convictions before the entire world. This has now been 
done; it is a stage you have passed through and need not repeat in 
this form. I am by no means opposed to partisan poetry as such. 
Both Aeschylus, the father of tragedy, and Aristophanes, the father 
of comedy, were highly partisan poets, Dante and Cervantes were 
so no less, and the best thing that can be said about Schiller’s Kabale 
und Liebe is that it represents the first German political problem 
drama. The modern Russians and Norwegians, who 
produce excellent novels, all write with a purpose. I think however 
that the purpose must become manifest from the situation and the 
action themselves without being expressly pointed out and that the 
author does not have to serve the reader on a platter — the future 
historical resolution of the social conflicts which he describes. To 
this must be added that under, our conditions novels are mostly 
addressed to readers from bourgeois circles, i.e., circles which are 
not directly ours. 
Thus the socialist problem novel in my opinion fully carries out 
its mission if by a faithful portrayal of the real conditions it dispels 
the dominant conventional illusions concerning them, shakes the 
optimism of the bourgeois world, and inevitably instils doubt as 
to the eternal validity of that which exists, without itself offering 
a direct solution of the problem involved, even without at times 
ostensibly taking sides. Here your exact knowledge and admirably 
fresh and lifelike presentation of both the Austrian peasants and 
Vienna “society” find ample material, and in Stefan you have 
demonstrated that you are capable of treating your characters with 
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the fine irony which attests to the author’s dominion over the 
beings he has created. 
But now I must finish, or I shall bore you to tears. Everything here 
is as before. Karl and his wife [Karl and Louise Kautsky] are studying 
physiology in Aveling’s evening classes, and are also working 
diligently; I am likewise engrossed in work; Lenchen, Pumps and her 
husband are going to the theatre this evening to see a sensational 
play, and meanwhile old Europe is preparing to set itself in motion 
again — and not before time, perhaps. I simply hope that it gives me 
time to finish the third volume of Capital, then it can begin! 
In cordial friendship and with sincere respect I am Yours, 
F. E n g e l s 
 
*** 
“Letter to Margaret Harkness”
3 
London, early April [1888] 
Dear Miss Harkness, 
I thank you very much for sending me your City Girl4 through 
3. From Marx-Engels Correspondence 1888. Transcribed by 
Dougal McNeill and put into HTML by Nate Schmolze for 
Marxists.org. 
4. Harkness’s novel A City Girl: A Realistic Story was first 
published (under the pseudonym John Law) for Henry 
Vizetelly in 1887. 
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Messrs Vizetelly. I have read it with the greatest pleasure and 
avidity. It is indeed, as my friend Eichhoff your translator calls it, ein 
kleines Kunstwerk. . . . 
If I have anything to criticize, it would be that perhaps, after all, 
the tale is not quite realistic enough. Realism, to my mind, implies, 
besides truth of detail, the truthful reproduction of typical 
characters under typical circumstances. Now your characters are 
typical enough, as far as they go; but perhaps the circumstances 
which surround them and make them act, are not perhaps equally 
so. In the City Girl the working class figures are a passive mass, 
unable to help itself and not even showing (making) any attempt 
at striving to help itself. All attempts to drag it out of its torpid 
misery come from without, from above. Now if this was a correct 
description about 1800 or 1810, in the days of Saint-Simon and 
Robert Owen,5 it cannot appear so in 1887 to a man who for nearly 
fifty years has had the honor of sharing in most of the fights of 
the militant proletariat. The rebellious reaction of the working class 
against the oppressive medium which surrounds them, their 
attempts – convulsive, half conscious or conscious – at recovering 
their status as human beings, belong to history and must therefore 
lay claim to a place in the domain of realism. 
I am far from finding fault with your not having written a point-
blank socialist novel, a “Tendenzroman,” as we Germans call it, to 
glorify the social and political views of the authors. This is not 
at all what I mean. The more the opinions of the author remain 
hidden, the better for the work of art. The realism I allude to may 
crop out even in spite of the author’s opinions. Let me refer to 
an example. [Honoré de] Balzac, whom I consider a far greater 
5. Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Robert Owen 
(1771-1858) were political reformist thinkers in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. Both are often associated 
with "utopian socialism." 
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master of realism than all the Zolas passés, présents et a venir, in 
La Comédie humaine6 gives us a most wonderfully realistic history 
of French “Society,” especially of le monde parisien, describing, 
chronicle-fashion, almost year by year from 1816 to 1848 the 
progressive inroads of the rising bourgeoisie upon the society of 
nobles, that reconstituted itself after 1815 and that set up again, 
as far as it could, the standard of la vieille politesse française. 
He describes how the last remnants of this, to him, model society 
gradually succumbed before the intrusion of the vulgar monied 
upstart, or were corrupted by him; how the grand dame whose 
conjugal infidelities were but a mode of asserting herself in perfect 
accordance with the way she had been disposed of in marriage, 
gave way to the bourgeoisie, who horned her husband for cash or 
cashmere; and around this central picture he groups a complete 
history of French Society from which, even in economic details 
(for instance the rearrangement of real and personal property after 
the Revolution) I have learned more than from all the professed 
historians, economists, and statisticians of the period together. 
Well, Balzac was politically a Legitimist ; his great work is a constant 
elegy on the inevitable decay of good society, his sympathies are 
all with the class doomed to extinction. But for all that his satire is 
never keener, his irony never bitterer, than when he sets in motion 
the very men and women with whom he sympathizes most deeply 
– the nobles. And the only men of whom he always speaks with 
undisguised admiration, are his bitterest political antagonists, the 
republican heroes of the Cloître Saint-Méry,7 the men who at that 
6. The Human Comedy. A series of novels published by 
Balzac between 1829 and 1847 that depict life in France 
from the fall of Napoleon to the Revolution of 1848. 
7. Engels refers here to a republican uprising against the 
French government in 1832. The Cloître Saint-Méry itself 
is a Parisian church located in the quarter where the 
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time (1830-36) were indeed the representatives of the popular 
masses. That Balzac thus was compelled to go against his own class 
sympathies and political prejudices, that he saw the necessity of 
the downfall of his favorite nobles, and described them as people 
deserving no better fate; and that he saw the real men of the future 
where, for the time being, they alone were to be found – that I 
consider one of the greatest triumphs of Realism, and one of the 
grandest features in old Balzac. 
I must own, in your defense, that nowhere in the civilized world 
are the working people less actively resistant, more passively 
submitting to fate, more hébétés than in the East End of London. 
And how do I know whether you have not had very good reasons for 
contenting yourself, for once, with a picture of the passive side of 
working-class life, reserving the active side for another work? 
group of insurgents set up barricades to defend 
themselves. 
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18. Karl Marx - from 
"Comments on The Latest 
Prussian Censorship 
Instruction" 
1. Truth is as little modest as light, and towards whom should it 
be so? Towards itself? Verum index sui et falsi. 
Therefore, towards falsehood?. 
2. If modesty is the characteristic feature of the investigation, 
then it is a sign that truth is feared rather than falsehood. It is a 
means of discouragement at every step forward I take. It is the 
imposition on the investigation of a fear of reaching a result, a 
means of guarding against the truth. 
3. Further, truth is general, it does not belong to me alone, it 
belongs to all, it owns me, I do not own it. My property is 
the form, which is my spiritual individuality. Le style c’est 
l’homme. Yes, indeed! The law permits me to write, only I must 
write in a style that is not mine! I may show my spiritual 
countenance, but I must first set it in the prescribed folds! 
What man of honour will not blush at this presumption and not 
prefer to hide his head under the toga? Under the toga at least 
one has an inkling of a Jupiter’s head. The prescribed folds 
mean nothing but bonne mine a mauvais jeu. 
4. You admire the delightful variety, the inexhaustible riches of 
nature. You do not demand that the rose should smell like the 
violet, but must the greatest riches of all, the spirit, exist in 
only one variety? I am humorous, but the law bids me write 
seriously. I am audacious, but the law commands that my style 
be modest. Grey, all grey, is the sole, the rightful colour of 
freedom. Every drop of dew on which the sun shines glistens 
Karl Marx - from "Comments on The
Latest Prussian Censorship
with an inexhaustible play of colours, but the spiritual sun, 
however many the persons and whatever the objects in which 
it is refracted, must produce only the official colour! The most 
essential form of the spirit is cheerfulness, light, but you 
make shadow the sole manifestation of the spirit; it must be 
clothed only in black, yet among flowers there are no black 
ones. The essence of the spirit is always truth itself but what 
do you make its essence? Modesty. Only the mean wretch is 
modest, says Goethe, and you want to turn the spirit into such 
a mean wretch? Or if modesty is to be the modesty of genius of 
which Schiller speaks, then first of all turn all your citizens and 
above all your censors into geniuses. But then the modesty of 
genius does not consist in what educated speech consists in, 
the absence of accent and dialect, but rather in speaking with 
the accent of the matter and in the dialect of its essence. It 
consists in forgetting modesty and immodesty and getting to 
the heart of the matter. The universal modesty of the mind is 
reason, that universal liberality of thought which reacts to each 
thing according to the latter’s essential nature. 
5. Further, if seriousness is not to come under Tristram Shandy's 
definition according to which it is a hypocritical behaviour of 
the body in order to conceal defects of the soul, but signifies 
seriousness in substance, then the entire prescription falls to 
the ground. For I treat the ludicrous seriously when I treat it 
ludicrously, and the most serious immodesty of the mind is to 
be modest in the face of immodesty. 
6. Serious and modest! What fluctuating, relative concepts! 
Where does seriousness cease and jocularity begin? Where 
does modesty cease and immodesty begin? We are dependent 
on the temperament of the censor. It would be as wrong to 
prescribe temperament for the censor as to prescribe style for 
the writer. If you want to be consistent in your aesthetic 
criticism, then forbid also a too serious and too 
modest investigation of the truth, for too great seriousness is 
the most ludicrous thing of all, and too great modesty is the 
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bitterest irony. 
7. Finally, the starting point is a completely perverted and 
abstract view of truth itself. All objects of the writer’s activity 
are comprehended in the one general concept “truth”. Even if 
we leave the subjective side out of account, viz., that one and 
the same object is refracted differently as seen by different 
persons and its different aspects converted into as many 
different spiritual characters, ought the character of the 
object to have no influence, not even the slightest, on the 
investigation? Truth includes not only the result but also the 
path to it. The investigation of truth must itself be true; true 
investigation is developed truth, the dispersed elements of 
which are brought together in the result. And should not the 
manner of investigation alter according to the object? If the 
object is a matter for laughter, the manner has to seem serious, 
if the object is disagreeable, it has to be modest. Thus you 
violate the right of the object as you do that of the subject. You 
conceive truth abstractly and turn the spirit into an examining 
magistrate, who draws up a dry protocol of it. 
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19. Karl Marx, from Economic 
and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 
660  |  Karl Marx, from Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844
Human Requirements and Division of 
Labour Under the Rule of Private Property
1 
1. Translator’s Notes (from Progress Publishers via 
Marxists.org): The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844 is the first work in which Marx tried to 
systematically elaborate problems of political economy 
from the standpoint of his maturing 
dialectical-materialist and communist views and also to 
synthesize the results of his critical review of prevailing 
philosophic and economic theories. Apparently, Marx 
began to write it in order to clarify the problems for 
himself. But in the process of working on it he conceived 
the idea of publishing a work analysing the economic 
system of bourgeois society in his time and its 
ideological trends. Towards the end of his stay in Paris, 
on February 1, 1845, Marx signed a contract with Carl 
Leske, a Darmstadt publisher, concerning the 
publication of his work entitled A Critique of Politics and 
of Political Economy. It was to be based on his Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and perhaps also on 
his earlier manuscript Contribution to the Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. This plan did not materialise in 
the 1840s because Marx was busy writing other works 
and, to some extent, because the contract with the 
publisher was cancelled in September 1846, the latter 
being afraid to have transactions with such a 
revolutionary-minded author. However, in the early 
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1. We have seen what significance, given socialism, the wealth of 
human needs acquires, and what significance, therefore, both 
a new mode of production and a new object of production 
obtain: a new manifestation of the forces of human nature and 
a new enrichment of human nature. Under private property 
their significance is reversed: every person speculates on 
creating a new need in another, so as to drive him to fresh 
1850s Marx returned to the idea of writing a book on 
economics. Thus, the manuscripts of 1844 are connected 
with the conception of a plan which led many years later 
to the writing of Capital. The Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts is an unfinished work and in part a rough 
draft. A considerable part of the text has not been 
preserved. . . .  Passages crossed out by Marx with a 
vertical line are enclosed in pointed brackets; separate 
words or phrases crossed out by the author are given in 
footnotes only when they supplement the text. The 
general title and the headings of the various parts of the 
manuscripts enclosed in square brackets are supplied by 
the editors on the basis of the author’s formulations. 
Quotations from the French sources cited by Marx in 
French or in his own translation into German, are given 
in English in both cases and the French texts as quoted 
by Marx are given in the footnotes. Here and elsewhere 
Marx’s rendering of the quotations or free translation is 
given in small type but without quotation marks. 
Emphasis in quotations, belonging, as a rule, to Marx, as 
well as that of the quoted authors, is indicated 
everywhere by italics. 
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sacrifice, to place him in a new dependence and to seduce him 
into a new mode of enjoyment and therefore economic ruin. 
Each tries to establish over the other an alien power, so as 
thereby to find satisfaction of his own selfish need. The 
increase in the quantity of objects is therefore accompanied by 
an extension of the realm of the alien powers to which man is 
subjected, and every new product represents a 
new potentiality of mutual swindling and mutual plundering. 
Man becomes ever poorer as man, his need for money 
becomes ever greater if he wants to master the hostile power. 
The power of his money declines in inverse proportion to the 
increase in the volume of production: that is, his neediness 
grows as the power of money increases. 
2. The need for money is therefore the true need produced by 
the economic system, and it is the only need which the latter 
produces. The quantity of money becomes to an ever greater 
degree its sole effective quality. Just as it reduces everything to 
its abstract form, so it reduces itself in the course of its own 
movement 
to quantitative being. Excess and intemperance come to be its 
true norm. 
3. Subjectively, this appears partly in the fact that the extension 
of products and needs becomes acontriving and ever-
calculating subservience to inhuman, sophisticated, unnatural 
and imaginary appetites. Private property does not know how 
to change crude need into human need. Its idealism is fantasy, 
caprice and whim; and no eunuch flatters his despot more 
basely or uses more despicable means to stimulate his dulled 
capacity for pleasure in order to sneak a favour for himself 
than does the industrial eunuch – the producer – in order to 
sneak for himself a few pieces of silver, in order to charm the 
golden birds, out of the pockets of his dearly beloved 
neighbours in Christ. He puts himself at the service of the 
other’s most depraved fancies, plays the pimp between him 
and his need, excites in him morbid appetites, lies in wait for 
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each of his weaknesses – all so that he can then demand the 
cash for this service of love. (Every product is a bait with which 
to seduce away the other’s very being, his money; every real 
and possible need is a weakness which will lead the fly to the 
glue-pot. General exploitation of communal human nature, 
just as every imperfection in man, is a bond with heaven – an 
avenue giving the priest access to his heart; every need is an 
opportunity to approach one’s neighbour under the guise of 
the utmost amiability and to say to him: Dear friend, I give you 
what you need, but you know the conditio sine qua non; you 
know the ink in which you have to sign yourself over to me; in 
providing for your pleasure, I fleece you.) 
[The following text between pointed brackets was crossed out by 
Marx] 
<How the multiplication of needs and of the means (of their 
satisfaction) breeds the absence of needs and of means is 
demonstrated by the political economist (and by the capitalist: in 
general it is always empirical businessmen we are talking about 
when we refer to political economists, (who represent) 
their scientific creed and form of existence) as follows: 
1. By reducing the worker’s need to the barest and most 
miserable level of physical subsistence, and by reducing 
his activity to the most abstract mechanical movement; 
thus he says: Man has no other need either of activity or of 
enjoyment. For he declares that this life,too, is human life 
and existence. 
2. By counting the most meagre form of life (existence) as the 
standard, indeed, as the general standard – general 
because it is applicable to the mass of men. He turns the 
worker into an insensible being lacking all needs, just as he 
changes his activity into a pure abstraction from all 
activity. To him, therefore, every luxury of the worker 
seems to be reprehensible, and everything that goes 
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beyond the most abstract need – be it in the realm of 
passive enjoyment, or a manifestation of activity – seems 
to him a luxury. Political economy, this science 
of wealth, is therefore simultaneously the science of 
renunciation, of want, of saving and it actually reaches the 
point where it spares man the need of either fresh air or 
physical  This science of marvellous industry is 
simultaneously the science of asceticism, and its true ideal 
is the ascetic but extortionate miser and 
the ascetic but productive slave. Its moral ideal is the 
worker who takes part of his wages to the savings-bank, 
and it has even found ready-made a servile art which 
embodies this pet idea: it has been presented, bathed in 
sentimentality, on the stage. Thus political economy – 
despite its worldly and voluptuous appearance – is a true 
moral science, the most moral of all the sciences. Self-
renunciation, the renunciation of life and of all human 
needs, is its principal thesis. The less you eat, drink and 
buy books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance hall, 
the public house; the less you think, love, theorise, sing, 
paint, fence, etc., the more you save – the greater becomes 
your treasure which neither moths nor rust will devour – 
your capital. The less you are, the less you express your 
own life, the more you have, i.e., the greater is 
your alienated life, the greater is the store of your 
estranged being. Everything which the political economist 
takes from you in life and in humanity, he replaces for you 
in money and in wealth; and all the things which you 
cannot do, your money can do. It can eat and, drink, go to 
the dance hall and the theatre; it can travel, it can 
appropriate art, learning, the treasures of the past, 
political power – all this it can appropriate for you – it can 
buy all this: it is true endowment. Yet being all this, it wants 
to do nothing but create itself, buy itself; for everything 
else is after all its servant, and when I have the master I 
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have the servant and do not need his servant. All passions 
and all activity must therefore be submerged 
in avarice. The worker may only have enough for him to 
want to live, and may only want to live in order to have 
that.> 
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20. Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels - from The German 
Ideology 
Part I: Feuerbach 
Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist 
Outlook 
A. Materialism and Idealism 
First Premises of Materialist Method 
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not 
dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made 
in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and 
the material conditions under which they live, both those which 
they find already existing and those produced by their activity. 
These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way. 
The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence 
of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is 
the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent 
relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either 
into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions 
in which man finds himself – geological, hydrographical, climatic 
and so on. The writing of history must always set out from these 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels - from
The German Ideology  |  667
natural bases and their modification in the course of history 
through the action of men. 
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by 
religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to 
produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by 
their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence 
men are indirectly producing their actual material life. 
The way in which men produce their means of subsistence 
depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence 
they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of 
production must not be considered simply as being the production 
of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite 
form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing 
their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express 
their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with 
their production, both with what they produce and with how they 
produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material 
conditions determining their production. This production only 
makes its appearance with the increase of population. In its turn 
this presupposes the intercourse [Verkehr] of individuals with one 
another. The form of this intercourse is again determined by 
production. 
[3. Production and Intercourse. 
Division of Labour and Forms of Property – Tribal, Ancient, 
Feudal] 
The relations of different nations among themselves depend upon 
the extent to which each has developed its productive forces, the 
division of labour and internal intercourse. This statement is 
generally recognised. But not only the relation of one nation to 
others, but also the whole internal structure of the nation itself 
depends on the stage of development reached by its production 
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and its internal and external intercourse. How far the productive 
forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the 
degree to which the division of labour has been carried. Each new 
productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative extension 
of productive forces already known (for instance the bringing into 
cultivation of fresh land), causes a further development of the 
division of labour. 
The division of labour inside a nation leads at first to the 
separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labour, 
and hence to the separation of town and country and to the conflict 
of their interests. Its further development leads to the separation 
of commercial from industrial labour. At the same time through 
the division of labour inside these various branches there develop 
various divisions among the individuals co-operating in definite 
kinds of labour. The relative position of these individual groups is 
determined by the methods employed in agriculture, industry and 
commerce (patriarchalism, slavery, estates, classes). These same 
conditions are to be seen (given a more developed intercourse) in 
the relations of different nations to one another. 
The various stages of development in the division of labour are 
just so many different forms of ownership, i.e. the existing stage in 
the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to 
one another with reference to the material, instrument, and product 
of labour. 
The first form of ownership is tribal [Stammeigentum] ownership. 
It corresponds to the undeveloped stage of production, at which a 
people lives by hunting and fishing, by the rearing of beasts or, in 
the highest stage, agriculture. In the latter case it presupposes a 
great mass of uncultivated stretches of land. The division of labour 
is at this stage still very elementary and is confined to a further 
extension of the natural division of labour existing in the family. The 
social structure is, therefore, limited to an extension of the family; 
patriarchal family chieftains, below them the members of the tribe, 
finally slaves. The slavery latent in the family only develops gradually 
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with the increase of population, the growth of wants, and with the 
extension of external relations, both of war and of barter. 
The second form is the ancient communal and State ownership 
which proceeds especially from the union of several tribes into a 
city by agreement or by conquest, and which is still accompanied 
by slavery. Beside communal ownership we already find movable, 
and later also immovable, private property developing, but as an 
abnormal form subordinate to communal ownership. The citizens 
hold power over their labouring slaves only in their community, and 
on this account alone, therefore, they are bound to the form of 
communal ownership. It is the communal private property which 
compels the active citizens to remain in this spontaneously derived 
form of association over against their slaves. For this reason the 
whole structure of society based on this communal ownership, and 
with it the power of the people, decays in the same measure as, 
in particular, immovable private property evolves. The division of 
labour is already more developed. We already find the antagonism 
of town and country; later the antagonism between those states 
which represent town interests and those which represent country 
interests, and inside the towns themselves the antagonism between 
industry and maritime commerce. The class relation between 
citizens and slaves is now completely developed. 
With the development of private property, we find here for the 
first time the same conditions which we shall find again, only on 
a more extensive scale, with modern private property. On the one 
hand, the concentration of private property, which began very early 
in Rome (as the Licinian agrarian law proves) and proceeded very 
rapidly from the time of the civil wars and especially under the 
Emperors; on the other hand, coupled with this, the transformation 
of the plebeian small peasantry into a proletariat, which, however, 
owing to its intermediate position between propertied citizens and 
slaves, never achieved an independent development. 
The third form of ownership is feudal or estate property. If 
antiquity started out from the town and its little territory, the 
Middle Ages started out from the country. This different starting-
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point was determined by the sparseness of the population at that 
time, which was scattered over a large area and which received 
no large increase from the conquerors. In contrast to Greece and 
Rome, feudal development at the outset, therefore, extends over a 
much wider territory, prepared by the Roman conquests and the 
spread of agriculture at first associated with it. The last centuries 
of the declining Roman Empire and its conquest by the barbarians 
destroyed a number of productive forces; agriculture had declined, 
industry had decayed for want of a market, trade had died out 
or been violently suspended, the rural and urban population had 
decreased. From these conditions and the mode of organisation of 
the conquest determined by them, feudal property developed under 
the influence of the Germanic military constitution. Like tribal and 
communal ownership, it is based again on a community; but the 
directly producing class standing over against it is not, as in the 
case of the ancient community, the slaves, but the enserfed small 
peasantry. As soon as feudalism is fully developed, there also arises 
antagonism to the towns. The hierarchical structure of land 
ownership, and the armed bodies of retainers associated with it, 
gave the nobility power over the serfs. This feudal organisation was, 
just as much as the ancient communal ownership, an association 
against a subjected producing class; but the form of association and 
the relation to the direct producers were different because of the 
different conditions of production. 
This feudal system of land ownership had its counterpart in the 
towns in the shape of corporative property, the feudal organisation 
of trades. Here property consisted chiefly in the labour of each 
individual person. The necessity for association against the 
organised robber-nobility, the need for communal covered markets 
in an age when the industrialist was at the same time a merchant, 
the growing competition of the escaped serfs swarming into the 
rising towns, the feudal structure of the whole country: these 
combined to bring about the guilds. The gradually accumulated 
small capital of individual craftsmen and their stable numbers, as 
against the growing population, evolved the relation of journeyman 
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and apprentice, which brought into being in the towns a hierarchy 
similar to that in the country. 
Thus the chief form of property during the feudal epoch consisted 
on the one hand of landed property with serf labour chained to it, 
and on the other of the labour of the individual with small capital 
commanding the labour of journeymen. The organisation of both 
was determined by the restricted conditions of production – the 
small-scale and primitive cultivation of the land, and the craft type 
of industry. There was little division of labour in the heyday of 
feudalism. Each country bore in itself the antithesis of town and 
country; the division into estates was certainly strongly marked; 
but apart from the differentiation of princes, nobility, clergy and 
peasants in the country, and masters, journeymen, apprentices and 
soon also the rabble of casual labourers in the towns, no division 
of importance took place. In agriculture it was rendered difficult by 
the strip-system, beside which the cottage industry of the peasants 
themselves emerged. In industry there was no division of labour 
at all in the individual trades themselves, and very little between 
them. The separation of industry and commerce was found already 
in existence in older towns; in the newer it only developed later, 
when the towns entered into mutual relations. 
The grouping of larger territories into feudal kingdoms was a 
necessity for the landed nobility as for the towns. The organisation 
of the ruling class, the nobility, had, therefore, everywhere a 
monarch at its head. 
[4. The Essence of the Materialist Conception of History. Social 
Being and Social Consciousness] 
The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively 
active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political 
relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance 
bring out empirically, and without any mystification and 
speculation, the connection of the social and political structure 
672  |  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels - from The German Ideology
with production. The social structure and the State are continually 
evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of 
individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people’s 
imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce 
materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, 
presuppositions and conditions independent of their will. 
[The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:]The ideas 
which these individuals form are ideas either about their relation to 
nature or about their mutual relations or about their own nature. 
It is evident that in all these cases their ideas are the conscious 
expression – real or illusory – of their real relations and activities, 
of their production, of their intercourse, of their social and political 
conduct. The opposite assumption is only possible if in addition to the 
spirit of the real, materially evolved individuals a separate spirit is 
presupposed. If the conscious expression of the real relations of these 
individuals is illusory, if in their imagination they turn reality upside-
down, then this in its turn is the result of their limited material mode 
of activity and their limited social relations arising from it. 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at 
first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material 
intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, 
the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct 
efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental 
production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, 
religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of 
their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are 
conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces 
and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest 
forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious 
existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in 
all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in 
a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their 
historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does 
from their physical life-process. 
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from 
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heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to 
say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor 
from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to 
arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on 
the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development 
of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The 
phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, 
sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically 
verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, 
metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms 
of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of 
independence. They have no history, no development; but men, 
developing their material production and their material intercourse, 
alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the 
products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, 
but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the 
starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the 
second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living 
individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as 
their consciousness. 
This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out 
from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. 
Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, 
but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development 
under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is 
described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with 
the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of 
imagined subjects, as with the idealists. 
Where speculation ends – in real life – there real, positive science 
begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical 
process of development of men. Empty talk about consciousness 
ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place. When reality is 
depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses 
its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by 
a summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which arise 
674  |  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels - from The German Ideology
from the observation of the historical development of men. Viewed 
apart from real history, these abstractions have in themselves no 
value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement 
of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata. 
But they by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, 
for neatly trimming the epochs of history. On the contrary, our 
difficulties begin only when we set about the observation and the 
arrangement – the real depiction – of our historical material, 
whether of a past epoch or of the present. The removal of these 
difficulties is governed by premises which it is quite impossible 
to state here, but which only the study of the actual life-process 
and the activity of the individuals of each epoch will make evident. 
We shall select here some of these abstractions, which we use in 
contradistinction to the ideologists, and shall illustrate them by 
historical examples. 
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Glossary 
“Of the Soul” ("De Anima") 
A treatise by Aristotle that, according to Thomas Kjeller 
Johansen, establishes him as the "father of psychology" and "the 
progenitor of faculty psychology, that is the attempt to account 
for the multitude of psychological phenomena by reference to a 
few permanent or inborn psychological capacities." 
double entente 
double significance 
je ne sçai quoi 
je ne sais quoi (i don't know what): an indescribable "something" 
that makes someone or something distinctive; usually refers to 
an appealing quality. 
sapere aude 
"have the courage to use your own reason"; Kant names this 
as the motto of the Enlightenment in his essay "What is 
Enlightenment?" (1784) 
Segnius irritant animos demissa per auresQuam quae sunt oculis 
subjecta fidelibus 
What is heard affects the mind more slowly than that which is 
seen. 
Verum index sui et falsi. 
truth indicates (shows, points in the direction of) both itself and 
falsehood 









νυν δε m’ eon μικρος τε και ασθενικός καιαδες 
Now he is a small and weak man 
νυν δε μ’αιων ολιγος τε και ουτιδανός και αεικες 






of the city 
αρετερ 
supplicator 
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δίφρων αεικελιών καταθείς ολίγην τη τράπεζαν 





Ἐπιχάρην εἶδονΜαραθῶνάδε βαδίζοντα 
I saw Epichares walking to Marathon 
Πηληιάδεω 
Son of Peleus 
φάγεταινα δ’χε μου σάρκας εσθίει ποδός 
the gangrene that feeds on the flesh of my foot 
δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν 
"by her righter breast (Iliad V 393)" -- translation and source 
comes from Richard Janko's translation of the Poetics (Hackett 
1987). 
πηαγεδαινα δ’ηε μου σαρκασ εστηιει ποδοσ 
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Addison 
Joseph Addison, essayist and founder (with Richard Steele) of 
The Spectator (1711-1712), a best-selling 18th-century daily 
periodical. 
Alcoran 
The Koran (Quran) 
alembic 
"An early apparatus used for distilling" ["alembic, n1"] Hegel is 




Andria is a play by Terence first produced in 166 BCE. 
Glycerium, the female character at the center of the story, is 
silent and unseen for the duration of the play. 
Ariosto 
Lodovico Ariosto, Italian poet best known for his epic poem 
Orlando Furioso (1516). 
Athalia 
Tragic drama, published as Athalie (1691) by Jean Racine, who is 
considered one of the great French playwrights. 
base and superstructure 
In traditional Marxist thought, the economic conditions of 
production, or the "base," gives rise to the "superstructure," or 
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political and ideological layer of society: schools, religion, laws, 
etc. 
Boccace 
Giovanni Boccaccio, follower of Petrarch. 
bonne mine a mauvais jeu 
putting a good face on a bad game 
Bunyan 
John Bunyan, minister and poet best known for the allegory The 
Pilgrim's Progress (1678). 
Burke 
Edmund Burke, British politician and writer (1729-1797) 
Byron 
George Gordon, Lord Byron, English Romantic poet (1788-1824) 
Callistic 
Concerned with beauty in general, from the Greek Kalliste 
(Καλλίστη), meaning "most beautiful." 
Cicero 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC), Roman statesman and 
orator, perhaps best known for his contributions to rhetorical 
theory and style. 
Clitia 
Clizia (1525), a play by Niccolò Machiavelli (Hume calls him 
"Machiavel"). Clizia, the woman at the center of the plot, never 
appears. 
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compact 
convention or accepted usage 
cultus 
Sometimes Hegel uses the word "cultus" to refer to the act 
of worship. Sometimes, he refers to the community of those 
who worship. In Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (Cornell UP, 
2001), Glenn Alexander Magee reminds us that Hegel explains 
the relationship between the cultus and God and the experience 
of cultus as "the eternal relationship, the eternal process [of 
knowing] in which the subject posits itself as identical with its 
essence" (Hegel, qtd. in Magee 225). 
Descartes 
Rene Descartes, a 17th century French philosopher who may be 
best known for his Discourse on Method (1637), where he made 
the philosophical proposition "I think, therefore I am (Cogito, 
ergo sum)." 
Deux ex Machina 
Literally, "god out of a machine." Aristotle refers to plays that 
conclude by having a god or goddess lowered on to the stage to 
resolve the plot, which would otherwise be unresolvable. 
dialectic 
The Hegelian dialectic is a three-step process that structures 
the relationship between opposing ideas or forces: 1) an idea 
(a thesis) gives rise to 2) a contradictory idea (an antithesis). 
The antithesis negates the thesis and, then, 3) the contradiction 
between the thesis and antithesis is resolved through a 
negation of the negation introduced by the antithesis. This 
second negation, though, is "determinate," meaning that the 
"nothing" is actually "something." It is a synthesis of the thesis 
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and antithesis. The antithesis is not just canceled out. It is 
canceled and preserved at the same time. It is from this 
moment of sublation (Aufhebung) that history (of 
consciousness, of logic, of social history, etc.) progresses 
toward Absolute Knowledge or the Ideal. 
Die Alten und die Neuen 
The Old and the New 
Don Quixote 
Novel by Miguel de Cervantes (Part One published in Spanish 
1605 and English 1612; Part Two published in Spanish 1615 and 
English 1620). 
ein kleines Kunstwerk 
a little work of art 
Epicurus 
Greek philosopher (341 BC-270 BC) during the Hellenistic 
period (a period that comes after Plato and Aristotle). 
Fenelon 
François Fénelon, French theologian and writer best known 
for The Adventures of Telemachus (1699), a prose treatise that 
presents political theory and moral guidelines through the tale 
of Telemachus, the son of Ulysses in Homer's Odyssey. 
fustian 
Pompous and overblown 
Goethe 
Johann Wolfang Von Goethe, German writer (1749-1832) 
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hébétés 
deprived of critical sense or in a stupor 
ideologies 
Ideology is a term used by Marx and Engels meaning the filter 
or lens through which we perceive the world. This lens (or 
lenses) distorts reality so that we do not see it accurately. 
Ideologies include morality, religion, and metaphysics. Marx 
and Engels believed the ideologies created in a capitalist system 
are inverted and hide the contradictions in society so that 
people cannot recognize them. The way to expose these 
contradictions is by dialectical analysis. 
imitation 
Aristotle uses the same word as Plato to explain literary 
representation (mimēsis). 
interfusion 
An important concept for Hegel, "interfusion" or 
interpenetration is the translation of Hegel's word 
Durchdringung. Here, it refers to the interpenetration of form 
and content. 
Joubert 
Joseph Joubert, French writer (1754-1824) 
la vieille politesse française 
social etiquette and style of French nobility prior to the rise of 
the bourgeoisie 
le monde parisien 
Parisian high society 
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Le style c'est l'homme 
You know a man through how he writes 
Legitimist 
Royalist; supportive of the Bourbon monarchy (antithetical to 
Engels's socialist principles) 
Machiavel 




John Milton, poet and political writer, best known for the verse 
epic Paradise Lost (1667) 
mode of production 
the forces that produce material conditions (tools, technology, 
labor, resources) and how material conditions are organized in 
ways that determine how people relate to one another and to 
production in general (the means of production) 
Mr. Hogarth 
William Hogarth, eighteenth-century painter best known for 
the widely-sold engravings of his satirical paintings (e.g. 
"Marriage A-la-Mode"). Here, Burke references Hogarth's 
treatise The Analysis Of Beauty (1753), Hogarth's book of 
aesthetic theory. In this book, Hogarth names the serpentine 
line (or S-shaped line) "the line of beauty." 
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Ogilby 
John Ogilby was a cartographer, printer, publisher, and poet. 
He translated and illustrated Homer's Iliad (1660) and Odyssey 
(1665). 
ouk an g’eramenos ton ekeinou elleboron 
This line is not complete but is translated as "Not if you desire 
his hellebore" on Internet Classics Archive's version of Butcher's 
translation. 
Ovid 
Roman poet, perhaps best known for his epic-length 
mythological narrative poem Metamorphoses (8 CE). 
passé 
gone 
passés, présents et a venir 
past, present, and future 
Petrarch 
Francesco Petrarch, Italian poet, known for his sonnet 
sequence La Canzoniere. In Canzoniere, Petrarch moves from 
lyrics about his unrequited love for Laura to penitent lyrics 
about his love for Christ. 
Physiognomy 
The face. Facial features were thought to embody aspects of a 
person's morality and character. 
Pindar 
Ancient Greek Poet (518-~438 BCE) 
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Polieucte 
Polyeucte (published 1643) is a tragic drama by Pierre Corneille, 
who is considered one of the great French playwrights. 
Privation 
absence or lack; some philosophers from Aristotle on viewed 
"privations" (darkness, silence, etc.) as the absence of what 
would naturally be present (light, sound, etc.). Burke seems to 




Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Swiss writer and philosopher (1712-1778) 
Sancho 
Sancho Panza, a character in Don Quixote. Sancho serves as 
squire to self-styled knight Don Quixote. The story Hume 
references here comes from Part 2, Chapter 13 of the novel. 
Shelley 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, English Romantic poet (1792-1822) 
Sophocles 
Ancient Greek dramatist, 496-406 BCE 
sublation 
The OED defines this term specifically in terms of Hegelian 
philosophy: Sublation is "the process by which the conflict 
between two opposed or contrasting things or ideas is resolved 
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by the emergence of a new idea, which both preserves and 
transcends them" ("sublation, n5"). [Chloe Groom] 
Tacitus 
Roman historian (about 55 CE-120 CE). 
Tendenzroman 
a novel with a purpose – a roman à these or social-problem 
novel 
Teneriffe 
A volcanic peak (possibly what is now called Mount Teide) on 
the island of Tenerife in the Canary Islands. 
Terence 
Roman comic playwright (c. 186-about 159 BC). 
Tristram Shandy's 
Tristram Shandy is the narrator of the fictional autobiography 
The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (1759-67) 
by Laurence Sterne (1713-1768). 
μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ 
“a single vision [ops] comes from both [eyes]" -- translation by 
Stephen Halliwell, Loeb Classic Library 199 (p. 109). Loeb notes 
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μοχθηρον καταθεσησ μικραν τη τραπεζα 
an unattractive and paltry table 
Virgil 
Roman author perhaps best remembered for the epic poem The 
Aeneid (19 BC). 
Voltaire 
French Enlightenment writer (1694-1778) 
Wolff 
Christian Wolff, eighteenth-century German Enlightenment 
philosopher 
Zolas 
A reference to Émile Zola, a novelist who was sympathetic to 
Socialism. 
GLOSSARY  |  693
